December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

No Subject
by anonymous＠extropia.wimsey.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Subject: Any cypherpunks building encrypted phone? >I am working on that exact problem. It is not really that trivial. The >encryption has to handle a lot of data real time. I have a license >agreement for IDEA and am working on RSA. I am thinking of using triple >DES rather than IDEA because of the cost of the IDEA license. That seems reasonable to me. While there is some controversy in the community, I haven't heard anyone I respect say that 3DES is not reasonably secure (i.e, comparable to IDEA). But perhaps I've missed those comments! I think that even a straight DES phone would provide Pretty Good security, provided that it generated a new DES key for every call and swapped that key with the other phone via some type of public key encryption. Whether you use DES or 3DES, I suggest putting a button on the phone that force immediate generation and exchange of a new key. The truly paranoid can then press the button as often as they like. >How much would you pay for a good encrypted phone? At $100, I would probably buy one for myself and several more as gifts for friends I'd like to talk to who would be unlikely to buy them themselves. Above $100, I'd still be willing to buy my own, but there would have to be a significant user community for me to talk to. I suspect it will be difficult to persuade the average non-cypherpunk to pay >>$100 for an encrypted phone that hardly anyone has compatible equipment for. You know, we should really spend some time deciding what kind of exchange protocols would be appropriate here on the list. Wouldn't it be nice if all the various groups out there building hardware and software phones could talk to each other? If we can agree on a spec, this can happen. One other thought--the *TRULY* paranoid will want to build their own phones from a schematic, and they may not want to use custom chips that **might** have a backdoor in them. The ideal phone might be based on CPU's, RAM, and DSP's, with no DES chips or anything like that. Lady Ada

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No Subject
by anonymous＠extropia.wimsey.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Subject: Any cypherpunks building encrypted phone? >I am working on that exact problem. It is not really that trivial. The >encryption has to handle a lot of data real time. I have a license >agreement for IDEA and am working on RSA. I am thinking of using triple >DES rather than IDEA because of the cost of the IDEA license. That seems reasonable to me. While there is some controversy in the community, I haven't heard anyone I respect say that 3DES is not reasonably secure (i.e, comparable to IDEA). But perhaps I've missed those comments! I think that even a straight DES phone would provide Pretty Good security, provided that it generated a new DES key for every call and swapped that key with the other phone via some type of public key encryption. Whether you use DES or 3DES, I suggest putting a button on the phone that force immediate generation and exchange of a new key. The truly paranoid can then press the button as often as they like. >How much would you pay for a good encrypted phone? At $100, I would probably buy one for myself and several more as gifts for friends I'd like to talk to who would be unlikely to buy them themselves. Above $100, I'd still be willing to buy my own, but there would have to be a significant user community for me to talk to. I suspect it will be difficult to persuade the average non-cypherpunk to pay >>$100 for an encrypted phone that hardly anyone has compatible equipment for. You know, we should really spend some time deciding what kind of exchange protocols would be appropriate here on the list. Wouldn't it be nice if all the various groups out there building hardware and software phones could talk to each other? If we can agree on a spec, this can happen. One other thought--the *TRULY* paranoid will want to build their own phones from a schematic, and they may not want to use custom chips that **might** have a backdoor in them. The ideal phone might be based on CPU's, RAM, and DSP's, with no DES chips or anything like that. Lady Ada

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Secure HTTP, Mosaic
by VACCINIA＠UNCVX1.OIT.UNC.EDU 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Below is the information NCSA/EIT sent me about S-HTTP, you can skip the press release at the end if you have already read it. It was posted to the list a short while ago. Vaccinia(a)UNCVX1.oit.unc.edu Thank you for your inquiry regarding Secure HTTP. This message provides some details on the protocol and the status of its implementation. The April 12th joint EIT/NCSA/RSA press release regarding Secure Mosaic is included at the end of the message. OVERVIEW OF S-HTTP We have developed a new protocol for dealing with a wide range of cryptographic modes and algorithms in the context of the World-Wide Web, based on the Web's existing HyperText Transfer Protocol (HTTP). We call this protocol "Secure HTTP" or "S-HTTP". This protocol has been designed to enable incorporation of various cryptographic message format standards into Web clients and servers, including, but not limited to PKCS-7, PEM, and PGP. S-HTTP supports interoperation among a variety of implementations, and is backwards compatible with HTTP. S-HTTP aware clients can talk to S-HTTP oblivious servers and vice-versa, although such transactions obviously would not use S-HTTP security features. IMPLEMENTATIONS AND LICENSING EIT will make available freely usable source code for implementing S-HTTP in both clients and servers. These reference implementations of "Secure NCSA Mosaic" and "Secure NCSA HTTPD" will support two crypto engine implementations: via an integrated TIPEM library (offering PKCS-7 support) and via an "outboard" RIPEM application. RSA has agreed to permit the distribution of their TIPEM library, in binary form, without charge in conjunction with the non-commercial distribution of NCSA Mosaic. Implementors of non-commercial clients or servers may wish to use the already available RIPEM system (which is itself based on RSA's RSAREF library). Commercial implementors or distributors of WWW clients and servers are encouraged to pursue licencing arrangements with RSA or their licencees. FEATURES OF S-HTTP S-HTTP does not require client-side public key certificates (or public keys), supporting a symmetric session key operation mode. This is significant because it means that secure, spontaneous transactions can occur without requiring individual users to have an established public key. While S-HTTP will be able to take advantage of a ubiquitious certification infrastructure, its deployment does not require it. S-HTTP supports end-to-end secure transactions, in contrast with current usage of the existing HTTP authorization protocol which requires the client to attempt access and be denied before the security mechanism is employed. Clients may be "primed" to initiate a secure transaction (typically using information supplied in an HTML anchor); this is used to support encryption of fill-out forms, for example. In S-HTTP, no sensitive data need ever be sent over the network in the clear. S-HTTP provides full flexibility of cryptographic algorithms, modes and parameters. Option negotiation is used to allow clients and servers to agree on transaction modes (should the the request be signed? encrypted? both? what about the reply?); cryptographic algorithms (RSA vs. DSA for signing, DES vs. RC4 for encrypting, etc.); and certificate selection (please sign with your "Mastercard certificate"). ABOUT PKCS-7 PKCS-7 is a cryptographic message syntax standard developed by a consortium of companies lead by RSA. PKCS-7 is compatible with the Internet standards for Privacy Enhanced Mail (PEM) in that signed-data and signed-and-enveloped-data content, constructed in a PEM-compatible mode, can be converted into PEM messages without any cryptographic operations. PEM messages can similarly be converted into the PKCS-7 signed-data and signed-and-enveloped-data content types. In other words, PKCS-7 and PEM implementations can interoperate. PKCS-7 has the following advantages: a) PKCS-7 permits transport of 8-bit data (contrast with PEM, which requires Base-64 encoding). b) PKCS-7 can have a signature-less mode of operation. This permits secure messages to be sent from senders who do not have RSA key pairs. Signature is mandatory under PEM. c) PKCS-7 permits more flexibility in certificate format and trust models. d) PKCS-7 is explicitly designed for algorithmic flexibility. New cryptosystems, message digest algorithms and signature schemes can be added just by defining new types. SCHEDULE An "alpha quality" implementation of Secure Mosaic and HTTPD was demonstrated in public on April 12th. The protocol document is to be sent for external review (to RSA, NCSA and TIS) at the end of April. After revision, we plan to submit it as an "experimental protocol" RFC -- by late May, we expect. The reference implementation will be supplied to beta testers (to the protocol reviewers, and selected CommerceNet sponsors). Public release (to CommerceNet participants) is scheduled for September. CommerceNet will operate a certification authority, suitable for operators of S-HTTP servers (open to CommerceNet participants), beginning at that time. We expect that NCSA will make the reference implementation available to the Internet community soon after. Periodic progress reports will be reported to Internet mailing lists (such as PEM-DEV), and available on the EIT and CommerceNet Web servers (URL's http://www.commerce.net/ and http://www.eit.com/) ORIGINAL PRESS RELEASE Secure NCSA Mosaic Establishes Necessary Framework for Electronic Commerce on the Internet PALO ALTO, Calif., April 12, 1994 -- Enterprise Integration Technologies (EIT), the National Center for Supercomputing Applications (NCSA) at the University of Illinois and RSA Data Security today announced agreements to jointly develop and distribute a secure version of NCSA Mosaic, the popular point-and-click interface that enables easy access to thousands of multimedia information services on the Internet. The announcement was made in conjunction with the launch of CommerceNet, a large-scale market trial of electronic commerce on the Internet. Under the agreements, EIT will integrate its Secure-HTTP software with public key cryptography from RSA into NCSA Mosaic Clients and World Wide Web (WWW) servers. WWW is a general-purpose architecture for information retrieval comprised of thousands of computers and servers that is available to anyone on Internet. The enhancements will then be made available to NCSA for widespread public distribution and commercial licensing. Jay M. Tenenbaum, chief executive officer of EIT, believes secure NCSA Mosaic will help unleash the commercial potential of the Internet by enabling buyers and sellers to meet spontaneously and transact business. "While NCSA Mosaic makes it possible to browse multimedia catalogs, view product videos, and fill out order forms, there is currently no commercially safe way to consummate a sale," said Tenenbaum. "With public key cryptography, however, one can authenticate the identity of trading partners so that access to sensitive information can be properly accounted for." This secure version of NCSA Mosaic allows users to affix digital signatures which cannot be repudiated and time stamps to contracts so that they become legally binding and auditable. In addition, sensitive information such as credit card numbers and bid amounts can be securely exchanged under encryption. Together, these capabilities provide the foundation for a broad range of financial services, including the network equivalents of credit and debit cards, letters of credit and checks. In short, such secure WWW software enables all users to safely transact day-to-day business involving even their most valuable information on the Internet. According to Joseph Hardin, director of the NCSA group that developed NCSA Mosaic, over 50,000 copies of the interface software are being downloaded monthly from NCSA's public server -- with over 300,000 copies to date. Moreover, five companies have signed license agreements with NCSA and announced plans to release commercial products based on NCSA Mosaic. "This large and rapidly growing installed base represents a vast, untapped marketplace," says Hardin. The availability of a secure version of NCSA Mosaic establishes a valid framework for companies to immediately begin large-scale commerce on the Internet." Jim Bidzos, president of RSA, sees the agreement as the beginning of a new era in electronic commerce, where companies routinely transact business over public networks. "RSA is proud to provide the enabling public key software technology and will make it available on a royalty-free basis for inclusion in NCSA's public distribution of NCSA Mosaic," said Bidzos. RSA and EIT will work together to develop attractive licensing programs for commercial use of public key technology in WWW servers." At the CommerceNet launch, Allan M. Schiffman, chief technical officer of EIT, demonstrated a working prototype of secure NCSA Mosaic, along with a companion product that provides for a secure WWW server. The prototype was implemented using RSA's TIPEM toolkit. "In integrating public key cryptography into NCSA Mosaic, we took great pains to hide the intricacies and preserve the simplicity and intuitive nature of NCSA Mosaic," explained Schiffman. Any user that is familiar with NCSA Mosaic should be able to understand and use the software's new security features. Immediately to the left of NCSA's familiar spinning globe icon, a second icon has been inserted that is designed to resemble a piece of yellow paper. When a document is signed, a red seal appears at the bottom of the paper, which the user can click on to see the public key certificates of the signer and issuing agencies. When an arriving document is encrypted, the paper folds into a closed envelope, signifying that its information is hidden from prying eyes. When the user fills out a form containing sensitive information, there is a 'secure send' button that will encrypt it prior to transmission. Distribution of Public Keys To effectively employ public-key cryptography, an infrastructure must be created to certify and standardize the usage of public key certificates. CommerceNet will certify public keys on behalf of member companies, and will also authorize third parties such as banks, public agencies, industry consortia to issue keys. Such keys will often serve as credentials, for example, identifying someone as a customer of a bank, with a guaranteed credit line. Significantly, all of the transactions involved in doing routine purchases from a catalog can be accomplished without requiring buyers to obtain public keys. Using only the server's public key, the buyer can authenticate the identity of the seller, and transmit credit card information securely by encrypting it under the seller's public key. Because there are far fewer servers than clients, public key administration issues are greatly simplified. Easy Access to Strong Security To successfully combine simplicity of operation and key administration functions with a high level of security that can be accessible to even non-sophisticated users, significant changes were necessary for existing WWW security protocols. EIT developed a new protocol called Secure-HTTP for dealing with a full range of modern cryptographic algorithms and systems in the Web. Secure-HTTP enables incorporation of a variety of cryptographic standards, including, but not limited to, RSA's PKCS-7, and Internet Privacy Enhanced Mail (PEM), and supports maximal interoperation between clients and servers using different cryptographic algorithms. Cryptosystem and signature system interoperation is particularly useful between U.S. residents and non-U.S. residents, where the non-U.S. residents may have to use weaker 40-bit keys in conjunction with RSA's RC2 (TM) and RC4 (TM) variable keysize ciphers. EIT intends to publish Secure-HTTP as an Internet standard, and work with others in the WWW community to create a standard that will encourage using the Web for a wide variety of commercial transactions. Availability EIT will make Secure NCSA Mosaic software available at no charge to CommerceNet members in September and NCSA will incorporate these secure features in future NCSA Mosaic releases. Enterprise Integration Technologies Corp., of Palo Alto, Calif., (EIT) is an R&D and consulting organization, developing software and services that help companies do business on the Internet. EIT is also project manager of CommerceNet. The National Center for Supercomputer Applications (NCSA), developer of the Mosaic hypermedia browser based at the University of Illinois in Champaign, Ill., is pursuing a wide variety of software projects aimed at making the Internet more useful and easier to use. RSA Data Security, Inc., Redwood City, Calif., invented Public Key Cryptography and performs basic research and development in the cryptographic sciences. RSA markets software that facilitates the integration of their technology into applications. Information on Secure NCSA Mosaic can be obtained by sending e-mail to shttp-info(a)eit.com. Press Contact: Nancy Teater Hamilton Communications Phone: (415) 321-0252 Fax: (415) 327-4660 Internet: nrt(a)hamilton.com

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Sudaplatov book, McNeil-Lehrer TONIGHT (Monday)
by tcmay＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

It may be too late for the East Coasters, but tonight's McNeil-Lehrer Newshour devotes 30 minutes to the just-released book, "Special Tasks," by Sudaplatov. Sudaplatov was effectively head of SMERSH, which many people think was Ian Fleming's fabrication...it was real, meaining "Death to Spies." Soviet MVD Counterintelligence. His actual title was head of Special Tasks, responsible for spy rings in the U.S. and Germany, assassination of people, etc. Important stuff! Revelations about Oppeheimer, Fermi, Bohr, and Gamov giving assistance to the Soviets, about the death of Trotsky, and about the sabotage of U.S. military bases. I happened to be reading the book today in a local bookshop, and when I got hope Harry Bartholomew, of our list, had left a message alerting me to the McNeil-Lehrer report. Check it out tonight, if you can. Consult your local listings. Many stations air it at 10, others at 11 (the late airings, that is). --Tim May -- .......................................................................... Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)netcom.com | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero 408-688-5409 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power: 2^859433 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Clipper == _chosen_ plaintext attack on cypherpunks?
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In <94Mar30.211225edt.12125(a)cannon.ecf.toronto.edu>, SINCLAIR DOUGLAS N <sinclai(a)ecf.toronto.edu> wrote, in reply to Bill Stewart: > > The proposed standards I've seen on the net say you can't encrypt > > *after* using Clipper, because that makes Clipper key-theft useless. > > On the other hand, encryption with real systems before encrypting with > > Clipper is undetectable until after they decrypt the Clipper, so it's > > hard to enforce except on people who are already suspects, > > and is unlikely to be convenient to implement (for interoperability) > > on some of the major Clipper targets, like cellphones and fax machines. > > Makes sense, doesn't it? When the whitehouse guy said that encryption > below clipper was legal but not above, we thought he was confused. However, > we ACKed it with an NSA employee, and he confirmed it. His reasoning went > like this: encryption below clipper can't be stopped, since one can just > splice a cryptdec into the phone line. Encryption on top of clipper is > impossible since the clipper phone will only accept audio input. No > word on how that would effect clipper modems. This explanation struck me as phony. No NSA employee would be so naive as to actually believe that "Encryption on top of clipper is impossible since the clipper phone will only accept audio input" and clearly the NSA had thought about how easy it would be to "splice a cryptdec". Then it struck me what Clipper/LEAF really does, it provides plaintext for a _chosen_ plaintext attack on other cryptosystems. Most of us tend to ignore chosen-plaintext attacks as being too impractical. How would we ever be able to get the adversary to send lots of plaintext of our (not his) chosing, we wonder. Now suppose that No Such Agency is really years ahead of the rest of the world in exploiting chosen plaintext to break all kinds of stuff, including (say) DES. They've unleashed DES upon the world, and now they're sort of regretting it. If only they could get us crypto-weenies ^H^H^H^H^H^H^H^H^H cypherpunks to send a few thousand choice pieces of chosen plaintext. Hmmmm. How could they do that? Final question: Am I the last person on this list to have thought of this, (namely, clipper as a chosen plaintext attack on other cryptosystems)?

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Lay Chilly Jones
by Jeff Davis 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- From: Wayne Q Jones <qjones(a)infi.net> Subject: re: Sgt Russell To: SGT=DARREN=S.=HARLOW%ISB%MCTSSA(a)nwsfallbrook3.nwac.sea06.navy.mil >Quantico, CIA funny farm....oh and FBI too...sorry many LURPS around now?? Jesus Christ Jones- get off Darren's back. Cyberspace is spook central. Learn how to live with it. If you don't get your head together, you'll go off the deep end like Detweiler. This is hard ball with the big boys. If you're not up to the game, take a break. And Darren, that's what you get for living in California. I quit using CA driver's licenses when they went to the strip. As I said via private email, welcome aboard. I don't care what you do. You're a participant in the common lot of humankind, as are we all. Carry on cypherpunks. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLbORO1/ScHuGXWgVAQE3KAP+JyxHkNO7jSkKHbvTittb0z5fokyUNEi9 scQw4YMhTmydlE66joeJjRsWsHrQuN/hBVDRgEQwQBpdjCTY2wvD+HJeucTeBA8H +LWTxn5KhsBCe6RifVIHKPRA/FfnSfrj3hmyEi7hAU0fEFISjtKZgQ/rEiEvfE+z A3GWd9eU5Bc= =uJnZ -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -- PGP PUBLIC KEY via finger! JAFEFFM Speaking & Thinking For Myself! * eagle(a)deeptht.armory.com email info(a)eff.org * *** O U T L A W S On The E L E C T R O N I C F R O N T I E R **** ***** Committed to Free Public Internet Access for World Peace *****

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British child porn used steganography (forwarded msg)
by greg＠ideath.goldenbear.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Forwarded message (from Cyberia-L, law/computers discussion list): > Date: Mon, 18 Apr 1994 14:48:45 -0400 > Message-Id: <9404181818.AA23764(a)mail.wm.edu> > From: efn!ideath!uunet!mail.wm.edu!thardy (Trotter Hardy) > Subject: Secret porn in .EXE files > An e-mail acquaintance of mine in the U.K., Phillip Boyd, has > related to me that someone in England has been arrested for the > distribution of pornographic materials. Apparently the > "materials" are secreted within a DOS .exe file in such a way > that the file can still run normally as a program, but those who > know how, can decipher the pornographic contents. > Here is Phillip's description: > ------------------------------------------------------------ > A research assistant at the University of Birmingham has just > been arrested for distributing Child Pornography through the > Internet: apparently wrapped up in innocuous .exe files which > really work and do something else if you don't know what they > are. The general view is that such distribution is pretty > well unstoppable. > Apparently it was the FBI who found him out and reported to > West Midlands Police here. He was a research assistant in > the Department of Metallurgy. No further details, it will > probably be months before he comes to trial. > ----------------------------------------------------------- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLbOV/n3YhjZY3fMNAQF8AAQAlVVuIT614fgE1Iphy1xWBuMkF9uGlHp4 r+Uga6lVH40wR4XPKFgCmdsQaYj9EfFuQFaM2jFVGWlQaqix59hu10TnOQbPJYC6 XQtLNSVwuHylNSnotXl9Ta3CCOmRJj8o0sAoPpioWeD2LZO97l9DlKRgLeGUVbmJ t6wBAQHaGQY= =V3OC -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Magnetic Strip Accidents
by Jeff Davis 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- From: Thomas Riggley <jester(a)grex.cyberspace.org> >Is this true? I am a NY state resident. I am under the impression that >altering either the bar code or the mag strip on the back of my license >would be as illegal as say changing the picture (Not that this is possible As Barlow told me during an unrelated incident, "Christ, *shit* happens, eh?" One of the main reasons I don't live in NY or CA is they have so many laws. If you can't find a way around the system, or to slip through the cracks, you'll just have to goose-step along to the bitter end. If the internet becomes the surveillance system the intelligence communities envision, there may be a law against sitting on the toilet sideways and a means to enforce it. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLbOijl/ScHuGXWgVAQEyGAP/XKNFu2rBDwz7l1/r+yeTW6nDhpGTyRA6 i8hBCnPHkxUP09aZT4EZcwBZOVPlyBDYDbkynPcP0yC3KRQ3Q/P+vjvfmdqfOP9u CqQaWC1UepRXpbuX2MYgkLg9f+4xa8xy3Fh9vbVGyhxySZtAWj9KAx85eQuaOOfa MUIghXkRPjI= =1QzN -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -- PGP PUBLIC KEY via finger! JAFEFFM Speaking & Thinking For Myself! * eagle(a)deeptht.armory.com email info(a)eff.org * *** O U T L A W S On The E L E C T R O N I C F R O N T I E R **** ***** Committed to Free Public Internet Access for World Peace *****

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Money Laundering thru roulette
by rees＠cs.bu.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In the book I mentioned earlier, "Th Eudamonic Pie", it mentions a scheme by which a person can always break even while playing roulette. Seems to me that this is exactly what is asked for. If anyone wants it, I'll type in the appropriate portion and send it to the list. --Dave

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how do i do this with pgp?
by Erich von Hollander 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

i'm writing a lot of perl scripts that need to interact with pgp. however, i have not found an easy way of getting a passphrase to pgp from a script. i realize of course that this is for security; pgp only wants things typed in from a keyboard. however, there are plenty of times when automated processing is desired, and security of the key does not need to be perfect. in these cases, the only way (it seems to me) to get pgp to work is to setenv PGPPASS, which is really terrible security. is there a better way to do this? will there be some easier way in future versions of pgp, like being able to read the passphrase from stdin? e

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