"If you're against unreadable encryption, don't use it!"
It's probably time for us to remind the security services (over and over) that they're within their rights to pass rules like "if you have access to classified information, then you're required to include the info's owning agency as a recipient in every encrypted message you send (since PGP and RIPEM both allow multiple recipients and there's nothing to stop the Dept of Energy, the CIA, the NSA, etc., from generating PGP and RIPEM keys to be used for this purpose.) This might have a chilling effect on whistleblowers, but it should keep those agencies from claiming that PGP and RIPEM are a security threat via spies. - Carl Ellison cme@sw.stratus.com RIPEM MD5OfPublicKey: 39D9860686A9F075A9A83D49589C677A PGP 2.4 Key fingerprint = E0 41 4C 79 B5 AF 36 75 02 17 BC 1A 57 38 64 78
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Carl Ellison