December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: NSA and PGP rabblerousing
by markh＠wimsey.bc.ca 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Note that doubling the key size from 1024 to 2048 bits is also > probably a ruse, since it dramatically increases computation time (I > think). 1024 bits are a lot of bits as it is. On the other hand, with 1. the right algorithms for multiple precision arithmetic 2. a little assembler code for time critical sections 3. reasonable hardware (say an intel 486DX/33. Nothing 'state of the art') encryption, decryption, signing &c. with a 2048 bit modulus can be quite practical (or at least tolerable). But yes, it does increase computation time considerably, so one has to be a lot more careful about how one does things if RSA is still going to be practical. Can you afford to wait 15 seconds to sign a message? What is the time limit for us to consider RSA practical? Mark -- Mark Henderson markh(a)wimsey.bc.ca (personal account) RIPEM MD5OfPublicKey: F1F5F0C3984CBEAF3889ADAFA2437433 ViaCrypt PGP Key Fingerprint: 21 F6 AF 2B 6A 8A 0B E1 A1 2A 2A 06 4A D5 92 46 cryptography archive maintainer -- anon ftp -- wimsey.bc.ca:/pub/crypto

1 0

Ray Cromwell's New Remailer
by tcmay＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I'm surprised there hasn't been more mention of Ray Cromwell's new remailer proposal....it seems to have some featrues to increase robustness and security and to really be a step toward a "second-generation remailer." Having used Ray's software for the Extropians list (though I no longer get that list), I look forward to trying out this new system. The proof is in the pudding, I guess, so we'll all await the beta release of this new software. However, a few comments on what has been described so far might be helpful to Ray. --Tim May -- .......................................................................... Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)netcom.com | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero 408-688-5409 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power: 2^859433 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

1 0

la cypherpunks
by jpp＠markv.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I am in the 'la area' too, which makes us three. Perhaps we should hold a concurrent meeting here next month? I could host, but my house is in Arleta (in the SF valley). Eric, how hard is it to create cp-la(a)toad.com? Until, or unless, it is set up, I will operate jpp=lacp(a)markv.com as a mailing list. Mail to jpp=lacp=request@ markv.com to be added to the list. j' -- O I am Jay Prime Positive jpp(a)markv.com 1250 bit fingerprint B06229 = B8 95 E0 AF 9A A2 CD A5 89 C9 F0 FE B4 3A 2C 3F 524 bit fingerprint 2A915D = 8A 7C B9 F2 D5 46 4D ED 66 23 F1 71 DE FF 51 48 Public keys via `finger jpp(a)markv.com', or via email to pgp-public-keys(a)io.com Your feedback is welcome directly or via my symbol JPP on hex(a)sea.east.sun.com Resist the Clipper Chip, write "I oppose Clipper" to Clipper.petition(a)cpsr.org

4 3

cypherfolks in Toronto?
by Ed Carp 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hey! Any of you cypherfolks in Toronto? Anyone interested in getting together to swap cryptolies and stuff? :) Let me know... -- Ed

1 0

2 bad ideas
by catalyst-remailer＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Business Week, March 21, 1994, p.126 Editorials DON'T LET WASHINGTON PLAY 'I SPY' ON YOU Will the Information Superhighway enable the federal government to become a high-tech snoop on a scale undreamt of in George Orwell's worst nightmares? For those who believe in the Fourth Amendment's promise that citizens shall be "secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects," the latest rumblings are ominous. The Clinton Administration is pushing two bad ideas left over from President Bush: the Digital Telephony Initiative and the Escrowed Encryption Standard (EES), known by the code name "Clipper" (page 37). Take the telephone initiative. Under current law, the government can obtain phone records without a warrant and can even trace all local calls. The proposed legislation allows law enforcement and intelligence agencies to trace calls as they are made. Clipper is worse. The government is offering business a new system for encrypting computer data files, data transmissions, and voice telephone calls to protect it from hackers and industrial spies. But built into the encryption computer chip is a trapdoor called the Law Enforcement Access Field, which gives the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the National Security Agency a way to decode messages. Corporate reaction to Clipper is overwhelmingly hostile. First, Clipper requires a special chip, meaning that encryption cannot simply be written into new or existing programs. Second, the trapdoor would give the government enormous snooping power over corporate life. Wise citizens--corporate and individual--should heed Thomas Jefferson's advice to remain eternally vigilant against an overreaching government.

1 0

my letter to Newsweek
by Carl Ellison 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

(with practice, I get more succinct. With luck I'll get a lot more practice at this! :-) Have y'all written, too? - Carl >TO: Letters Editor, Newsweek >FAX: (212) 350-4120 > >SUBJECT: Mar 14, 94; p. 38; "Keeping the Cybercops Out of Cyberspace" > >Dear Editor: > >I consider myself a pragmatic critic and yet I propose scrapping any "key >escrow" system, Clipper included. It is too insecure, not just because of >government misconduct (although I am old enough to remember the Nixon >administration) but because it opens discovery of encryption keys up to >plain vanilla criminals. > >By creating a database of master keys (no matter how many pieces they are >in), what has previously required the mathematical genius and computer >budget of the NSA to crack is laid wide open to people whose only skills >are in bribery, breaking and entering, impersonation, coercion, ..., namely >those skills in which organized crime is presumably more expert than even >the CIA. > >Meanwhile, the talk about wiretap court orders is misleading. Encryption >will be needed by civilians in vast quantities not for wire communications >but for wireless (and cellular) communications for which no one needs a >court order to eavesdrop without fear of being detected. > >Thank you for your article and for considering these additional points. > >Sincerely, > >Carl M. Ellison

1 0

Re: Address correction
by Black Unicorn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-> The address given by Black Unicorn to mail to cspan was in error, my mail to cspanviewr(a)aol.org bounced. To rattle their cage, try cspanviewr(a)aol.COM. <- You will not that I merely forwarded the message. Sorry for any error, I didn't not feel it prudent to seek confirmation before posting.... (not=note) -uni- (Dark)

1 0

ALERT: Digital Telephony Public Hearings, DC, 2/17/94, 9:30am EST
by Stanton McCandlish 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

For immediate release - distribute widely, but quickly 02/18/94 - Congressional Hearings on FBI Digital Telephony proposal, Wash. DC WHERE & WHEN: On March 18, 1994 (TOMORROW), a joint Senate-House public hearing will be held on the FBI's Digital Telephony proposal. The hearing will be held at 10:30am EST (but staffers suggest you arrive one hour early to be assured of a seat), at room 226 of the Dirksen Senate Office Building, near Constitution & 1st Streets, NW (next door to the Hart Building). The hearing should last approximately 2 hours. Witnesses will include FBI Director Louis Freeh, Electronic Frontier Foundation Executive Director Jerry Berman, US Telephone Assoc. Pres. Roy Neel, and Plymouth Co. Mass. DA William O'Malley (also Pres. Nat'l. District Attorney Assoc.) The hearing was arranged by the Senate Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Technology and the Law, and the House Judiciary Committee's Civil and Constitutional Rights Subcommittee. The hearings will be chaired by Sen. Patrick Leahy, who also intends to hold hearings on the Administration's Clipper Chip scheme, and Rep. Don Edwards. WHAT YOU CAN DO Written comments may be submitted, before or after the hearing, to: Subcommittee on Technology and the Law Attn: Beryl Howell Senate Judiciary 815 Hart Senate Office Building Washington DC 20510 USA Note that such comments do not become part of the official record of the hearing, but are probably still important. Let your representatives in government know what YOU have to say. According to Senate Judiciary staff, such comments will be received, reviewed and considered before, during and after the hearings. Comments can also be faxed to the Senate Judiciary office: Beryl Howell, Technology and the Law Subcommittee +1 202 224 9516 (fax) More information is available from the Senate Judiciary office staff: +1 202 224 3406 (voice) BACKGROUND: The Clinton Administration is backing a proposal by law enforcement agencies that could make the entire communications infrastructure susceptible to surveillance. The Digital Telephony Proposal, reintroduced this year after being successfully thwarted last year, would require communications service providers to include "back doors" in their software through which "wiretapping" can be done. In addition, the proposal would give law enforcement officers access to records *about* communications, such as who you call, how long you talk, what online services you frequent, who you send email to and where: if it's something you do online, it is to be laid bare for inspection. Such traffic analysis can reveal vast amounts of information about you, and the potential privacy invasion is far more revealing than past techniques of traffic analysis. EFF is extremely concerned about this proposal and has prepared a detailed summary to explain it and the harm it could do. See: ftp://ftp.eff.org/pub/EFF/Policy/Digital_Telephony/digtel94_analysis.eff ftp://ftp.eff.org/pub/EFF/Policy/Digital_Telephony/digtel94.announce EFF has received a draft of the FBI's new, proposed "Digital Telephony" bill. After initial analysis, we strongly condemn the bill, which would require all common carriers to construct their networks to deliver to law enforcement agencies, in real-time, both the contents of all communications on their networks and the "signalling" or transactional information. In short, the bill lays the groundwork for turning the National Information Infrastructure into a nation-wide surveillance system, to be used by law enforcement with few technical or legal safeguards. This image is not hyperbole, but a real assessment of the power of the technology and inadequacy of current legal and technical privacy protections for users of communications networks. Although the FBI suggests that the bill is primarily designed to maintain status quo wiretap capability in the face of technological changes, in fact, it seeks vast new surveillance and monitoring tools. Among the new powers given to law enforcement are: * Real-time access to transactional information creates the ability to monitor individuals "live". * Access to communication and signalling information for any mobile communication, regardless of location allows tracking of an individual's movements. * Expanded access to electronic communications services, such as the Internet, online information services, and BBSs. * The power to shut down non-compliant networks Several documents, including the full text of the proposed bill and a more detailed section-by-section analysis are available via anonymous ftp on EFF's ftp site, as well as an archived copy of this announcement, and FBI Director Louis Freeh's Digital Telephony speech from late 1993. The documents can be located via ftp, gopher, or WWW, as follows: ftp://ftp.eff.org/pub/EFF/Policy/Digital_Telephony/digtel94_bill.draft ftp://ftp.eff.org/pub/EFF/Policy/Digital_Telephony/digtel94_analysis.eff ftp://ftp.eff.org/pub/EFF/Policy/Digital_Telephony/digtel94.announce ftp://ftp.eff.org/pub/EFF/Policy/Digital_Telephony/digtel93_freeh.speech gopher: substitute "gopher://gopher.eff.org/00/" for "ftp://ftp.eff.org/pub/" WWW: substitute "http://www.eff.org/" for "ftp://ftp.eff.org/" THE ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION 1001 G Street NW, Suite 950 E Washington DC 20001 USA +1 202 347 5400 (voice) +1 202 393 5509 (fax) +1 202 638 6120 (BBS) Internet queries: ask(a)eff.org General info: info(a)eff.org -- Stanton McCandlish * mech(a)eff.org * Electronic Frontier Found. OnlineActivist "In a Time/CNN poll of 1,000 Americans conducted last week by Yankelovich Partners, two-thirds said it was more important to protect the privacy of phone calls than to preserve the ability of police to conduct wiretaps. When informed about the Clipper Chip, 80% said they opposed it." - Philip Elmer-Dewitt, "Who Should Keep the Keys", TIME, Mar. 4 1994 -- Stanton McCandlish * mech(a)eff.org * Electronic Frontier Found. OnlineActivist "In a Time/CNN poll of 1,000 Americans conducted last week by Yankelovich Partners, two-thirds said it was more important to protect the privacy of phone calls than to preserve the ability of police to conduct wiretaps. When informed about the Clipper Chip, 80% said they opposed it." - Philip Elmer-Dewitt, "Who Should Keep the Keys", TIME, Mar. 14 1994

1 0

Re: la cypherpunks
by Jim Gillogly 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> tcmay(a)netcom.com (Timothy C. May) writes: > This is encouraging, that the LA area is talking about having a meeting. > So, mid-May? Sometime before the 16th would be good for me... otherwise how about a Maui meeting in the last half of the month? Jim Gillogly 25 Rethe S.R. 1994, 21:18

1 0

Re: Denning Presentation and Q&A at George Mason University
by Carl_Ellison＠vos.stratus.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>If cellular phones, baby monitors (!) and regular telephones used >Clipper-like technology, many citizen-to-citizen privacy worries would be >solved since ham radio and scanner operators would be unable to monitor >these transmissions. The same is true if all those transmitters used DES without key escrow -- and, if wireless and cellular phones were to decrypt when they came off the air, there would be no loss of FBI wiretap ability. Today I mailed a formal proposal to that effect (scrap Clipper; replace it with regular DES over the air and clear otherwise; reform the export laws) to NIST with cc: to DERD (at her suggestion). - Carl

1 0