Andy Grove on Clipper
In between the helocopter coverage of OJ, which looked like outtakes from "Speed" in slo-mo, I happened to catch a repeat showing of the "Larry King Live" discussion with Al Gore, Andy Grove, the head of the FCC, and a journalist. The transcript was posted here, so I won't try to check on the details. Just my impressions, having worked with Grove. I say impressions because its important we understand how views come to be held, how strongly they are held, whether they can be changed, etc. In the case of Grove's comment that Clipper is just an extension into the digital real of existing wiretap "rights," I think I can see why he has this view--I don't agree with it, of course, but his view is probably the dominant view. Something we need to understand. To wit, * If asked whether digital transmission should "exempt" someone from wiretaps, most people would say "No, of course not." (There are subtle issues here, of course. More on this later.) * If asked a different question, about whether users should be compelled to use a government encryption and key escrow system, the answer for most Americans is different: "No, of course not." (Actually, same answer, different question.) If I were trying to convince Grove of the "Cypherpunks position," I would of course make these arguments about mandatory escrow, about the parallels to "diary escrow" (after all, cops can search papers with search warrants, so doesn't this mean that the digital age needs "diary and papers escrow"?) and other such travesties. I think it might take an hour of discussion, but eventually a light bulb would go off in his head and he'd see that the price paid with these "escrow" systems--especially if _mandatory_, as most of think is the real agenda--is simply too high for a nominally free society to put up with. (I had these hour-long debates with Grove, Moore, and Barrett when I was at Intel, and sometimes I won. Often I lost. I won't be having any opportunities to argue the Clipper issue with them, of course.) I'm citing this because it helps to explain the dichotomous reaction to Clipper. If the question about Clipper is phrased as an issue of privacy, do Americans have the right to keep conversations private, etc., then the answer is overwhelmingly (80%, as in Time-CNN poll) pro-privacy. If, however, the question is phrased in terms of "legitimate law enforcement needs" and whether suspected terrorists and pedophiles have a sacred right to use "fortress-like crypto," then I suspect the answer will shift in the other direction rather dramatically. With egg all over their face on Clipper, I see the Administration now launching a new campaign, a campaign being led by Donn Parker, Dorothy Denning, Andy Grove, and others. In this campaign, the second approach mentioned above will be dominant: a focus on pedophiles who "encrypt their list of victims," a focus on "terrorists who form virtual networks around the world," and a focus on "money launderers who use crypto anarchy to spread their poison." Their is little chance that we Cypherpunks will get the opportunity to make our case in the public...the hour it might take me to convince Grove, as an example, is about 59 minutes more than the "sound bite" any of us will be given. Is it hopeless? For public relations, probably yes. Fortunately, the power of strong crypto lies in its use. The leverage effect. As Phil Karn put it: "Don't get mad, get even. Write code." --Tim May -- .......................................................................... Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay@netcom.com | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero 408-688-5409 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power: 2^859433 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."
Tim writes:
With egg all over their face on Clipper, I see the Administration now launching a new campaign, a campaign being led by Donn Parker, Dorothy Denning, Andy Grove, and others. In this campaign, the second approach mentioned above will be dominant: a focus on pedophiles who "encrypt their list of victims," a focus on "terrorists who form virtual networks around the world," and a focus on "money launderers who use crypto anarchy to spread their poison."
This is beginning already. I haven't seen anything in the mainstream press lately on Cyberspace in which the word "pedophile" wasn't mentioned prominently. The enemy learned long ago that you can get the public up in arms about almost anything, as long as you package it as either a public safety or child protection issue. I don't think we have very much time left to save our precious encryption rights from Big Brother. Revoking rights is like frog boiling. As long as it is done slowly enough, it goes relatively unnoticed. Bill Clinton was talking yesterday about how no one complains any more about tight airport security and accepts it as a fact of life. Contrast this with the screams of outrage from the first few people forced to walk through metal detectors and have their baggage searched. Remember when civil forfeiture started? First only profits from illegal activities were seized. They quickly moved to seizing all of a suspects assets. Now cops can stop you on the road, empty your pockets, and take your money using only the justification that possession of more than a certain amount is evidence of wrongdoing. Look at the engineering of public attitudes on marijuana, underage erotica, and even smoking that have taken place over the last decade. Pretty soon the public will accept the notion that they must give up all their personal privacy in order to protect us from terrorists, drug dealers, and people with rarified sexual interests. Only incompetent opposing points of view on this issue are ever presented by the mainstream media. Give these people another year or two, and they will be telling us that mere possession of PGP abuses children in some ficticious and vicarious manner. Because the government is so powerful, and we are not, we have to avoid the pitfall of harping frivilous issues in a last desperate attempt to thwart the federal agenda. Attacks on Denning's character, the Clipper algorithm, and the LEAF field, while interesting, do nothing to help our cause. What will we do when the government presents us with an escrowed, publicly reviewed, unbreakable strong encryption algorithm which is mandatory? We need to concentrate on the basic issues here and state them clearly many times in language the public can understand. The public slap in the face our agenda received the other day on the crypto export issue should be proof enough that our enemies will accept nothing less than the total surrender of our right to personal privacy. It's time to stop being nice. When you go after the King, you shoot to kill. -- Mike Duvos $ PGP 2.6 Public Key available $ mpd@netcom.com $ via Finger. $
If you substitute the word "gun" for "crypto" most all of this applies to your second amendment rights as well. The plan seems to be to demonize and then ridicule the target group until the masses are convinced they are not worthy of rights. The best known case: Germany in the 30s and 40s. The new Jew=crypto user. Mike is exactly right when he states that every story in print or video or radio highlights the miniscule misuse of crypto and, of course, the Oprah generation eats it up. Now, they do not give the relative misuse of crypto, it must be huge or why would they report it as a problem, right? About like the horrendous number of crimes committed with so-called assault weapons, which on a bad day might approach 1%. Let us not forget RICO while we're at it, talking about seizing. clewton@netcom.com E-mail for PGP 2.x public key On Sat, 18 Jun 1994, Mike Duvos wrote:
Tim writes:
With egg all over their face on Clipper, I see the Administration now launching a new campaign, a campaign being led by Donn Parker, Dorothy Denning, Andy Grove, and others. In this campaign, the second approach mentioned above will be dominant: a focus on pedophiles who "encrypt their list of victims," a focus on "terrorists who form virtual networks around the world," and a focus on "money launderers who use crypto anarchy to spread their poison."
This is beginning already. I haven't seen anything in the mainstream press lately on Cyberspace in which the word "pedophile" wasn't mentioned prominently. The enemy learned long ago that you can get the public up in arms about almost anything, as long as you package it as either a public safety or child protection issue.
I don't think we have very much time left to save our precious encryption rights from Big Brother. Revoking rights is like frog boiling. As long as it is done slowly enough, it goes relatively unnoticed.
Bill Clinton was talking yesterday about how no one complains any more about tight airport security and accepts it as a fact of life. Contrast this with the screams of outrage from the first few people forced to walk through metal detectors and have their baggage searched.
Remember when civil forfeiture started? First only profits from illegal activities were seized. They quickly moved to seizing all of a suspects assets. Now cops can stop you on the road, empty your pockets, and take your money using only the justification that possession of more than a certain amount is evidence of wrongdoing.
Look at the engineering of public attitudes on marijuana, underage erotica, and even smoking that have taken place over the last decade.
Pretty soon the public will accept the notion that they must give up all their personal privacy in order to protect us from terrorists, drug dealers, and people with rarified sexual interests. Only incompetent opposing points of view on this issue are ever presented by the mainstream media. Give these people another year or two, and they will be telling us that mere possession of PGP abuses children in some ficticious and vicarious manner.
Because the government is so powerful, and we are not, we have to avoid the pitfall of harping frivilous issues in a last desperate attempt to thwart the federal agenda. Attacks on Denning's character, the Clipper algorithm, and the LEAF field, while interesting, do nothing to help our cause. What will we do when the government presents us with an escrowed, publicly reviewed, unbreakable strong encryption algorithm which is mandatory? We need to concentrate on the basic issues here and state them clearly many times in language the public can understand.
The public slap in the face our agenda received the other day on the crypto export issue should be proof enough that our enemies will accept nothing less than the total surrender of our right to personal privacy. It's time to stop being nice. When you go after the King, you shoot to kill.
-- Mike Duvos $ PGP 2.6 Public Key available $ mpd@netcom.com $ via Finger. $
I agree with what Mike Duvos says here: (other points I also agree with elided)
I don't think we have very much time left to save our precious encryption rights from Big Brother. Revoking rights is like frog boiling. As long as it is done slowly enough, it goes relatively unnoticed.
That's right. And the essay I just posted on "Corporations and Encryption" is apropos. If, for example, Cypherpunks go along with (or, worse, _advocate_) laws regulating crypto use in corporations, then this is part of turning up the temperature on the frog.
Remember when civil forfeiture started? First only profits from illegal activities were seized. They quickly moved to seizing all of a suspects assets. Now cops can stop you on the road, empty your pockets, and take your money using only the justification that possession of more than a certain amount is evidence of wrongdoing.
It's worth noting again for any newcomers in the last half year or so that Whit Diffie said at a Cypherpunks meeting that he think _civil forfeiture_ will be used to suppress noncomplying crypto: corporations will be told that only certain types of crypto are allowable, and noncomplying crypto will be grounds for forfeiture of corporate assets. ...
attempt to thwart the federal agenda. Attacks on Denning's character, the Clipper algorithm, and the LEAF field, while interesting, do nothing to help our cause. What will we do when the government presents us with an escrowed, publicly reviewed, unbreakable strong encryption algorithm which is mandatory? We need to concentrate on the basic issues here and state them clearly many times in language the public can understand.
I agree...the focus on the "weaknesses" of EES, rather than the deeply flawed ethical, Constitutional, and practical issues, is mistaken. But if folks want to put effort into this, fine. I don't. They can.
The public slap in the face our agenda received the other day on the crypto export issue should be proof enough that our enemies will accept nothing less than the total surrender of our right to personal privacy. It's time to stop being nice. When you go after the King, you shoot to kill.
I'm sure there are those scanning this list who view such metaphorical comments more literally, as a death threat against Bill Clinton and his minions. They have no appreciation of irony. Pushing strong crypto to the "tipping point," the point of no return, is within our grasp. --Tim May -- .......................................................................... Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay@netcom.com | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero 408-688-5409 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power: 2^859433 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."
The public slap in the face our agenda received the other day on the crypto export issue should be proof enough that our enemies will accept nothing less than the total surrender of our right to personal privacy. It's time to stop being nice. When you go after the King, you shoot to kill.
I'm sure there are those scanning this liFrom owner-cypherpunks Mon Jun 20 01:18:06 1994 Return-Path: <owner-cypherpunks> Received: by toad.com id AA11875; Mon, 20 Jun 94 01:18:06 PDT Received: from gw1.att.com by toad.com id AA11869; Mon, 20 Jun 94 01:18:00 PDT Received: from anchor.ho.att.com by ig1.att.att.com id AA11807; Mon, 20 Jun 94 04:17:35 EDT Received: by anchor.ho.att.com (bind.920909) id AA03886; Mon, 20 Jun 94 04:16:53 EDT Date: Mon, 20 Jun 94 04:16:53 EDT From: wcs@anchor.ho.att.com (bill.stewart@pleasantonca.ncr.com +1-510-484-6204) Message-Id: <9406200816.AA03886@anchor.ho.att.com> To: pfarrell@netcom.com Subject: Re: Hardware generators Cc: cypherpunks@toad.com Sender: owner-cypherpunks@toad.com Precedence: bulk
The problem with the serial port dongles are:
3) PCs typically don't have a spare serial port. 1) while parallel port dongles are known technology, making it work on a serial port is more problematical.
Only if you're trying to share the port with other functions, like, ummm, modems, which you'll probably want at about the same time you want your random number generator. But if you've got a spare slot to put a random number generator in, you could just as well put *it* in the spare slot, and save $20 or whatever the current price difference between internal and external modems is. Except for laptops, where slots are generally not available (except PCMCIA),
participants (4)
-
charles lewton -
khijol!erc -
mpd＠netcom.com -
tcmay＠netcom.com