December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Digital Telephony Threat Returns
by jim＠Tadpole.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Digital Telephony Threat Returns According to FBI Dir. Louis Freeh, the development of sophisticated digital telecom and networking technology threatens the ability of the Feds to wiretap. In a Dec. 8 speech at Washington's National Press Club, Freeh annouced a renewal of the FBI's 'Digital Telephony' legislation scheme: the return of the controverial 'Wiretap Bill'. The bill is strongly opposed by organizations and individuals concerned about privacy, as well as the telecommunications and computing industries at large. The FBI's 'need' for this legislative action is under review by the Administration as part of its examination of security and encryption issues. The reappearance of this Bureau effort contradicts statements by Special Agent Barry Smith of the FBI's Congressional Affairs Office, who stated less than a month ago that the 'Wiretap Bill' had been tabled. According to classified documents released under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), the FBI and the Electronic Communications Service Provider Committee or ECSPC (an ad hoc industry working group, which formed in March), are attempting to decide if technical solutions can be found to satisify law enforcement. According to a Nynex representative co-chairing the group, Kenneth Raymond, no solution has yet been found, but that FBI has yet to prove any solution is needed at all. Raymond likened Freeh's tactics to "yelling out the window" - an attention-getting move that needs some sort of clarifying followup. Though the ECSPC claims to be attempting to evaluate the problem and to solve it "in some reasonable way that is consistent with cost and demand", Raymond indicated that the group considers one 'solution' to be building wiretap access into future telecom hardware - like the Clipper chip backdoor, but a 'feature' of all switch specifications for phone and data lines. This news was just received, and a more detailed analysis and statement from EFF will follow soon.

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Keyservers and anonymous Mailings
by greg＠ideath.goldenbear.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Black Unicorn <uunet!access.digex.net!unicorn> writes: > It seems that PGP keyservers have been attacked of late for > alleged copyright violations. Nice tactic if you are PKP I guess. > Has anyone considered the use of anonymous remailers to run a > keyserver? A double blind keyserver might solve the operator a > good deal of heat. As far as I can tell, the copyright issue exists only in David Sternlight's addled mind; and even he has conceded that he's got no factual basis for asserting that PGP might infringe someone's copyright. I can't tell if his messages about this reflect actual confusion about the difference between patent and copyright, or if he's simply stumbled across another FUD tactic to use against PGP. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.4 iQCVAgUBLQ7bV33YhjZY3fMNAQGG1QP/XbLehbgzvvdsSeN1YSKeKQGoZM0XigBt 0JClAQXHaoMeu2PDh4et7Txhq+IOvhAwrW3xCB+0aEXWiyZ3XGU0Z5rYL4e57/q6 Z5IgeYyPO/5DSIc+45XlwdC24X2MPENvex2IN2dYypGU4fUIff2GxaTW4hc4458u Agno8lsCjs4= =cjSg -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -- Greg Broiles Lemon Detweiler Pledge? greg(a)goldenbear.com You're soaking in it.

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addme
by Ophir Ronen 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi Eric, Please add me to the list. *Thx, -Ophir

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Anonymous Video Rental
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

P>So, when I go to Huntsville Utilities and ask them to turn on the P>power at my house, rather than writing a check or giving them personal P>information, I just tell give them a blinded token which they could P>use to withdraw $X from my account at the Austin-Internet Credit P>Union. As always the UK is ahead of the curve on this one. It is still possible in certain UK apartments to pay gas *and* electricity bills anonymously. The electricity and gas meters have coin boxes on them. You want electricity or gas and you just put the coins it. True. This used to be the standard method of paying for utilities. This is less common for electricity now but any office of British Gas will still sell you plastic "keys" that are shaped like keys. They turn on your gas for a set period of time and presumably break off in the process so they can't be reused. Cutting-edge high tech! DCF "Buy Extra Gas Tokens For the Holidays" Poster inside BG offices this time of year. --- WinQwk 2.0b#1165

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Use foreign key servers
by Pierre Uszynski 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Black Unicorn <unicorn(a)access.digex.net> thus posted: > > It seems that PGP keyservers have been attacked of late for > alleged copyright violations. Nice tactic if you are PKP I guess. > Has anyone considered the use of anonymous remailers to run a > keyserver? A double blind keyserver might solve the operator a > good deal of heat. > (I thought it was a patent problem rather... but that's not the point) Let me know if I'm missing some essential point here, but why are people insisting on running key servers in the US, the only country where there may be a patent claim? I doubt mailers would care one way or the other if you used foreign keyservers. I do understand how some of us would make it their Duty to actively protect their Konstitooshunol Right to run PGP key servers in their Own Country, free from interference from evil commercial and governmental entities :-) (no, really, I understand) but what other reason could there be for that? In this case, to the user, it should not matter where the keyserver if physically located. I'm not really up to speed as to which key servers are running where, but the current versions of PGP being developped outside of the US, there must be a few keyservers here and there. Keys crossing the border cannot be the problem, they are all over Netnews and all over mailing lists too. So, I do not understand why this could be a "nice tactic if you are PKP". Surely they cannot be spending much ressources on this when the easy counter move is to use foreign key servers. I do not understand what reason there is to start (or even develop) keyservers in the US, apart from annoying PKP. Pierre Uszynski pierre(a)shell.portal.com

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Anonymous remailers and keyservers.
by Black Unicorn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

A keyserver that doesn't patent (or copyright? Who told you that?) ()() oops, did I say copyright...? First of all, I wrote the new replacement keyserver and I happen to know it isn't even released yet (except to a handful of people for the purposes of testing portability and ease of installation etc), ()() I hadn't realized that my message implied this. so it is not *possible* that the new sites have been harassed, and I think you should wait until it happens before you start worrying about it. As I've said before, all these keyservers will be doing is *publishing* information, and that's a protected right in the US. ()() Again, I did not mean for my message to so imply, my point was that it was a possbility and considering past behavior, not way beyond PKP. I really wanted to point out that it might be an interesting statement on other internet services (none come to mind which might be the most revealing statement on the applicability of the idea) and the use of anonymous remailers. Now, if pkp choose to start chasing down people who publish their keys and asking them if they have a license (assuming they're in the US and need one), that's a different thing altogether, but that could happen at the moment given that the actual keys are up for ftp all over already. ()() I had not considered this, it was a little beyond the scope of my message. I was more concerned with the operators of the servers not the end users. It's a good point none the less. A keyserver that doesn't patent (or copyright? Who told you that?) infringe *cannot* be closed down even if the people whose keys are published *are* harassed. ()() You use the word *cannot* pretty strictly. I think you mean legally cannot. Consider that the keyservers that have been closed down (if they have...?) may fall into the legally *cannot* be shut down group. They just haven't been tested yet. What I think you mean is legally cannot, as opposed to practically cannot. Political pressure is plenty enough to make university administrators jumpy. Private machines are immune of course (to some extent anyhow). Anyway, the keyservers have to exist for the benefit of both ViaCrypt customers and European FreePGP users. ()() And argueably those who don't hold ViaCrypt licenses. -uni- (Dark)

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Is VIACrypt PGP authorized for use byPKP?
by Syl Miniter 803-768-3759 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I would appreciate some commentary as to whether the VIACRYPT PGP MSDOS package is licensed for use by PKP (Public Key Partners). It is my belief that it is.

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Inman vs. crypto
by smb＠research.att.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Bobby Inman has just been nominated as the new secretary of defense. When he was director of NSA, he was not, as I recall, particularly sympathetic to private-sector cryptography. In fact, he tried to institute a review process for civilian cryptographic papers. His nomination is subject to confirmation by the Senate, after review by the Armed Services committee. While in my opinion it's unlikely that his nomination will be blocked, the hearings would be an excellent time to question him on this subject. Contact your senator (this is for U.S. residents only, of course...), especially if he or she is a member of that committee.

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Digital Cash Session as Worldwide Electrnoic Commerce Conference (fwd)
by szabo＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: From: BAUM(a)HULAW1.HARVARD.EDU Date: Thu, 16 Dec 1993 08:44:21 -0500 (EST) Subject: Digital Cash Session as Worldwide Electrnoic Commerce Conference FYI, a Digital Cash session has been added to the Jan 17-18 Worldwide Electrnoic Commerce Conference: Law, Policy and Controls Conference in NYC at the Waldorf Astoria. Because a number of people on this list might have obtained a copy of the program on some other list, I will only reprint the press release below. PRESS RELEASE Worldwide Electronic Commerce: Law, Policy and Controls Conference announced for January 1994 in NYC Dallas - June 11, 1993: MultiCorp, Inc. today announced Worldwide Electronic Commerce: Law, Policy and Controls Conference, a conference addressing the Legal, Audit and Security aspects of Electronic Data Interchange (EDI), Electronic Commerce and Electronic Messaging. The event is offered in affiliation with the American Bar Association's Section of Science and Technology, Harvard Law School, The Computer Law Association, the EDI Association of the United Kingdom, Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government, the U.S. Council for International Business, National Institute for Standards and Technology, and the University of London's Centre for Commercial Law Studies. This unique event Brings together leading academic and business experts from around the globe on the control issues facing EDI and messaging. Additionally, various industry associations will participate including HEDIC, the Healthcare EDI Corporation. A comprehensive program is planned revolving around over 40 sessions designed to address the issues, opportunities, strategies, status, and future of Electronic Data Interchange (EDI), Electronic Commerce and Electronic Messaging from Legal, Audit and Security perspectives. This program is designed to address the real-world issues and emerging questions encountered by legal professionals, auditors, information managers, EDI professionals, security managers, purchasing managers, sales and marketing executives and others engaged in the developing global information infrastructure. Worldwide Electronic Commerce: Law, Policy and Controls Conference will be held January 17 - 18, 1994 in New York City at the Waldorf=Astoria Hotel. The price of registration is $550.00 per attendee. Parties interested in attending, acquiring sponsorships, or speaking should contact the conference coordinator at (214) 516-4900 or by fax at (214) 475-5917. The conference group can also be reached at: 76520.3713(a)compuserve.com. ***

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Bobby Inman
by karn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In case you haven't been following the news for the past two days or so, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin has resigned, and Clinton has already nominated Bobby Inman, a retired 4-star Navy admiral, as his replacement. Inman was NSA director during the Carter administration. He is probably best known for his outspoken calls for draconian laws regulating private cryptography. He wanted all cryptographic research, public or private, to be "born classified", just like nuclear weapons, with NSA given authority over all publications. He lost, of course, but his becoming Secretary of Defense just as the issue of private crypto regulation is coming to a head again does not bode well at all. Phil

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