December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

REMAIL: [Finally, I hope] The easy to install cypherpunks remailer
by Sameer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hopefully it will work this time. I've stripped it down a little, and i've added some flexibility. It doesn't try to compile pgp for you, or find perl. You have to do that yourself. That was where most of my problems lay previously. Now it *should* work even if you're using your .forward file-- the functionality of your .forward file should not be lost, I hope. I *sure* hope this can be an actual release this time. (It's been *way* too long. [interesting how my cypherpunk coding increases in the days before a meeting. ;-]) Here's the readme. Available in soda.berkeley.edu:/pub/cypherpunks/remailer/remail-install.tar.gz The Cypherpunks Anonymous Remailer Installation Version 1.0 Installer: Sameer <sameer(a)soda.berkeley.edu> Remailer: Eric Hughes & Hal Finney, with minor modifications by Sameer ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- This is the Cypherpunks Anonymous Remailer Installation Suite Version 1.0. By simply running the script "install_remail" included in the archive, you can very easily install a cypherpunks anonymous remailer service in almost any UNIX account. The anonymous remailer uses the .forward file to pipe all mail to the remailer system. If mail to the remailer account is not acted upon by the remailer software, it goes to wherever mail should go based on what the .forward file said before the remailer was installed. (Hopefully.. no guarantees.) % gunzip RemailInstall.tar.gz % mkdir install % cd install % tar xfv ../RemailInstall.tar You might have to edit the remail_install program slightly if your system's "test" does not support the -x flag.. Try the following once you've untarred the remailer: % test -x bounce If that returns an error, you have to edit the -x and replace it with a -f in the beginning of the script "install_remail": EXECTEST=-x should be changed to: EXECTEST=-f Execute the installer program: % install_remail Answer all the questions. You need a perl and a pgp binary on your system already compiled. (You don't need pgp if you don't want PGP functionality, of course.) The program self-tests, and mails me that the remailer is running, if you want it to. I will forward that notice to the cypherpunks list and the person maintaining the list of active remailers. Remember that running a remailer is a sensitive issue on the net. If you choose to run a remailer, keep in mind that some powerful net-personalities object to anonymous remailers, possibly endangering your access to the internet. This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU General Public License for more details. Running "remailer_remove" *should* clear up any problems that my script might create in your account, but I will guarantee nothing. There are so many strange versions of UNIX out there.. If it doesn't work, however, please tell me and a later release of this installer will hopefully fix that problem. Later releases will hopefully also incorporate a remailer with delays, mixing, and other nice features. Stay free, Sameer sameer(a)soda.berkeley.edu

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Re: chips...
by an57322＠anon.penet.fi 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>> Today I ran into a situation that made me completely nausiated and >> feel like my privacy had been completely invaded... It involves a >> chip which is implanted in animals and used for identification... > >> [....] "Well, if their doing this to animals, how soon will it be >> before they implant the same sort of thing in us?" She said, "Oh, >> I hadn't thought about it like that."... > >Several years ago (like mid or early 80's if I recall), there was >just such a program for marking children. It involved implanting >a "microchip" on the surface of a tooth. > Routine implants of transponder devices into humans are not a question of if, but only of when. I predict that they will become routine before the end of the decade. First they will be voluntary, used primarily in children to facilitate identification in case of abduction, some years later they will become mandatory for all drivers, to combat the use of fake driver licenses, and soon thereafter transponders will become the primary, if not sole accepted form of ID for all business transactions. A generation from now transponders will be mandatory used not only for identification, but for routine tracking of the movements of every citizen. If you think this sounds crazy, go to Germany, where you will find a camera on every major intersection, tracking your every move. -=T.A.Z. ------------------------------------------------------------------------- To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help(a)anon.penet.fi. Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized, and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned. Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin(a)anon.penet.fi.

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Re: chips...
by an57322＠anon.penet.fi 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>> Today I ran into a situation that made me completely nausiated and >> feel like my privacy had been completely invaded... It involves a >> chip which is implanted in animals and used for identification... > >> [....] "Well, if their doing this to animals, how soon will it be >> before they implant the same sort of thing in us?" She said, "Oh, >> I hadn't thought about it like that."... > >Several years ago (like mid or early 80's if I recall), there was >just such a program for marking children. It involved implanting >a "microchip" on the surface of a tooth. > Routine implants of transponder devices into humans are not a question of if, but only of when. I predict that they will become routine before the end of the decade. First they will be voluntary, used primarily in children to facilitate identification in case of abduction, some years later they will become mandatory for all drivers, to combat the use of fake driver licenses, and soon thereafter transponders will become the primary, if not sole accepted form of ID for all business transactions. A generation from now transponders will be mandatory used not only for identification, but for routine tracking of the movements of every citizen. If you think this sounds crazy, go to Germany, where you will find a camera on every major intersection, tracking your every move. -=T.A.Z. ------------------------------------------------------------------------- To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help(a)anon.penet.fi. Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized, and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned. Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin(a)anon.penet.fi.

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Re: chips...
by an57322＠anon.penet.fi 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>> Today I ran into a situation that made me completely nausiated and >> feel like my privacy had been completely invaded... It involves a >> chip which is implanted in animals and used for identification... > >> [....] "Well, if their doing this to animals, how soon will it be >> before they implant the same sort of thing in us?" She said, "Oh, >> I hadn't thought about it like that."... > >Several years ago (like mid or early 80's if I recall), there was >just such a program for marking children. It involved implanting >a "microchip" on the surface of a tooth. > Routine implants of transponder devices into humans are not a question of if, but only of when. I predict that they will become routine before the end of the decade. First they will be voluntary, used primarily in children to facilitate identification in case of abduction, some years later they will become mandatory for all drivers, to combat the use of fake driver licenses, and soon thereafter transponders will become the primary, if not sole accepted form of ID for all business transactions. A generation from now transponders will be mandatory used not only for identification, but for routine tracking of the movements of every citizen. If you think this sounds crazy, go to Germany, where you will find a camera on every major intersection, tracking your every move. -=T.A.Z. ------------------------------------------------------------------------- To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help(a)anon.penet.fi. Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized, and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned. Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin(a)anon.penet.fi.

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Re: chips...
by an57322＠anon.penet.fi 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>> Today I ran into a situation that made me completely nausiated and >> feel like my privacy had been completely invaded... It involves a >> chip which is implanted in animals and used for identification... > >> [....] "Well, if their doing this to animals, how soon will it be >> before they implant the same sort of thing in us?" She said, "Oh, >> I hadn't thought about it like that."... > >Several years ago (like mid or early 80's if I recall), there was >just such a program for marking children. It involved implanting >a "microchip" on the surface of a tooth. > Routine implants of transponder devices into humans are not a question of if, but only of when. I predict that they will become routine before the end of the decade. First they will be voluntary, used primarily in children to facilitate identification in case of abduction, some years later they will become mandatory for all drivers, to combat the use of fake driver licenses, and soon thereafter transponders will become the primary, if not sole accepted form of ID for all business transactions. A generation from now transponders will be mandatory used not only for identification, but for routine tracking of the movements of every citizen. If you think this sounds crazy, go to Germany, where you will find a camera on every major intersection, tracking your every move. -=T.A.Z. ------------------------------------------------------------------------- To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help(a)anon.penet.fi. Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized, and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned. Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin(a)anon.penet.fi.

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Re: Response to CJ request for Applied Cryptography
by Phil Karn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I had to revise my second filing slightly. Early Wednesday morning, I got a phone call from Maj. Gary Oncale stating that my title was too vague. He asked me to resubmit it using a more specific title, so I did. I've appended the revised version here. The only change is the title in the second subject line. I called him back later on Wednesday afternoon to confirm receipt. He had received it, but had not yet assigned an official case number. He thought the number would probably be 079-94. I haven't called back to verify this yet, I will try to remember to do so tomorrow. --Phil Phil Karn 7431 Teasdale Avenue San Diego, CA 92122 karn(a)unix.ka9q.ampr.org (Internet) 619-587-8281 (voice) 619-587-1825 (fax) ATTN: Maj Gary Oncale - 15 Day CJ Request U.S. Department of State Office of Defense Trade Controls PM/DTC SA-6 Room 200 1701 N. Fort Myer Drive Arlington, VA 22209-3113 Fax +1 703 875 5845 ATTN: 15 Day CJ Request Coordinator National Security Agency P.O. Box 246 Annapolis Junction, MD 20701 Subject: Mass Market Software with Encryption - 15 Day Expedited Review Requested Subject: Commodity Jurisdiction Request for "APPLIED CRYPTOGRAPHY SOURCE CODE DISK" INTRODUCTION This is a Commodity Jurisdiction Request for mass market software with encryption capabilities. It is a followup to an earlier CJR (case 038-94, dated February 12, 1994) regarding the book "Applied Cryptography" by Bruce Schneier, published by John Wiley and Sons, ISBN 0-471-59756-2. In your reply of March 2, 1994, you explicitly limited your determination that the item was outside State jurisdiction to the book itself, explicitly excluding the source code diskettes available from the author. Hence my second request. The newly released diskette that is the subject of the present request should not be confused with the more comprehensive two-diskette set also available from the author. This new diskette is strictly limited to the source code that already appears in the book, which you have already determined to be public domain. Character by character, the information is exactly the same. The only difference is the medium: magnetic impulses on mylar rather than inked characters on paper. I have no DTC registration code. I have reviewed and determined that this diskette, the subject of this CJ request, meets paragraph 1 of the "Criteria for Determining the Eligibility of A Mass Market Software Product for Expedited Handling." I base this determination on the following facts: a) this diskette is readily available from the author by mail-order, thus qualifying it as mass market software; b) sufficient documentation is included to allow installation and use by any end user capable of compiling and executing it. To my knowledge the author provides no "product support" as that term is generally understood; and c) the diskette contains source code for encryption software that provides confidentiality. A duplicate copy of this CJR has been sent to the 15 Day CJ Request Coordinator. DESCRIPTION This diskette contains (and is limited to) the exact same source code printed in Part 5 of "Applied Cryptography", the subject of ODTC Case CJ 038-94. It is not to be confused with the more comprehensive two-disk set previously released by Mr. Schneier and mentioned in his book. Mr. Schneier's announcement (attached) lists the contents of this diskette. ORIGIN OF COMMODITY The diskette is available from Mr. Schneier, a US citizen living in the US. The price is $15. CURRENT USE The software on this diskette is provided for those who wish to incorporate encryption into their applications. Examples of the commercial use of these ciphers include integrity verification, authentication and confidentiality of electronic mail, computer software, voice, video and other information in digitized form. For example, the Internet's Privacy Enhanced Mail (PEM) project uses DES for confidentiality and MD5 for integrity. The Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) package uses IDEA and MD5 for the same purposes. PGP is now widely used around the world. The uses of these ciphers have not changed significantly over time, although their popularity has grown substantially. Their present military utility is unknown, except that it is believed that none of these algorithms are approved for the protection of US classified information. SPECIAL CHARACTERISTICS There are no military standards or specifications that this diskette is designed to meet. There are no special characteristics of the diskette, including no radiation-hardening, no ballistic protection, no hard points (the corners of the diskette are rounded), no TEMPEST capability, no thermal and no infrared signature reduction capability, no surveillance, and no intelligence gathering capability. The diskette does not use image intensification tubes. OTHER INFORMATION I recommend that this diskette be determined to be in the jurisdiction of the Commerce Department. I believe that it qualifies for the general license GTDA for General Technical Data to All Destinations, because it qualifies as "publicly available". ATTACHMENTS I have enclosed the announcement of this diskette's availability as published over various electronic mailing lists by the author. From: schneier(a)chinet.com (Bruce Schneier) Subject: announcement Date: Tue, 8 Mar 1994 14:21:25 -0600 (CST) ANNOUNCING: APPLIED CRYPTOGRAPHY SOURCE CODE DISK This disk includes all the source code from the book, Applied Cryptography: Vigenere, Beauford, Variant Beauford Enigma DES Lucifer NewDES FEAL-8 FEAL-NX REDOC III LOKI 91 IDEA N-HASH MD5 Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA) Secret Sharing The code is available either on a single 5.25 or 3.5 IBM-PC disk, or on a single 3.5 Macintosh disk. Cost: $15 Bruce Schneier Counterpane Systems 730 Fair Oaks Ave Oak Park, IL 60302 (708) 524-9461 schneier(a)chinet.com

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money...
by dwomack＠runner.utsa.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I'd appreciate any opinions/info available on whether a rumor I heard is true or not. I just learned that US bills, $20 and above, have a magnetic strip embedded in the bill, on the left hand side. Looking at the front of the bill, under the "U" in United States, it's clearly visible on those bill printed in 1990 and thereafter. Supposedly, bills in the $5 and $10 amounts have started being fixed in such a way. Now...the interesting part. The rumor is that it is possible to detect, at a modest distance, the existance of and the amount of currancy being carried. Thus, if a person boarded an airplane carrying $12,000 in cash in a money belt, it would be possible to detect that fact. The rumor expands that this has in fact already been implemented at one airport (at least). Any thoughts?

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D.C. meet
by Grand Epopt Feotus 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Could someone possibly be able to direct me on how to get to the EFF building from Union Station? I want to take a trin in from Wilmington and then go to the meet from there, possibly I'll have to catcha metro or something? You're eqipped with a hundred billion nueron brain, that's wired and fired, and it's a reality generating device, but you've got too do it. Free youself ----Tim Leary----

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Re: FinCen
by gtoal＠an-teallach.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: Wayne Q Jones <qjones(a)infi.net> The "roadblocks" put up by intelligence is no surprise. Afterall what did happen to the 10 millions of the Iran-Contra drug money? What about the DEA agent who stole several hundred thousand dollars in drug money? FinCen is one way of hiding the illegal drug escapades of the intelligence community. It's precisely because of the CIA's illegal funding of covert activities (ones they can't even get a black budget for) that I posted on eff.talk, the day that Ames was uncovered, that he most likely slipped through the detection-net of overspending precisely *because* agencies like this and the CIA cooperate to hide the illegal income of top CIA agents. It's almost certain that FINCen has tweaked their algorithm specifically to bypass people like Ames. And we still haven't seen the drug connection in that case surface. But don't worry, it will. Head of anti-drugs operations for the last <N> years? Don't kid me... So much for 'checks and balances'. G

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magstripes in $$
by nobody＠soda.berkeley.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Someone worries about magnetic strips in U.S. currency... Yeah. I do too. On a slightly related topic, I know of an instance where the Secret Service located a stolen color copier with somewhat greater speed than one might have expected. Is it possible that these machines either: (1) contain transponders or (2) hide a "signature" in their output ???

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