December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

EFF's Barlow v. Denning on Clipper - AOL March 10, 9PM EST LIVE
by Stanton McCandlish 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

CLIPPER CHIP DEBATE Thursday, March 10, 9 pm eastern Dorothy Denning, cryptologist and chair of the computer science department at Georgetown University, will debate John Perry Barlow, cognitive dissident and co-founder of the Electronic Frontier Foundation, in the TIME Odeon on America Online this Thursday at 9 pm. Philip Elmer-DeWitt, TIME senior writer, and Robert Pondiscio, TIME public affairs director, will moderate. The floor will be open to questions from the audience. You need an America Online account to participate. Call America Online at 703-448-8700 to subscribe. Philip Elmer-DeWitt ped(a)panix.com ped(a)well.com TIME Magazine philiped(a)aol.com Read TIME on America Online, where we get paid to take abuse. -- Stanton McCandlish * mech(a)eff.org * Electronic Frontier Found. OnlineActivist F O R M O R E I N F O, E - M A I L T O: I N F O @ E F F . O R G O P E N P L A T F O R M O N L I N E R I G H T S V I R T U A L C U L T U R E C R Y P T O

2 1

Church Accounting - keeping secrets from myself
by wcs＠anchor.ho.att.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Cortland Starrett (cort(a)ecn.purdue.edu) asked a question about how a church treasurer could keep track of running totals of donations from parishioners without being blatantly reminded of what they are except at tax time. Secrecy doesn't have to be real high, since the treasurer does see each check as it comes in, and could keep track separately. One technique that could be adapted is to add a large random number to each person's initial balance, and then subtract that at the end of the year to get the total for tax purposes. Pick a bunch of numbers, say between 100K and 900K save them in a file, and give everyone a copy of their number. Also add up the total of the random numbers so that you can get the whole spreadsheet to balance. Then everybody's running total can be visible without it conveying any useful information except to people who want to track changes from week to week, since you can't tell if $654321 means you gave $1 (with a random number of 654320) or $554321. The total number shouldn't cause overflow problems for 32-bit integers unless you've got more than 3-4000 people. For convenience, you may want to derive the random number from a hash of the person's name, in case they or use lose records. Not letting the left hand know what the right hand is doing..... Bill P.S. Of course, this is just another example of how taxation negatively affects people's lives - if you weren't paying income taxes, you wouldn't need to keep track of deductions to charities, and you could just pay in cash.

1 0

Decoding the Electronic Future
by nobody＠jarthur.cs.hmc.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

US News & World Report Copyright, 1994, U.S. News & World Report All rights reserved. U.S.NEWS & WORLD REPORT, MARCH 14, 1994 DECODING THE ELECTRONIC FUTURE By Vic Sussman WILL ENCRYPTION SECURE OR DENY PRIVACY RIGHTS? Would you hand over a spare set of house keys to your local police to help them fight crime, trusting that they would never enter your home without good reason? According to opponents of the so-called Clipper chip, a powerful new telecommunications encoding device, that is an apt metaphor for what the White House, the FBI and the supersecret National Security Agency are asking of a gullible American public. Clipper backers insist the innovation will not only help in an increasingly desperate fight against crime but actually give Americans more privacy than ever. The Clipper controversy--which has sparked frenzied debate and angry protests in recent weeks--swirls around a small sliver of silicon that can be built into telephones. Ordinary phones can be tapped with anything from cheap scanners to quaint-tech alligator clips. But Clipper phones use encryption technology to scramble voice, fax, electronic mail and other data transmissions into digital gibberish. Only other Clipper phones can unscramble the information, which makes the Clipper an untappable system. Well, almost. A phone that can't be tapped is every cop's nightmare, because anyone from drug traffickers to terrorists would be able to scheme and plot with impunity. So under a plan hatched by the NSA and backed by the White House, government agents would be able to unscramble Clipper's secret code by using two mathematical keys. To guard against abuse, the keys would be held by two government agencies. Authorities would first have to get a warrant--standard wiretap procedure--before obtaining the decoders. Key escrow, as it's called, may sound good on paper, but critics maintain it will be both invasive and ineffectual. In addition, Democratic Sen. Patrick Leahy of Vermont maintains that Clipper is a ``misstep in export policy.'' U.S. companies would have a tough time selling compromised telecommunications products overseas and consequently would have to manufacture both domestic and foreign versions, an expensive proposition. IBM, Apple, Microsoft and the Software Publishers Association, among many others, oppose Clipper. Leahy's Technology and the Law Subcommittee is planning March hearings on these issues. HISTORY'S SHADOW. Critics are also doubtful that Clipper's decoding keys will be sufficient to deter government recklessness, pointing to past abuses by the FBI, NSA and CIA. But Georgetown University computer scientist Dorothy Denning contends that much more stringent controls against illegal eavesdropping exist today. ``The greater danger,'' she insists, ``is losing the ability to wiretap, giving organized crime and terrorism the advantage.'' Law enforcement authorities also say they are looking for no more authority than they already have--to make lawful requests to have the telecommunications industry cooperate in crime prevention. But Marc Rotenberg, Washington director of Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility, a public-interest group that has collected more than 50,000 signatures on an anti-Clipper petition, doesn't buy that argument. In fact, he says, the government has admitted the system could be easily breached by the NSA, which wouldn't need a warrant if it made its demand under the rubric of national security. Many valid concerns about Clipper, says Rotenberg, ``are similarly dismissed with the claim of national security, a dangerous way to design our civilian communications infrastructure.'' The Clipper chip has been proposed as a voluntary standard. But once the Internal Revenue Service, the Pentagon and other agencies order tens of thousands of Clipper phones, it will be impossible to do government business using any other equipment. Indeed, the biggest fear raised by Clipper is that it is the digital camel's nose under the electronic tent. Another White House proposal, for instance, would require that all future telecommunications systems--everything from phones to online services--be ``wiretap friendly,'' says Jerry Berman, executive director of the Electronic Frontier Foundation. Even the most vociferous Clipper opponents concede a legitimate need for electronic surveillance, but many would like to see Congress rather than agencies like the NSA determine the proper balance of government needs and individual rights. Cliff Stoll, whose book THE CUCKOO'S EGG focused attention on computer espionage, thinks the Clipper controversy is overblown by both sides. In fact, he contends, the typical telephone or computer user doesn't need any encryption more powerful than pig Latin. Erhaps-pay.

1 0

Re: Decoding the Electronic Future
by jim＠bilbo.suite.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

[..] Law enforcement authorities also say they are looking for no more authority than they already have--. [..] Perhaps LE is not asking for more *authority*, but they sure are asking for more *capability*. If LE had the capability to do everything they're currently authorized to do (wiretaps, search and seizure, follow people, undercover officers, sting operations, obtain financial records, public security cameras, etc), on a nationwide scale, the US would truly be a police state. It's not so much the amount of "authority" that is keeping the US from being a police state, it is LE's level of capability. Don't give LE more capabilities. One person's opinion, Jim_Miller(a)suite.com

1 0

ViaCrypt PGP for Unix, CompuServe
by Mike Ingle 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I got a flyer from ViaCrypt today about these: ViaCrypt PGP for MS/DOS $99.98 one user, $299.98 five user ViaCrypt PGP for Unix $149.98 one user, $449.98 five user ViaCrypt PGP for C$ $119.98 one user The Unix versions are for: SunOS 4.1.x, RS/6000 AIX, HP 9000 700/800 UX, SCO 386/486 UNIX (others soon). The Compu$pend version integrates into CompuServe Information Manager or CS Navigator for Windows. Includes the regular PGP and an integration program for CompuServe. DigiSig+ cryptographic modules: RSA, DES, and DSS. Developers' Kit $950 two user for MS/DOS. DigiSig+ D150. Software crypto engine. $80 to $20 depending on quantity. DigiSig+ D350. Parallel port crypto device, looks like a modem. $625 DigiSig+ D355. As above but plugs into serial port. $635 DigiSig+ D360. Internal board for PC. $595 Memory card - securely stores a secret key. $30 for two.

1 0

Re: (forward message on privacy)
by flesh＠wps.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message:

2 1

DC Physical Meeting This Saturday
by pfarrell＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- This Saturday, March 12 starting at 3:00 PM EST and running until 5:30 PM, there will be a physical Cypherpunks meeting at the EFF's offices in downtown Washington DC. The meeting title is: Cypherpunks distributed meeting Politics, Strategies, and Action The meeting will run in parallel with several other c'punk meetings. If the technology works, we will have realtime audio feeds from other sites. If not, we'll call in using speakerphones (bring your long distance credit card as EFF is _not_ sponsoring us.) With the Clinton Administration's continued insistance on Clipper and the current revision of the FBI's Digital Telophony bill, we c'punks "inside the Beltway" need to get organized. Please do not bring PCs or floppies. We will be inside EFF's offices, and should not bring in, nor take out, any hardware or magnetic media. Paper copies of the MD5 hash of your PGP/ViaCrpyt keys for swapping are fine. We can use email or the keyservers to exchange the actual keys. Some EFF staffers are interested in getting signatures for their ViaCrypt keys. So this will be a good chance to expend the web of trust. Directions: EFF is at the Metro Center stop of the Metro. There is nearby street parking. The Metro stop is literally inside the building lobby. Address is 1001 G street, North West. This is the corner of 11th and G. EFF is in suite 950 East, but the meeting is on the 8th floor. Coming by the metro, leave the station through the Woodies Deli. Go though there, and there will be a set of double doors oposite an escalator. Go though the doors, around a corner and up two escalators. You should then be in the lobby of the EFF building. Off the street, We are next door to the Grand Hyatt, which is right across the street from the Washington Convention Center. Once again, come in and you should be in the lobby of our building. We will send folks down on the hour to let you into the EFF's secure space. Outside of those times, you can set up an appointment, or you will need to call up to get an EFF staff member to come down and let you in. Call 202-347-5400. ext 224 and ext 205 will probably get answered Saturday. Questions: Contact pfarrell(a)netcom.com or leave a voicemail (up until about noon Saturday) at (703) 267-2986) -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQBVAgUBLX1aIR9bGnaOb/KNAQF5BgIAx6SwF1q2H2W/Pt85g7TdfWV+vQIuU6oZ k42HeH8+CiRftiIGbtueso9v/hF1sLYAyUs+/4NAYPXegLpLzbrUbQ== =GlHV -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

1 0

Where'd pgptools go?
by mpjohnso＠nyx10.cs.du.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hal <hfinney(a)shell.portal.com> writes: >I notice on csn.org:/mpj there is now pgptl10d.zip, PGP Tools version >1.0d. However, 1.0d is not the whole PGP Tools program. It is just an >addendum which implements Diffie-Hellman. Apparently pgptl10c.zip is still >needed to give you the whole of PGP Tools. Does anyone know of an FTP >site which still has pgptl10c available? Thanks - I've merged the old & new files, now -- and put 10c back, just in case I missed something. ___________________________________________________________ |\ /| | | | | \/ |o| | Michael Paul Johnson Colorado Catacombs BBS 303-938-9654 | | | | / _ | mpj(a)csn.org ftp csn.org \mpj\README.MPJ for access info.| | |||/ /_\ | aka mpjohnso(a)nyx.cs.du.edu mikej(a)exabyte.com | | |||\ ( | m.p.johnson(a)ieee.org CIS 71331,2332 VPGP key by finger | | ||| \ \_/ |___________________________________________________________|

1 0

ANNOUNCE: Boston Area Cypherpunks Meeting
by Derek Atkins 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

There will be a meeting of the Boston Area Cypherpunks on Saturday, March 12, 1994 in MIT Room 1-115 starting at 3pm EST. The plan is to have an audio link to the other cypherpunks meetings around the country and around the world. The title for this meeting is: Politics, Strategies, and Action All further announcements about the Boston Area meeting will be made on the mailing list "cypherpunks-east(a)MIT.EDU". (Send sub/unsub requests to cypherpunks-east-request) Directions to MIT 1-115: Via T: Get off at Kendall, on the Red Line. Walk away from the marriott hotel, and walk until the street dead ends at Amhust. Take a right, and then keep walking. Follow the path across Ames street, and keep walking past the Great Sail, and when the path splits, take the 45-degree right path. Keep walking until you reach the steps into the building, and go in. Walk to the other end of the corridor. You will be in a large cathedral-like lobby (lobby 7) in front of 77 Mass Ave. Follow the signs for 1-115 from here. Via Bus: Take route 1 to 77 Mass ave and follow the signs Via Car: Drive to Cambridge. MIT building 1 is on the corner of Mass Ave. and Mem Drive, slightly south of 77 Mass Ave. Find a place to park, and enter the building from Mass Ave. Follow the signs to room 1-115. -derek

1 0

Re: chips...
by mbriceno＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

X-Anon-Password:legal9road X-Anon-To:cypherpunks@toad.com >> Today I ran into a situation that made me completely nausiated and >> feel like my privacy had been completely invaded... It involves a >> chip which is implanted in animals and used for identification... > >> [....] "Well, if their doing this to animals, how soon will it be >> before they implant the same sort of thing in us?" She said, "Oh, >> I hadn't thought about it like that."... > >Several years ago (like mid or early 80's if I recall), there was >just such a program for marking children. It involved implanting >a "microchip" on the surface of a tooth. > Routine implants of transponder devices into humans are not a question of if, but only of when. I predict that they will become routine before the end of the decade. First they will be voluntary, used primarily in children to facilitate identification in case of abduction, some years later they will become mandatory for all drivers, to combat the use of fake driver licenses, and soon thereafter transponders will become the primary, if not sole accepted form of ID for all business transactions. A generation from now transponders will be mandatory used not only for identification, but for routine tracking of the movements of every citizen. If you think this sounds crazy, go to Germany, where you will find a camera on every major intersection, tracking your every move. -=T.A.Z.

1 0