December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Controlling the Internet
by nobody＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

[It shouldn't be too hard to figure out who "nobody" is:] Blanc writes... >I can't say that everything that billg does or makes arrangements for >with his clout will be defensible; I can point out that any >arrangements which he makes with others depends upon those individual's >consent, their agreeableness, and not to coercion or the elimination of >choice altogether. (I don't know all of the details of how the closing ... >The threat of a monopolization of power which (someone) mentioned >as being presented by Microsoft's dominance in the market is not of the >same type as is presented by the government's. From what I know about >"intellectual property", this concept is supposed to establish the >source of what has been produced (software) as belonging to its >creator, and therefore as something akin to an object or service which >can be traded and from which one can receive payment. It's a way to >make a living, in other words, based on the recognition of a value. I think we agree philosophically. Where we diverge is in our understanding of things-as-they-are. I contend that large companies, MS being one example, often enlist the government and its coercive powers in their service. One issue where I think I've seen MS's hand is "intellectual property". My concern about "intellectual property" is that MS and some others have changed the terms of the debate ["property" is protected more than "privilege"] and the law to further their own interests, to the detriment of the rest of us. >The only way that I can think of to counter the dominance of one >company in the free exchange of goods is to desist from the purchase of >that company's offerings, or better yet to produce better ones and make >a better case for them with the buying public. We need to reduce the power of government so that it cannot be enlisted in any company's service. That said, I am following your advice: With the exception of the ubiquitous DOS/Windows operating systems, I've gotten rid of every MS product on my machines. If OS/2 ever grows up [can handle a 14.4k faxmodem for example], I'll be MS free. -------------------------------------------------------------------- One example of why I'm ticked at SPA folks ... >Date: [Recently] >To: [Us] >From: [Them] >Comprehensive Computer Inspection >Beginning [Soon], [We] will conduct a comprehensive inspection ... >...[T]the sofware inventory and licensing compliance issue will be >emphasized. Each user should make certain that the report from the >latest sofware inventory list is up-to-date and is readily >available for the inspector. (...) >When confronted by potential inspectors... No "smart" remarks ... I'm tired of this shit. Now, imagine if SPA owned the internet....

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Government by Sysadmin
by fnerd＠smds.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Maybe people like Dot and Don think of government as a systems-administration sort of job. So here they are, security experts advising the sys admins on things like... setting permissions allocating quotas registering users and giving them passwords (we used to put the encrypted passwords in /etc/passwd, but now we put them in /etc/shadow, with no read permission, so they're safe) deciding what utilities are and aren't available deciding what software the users need, and installing it (grudgingly, based on who's yelling the loudest) setting up connections to other machines deciding who's allowed to log in from "foreign hosts" getting mail set up and running buying new hardware from vendors specifying the hardware to the vendors ... These are the things computer security experts advise on. Maybe hammer experts see things as nails. Only a country is not a host system owned and administered by the government, and citizens are not guests or users. Maybe we Unix mavens are partly at fault for propogating systems that are such good models for dictatorships. -fnerd quote me - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - blue pill, Pharm. a pill of blue mass, used as an alterative... alterative, adj. tending to alter... -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a aKxB8nktcBAeQHabQP/d7yhWgpGZBIoIqII8cY9nG55HYHgvt3niQCVAgUBLMs3K ui6XaCZmKH68fOWYYySKAzPkXyfYKnOlzsIjp2tPEot1Q5A3/n54PBKrUDN9tHVz 3Ch466q9EKUuDulTU6OLsilzmRvQJn0EJhzd4pht6hSnC1R3seYNhUYhoJViCcCG sRjLQs4iVVM= =9wqs -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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ARTICLE - Two Updates Make for Digital Signatures in Email
by Christopher Allen 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PRIVACY-ENHANCED MESSAGE----- Proc-Type: 4,MIC-CLEAR Content-Domain: RFC822 Originator-Certificate: MIICETCCAaYCBQJBAADUMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAgUAMGMxCzAJBgNVBAYTAlVTMSAw HgYDVQQKExdSU0EgRGF0YSBTZWN1cml0eSwgSW5jLjEyMDAGA1UECxMpVW5hZmZp bGlhdGVkIFVzZXIgQ2VydGlmaWNhdGlvbiBBdXRob3JpdHkwHhcNOTMxMDI2MDAw MDAwWhcNOTUxMDI2MjM1OTU5WjCBqjELMAkGA1UEBhMCVVMxEzARBgNVBBETCjk0 MTE0LTM2MTUxCzAJBgNVBAgTAkNBMRYwFAYDVQQHEw1TYW4gRnJhbmNpc2NvMUUw QwYDVQQJFDxjL28gQ29uc2Vuc3VzIERldmVsb3BtZW50IENvcnBvcmF0aW9uLCA0 MTA0LTI0dGggU3RyZWV0IKY0MTkxGjAYBgNVBAMTEUNocmlzdG9waGVyIEFsbGVu MFwwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADSwAwSAJBAMDg2GDo+1J5OQ+Sx6Ub3WkKzJkBV1f+ uognXb5tTNOdskyKKmMpNivX3yNW9yLNxdaMSU7/s8Nq5Oh3Y7KMunUCAwEAATAN BgkqhkiG9w0BAQIFAANWAAEnzrJ1IFNscUI4zJl7HjZIw4rR2Zmh7nJ0qVH55X72 DU8VP/TBdiEWbhfM1qMthQqmnTNYZ9aq7J1d54nRMbk0ccqSapmqknaKiWqdCXBj Qcxg88p= Issuer-Certificate: MIIB/jCCAWsCBQIFAAABMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAgUAMFwxCzAJBgNVBAYTAlVTMSAw HgYDVQQKExdSU0EgRGF0YSBTZWN1cml0eSwgSW5jLjErMCkGA1UECxMiQ29tbWVy Y2lhbCBDZXJ0aWZpY2F0aW9uIEF1dGhvcml0eTAeFw05MzA1MDEwMDAwMDBaFw05 ODA0MzAyMzU5NTlaMGMxCzAJBgNVBAYTAlVTMSAwHgYDVQQKExdSU0EgRGF0YSBT ZWN1cml0eSwgSW5jLjEyMDAGA1UECxMpVW5hZmZpbGlhdGVkIFVzZXIgQ2VydGlm aWNhdGlvbiBBdXRob3JpdHkwcDANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAANfADBcAlUxe5CmA5dy igi8ZWJpGJdctHi5wvnIVcG9aupi7+ym5hDyFtVLEeJy5U31xIHz/RSoRJvy0RiY LtSUOZWWlHol6aEzss1lEknAZNX1aluc+ia7NuvxAgMBAAEwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEC BQADfgBe/pia8Oo46rbZlEZE5S0JDsrqWRS5v2ia0D55lJHQqr5vLY0pJy4sSbcp 0r7ZihMMEEO4o8Mu5ZjM8F1ZfEXPy0mWaHPoVxvb13sXgo17Q9m2U58hvjI72U0m nyB7fXhsjlnFSm8PN0zaTx6RRv8dxvyC42V2mPz6xciQcw== MIC-Info: RSA-MD5,RSA, BVNiXNeTZzv5ChVt/OzLHOvgQ0XbSIW5GsUV/Da58fSVFcxc+OF2R6MMH3NxcWPu tlpZNMVi51vRzw0pLH2psg== Date: Wed, 23 Mar 1994 14:41:00 -0800 Subject: ARTICLE - Two Updates Make for Digital Signatures in Email From: Christopher Allen <consensus(a)netcom.com> Reply-To: Christopher Allen <consensus(a)netcom.com> Originator: Christopher Allen <consensus(a)netcom.com> Organization: Consensus Development Corporation, San Francisco, CA USA Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" X-Sender: consens(a)netcom.com X-Last-Updated: 1994/03/23 X-Text-Source: ftp://netcom7.netcom.com/pub/consensus/text/Two_Updates_Dig_Sig.txt X-HTML-Source: ftp://netcom7.netcom.com/pub/consensus/www/Two_Updates_Dig_Sig.html Summary: This article is about two recent software updates, RIPEM 1.2 and RSAREF 2.0, which are significanct to the progress of using digital signatures in electronic mail. Keywords: article, christopher allen, consensus development, ripem, ripem/sig, rsaref, digital, signature, electronic, mail, email, security, privacy, privacy enhanced mail, pem, export, decryption encryption, cryptography, authentication, rsa data security, pgp, pretty good privacy, software, license, patent TWO UPDATES MAKE FOR DIGITAL SIGNATURES IN EMAIL ================================================ by Christopher Allen <consensus(a)netcom.com> Copyright (c)1994 by Consensus Development Corporation--All Rights Reserved. See the end of this article for the full copyright notice. DIGITAL SIGNATURES - ------------------ One of the real up-and-coming uses of encryption technology is for applying digital ``signatures'' to various electronic documents. Such signatures are not forgeable and guarantee that a document originates with its author. If Dartmouth College had such a system in place recently, a message impersonating a faculty member announcing the cancellation of an exam might have been avoided. Digital signatures can also be used to detect viruses before infected files execute. Up to now, however, digitally signing documents has not been an easy task. The first hurdle has been an inability to export the technology overseas, making it virtually impossible to standardize on a signature method. Secondly, it has been difficult to license the technology patents involved. The use of a freeware software utility called Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) has caused some difficulties as well. Since PGP has already found its way overseas and has gained some popularity, in particular because US digital signature software has not been easily exportable. In the United States, many organizations are reluctant to use PGP because of its questionable patent status. In addition, its author, Phil Zimmermann, is under investigation for possible export violations. These problems have kept organizations from adopting PGP as a standard. Two recent announcements have significantly changed things. The first announcement is the release of two new versions of RIPEM, one called RIPEM, the other called RIPEM/SIG. RIPEM is a free version of the Internet Privacy Enhanced Mail (PEM) standard implemented by Mark Riordan of Michigan State University. RIPEM/SIG is a subset of RIPEM that allows users to digitally sign their e-mail documents but does not allow encryption or decryption. What is significant about this announcement is that Riordan--in cooperation with RSA Data Security, Inc--has received a ``commodities jurisdiction'' ruling which allows free and legal export of non-encrypting RIPEM/SIG outside of the US. This means both US and overseas users can now standardize on a single set of software, instead of only working with RIPEM inside the US and PGP outside. This release also addresses some of the complaints of PGP users: both RIPEM and RIPEM/SIG support a non-hierarchical trust model similar to PGP, and for US users the non-exportable version of RIPEM provides full triple-DES privacy. Even though the triple-DES RIPEM may not be exportable, Riordan is working with authors of independently developed PEM applications in other countries with the goal of 100% interoperability in a version 2.0 of RIPEM. Until that time, since RIPEM/SIG is free and exportable, users could send a non-US or Canadian user both RIPEM/SIG and the message to be authenticated. The second announcement is from RSA Data Security, Inc. for the 2.0 version of RSAREF. RSAREF is a source code cryptographic toolkit designed specifically for writing PEM applications as well other fundamental cryptographic and digital signature tools. In fact, RIPEM is based on the RSAREF source code. What is most significant about this new RSAREF is that RSA Data Security has changed its license to make RSAREF much more accessible to both corporations and commercial and non-commercial developers. Freeware products (i.e., software where no fee other than media or bandwidth cost is requested) can use the RSAREF toolkit provided that the public has access to the product's source code. Though a new license agreement has not been finalized, I've been told by RSA that they will grant a royalty-free license for shareware products for up to $10,000 worth of gross annual sales if the shareware source code is available and the developers do not charge more than $50 a copy. Even if you are a commercial developer, I know from personal experience that RSA can be quite reasonable about licensing. They want this base level of technology adopted as widely as possible--just make RSA a reasonable offer and I think they'll take it. RIPEM and RIPEM/SIG are also beneficiaries of this new RSAREF license, which means that US companies can have privacy and authentication free of hassles from patent holders and export cops. MORE ON RIPEM/SIG - ----------------- The press release on RIPEM/SIG from Mark Riordan <mrr(a)scss3.cl.msu.edu> is at: ftp://ripem.msu.edu/pub/crypt/ripem/ripemsig/posting If you are a US or Canadian citizen, you can request an account for access to the full non-exportable RIPEM. Information on how to get access is at: ftp://guest.mu5k2d55:@ripem.msu.edu//pub/crypt/GETTING_ACCESS The binary files for the exportable RIPEM/SIG can be found in the directory: ftp://ripem.msu.edu/pub/crypt/ripem/ripemsig/binaries/ RSAREF/SIG Files available today are: ftp://ripem.msu.edu/pub/crypt/ripem/ripemsig/binaries/ ripemsig-68030-macintosh-commandline-1.2a.sit.hqx ftp://ripem.msu.edu/pub/crypt/ripem/ripemsig/binaries/ ripemsig-80x86-dos-vanilla-1.2a.exe ftp://ripem.msu.edu/pub/crypt/ripem/ripemsig/binaries/ ripemsig-hppa-hpux9.01-1.2a ftp://ripem.msu.edu/pub/crypt/ripem/ripemsig/binaries/ ripemsig-ibm-rs6000-aix3.2-1.2a ftp://ripem.msu.edu/pub/crypt/ripem/ripemsig/binaries/ ripemsig-sparc-sunos4.1.1-1.2a There does not seem to be separate documentation for RIPEM/SIG yet, so I guess you have to use the documentation for RIPEM 1.2a: ftp://ripem.msu.edu/pub/crypt/ripem/ripem.man ftp://ripem.msu.edu/pub/crypt/ripem/ripemusr.doc ftp://ripem.msu.edu/pub/crypt/ripem/ripemusr.txt A current list of RIPEM public keys is at: ftp://ripem.msu.edu/pub/crypt/ripem/pubkeys.txt There is an electronic-mail users group list PEM-DEV for discussions related to the development and deployment of Privacy Enhanced Mail (PEM) systems. Contributions to the list should be sent to ``pem-dev(a)tis.com''. Administrivia, e.g., additions to or deletions from the list should be sent to ``pem-dev-request(a)tis.com''. The Internet Multicasting Service <carl(a)radio.com> is now beginning to stamp all of their text files with RSA/RIPEM digital signatures. You can find their public key through a finger request to town.hall.org. For examples of stamped files, look at: ftp://town.hall.org/edgar/docs/ MORE ON RSAREF 2.0 - ------------------ Remember, even though you can use RSAREF to create exportable, non-encryption based digital signature software, the source code to RSAREF is not exportable itself, as it can do encryption. It is only available to US and Canadian citizens. The press release on RSAREF from Jim Bidzos <jim(a)chirality.rsa.com> is at: ftp://rsa.com//pub/RIPEM_SIG_announce.txt Information on what RSAREF is all about and what are the license terms are located at: ftp://rsa.com/rsaref/info.reply ftp://rsa.com/rsaref/license.txt To get access to a time dependent directory (it changes every few minutes) you will need to read the document: ftp://rsa.com/rsaref/README If you agree to it's terms, take the directory mentioned there and substitute it for the checksum in the directory ``U.S.-only 7c04e6''. The compressed tar archive of RSAREF is at (remember to change the time dependent directory!): ftp://rsa.com/rsaref/dist/U.S.-only-7c04e6/rsaref.tar.Z The ZIP archive of RSAREF is at (remember to change the time dependent directory!): ftp://rsa.com/rsaref/dist/U.S.-only-7c04e6/rsaref.zip You can also get the RSAREF via email by reading the RSAREF license agreement and sending the following message to <rsaref-administrator(a)rsa.com> (If your electronic mail address is located in Canada, please also send RSA your full name and mailing address; they'll need it to complete a Department of State export declaration): I acknowledge that I have read the RSAREF Program License Agreement and understand and agree to be bound by its terms and conditions, including without limitation its restrictions on foreign reshipment of the Program and information related to the Program. The electronic mail address to which I am requesting that the program be transmitted is located in the United States of America or Canada and I am an United States citizen, a Canadian citizen, or a permanent resident of the United States. The RSAREF Program License Agreement is the complete and exclusive agreement between RSA Laboratories and me relating to the Program, and supersedes any proposal or prior agreement, oral or written, and any other communications between RSA Laboratories and me relating to the Program. RSA Laboratories maintains an electronic-mail users group <rsaref-users(a)rsa.com> for discussions on RSAREF applications, bug fixes, etc. To join the users group, send electronic mail to <rsaref-users-request(a)rsa.com>. AUTHOR'S BIOGRAPHY - ------------------ Christopher Allen is president of Consensus Development Corporation, a microcomputer software development & consulting firm specializing in groupware (defined as software to support collaboration and intentional group processes), including such related areas as hypertext, online documentation, document architecture, electronic publishing, group knowledge-base support tools, and creation and management of shared collaborative spaces. Christopher has been active in a number of other computer industry areas. He runs the Mac Developers Forum and Newton Development SIG on America Online, and a Mosaic/World-Wide-Web area on groupware and collaboration. Christopher has written for a number of industry books and publications, including MacWorld and the Macintosh Bible. He has been moderator and speaker at MacWorld Expo's and Mactivity's groupware sessions, and speaks as a panelist on the subject of Macintosh groupware at other industry conferences. He was chairman of MacHack '93, a conference for Macintosh programming gurus, is on the MacHack Planning Board, and is a senior associate at the Foresight Institute. COPYRIGHT NOTICE - ---------------- This article was written by Christopher Allen <consensus(a)netcom.com> and is Copyright (c)1994 by Consensus Development Corporation--All Rights Reserved. This article, in whole or in part, may be used and shared in accordance the fair-use provisions of international copyright law: You may print or reproduce this article for non-commercial, personal, or educational purposes only, provided that the article is not modified, and that the copyright notice and this notice appear in all copies; You may quote, mention, cite, refer to, point, or describe this article in books, products, online services, or other media-- but you may not reproduce in whole or in part without permission. In addition, Consensus Development Corporation grants you permission to redistribute this article in electronic form, provided that you first notify Consensus Development and that you receive no fees, in excess of of normal online charges, for access to this article. Archiving, redistribution, republication, or derivation of this article on other terms, in any medium, including but not limited to electronic, CD-ROM, database, or publication in print, requires the explicit written or digitally signed consent from Consensus Development Corporation. These requirements are not meant to be restrictive--we are quite willing to make our articles available even for commercial use, provided that permission is requested. If you have any questions about these terms, or would like information about licensing rights from Consensus Development Corporation, please contact us via telephone 415/647-6383, or email Christopher Allen <consensus(a)netcom.com>. - ------------------------------------------------------------------------ ..Christopher Allen Consensus Development Corporation.. ..<consensus(a)netcom.com> 4104-24th Street #419.. .. San Francisco, CA 94114-3615.. .. o415/647-6383 f415/647-6384.. ..Mosaic/World-Wide-Web Front Door: .. ..ftp://netcom7.netcom.com/pub/consensus/www/ConsensusFrontDoor.html .. -----END PRIVACY-ENHANCED MESSAGE----- Created with RIPEM Mac 0.8.5 b2

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tacky
by Black Unicorn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Anyone want to mail me some tacky tokens? -uni- (Dark)

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information question.
by basic＠altern.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hello, i have read your message. Perhaps it could interested me. I'm working in computer security and for my job i try to broke systems. Are those informations interesting for you . Sent me a mail at this adress. bye.

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Quiz du Jour
by mpd＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Which of the following will soon be illegal in the Netherlands? A. Euthanasia B. Pedophilia C. Encryption According to a new telecommunications bill which my Dutch friends tell me has an excellent chance of being passed, the correct answer is "C". Someone send these poor people a good Stego program. -- Mike Duvos $ PGP 2.3a Public Key available $ mpd(a)netcom.com $ via Finger. $

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List Dead lately???
by kelly＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Subject says it all no mail for days...

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Re: A possibility...
by gtoal＠an-teallach.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

:What I am thinking is to have one person encrypt using a RNG (noise). He :encrypts his message using the noise on one channel and then copies the noise :utilized on another channel. He then mixes the two channels to :create....noise. What you mean is generating a random one-time-pad, encrypting with that pad, and sending the pad to the recipient via secure means. I think it has been done before :-) If your idea of sending the 'random noise' is something electronic rather than a black bag, then all you've done is re-invent security through obscurity and your program is little more than hiding plaintext with a stego program. :On the other side the person must be expecting the noise and must know how to :seperate the signal. It seems that this leaves things open by having the :encryption key along with the message, but the message itself is just noise. :(i.e. the interloper must know of the signal, and know how to split it into :it's two components.) Oops. Sure sounds like you meant the security through obscurity option... :::::Comments? You design anything important for Microsoft then??? G

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PowerMac & PGP
by Harry Shapiro Hawk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

X-Reposting Policy: Don't redistribute without permission. Rev.1.0.1 I just got my 7100 PowerPC based PowerMac. So far I am using only 680x00 code and it is runnin just fine. Since there was some questions about where MacPGP would work on this platform, I just generated a key pair. It seems to work fine. I am including the pair and the pass phrase below. Don't use this for privacy :) Here is the pair: -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.3 mQBPAi2RHwoAAAECANiGZ0Qir9+KnQmGi2wIDQyh2E0jG1kclcBwonmct1II6bq1 I50thXufH/7HL/ISYT8iC//miy89RRKoKLcBkzkAEQEAAbQaUG93ZXJQR1A8aGFi c0B3YXJ3aWNrLmNvbT6JAJUCBRAtkR8kT2czE8MZ2cUBAVfRA/wN3Ozs89tjJgZ4 5dFB65eAQ2iVjGrDDQ3AUEQD4CBDQ1jMerXHKNnK5BsGmf2NIw9OGk4wbybDzKh0 Sk1JT+3TU0zqOE3PNf1lxdJrQvnenDw9fWxw/KDbxHFoxsFjpvKNNA1MIbWt2hR4 gOxjNHW3KSmFTtWlSOSXRTQg9/3axA== =tgZ6 -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- -----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE----- Version: 2.3 lQECAi2RHwoAAAECANiGZ0Qir9+KnQmGi2wIDQyh2E0jG1kclcBwonmct1II6bq1 I50thXufH/7HL/ISYT8iC//miy89RRKoKLcBkzkAEQEAAQFWWTx9RmAzxAH/YDTp P9s8+lIhguVPMgrI/L9AIqpYjZ9XDiZ94NfDX68k0/A+hTp7f4/J/jIUp21x+HV5 t1kNE+IfE/HifOH/HQEA9JmghV5dHv8eGH/VkgoRn+OrlN3sv0Ds+fHzUbqNWV4B AMlbeRZVsGNUfP/1qUaP4Yl+h2NGIuXPoa0r2wfY9IevAP7U8bCkPgi1Q5mDlG0e M1SKs6XfMObaSdwOB/6CJQljQ0/9tBpQb3dlclBHUDxoYWJzQHdhcndpY2suY29t Pg== =dokV -----END PGP MESSAGE----- The pass phrase is: powerPGP Harry Shapiro Hawk Manager of Computer Services Warwick Baker & Fiore habs(a)uucp.warwick.com

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Canon Color Copiers
by Harry Shapiro Hawk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

X-Reposting Policy: Don't redistribute without permission. Rev.1.0.1 Hi, With a friend, I conducted an experiment. We took two one dollar bills. We tried to copy each one on a Canon CLC 550 (aka Canon Color copier). The side with George Washington on it copied fine. The other side didn't. We adjusted the bills so we exposed only half of each bills; that is the top and bottom half and the right and left half. The bottom have copied while the top half didn't. The Left half copied (side with The Great Seal) while the right half didn't. We assumed then it was finding something located in the upper right half of the back of the dollar bill. When we attempted to isolate that part of the bill, it DID copy. Strange. Perhaps someone could look at a 1, 5, 10, 20 and 100 dollar bill and see if there is anything in common in the upper right half of the back of those bills. Interestingly, when we did isolate the upper right half even though it copied, it didn't copy cleanly. You might ask, "How good are the copies." My friend thought they were not great, while I thought they were pretty good. As we were leaving the copier and cleaning up after ourselves, the truth was revealed. My friend tried to pick up one of the "copied" dollars. My friend then remarked, "I guess it is not such a bad copy." /hawk Harry Shapiro Hawk Manager of Computer Services Warwick Baker & Fiore habs(a)uucp.warwick.com

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