December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

yet another thing tacked on to my slocal
by hh＠cicada.berkeley.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

You can get the ordering info about the Cypherpunks T shirt by sending mail to hh(a)soda.berkeley.edu with "tshirt-info" (spelling counts!) in the subject line. This is part of my plot to subvert all Internet protocols and just use Port 25 for everything. e

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Am. Bar Ass'n Information Security Committee Meeting (fwd)
by remail＠tamsun.tamu.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Here's a crypto-EDI/legal mini-conference announcement from the Electronic Data Interchange Issues <EDI-L(a)UCCVMA.UCOP.EDU> list. This is a great list for issues of networked-based commerce and security practicum. Forwarded message: Date: Fri, 7 Jan 1994 09:45:57 -0500 Sender: Electronic Data Interchange Issues <EDI-L(a)UCCVMA.UCOP.EDU> From: Michael Baum <BAUM%HULAW1.bitnet(a)UCCVMA.UCOP.EDU> Subject: Am. Bar Ass'n Information Security Committee Meeting Announcement To: Multiple recipients of list EDI-L <EDI-L(a)UCCVMA.UCOP.EDU> **Posted For Information Purposes Only** Please correspond to: Michael S. Baum, Esq. 33 Tremont Street Cambridge, MA 02139-1227 Tel: 617/661-1234 Fax: 617/661-0716 Email: baum(a)hulaw1.harvard.edu Subject: ** Notice and Invitation ** Certification Authority Work Group Notarization and nonrepudiation Work Group Information Security Committee, EDI/IT Division Section of Science and Technology You are cordially invited to participate in a meeting of the above- referenced work groups of the Information Security Committee on Wednesday-Thursday, January 19-20, 1994. These interdisciplinary work groups will continue to address conventional and electronic notarization and certification authority issues. The meetings are focused around the work product of its respective participants and will be highly results driven. At the last meeting, further progress was made on the development of "Model Certification Authority Guidelines/Rules of Practice ("Guideline") to provide a legal framework for the use of certificate- based public key cryptography. Also, proposals were further debated and developed including for: (i) the creation of a new ABA accreditation/- specialization "attorney-notary;" (ii) a "Clipper Resolution;" and (iii) alternative dispute resolution for CAs. Professor Carl Felsenfeld has secured the use of the Faculty Reading Room of Fordham Law School in New York City. The meeting agenda and logistics are attached. I look forward to seeing you in New York. Sincerely, Michael S. Baum Chair, Information Security Committee and EDI/IT Division cc: Joe Potenza, Section Chair Council, Division and Committee Chairs attachment Information Security Committee EDI and Information Technology Division Section of Science and Technology American Bar Association Certification Authority Work Group Notarization and Nonrepudiation Work Group January 19-20, 1994 TENTATIVE AGENDA Wed. Jan. 19, 1994 8:30- 9:00 Continental breakfast and registration. 9:00- 9:30 Participant introductions, meeting logistics and questions. 9:30-10:30 Presentation of revised notary and accreditation proposals. 10:30-10:45 Break. 10:45-12:30 Review of revised draft Guideline outline; presentation on identity credentials; break-out session on contributions. 12:30-13:30 Lunch & informal presentation - TBD. 13:30-15:00 Report from break-out session; drafting sessions. 15:00-15:15 Break. 15:15-16:45 Update on computer-based powers of attorney; continuation of Guideline contribution presentations and discussion. 16:45-17:00 Wrap-up. Thurs. Jan. 20, 1994 8:30- 9:00 Continental breakfast and registration. 9:00-10:30 Break-out sessions on Guideline. 10:30-10:45 Break. 10:45-12:30 Additional presentation by contributors to the Guideline; Review of outline and contributions. 12:30-13:30 Lunch & informal presentation - TBD. 13:30-15:00 Review of Meeting Work Product and "mid-course corrections." 15:00-15:45 Break. 15:15-16:15 Presentation and Update of Clipper-Capstone Resolution; presentation of revised proposal/resolutions (Notarial, etc.). Report on Dec. '93 WG meeting on Digital Signature Legislation. 16:45-17:00 New Work Group assignments; wrap-up. Certification Authority Work Group Notarization and Nonrepudiation Work Group Information Security Committee January 19-20, 1994 Meeting Details Papers: All prior participants who plan to attend must submit their agreed upon contributions ASAP to: baum(a)hulaw1.harvard.edu and please bring a copy of the contribution to the meeting on disk. First-time participants (who plan to attend the January 19-20 meeting) must submit a brief paper (~3 pages in length) relevant to the subject matter or discuss their planned contribution to the committee (please contact Michael Baum for details). A binder of prior papers will be presen to new participants during registration. Prior participants are requested to bring their Work Group binders. Meeting Location: Faculty Reading Room - 4th Floor Fordham Law School 140 West 62nd Street New York, NY (enter btwn. Amsterdam and Columbus Aves.) (this is adjacent to Lincoln Center) Phone: 212-636-6856 (Prof. Carl Felsenfeld) Fax: 212-636-6899 (Law School Faculty Office) Meals: Continental breakfast and refreshments during the breaks will be served as well as a light lunch (at cost). Hotels: The closest hotel to the meeting is the Radisson Empire Hotel at 44 West 63rd Street, New York, NY 10023 Ph: +1 212-265-7400 Fax: +1 212-314-0349). However, you may want to take advantage of the conference discount provided for the Worldwide Electronic Commerce conference being held at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel, Ph: 212-355-3000 (hotel reservations). I am informed that the Waldorf's conference discount will continue for the duration of the Information Security Committee Meeting. R.S.V.P. Please notify the ABA to RSVP. Also, please send a biography (new participants) and confirmation of your intention to participate to Ann Kowalski, Section Manager, Section of Science and Technology (ABA Chicago 312-988-6281 or kowalskya(a)attmail.com) as soon as possible. *** END *** ------------------------------------------------------------------------- To find out more about this anonymous remail service, send mail to remail(a)tamsun.tamu.edu with the word "remail help" as the only words in the subject field.

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IIA
by szabo＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Newsgroups: alt.internet.services >Path: netcom.com!csus.edu!wupost!howland.reston.ans.net!newsserver.jvnc.net!jvnc.net!johnson >From: johnson(a)tigger.jvnc.net (Steven L. Johnson) >Subject: Re: IIA >Message-ID: <1994Jan9.221436.5417(a)tigger.jvnc.net> >Originator: johnson(a)nisc.jvnc.net >Sender: news(a)tigger.jvnc.net (Zee News Genie) >Nntp-Posting-Host: nisc.jvnc.net >Organization: JvNCnet >References: <1.8248.1623.0N27B602(a)satalink.com> >Date: Sun, 9 Jan 1994 22:14:36 GMT >Lines: 20 ???@??? (Mike Fieschko) writes: >MF> + gulfa:/u/john 105> whois iia.org >MF> >MF> + International Internet Association (IIA2-DOM) >MF> + 30 South First Avenue >MF> + Highland Park, NJ 08904 >MF> Well, well. I grew up in Highland Park, a small town across the Raritan >MF> River from New Brunswick. I _believe_ the building on South First is in a >MF> residential area. 30 South First is a blue two story residence complete with Volvo in the driveway and Winnebago (or some such similar beast) in the back yard. There are no signs or markings for IIA (or Intellicom/icm.com, which shares this same address according to whois). There is a single mailbox which has no name on it, personal or company. -Steve "with obviously not enough to do."

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a simple guide to my remailer
by Eric Hollander 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Here's the Official Guide to the hh remailer. Please post this wherever you think people will find it useful. ----- How to use the hh(a)soda.berkeley.edu Usenet poster and Anonymous Remailer by Eric Hollander This document describes some of the special features of the hh(a)soda.berkeley.edu remailer. Because this remailer is essentially just a modification of the standard Cypherpunk's Remailer, I recomend that you also read soda.berkeley.edu:/pub/cypherpunks/remailer/hal's.remailer.gz. = What does this remailer do? This remailer allows anyone who can send mail to post to Usenet newsgroups, and also to send mail to anyone else on the Internet. Both of these functions can be anonymous (the identity of the sender is hidden from the recipient) or non-anonymous (the identity of the sender is known to the recipient). = Why is this remailer different from the standard Cypherpunks remailers? The main difference between this remailer and the other Cypherpunk remailers is that this remailer allows posting to all Usenet newsgroups, either anonymously, or non-anonymously. It also has the regular remailer functions of forwarding mail, either anonymously or non-anonymously (nonymously?). The other minor difference is that this remailer adds a random time delay for anonymous mail and posting. = A note about header fields This remailer/poster looks at the header of the mail you send it to decide what to do. Some mail programs don't allow easy editting of the header. If your program doesn't allow editting of the header, you can still use the remailer. To do this, send mail in the normal way, but start your message like this: :: Anon-Post-To: rec.fish leaving no blank lines before the :: and a blank line after the header field to be inserted. The remailer will consider the line after the :: to be a part of the header. All of the instructions bellow can be used with actual header fields or the :: format. = How do I use this remailer to anonymously post to Usenet? Send mail to hh(a)soda.berkeley.edu with a header like this: To: hh(a)soda.berkeley.edu Anon-Post-To: rec.fish Subject: I flushed a fish on Friday On Friday, I did a terrible thing, so I'm posting this anonymously... This message will be posted to rec.fish, with nothing to indicate who was the original sender. Only the Subject field will be retained; everything else in the header will be discarded. = How do I post non-anonymously? Send mail like this: To: hh(a)soda.berkeley.edu Post-To: rec.fish Subject: flushing fish How despicable of you to flush a fish! This will be posted to rec.fish non-anonymously; the From and Subject fields will be retained in the post. = Crossposting To crosspost, simply list the newsgroups, separated by commas, with no spaces, like this: Anon-Post-To: rec.fish,alt.ketchup Note that excessive crossposting is an abuse of the net. Some people have to pay for their news, and they don't want to read "how to make money fast" in rec.fish. = Testing I recomend that you post test messages to make sure you are using the remailer properly. Please post these messages to the appropriate test groups (alt.test, rec.test, etc). Also, if you post non-anonymously to a test group, many sites will send you mail confirming that they have received the post. To avoid this, put the word "ignore" in the subject line. = Anonymous mail This remailer is capable of sending anonymous mail. To send mail to foo(a)bar.com, send a message like this: To: hh(a)soda.berkeley.edu Anon-Send-To: foo(a)bar.com Subject: Ronald Sukenick I think you should read something by Ronald Sukenick. and foo(a)bar.com will recieve the message, without knowing who sent it. = Non-anonymous mail forwarding This remailer supports non-anonymous mail forwarding. To use this feature, send mail like this: To: hh(a)soda.berkeley.edu Send-To: foo(a)bar.com Subject: you know who I am This mail is from me! = Testing mail Please test the anonymous remailer functions before you use it "for real" by sending mail to yourself or a friend. = Chaining, encryption, and other issues These features are discussed in detail in soda.berkeley.edu:/pub/cypherpunks/remailer/hal's.remailer.gz. While you're looking at that file, you might also want to check out PGP in /pub/cypherpunks/pgp. If you haven't installed PGP on your machine yet, you should try it out. This remailer doesn't yet support encryption, but it's coming soon. = Remailer abuse This remailer has been abused in the past, mostly by users hiding behind anonymity to harass other users. I will take steps to squish users who do this. Lets keep the net a friendly and productive place. = A note to ucb users This remailer allows posting to ucb.* newsgroups. = If you have other questions or problems send normal mail (without any of the above headers) to hh(a)soda.berkeley.edu. = Copyright This file is copyright 1994 Eric Hollander, all rights reserved. You are free to distribute this information in electronic format provided that the contents are unchanged and this copyright notice remains attached. = Disclaimer This remailer is not endorsed in any way by the University of California. I, Eric Hollander, take no responsibility for the content of posts or messages, and I take no responsibility for the consequences of using my remailer. For example, if you post anonymously, and someone manages to trace it back to you, I am not responsible.

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No Subject
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Noone persists in the belief that absolutely no "psuedospoofing" is occurring on Cypherpunks. What is patently obvious, however, is that Detweiler makes wild and unsubstantiated charges against others. Please send me a small selection of his 1000 messsages that he feels prove the charges he has been making. Otherwise, let him keep his delusions to himself. His behaviour concerning these absurd claims that Tim May and Eric Hughes (neither of whom I have met) are criminals is completely unacceptable to reasonable people. I urge Detweiler to bring forth proof or shut up. Has he ever considered how sociopathic it is for him to whine about how painful a particular letter or article is to him and yet he never seems to care about the hurt he's causing with his apparently groundless charges concerning TC May, Eric Hughes, and Cypherpunks list members in general ???? Jeremy Anderson Freelance programmer and Chinese translator jeremy(a)cyberspace.com PGP public key available on request Good cheer and smiles dispensed freely

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retraction re: triple-DES
by Carl Ellison 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Some of you may remember that I was promoting triple-DES-CBC using three feedback loops rather than one, claiming that is was clearly at least as secure as triple-DES with one feedback loop, while being faster for pipelined operation. It is clearly faster in a pipeline but Eli Biham has shown me his attack on inner-loop triple-DES and it's quite good and I was quite wrong...at least for chosen-ciphertext attacks. The inner loops weaken the resulting cipher drastically, under those attacks. I might still use the inner loops to get longer brute force attacks (as noted by Burt Kaliski in a posting here a while ago), if I knew that chosen-ciphertext attacks couldn't happen, but my original claim is clearly wrong and I thank Eli for pointing that out. Meanwhile, there are probably better ways to get the longer key for avoiding brute force (eg., XOR with a single secret value or with a simple (fast) PRNG). I'm told that Eli has a paper in preparation explaining his attack in full and I'm looking forward to that paper. I am sure that its location will be announced to this list when it becomes available. - Carl

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Re: Public key encryption, income tax and government
by Carl Ellison 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PRIVACY-ENHANCED MESSAGE----- Proc-Type: 2001,MIC-CLEAR Originator-Name: cme(a)sw.stratus.com Originator-Key-Asymmetric: MIGbMAoGBFUIAQECAgP+A4GMADCBiAKBgCl79/jl0DEVl1GQzOHlzjDmChDDxnWO Acd7jShj2x1vclFh6vbHx9IJqkQdwNhNAWf8XnTrqBDN+VSBc1qdT6nSEAbNPxHD XcvY2DudhuRaRBVLgUQ4scTK657m90Q+bTL5yIh2MaFipUw9BgbIXPTDlksSskWP 9oHjo+pCJC+lAgMBAAE= MIC-Info: RSA-MD5,RSA, C3gMSFO0aMHOYmm5S1biubEdUqIq8HEhOvSHO8n/+DqknxLju55dTCcI43u6rhH9 Nh6A0d8+9rZFi1P+sNAJ/kk0ory5q144Chg1z1Aukf/uLrhDLYkZZhplL0tFSi5y YWmf6jzlH5I6tcTzMbpf5/5iHFsgLiFJ0LVFn1rYwTY= In article <jdurr-100194200236(a)nubs92.ccs.itd.umich.edu> jdurr(a)eland.com (J. Durr) writes: > >from Strategic Investment, p 11, November 11 1993 > >Escape to Cypherspace: >The Information Revolution and the demise of the income tax > >by James Bennett > >The ultimate revenge of the Nerds > > Readers of Strategic Investment are already aware of the crucial >role of the microchip in eroding the power of governments over their >citizens. Recent developments herald an expansion of this role that >promises to dwarf the effects seen to date. >[...] in >the coming decade, it may create consequences which change the life of >everyone on the planet more than the atomic bomb. Mr. Bennett is clearly a victim of the popular impression that privacy is somehow new. Anything which can be done with public key encryption can be done already with private communications (whispers, notes which are mailed and destroyed, secret mail drops, couriers, secret-key encryption, ...). All the hype over cryptoanarchy is overblown. We are capable of anarchy, income tax evasion and secret bank accounts today. Look around you. How much of that do you see in your own life? What makes you think that you'll see any more of it in 10 years? - Carl P.S. His claim that RSA markets RIPEM was humorous -- but sad. Maybe it's always like this when the general public gets interested in something technical. -----END PRIVACY-ENHANCED MESSAGE-----

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amusing quote
by doug＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I found this quote amusing: >obviously, I don't give a damn, do I? somehow my life has become far more >exciting now that I have so many enemies and have discovered all their >blackest secrets. I've been keeping out of the Detweiler fray, and wouldn't ordinarily quote him, but this is unusual...I'm taking him at face value here; that probably *is* the source of his motivation for all his frothing at the mouth. Paranoia is entertaining to him. The quote comes from talk.politics.crypto, where I was grazing the other day. Doug -- Doug Merritt doug(a)netcom.com Professional Wild-eyed Visionary Member, Crusaders for a Better Tomorrow Unicode Novis Cypherpunks Gutenberg Wavelets Conlang Logli Alife HC_III Computational linguistics Fundamental physics Cogsci SF GA VR CASE TLAs

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Weak Random Number Generators
by doug＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

jerry(a)terminus.dell.com a while ago said he'd made a hardware random number generator, and offered to send out data generated by it, inviting people to look for weaknesses. I followed up on that and found problems with one of the two sets of data he sent (files a.bin and b.bin, one produced with his hardware and one with a software RNG, but which is which was not identified). He apparently is too busy to acknowledge my response, so I thought I'd post the results I emailed him here, for those of you interested in weaknesses of RNG's. The weakness is shown via ascii graphics of the results of the analysis, which makes it accessible and intuitive. -------------- included message ------------------ As I suspected, it only took a few minutes of programming to find periodicity in the phase space. The set you called "a.bin" is the one that shows a great deal of obvious structure. The intrinsic resonance is related to powers of two (I haven't figured it out more closely than that), which is what one might expect from software methods, but less likely from hardware methods (unless there's a power-of-two bias introduced by an ADC). On the other hand, I may be seeing structure in your psuedo-random number generator...they're notoriously bad unless you went out of your way to find a really really good one. The b.bin file appeared ergodic, almost completely filling the 2d phase space I picked as an easy-to-implement test. I may try another few tests shortly. For your amusement, I produced two psuedo-RNG files, one using the ancient and decrepit rand() function, well known to be a very poor source of randomness (c.bin), and one using the more carefully constructed BSD Unix random() function (d.bin). The latter also has its flaws, but they are far better hidden than those of rand(). Note that c.bin is even more grossly flawed (structured) than your a.bin. Meanwhile, if a.bin happens to be from your software RNG rather than from your hardware RNG, then you need a new one! I have one of the better ones lying around somewhere, let me know if you need it. Below is what I saw from my crude-ascii graphics output from the four test sets. If you think this would be of interest to cypherpunks, feel free to post this there...or tell me to. Doug (Note that I'm using a 35 by 80 window to view these) 2811> ran < a.bin . . .... . . .... . . ..... . ... . . . . ... .... . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .... . . . .... . ....... . .... ... ... .... .. ..... . ..... .... . ..... . ..... . ..... . .... . .... . . .... .... . ... . . ... . .. . . . .. . . . . .. .. ... . . ..... . . ..... . ..... . .... . . ....... ...... ..... ... . . ..... . ..... . ..... .... 2812> ran < b.bin ........................................................... .... . .............................................................. ..................................... .......................... ................................................................ ...................................... ......................... ..................... .......................................... ................................................................ ........................................ ....................... ................................................................ ................................................................ .................... ................. ......................... ................................................................ .......................................... ..................... ................................................................ .................................... ........................ .. ............................. .................................. ............................................. .................. ................................................................ ................................................................ ................................ ............................... ................................................................ ......... ..................................................... ............................ ................................... .......................... ..................................... ................................................................ ................................................................ ........... .................................................... ................... ............................................ .......................... ..................................... ................................................................ ................................................................ .............................................................. . 2813> ran < c.bin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2814> ran < d.bin ................................................................ ................................................................ ... ............................................... ....... .... ........................................................... .... ................................................................ ........................................................ ....... ................................................................ ................................................................ ................................................. .............. ...................................... ......................... ................................................................ ............ ................................................... ................................................................ ................................................................ ................................................................ ................................................................ ................................................................ ................................................................ ................................................................ ............... ................................................ ................................................................ ................................................................ ................................................................ ................................................................ ................................................................ ................................................................ .......................... ................ .................... ................................................... ............ ................................................................ ................................................................ ................................................................ ................................................................ -------------- end included message -------------

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No Subject
by ltech1!ltech1!mercury＠heifetz.msen.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

unsubscribe

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