December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

PC Week article
by Giuseppe Cimmino 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Copyright (c) PC Week - Reproduced without permission Volume 11, Number 10 - March 14, 1994 Jim Seymour's column The Corporate Micro Businesses would be Clipper victims, too This Clipper-chip stuff is getting out of hand. A manifestly bad idea that seemed likely to sink of its own weight has taken on a life of its own as government officials offer ever more specious arguments for its desirability. Many corporate computing managers tell me they haven't thought about Clipper much, because they aren't interested in politics. That's naive. Ignore this one at your own - and at your company's - very substantial risk. In case you've been on Mars for the past few months, the Clinton administration is pushing for adoption of a data-encryption standard using an embedded chip in every piece of communications equipment. Decryption by any entity other than the intended recipient of the data would be impossible - except by the government, under strict limitations: The necessary keys would be held in trust by a government agency, which would deliver them to a law enforcement agency only after issuance of a court order based on probable cause. The government expects that by requiring Clipper chips in every piece of communications equipment it buys, Clipper chips will become ubiquitous. There is also talk about barring data that is not encrypted by the Clipper standard from any national information superhighway, further assuring its universal use. Uncle Sam assures us this is the best ever data-security system and that we have nothing to worry about from government snooping which just wouldn't happen. This whole proposition is so ludicrous that it seemed unlikely to make it to the congressional hearings on a new telecom act. But it did, and now our servants in Washington are considering making this the law of the land. Which has led to the spectacle of FBI Director George Orwell - oops, make that Louis Freech - saying that Americans should be willing to give up some of their freedoms to become more secure. What's next, Lou, viewscreens in every room? Organizations from Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility to Wired magazine are sponsoring petitions and letter-writing campaigns to try to end this craziness. You can't get on the Internet these days without being asked to sign a petition. All that is well and good; the personal-privacy arguments are powerful and appropriate. But in the flag-waiving over potential government snooping, we're missing a compelling business argument against the Clipper standard. If the image of Uncle Sam as a snoop doesn't move you to action, maybe this one will. Say Clipper becomes the standard and your company's electronic communication is Clipperized. How secure from interception and decoding by competitors do you think your data will be? Beyond the press-release smoke about how limited access to Clipper decryption keys will be, the fact is that ordinary people will be responsible for safeguarding them. And people can be bribed, and can take impetuous and spiteful actions. It's not a question of whether a scandal will erupt when critical and highly confidential corporate information is invaded - only how long it will be before that happens. You and I break our backs devising super-secure communications systems. Our livelihoods depend upon our expertise and commitment to that goal. Do you really want to undermine that work and commitment with this kind of insane back-door risk? Jim Seymour can be reached via MCI Mail at 336-5687.

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Re: CIA@funet.fi ?
by Graham Toal 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

: From: paulj(a)xs4all.hacktic.nl (Paul Jongsma) : Well don't think the funet.fi one is a CIA setup, but i know for sure that : anon(a)hacktic.nl isn't..... The trouble with the cypherpunk remailers is there isn't a single one of them I'd trust. The overwhelming credo of the sort of person I've met in this area is that they want extreme absolute privacy for *themselves* but sneak and spy on everything they possibly can about everyone else. (Oops - that sounds bad - I don't specifically mean the people who run cypherpunk remailers; I mean people who're obsessive about secrecy in general and hackers in particular. Secretive hackers being the worst.) And you can take it as read that every remailer will be logged by the Black Hats too. Only double-blinded *encrypted* remailing is going to have any chance of maintaining secrecy, and then only if you go out of your way to explicitly chain round dozens of remailers in the hope of finding *one* that isn't compromised. (And that, only if all the remailers are regularly spoofing traffic between themselves to foil traffic analysis) G

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Re: PowerMacPGP
by Derek Atkins 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded with permission. ;-) FYI: I saw a Power PC yesterday, and asked about running standard Mac Apps, and was told it would do it, but not get the Power PC speedups... -derek ------- Forwarded Message Date: Mon, 14 Mar 1994 17:10:42 -0800 Message-Id: <199403150110.RAA26805(a)mail.netcom.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 To: Derek Atkins <warlord(a)MIT.EDU> From: plaz(a)netcom.com (Plaz) Subject: Re: PowerMacPGP Derek Atkins <warlord(a)MIT.EDU> replies to someone. >> Does anyone know if Mr. Zimmerman or anyone else will be writing a >> Power Macint -osh PGP porgram. What about the other popular >> encryption programs. Thanks, > >The source code is available. If you have a C compiler, it shouldn't >be very hard to build. Then again its a Macintosh, so who really >knows? I don't expect to see Phil to do it, since Phil hasn't done >any coding for PGP. Also, I don't think that PowerMacs are prominent >enough for developers to have them, yet. I am 99.9% certain that MacPGP will run on a PowerMac, in emulation mode. Some time soon someone will get around to recompiling for native mode. For the original poster: PowerMac is supposed to run all Macintosh OS based programs, right out of the box. No porting of the programs is required. They run slower than native apps, but they run as fast as they would on most Macs now. _______________________________________________________________________ Geoff Dale -- Cypherpunk/Extropian -- Plastic Beethoven AnarchyPPL - Anarch (Adjudicator) ExI-Freegate Virtual Branch Head plaz(a)netcom.com 66 Pyramid Plaza plaz(a)io.com Freegate, Metaverse(a)io.com 7777 ------- End of Forwarded Message

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Re: spyproofing your house/work building
by System Operator 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Don Melvin <anagld!access.digex.net!storm> writes: > > Have I forgotten anything? > > > Guard physical access so a mic/camera (1/8") can't be placed after > construction. > > Drapes so the lip readers can't see you. Make sure the drapes block IR. There are instances of even local police forces flooding the front of a house with IR light, and viewing the activities inside with IR viewers -- all of this through closed drapes. -- system(a)decode.UUCP (System Operator) Cryptography, Security, Privacy BBS +1 410 730 6734 Data/FAX

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Future Remailers
by Brian D Williams 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I have a suggestion on building future remailers. Let's not overlook the idea of operating them "Out of band." At intervals ( preferably random) it would be possible to transmit messages via the phone network, or spread spectrum, to other remailers. (encrypted links of course)( encrypted UUCP?) This would make traffic analysis more difficult. It would also be possible to bounce messages through diverters in other states, further hindering TA. This might also work well for random sources for one time pads. Brian Williams Extropian Cypherpatriot "Cryptocosmology: Sufficently advanced comunication is indistinguishable from noise." --Steve Witham -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLYYmetCcBnAsu2t1AQGrcAP9Frr3RqyemW+SsQ/aCJKMK1qrGbxBNsmN hioP1tZFVkCWBEUi5lKxn3xcy5fh3neN8ow6tDQbBBy8KmBNvfwiaM6cmRu0VAJ5 sUKNUz0drcgnoEdSyiV4BHFLTz1X0XdeYZ8brtLBC2uu991yf3sw6J7XA5z6E93x +fk13mAssMQ= =KeL3 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: spyproofing your house/work building
by System Operator 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

"Perry E. Metzger" <anagld!lehman.com!pmetzger> writes: > > Make sure the drapes block IR. There are instances of even local > > police forces flooding the front of a house with IR light, > > You mean heat? What did they do, exactly? Erect giant heat lamps in > front of the house? No one inside noticed either? This is getting rather far afield, but I'll answer: Light sources to generate usable IR aren't any larger than visible systems, and do not generate the amounts of heat you're imagining. These aren't Kentucky Fried Chicken food warmers. Pick any of several security industry magazines and you'll find many advertisements for "undetectable" (in the sense of being visible to the naked eye) IR surveillance systems. Even the FLIR systems mounted on police observation helicopters (Ft. Worth being the most notable user) are easily mounted inside a van or delivery truck. >From the literature I have, the British SAS have long used this observation method immediately prior to initiating hostage rescue. It will be interesting to see if any "peeping tom" cases come out of the large amount of Soviet night vision gear now available, relatively cheaply, to civilians. Due to it's low price, it has also become popular with local police departments. Even the town I went to high school in, population 10,000, has some night vision gear. Dan -- system(a)decode.UUCP (System Operator) Cryptography, Security, Privacy BBS +1 410 730 6734 Data/FAX

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NSA and PGP rabblerousing
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: jtaylo3(a)umbc.edu (Randy Taylor) Newsgroups: alt.security,talk.politics.crypto Subject: Re: What codes can NSA crack/not crack? Followup-To: alt.security,talk.politics.crypto Date: 13 Mar 1994 16:57:19 GMT Organization: University of Maryland, Baltimore County Lines: 54 Message-ID: <2lvglf$i43(a)news.umbc.edu> References: <2hhe0i$e15(a)hp-col.col.hp.com> <CJuK4o.4DBJ(a)hawnews.watson.ibm.com> <WCS.94Mar9001430(a)anchor.ATT.COM> NNTP-Posting-Host: f-umbc9.umbc.edu X-Newsreader: TIN [version 1.2 PL2] Just my $0.02... I recently took a course here at UMBC called Computer Systems Security taught by a guy who works for NCSC/NSA. A brief topic of discussion was PGP. The guy was really biased against PGP, calling it "illegal", but he also hinted that it had been broken. The hint was wrapped within a "non-denial denial" (for fans of "All The President's Men") and there was no *concrete* information given to support it. One conclusion I drew was that: 1) NSA doesn't like PGP *at all* 2) If NSA hasn't broken PGP, they're working hard on breaking it. One last bit - the guy did admit that PGP would be unbreakable for the forseeable future if the the key length were increased from a max of 1,024 bits to a max of 2,048 bits. Doubling key length doesn't double search time, it's an exponential thing. Oh yeah, this is really the last bit... living in the same area as NSA, one hears all kinds of rumors - but one that I've heard numerous times (and that I give some credence to) is that the NSA measures it's floorspace dedicated to Crays and other supercomputers in *acres*. Kind of frightening, isn't it ? :-) --RT Bill Stewart +1-510-484-6204 (wcs(a)anchor.ho.att.com) wrote: : In article <JY1J-VU.keithdufour(a)delphi.com> keithdufour <keithdufour(a)delphi.com> writes: : Nsa can crack anything you got, big boys. You think they play cards : all day? : When you've got mathematically-based crypto systems, you can analyze : how much work it takes to crack them. They're harder to use than : wimpy cryptosystems, but personal computers take care of that problem. : That's why the NSA's trying so hard to push things like Clipper on us, : that work around their weaknesses; otherwise they're out of luck. : Of course, it's still easy to invent cyphers they *can* break, : and the large number of amateur cryptographers does give them some : ongoing business :-) : We all must take this game more serious than trying to beat the Dallas : Cowboys with your high school team!! : My high school chess team could have easily beaten the Dallas Cowboys, : unless you're talking about football or something...... : (My high school soccer team could probably have also beaten them at chess...) : -- : # Bill Stewart AT&T Global Information Solutions (new name for NCR!) : # 6870 Koll Center Pkwy, Pleasanton CA 94566 1-510-484-6204 fax-6399 : # Email: bill.stewart(a)pleasantonca.ncr.com billstewart(a)attmail.com : # ViaCrypt PGP Key IDs 384/C2AFCD 1024/9D6465

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re 2nd amendment
by Judith Milhon 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

any comments, please reply to me personally...

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Re: Administrivia: Questi
by terry.smith＠canrem.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Jim Choate wrote |-------------------------------| >> Ok - I'm going to have to come out and admit that I have no idea what >> the geek code is and I'm dying to know.... >> Terry Smith - XANTH sysop - 1:259/510 >> >related to the cat characteristic codes I would imagine...check out pets.c |-------------------------------| Ok thanks! Terry Smith - XANTH sysop - 1:259/510 CI$ 70733,3013 PGP 2.3A KEY FREQABLE AS 'KEY'. My opinions are not that of my company. But one day they WILL be! And then - the -+*WORLD*+- Bwaw ha ha !!. Read the Tick and others by NEC. Geraldo - "So, Mr. Smith, you admit you like to eat babies!" Me - "Nono - I admit I like to eat BABES!" --- * TLX v1.55 * Is Q related to Q*Bert, Qleopatra or HerQles?

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Re: spyproofing your house/work building
by lefty＠apple.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Ok genuises. The above subject mentioned FLIR talking about apying in >the IR spectrum. SLIR is Side Looking Infrared Radar, OTH is Over the >Horizon, UV is UltraViolet (existing light) Low Light speaks for itself. > Remote Sensing and Remote Imaging is what I am involved in. Stealth is >basically passive radar. Take it from there.... Ah, but do you know what TLA is? Feel free to impress us some more with your wit. Either half of it. Have you brought down the NSA with your Side Looking Low Light Ultraviolet Macrobiotic Cyberphage yet? Let me know when it happens: I want to make a lowball offer on some of their old equipment. -- Lefty (lefty(a)apple.com) C:.M:.C:., D:.O:.D:.

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