December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

IRC and the Feeling of Power
by Mike Ingle 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hawkwind describes the "justice system" of IRC in his forward. It seems to me that the kick/ban process on IRC is a good example of how not to moderate a forum. Many people on IRC seem to be there for no other purpose than to enjoy the testosterone high of being op. They go to a lot of trouble to write bots which keep their channels open and op them when they join. They take great pleasure in kicking people. There is often a little clique which runs a channel, and whenever one of those people joins, someone else ops him. Have you ever been on a channel where nobody was saying anything, but people were constantly opping, de-opping, kicking, banning, unbanning, coming back in and flooding the channel before being kicked again, etc...? I don't use IRC that much, but from what I've seen, that system doesn't work very well. An extropians-style kill command would probably be better for IRC or the list. If someone is causing trouble, you could just set to ignore them.

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Re: IRC and the Feeling of Power
by Mike Ingle 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>As a more frequent user of IRC, I agree with you. However, the problem is >generally technical. This system was established because IRC channels have >no "home" server or organization which can claim "ownership" and >"responsibility" for the behavior and content of the channel. These problems will exist in any distributed system, so solutions need to be worked out. >>I don't use IRC that much, but from >>what I've seen, that system doesn't work very well. An extropians-style >>kill command would probably be better for IRC or the list. If someone is >>causing trouble, you could just set to ignore them. >I would prefer a system of "talkers" and "listeners". The channel >administration, whatever this may be, decides who can talk and who must >listen. There is a tentative first step toward this goal in the current >wave of server revisions. Why have an administration at all? Why not just give everyone an /exclude command which eliminates everything from a particular person, and an /include command which restores output from that person. If someone is ranting or flooding, everyone will /exclude him and he will be left with only himself for an audience. --- Mike

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Re: The Cyber Lexicon of 2030 AD
by fnerd＠smds.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

*Fuse*: (n) 1) Software or hardware to isolate a net, system or subsystem in the event of detection of a security or resource use problem. 2) reputation. *Crowbar*: (n) Type of _cannibal_ that, on detecting a security or resource use problem, blows _fuses_ in outside systems by flooding communications channels with noise, triggering security checks in other systems, and/or exhausting bank accounts, credit lines and stores of _e-cash_. The effect of a crowbar is harder to reset by a presumed intruder than that of an internal fuse. A countermeasure to _mug shots_. *Mug Shots*: (n) Backups of the state of a system to allow repeated attempts at cracking it. A countermeasure to _cannibals_. *Runaway*: (n) Endless echoing of messages caused by bugs in routing software. Usually refers to a bug that exacerbates its own trigger conditions, such as traffic level or lack of storage space. -fnerd(a)smds.com ~ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a aKxB8nktcBAeQHabQP/d7yhWgpGZBIoIqII8cY9nG55HYHgvtoxiQCVAgUBLMs3K ui6XaCZmKH68fOWYYySKAzPkXyfYKnOlzsIjp2toust1Q5A3/n54PBKrUDN9tHVz 3Ch466q9EKUuDulTU6OLsilzmRvQJn0EJhzd4pht6hanC0R3seYNhUYhoJViCcCG sRjLQs4iVVM= =9wqs -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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The Cyber Lexicon of 2030
by terry.smith＠canrem.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Mnemonic(a)eff.org wrote |-------------------------------| > of littering. The MD Pound > logo features the mustaches of Salvador Dali, a notably prolific > 20th century surrealist. > > *Municipal Dump*: (n) an institution formed by the |-------------------------------| Hi - this was great - but I only got the first and last message in the series. Could you re-post it? Also, I have no internet access.. Terry Smith - XANTH sysop - 1:259/510 CI$ 70733,3013 PGP 2.3A KEY FREQABLE AS 'KEY'. My opinions are not that of my company. But one day they WILL be! And then - the -+*WORLD*+- Bwaw ha ha !!. Read the Tick and others by NEC. Geraldo - "So, Mr. Smith, you admit you like to eat babies!" Me - "Nono - I admit I like to eat BABES!" --- * TLX v1.55 * A bug is a feature that didn't make it into the manual.

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Random numbers and "dirty" books
by jpinson＠fcdarwin.org.ec 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I have been working off and on for some time on a one-time pad application (that I will release next week). Since the success of an OTP is dependent on having a good source of random numbers, I have kept my eyes open for any information related to random numbers, and their generation. Conventional wisdom has it that the best way to generate random numbers is to measure some physical phenomenon such as radioactive decay, and use these measurements to form your "random" number sequence. Recently, I came across an interesting article in the "New Scientist" (May 8, 1993) entitled "The half Life of a Dirty Book". This article indicates that phenomena-based measurements may have some interesting properties. A number of years ago, when people used log tables (any of you remember the CRC tables?), some astute observers noticed that the front section of the log tables were more heavily used than the back section. This seemed odd, since it would seem reasonable that all portions of the table should have an equal chance of being examined. In 1938, the physicist Frank Benford made a study of numerous measurements based on natural phenomena. He looked at surface areas of lakes, molecular weights of compounds etc. He discovered that the first digit of any such measurement was most likely to be a one, and least likely to be a nine. The probability that this digit takes a given value decreases in a regular manner as the digits increase from one to nine. This is called Benford's Law. Later, a report in the European Journal for Physics (vol 14, page 59) showed that that alpha decay half lives, both predicted and observed, followed Benford's law. What was also interesting was that Benford's law is scale- invariant. According to the article: "The same law applies whether you measure the areas of lakes in hectares or square yards, whether you multiply house numbers by seven or 93, or whether you count the half-lives of alpha particles in seconds or centuries". The article concludes that Benford's law may actually be a part of chaos theory. Fractals, they also point out, are scale - invariant. All this may indicate that random number produced from observations of physical phenomena may have characteristics that set them apart from software-derived random numbers. Does this give a tool for breaking random number based encryption? I can't see how, since you still can't figure out the exact sequence. But it perhaps means there may be fractal patterns there, at least for numbers derived from physical phenomena. Interesting. Of course, with an 8 bit random number sequence (with a maximum number of 255), it would be hard to generate a number sequence that did not follow Benford's law.. You would have to throw in a lot of 9's , and 99's to get as as many numbers begining with '9' as you do that begin with a '1' (1, 10-19,100-199). So let's see..... first we had flat distributions vs. normal distributions, now Benford vs. non Benford..... Jim Pinson Confused in Galapagos.

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Secure Drive Distribution
by edgar＠spectrx.saigon.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- After reading Mike Ingle's post of Dec 21, I withdraw my request for a "public-spirited Cypherpunk (perhaps even an anonymous one) to place Secure Drive on an FTP site or a site with an E-mail file server." Mike said: If you do this [upload Secure Drive to an FTP or mailserver site], please make it a U.S./Canada only site. If you mean a site -in- the USA/Canada, no problem. If you mean a site which will not send files outside the USA/Canada, I don't think there is any such animal. The only site even -attempting- to restrict service I've heard of is RSA.com, which distributes RSAREF. And I think it would be rather easy to spoof. A foreigner can easily login to any public -domestic- internet BBS with just an international phone call, giving him a domestic-looking net address. Even if you distribute every copy yourself, Mike, you are not immune from this kind of "spoofing." >So far I still haven't heard from Eric. I did get two responses. >The first was anonymous and sent me a copy of Secure Drive with >a request for me to post it to foreign FTP site(s). The second >was a request from a foreign site for me to send them a copy. I'd like to see more about this, in private mail if you don't want to post it to the list. Not much to tell. I didn't keep copies of either request. I think the non-anon one was from Australia, maybe. The non-distribution of the beta was because I had no way to check it, and it could easily have eaten hard drives. I did say in the ad that you were not to export, although I didn't make anyone send a statement. Maybe I should have. Perhaps. But the ad says: This program may be freely distributed within the U.S. and Canada; do not export it. and the docs say: Exporting this program. This program is for use in the US and Canada only. Cryptography is export controlled, and sending this program outside the country may be illegal. Don't do it. Fine. But "freely distributed in the USA & Canada" would include uploading it to domestic BBS's & anon. FTP sites by my interpretation of English. If a foreigner enters the country and smuggles a copy home with him, whether he does it physically or electronically, he is committing the criminal act; not whoever uploaded SD and certainly not Mike. On the Hacker matter Mike said: They are going to attempt to break Secure Drive. He asked me to write a program which will take a list of passphrases and test them quickly to run a passphrase attack. I had a few qualms about writing a program to crack someone's data, but I don't think it really matters. Unless the hacker chose a very lame key, they don't have a prayer in hell. By all means, go ahead & write the program to their specs.! Of course, as a "forensic software consultant" you're entitled to a fee. I would say a minimum of $100/hour is "fair." After they try that for a while, you can offer an improvement that will try "more keys of a smaller possible set faster" by just trying the 2^128 keys directly without bothering with a passphrase, along with a mod to LOGIN which will insert a binary key directly rather than use MD5 on a passphrase. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLR8uuN4nNf3ah8DHAQHQ1AP/ZXImvQO2XxKXi/k2CCMPgD12rYPAcfZp ZabuyERUGW8UuKZJLS8Wy4i7q2EdWi1TT80dKhHVQgO6ec+ybKyirXN/N8Ahz3BF zKqa+YKKgaroxv50Xg4RdQ3Cr/rfYQeQ0yiH1VdJOJj4dVwDMTnm+uC/Uph/wXJI U53PBfQWR28= =T2cH -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -- edgar(a)spectrx.saigon.com (Edgar W. Swank) SPECTROX SYSTEMS +1.408.252.1005 Cupertino, Ca

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NBC news.
by GRABOW_GEOFFREY＠tandem.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Greetings all, NBC Nightly news recently did a report on the Internet and NII, at the end of which, they mentioned that they have an Internet address of: news:nightly@nbc.com They asked for comments regarding the use/misuse of Internet and I'm sure that they would be thrilled to hear from us. So drop 'em a line and tell 'em your opinion of the NII. ******************************************************************** Geoffrey C. Grabow grabow_geoffrey(a)tandem.com Oyster Bay, New York 'What we demand are rigidly defined areas of doubt and uncertainty!' - Hitchhiker's Guide To The Galaxy ********************************************************************

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Re: anonymous video rental store - Libraries
by jazz＠hal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Out of curiousity, has any ftp-archive maintainer tried to join the American Library Association, either directly or as part of some university's library system? I'm not sure what this would do. My wife is a professional librarian and a member of the ALA (and SLA and a few other besides) - as far as I know, the ALA doesn't directly intervene to protect its members. Jason

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GPS and security
by m5＠vail.tivoli.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

CBS's "60 Minutes" had a "Oooh Scarey" segment about the Global Positioning System last Sunday. The scarey part is, according to 60 Minutes, that any old terrorist government can now put together accurate guided missles and wreak death and destruction upon our homeland. The crux of the problem is that the system broadcasts out positioning information to one and all indiscriminately, and according to the show there's no way we can stop it. Because my mind is regularly exposed to wild conspiracy theories and all sorts of crazed paranoiac ravings (i.e., I read Usenet), I started thinking that this is rather unlikely. I speculated that the government may in fact have designed the satellite systems so that they could be told to do several things in case of national emergency: * Shut down (probably possible; they may have actually mentioned this on the show). Problem is that lots of friendlies may grow to rely on the data for life-critical things, like guiding commercial airliners. * Shut down normal transmission and begin strongly encrypted transmission. No mention of this; apparently, the satellites were originally designed with some sort of weak system that made the data difficult to use for high-accuracy purposes, but that's been defeated (by the FAA or someone contracted thereto). * Enter into a bogus-cleartext with encrypted subchannel mode, where the plaintext is slyly made to be wrong, but using some subchannel encrypted "good stuff" is still available. I don't know much about how this system works, so I don't know whether any of my thoughts are relevant. It's probably most likely that the government indeed blasted these things up into space without considering using encryption technology to enhance security. -- Mike McNally : m5(a)tivoli.com : Day Laborer : Tivoli Systems : Austin, TX ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Remember that all experimentation does not produce extrapolated results. - k. pisichko

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CACM Letters
by Pat Farrell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

There is a very nice letter on the government's rationale for controlling crypto in the current January 94 (received today) CACM, by Walter M Anderson. The main claim is that the government must want to control US citizens, because no other reason is logically consistant. And a nice short one from our own CME. Pat Pat Farrell Grad Student pfarrell(a)netcom.com Department of Computer Science George Mason University, Fairfax, VA Public key availble via finger #include <standard.disclaimer>

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