December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Escobar and Cellular Ph0n3z
by lex＠mindvox.phantom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I found it very interesting to read in the paper this morning about how EXACTLY the Columbian authorities were able to LOCATE Pablo Escobar. The article stated that Pablo was concerned about his wife and child's safety and called them on a CELLULAR phone to check up on them. The Columbian Police did not know where either of them were located. It stated that the U.S. government (DEA in print, but was it the NSA?) gave or let the Columbian police borrow equipment that did the following: 1) The equipment scanned all the cellular phone frequencies used in that area. 2) Already having a voice print/sample of Pablo's voice, the equipment continuously compared cellular conversations with those they had of Pablo, in near real time. 3) Once a match was made, the equipment would triangulate? or otherwise locate the origin of the call within two minutes. It did not say how good the accuracy of the location was (ie within 1 mile or 1/10 of a mile or 10 feet, etc.) however. Apparently it was CLOSE ENOUGH. This is sophisticated, no question about it. I imagine the equipment/circuits are available to do all this to the general U.S. public, but still, I think the NSA probably provided the equipment as it was probably all integrated together and fairly idiot-proof to use. Maybe one big box, with a few of these big boxes being dispersed about the country-side. The report stated that Escobar was worth a few Billion dollars and that he was a smart man. Why didn't he use encryption? This would have thwarted the police. Of course you may say, how many encrypted cellular conversations take place in that part of Columbia, and the answer would probably be close to zero if not zero. So just modify the equipment to recognize encrypted/scrambled speech or whatever and locate the source. Fine, but if Escobar has so much money and so many allies, why not buy many encrypted cellular set-ups and distribute them to his people (paying them of course) to move throughout the region constantly and make cellular encrypted phone calls at random? Now, tying this in with the 'ol Clipper-chip debate, if Escobar who is worth billions of dollars, is smart, and is considered one of the biggest drug kingpins in history does not use encryption, how many lower-level criminals, who don't have the financial resources nor the intelligence will? Lex

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Review of Crypto-Rebels in Cryptologia
by smo＠gnu.ai.mit.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In the October issue of Cryptologia, Louis Kruh reviews the "Crypto Rebels" article by Stephen Levy that appeared in Wired. Shawn smo(a)gnu.ai.mit.edu Article liberated without permission. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Cryptologia. Vol. XV11, Number 4 (October 1993) >From the column "Reviews and Things Cryptologic" by Louis Kruh. Crypto Rebels Write-Up [Wired 1.2] Wired is a new magazine aimed at the "Digital Generation." The cover story in its second issue examines the growing "Cypherpunk" movement to insure individual privacy. According to the author, Cypherpunks believe that all information about an individual belongs to that person and opinions, medical records, personal data collected by local, state or national governmental agencies, communications sent by the individual or any other information should be available only if the person involved chooses to reveal it. And the means through which this privacy would be maintained is by the widespread use of virtually unbreakable public-key cryptography. Opposing forces are U.S. government agencies who seek to insure their ability to read public-key encrypted messages by the continuance of electronic surveillance and by having access to public-key cryptography's secret keys when authorized by a judge. The author suggests that the government cryptologic monopoly was destroyed in 1975 when Whitfield Diffie created public-key cryptography. His later work with Martin Hellman is recounted along with the implementation of the Diffie-Hellman system by three MIT computer scientists who founded RSA Data Security to market their patented algorithms. A well known figure in academic crypto circles, Georgetown Professor Dorothy Denning, counters Cypherpunk beliefs by pointing out that "Organized Crime leaders, drug dealers, terrorists, and other criminals could conspire and act with impunity" if electronic surveillance was illegal and authorized agencies did not have access to private keys used in public-key cryptography. The article explores many views and contains a great deal of fascinating information. ----------------------------------------------------------------------

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Re: Escobar and Cellular Ph0n3z
by frode＠toaster.SFSU.EDU 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I don't think encryption will go unnoticed for very long, one doesn't have to have a very high IQ to understand that secrecy is important, and that encruption is a technology which will help keep things secret. In Escobar's case, the thing to do would perhaps have been to hide an encrypted data stream in a normal-sounding conversation? This would be harder to detect for the authorities. The data would probably be text which would require much less bandwith than voice. Notice how our Prez referred to the killing of these two men as heroic and brave? It was two against THOUSANDS, I'm sure they shot him to pieces. :-) (No, I don't think drug use is anything but destructive but it's easy to see that TPTB speak with two (more more) tounges.) - Frode

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Re: The Darkness of Hell
by Black Unicorn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

You know, your article would have been excellent without the typical anti-drug rhetoric. It almost seemed like you were just using the medusa analogy to make cypherpunks the proper forum for your rant. The war on drugs in the United States (which I become more and more hesitant about capitalizing) is the single most effective weapon against privacy today. You really need to seek attention elsewhere. Too bad Melody didn't get some better acid. She'd have saved us all a lot of trouble. Arguement for legalization if you ask me. -uni- (Dark)

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Re: Escobar and Cellular Ph0n3z
by Black Unicorn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I'm not sure about your speculation that the NSA provided the equipment. I have a feeling that it was a third party vendor actually. When cellular was just beginning to be used the FBI came up with a similar box. As I recall it just waitied for certain selected ESN's to go active and then listened to every call they made and/or received. Of course you had to be within range of the car or the cell it was using. The article on the box was in the Chicago Trib. I'll see if I can find it, but I sort of doubt it as I can't really nail down the year in my head. I'll try a nexis search. In any case, the article was boosting third partys and their contrubution to the war on drugs. I might add however, that the equipment did not triangulate. -uni- (Dark)

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Anonymity Offense
by hfinney＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

FYI, here is the number of remailed messages passing through my remailer for the past couple of months. The first number is the number of messages on that day, and the remainder of the line is the date. 2 Sun Oct 3 3 Mon Oct 4 8 Wed Oct 6 1 Thu Oct 7 3 Fri Oct 8 1 Sun Oct 10 1 Tue Oct 12 1 Thu Oct 14 1 Fri Oct 15 2 Mon Oct 18 8 Tue Oct 19 1 Wed Oct 20 3 Thu Oct 21 2 Fri Oct 22 1 Sat Oct 23 1 Sun Oct 24 5 Mon Oct 25 3 Tue Oct 26 9 Wed Oct 27 5 Sat Oct 30 2 Wed Nov 3 3 Thu Nov 4 1 Fri Nov 5 8 Sat Nov 6 1 Sun Nov 7 9 Mon Nov 8 3 Tue Nov 9 10 Wed Nov 10 7 Thu Nov 11 4 Fri Nov 12 1 Sat Nov 13 7 Sun Nov 14 4 Mon Nov 15 5 Tue Nov 16 6 Wed Nov 17 26 Thu Nov 18 1 Fri Nov 19 9 Sat Nov 20 6 Sun Nov 21 2 Mon Nov 22 4 Wed Nov 24 16 Fri Nov 26 10 Sat Nov 27 54 Sun Nov 28 37 Mon Nov 29 36 Tue Nov 30 33 Wed Dec 1 18 Thu Dec 2 19 Fri Dec 3 18 Sat Dec 4 Here is the corresponding table for just encrypted messages. These are included in the counts above. 2 Sun Oct 3 3 Mon Oct 4 2 Wed Oct 6 1 Thu Oct 7 1 Fri Oct 8 1 Thu Oct 14 1 Tue Oct 19 1 Wed Oct 20 3 Thu Oct 21 1 Fri Oct 22 3 Sat Oct 23 1 Sun Oct 24 5 Mon Oct 25 3 Tue Oct 26 9 Wed Oct 27 4 Sat Oct 30 1 Wed Nov 3 1 Fri Nov 5 3 Sat Nov 6 3 Mon Nov 8 2 Tue Nov 9 4 Wed Nov 10 2 Thu Nov 11 1 Fri Nov 12 1 Sat Nov 13 1 Mon Nov 15 1 Tue Nov 16 13 Thu Nov 18 4 Sat Nov 20 3 Sun Nov 21 2 Wed Nov 24 1 Thu Nov 25 8 Fri Nov 26 6 Sat Nov 27 20 Sun Nov 28 22 Mon Nov 29 20 Tue Nov 30 23 Wed Dec 1 11 Thu Dec 2 5 Fri Dec 3 4 Sat Dec 4

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Re: Escobar and Cellular Ph0n3z
by Andrew Loewenstern 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

lex(a)mindvox.phantom.com (Lex Luthor) writes: > This is sophisticated, no question about it. I imagine the > equipment/circuits are available to do all this to the general > U.S. public, but still, I think the NSA probably provided the > equipment as it was probably all integrated together and fairly > idiot-proof to use. Maybe one big box, with a few of these big > boxes being dispersed about the country-side. The FBI used the same stuff a couple of years back to catch the people who kidnapped that Exxon executive. Considering how easy it is to pick up cellular transmissions and the way it works (cells with limited range), I believe it is something well within the resources of the FBI to develop. I really don't think the NSA has much of a hand in any of the things we hear about, unless it has something directly to do with crypto (which this does not, except, as Lex pointed out, that escobar probably should have been using strong crypto...). andrew

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Re: Will I be on a wanted poster?
by Andrew Loewenstern 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> > In my opinion, this is the best example yet since PGP of "cypherpunks > > writing code" because of the implications that this program has > > on privacy. (I'm using it to keep a personal space for my tax > > records, private correspondence, PGP dir, etc.), but Mike's > > suggestion for encrypting an entire BBS itself is a good point. > > What if *every* sysop encrypted their BBS with Secure Drive? > > No more Steve Jackson Games cases. I hope this happens. Computer > theft and unreasonable seizure is a real problem. As far as I know, a system like SecureDrive, KFS, or CFS, is really only as secure as the running machine is. Generally, when a BBS is 'seized' (forfeited? ;), it is running when the feds get there. Right now, if they have any clue (and from what I hear, the FBI has much more of a clue than the SS when it comes to this type of investigation), they usually take pictures of the setup to make sure they can put the machine back together when they get it to wherever they are taking it to. If encrypting file-systems become a problem, a disk could be developed (probably pretty easily) to retrieve the key from memory before they power it down. andrew "Touch that keyboard and die!!"

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Pablo and NSA
by Black Unicorn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Ok, so I take it back. +++ From: theprez(a)whitehouse.gov.com Subject: WE ARE INDEED WATCHING ! Lines: 10 Organization: University of Zurich, Department of Computer Science X-Newsreader: IBM NewsReader/2 v1.00 Date: Fri Dec 03 09:03:21 EST 1993 NEUTERS - Botoga 3.12.93 Police and military officials announced yesterday that they had help from American National Security Agency officials in tracking down Pablo Escobar. The NSA provided Columbian officials with the tools necessary to decipher communication between the Columbian drug lord and his cohorts. Escobar had been communicating by computer using the American Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) software product which was compromised by NSA officials working at a remote listening station in the Columbian jungle. +++ Haw Haw Haw. -uni- (Dark)

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(fwd) Re: Keyserver going down
by ferguson＠icm1.icp.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In light of the recent closure of the .toxicwaste keyserver, I thought that this message from Vess was rather timely. Forwarded message: > From: bontchev(a)fbihh.informatik.uni-hamburg.de (Vesselin Bontchev) > Newsgroups: sci.crypt,alt.security,comp.security.misc,alt.security.pgp,alt.security.keydist > Subject: Re: Keyserver going down > Date: 3 Dec 1993 13:14:21 GMT > Organization: University of Hamburg -- Germany > Message-ID: <2dne3d$ofc(a)rzsun02.rrz.uni-hamburg.de> > References: <WARLORD.93Dec2161745(a)toxicwaste.mit.edu> <gbeCHFxIy.42F(a)netcom.com> <2dn9re$6n5(a)news.mantis.co.uk> > NNTP-Posting-Host: fbihh.informatik.uni-hamburg.de > X-Newsreader: TIN [version 1.2 PL2] > > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > > > Tony Lezard (tony(a)mantis.co.uk) writes: > > > >With both toxicwaste and iastate now out of business, what key servers > > >are still operating? > > > The folling list comes straight from keyserv.doc, in the PGP source files > > Unfortunately, I have the impression that the information there is > slightly out-of-date. I would prefer to get a direct reply to the > question asked from the people who run the keyservers. > > > archive. I must say, although I'm not one for conspicacy theories, the > > sudden and unexplained closure of *two* key servers in such a short time > > does make me a bit ... suspicious. Why were they closed? > > Yes, me too... Two keyservers, both in the USA, both were closed with > no explications given, both were closed rather fast... Is it what > we're all thinking about or are we just paranoid? > > > Internet sites: > > [list deleted] > > I have installed a public key server at our site as an experiment. It > took quite a long time, because I am not root on our machine and a > regular user installing such software is not a trivial task and has > some security implications. > > Till now, our server was syncronized only with one of the US ones. > Now, after two US servers have been closed down, I would like to > activate ours and to syncronise it with all other servers around the > world. It is currently working (you can get and send public keys); it > is just not syncronized with the other servers. > > Could please those who are running such servers and agree to have them > syncronized with ours contact me, so that I can include their site in > my CONFIG file? > > The information for our server is: > > pgp-public-keys(a)fbihh.informatik.uni-hamburg.de > Vesselin Bontchev > bontchev(a)fbihh.informatik.uni-hamburg.de > FTP: ftp.informatik.uni-hamburg.de:/pub/virus/misc/pubkring.pgp > > Requests to the server are processed every 15 minutes. > > Regards, > Vesselin > - -- > Vesselin Vladimirov Bontchev Virus Test Center, University of Hamburg > Tel.:+49-40-54715-224, Fax: +49-40-54715-226 Fachbereich Informatik - AGN > < PGP 2.3 public key available on request. > Vogt-Koelln-Strasse 30, rm. 107 C > e-mail: bontchev(a)fbihh.informatik.uni-hamburg.de 22527 Hamburg, Germany > > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- > Version: 2.3a > > iQCVAgUBLP87VTZWl8Yy3ZjZAQHKIQP9GKbCGpdMNNQwKbWOrg5jk3Cam7YDrcpq > VYLO3p3yJ6JHHDKl/XJBXd4OGwbG6RY9H6E1vyb0VwfGDuwYxH8/1gp/b+Cod5Rb > GilZ9b2OiqornVAvAYwrg6XtsuOOTh1dpHUJB66YRudJ4UCCnju53XQ40V/7mylV > Bzv5idC4Iq0= > =Nl7x > -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- >

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