December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: NPR?
by doug＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

DON_HENSON(a)delphi.com said: >I'm in favor of getting the word out on the Clipper/Skipjack problem but >I don't think sending a note to NPR is going to do it. They have a long >history of extremely biased (toward the government view) reporting. So phrase it in a slick way that gets past their bias. For instance, lie and say that "other government agencies are concerned that..." Anyone biased towards the govt will be willing to believe that some part of it is a benevolent avuncular sort. It's part of that mind set. Doug

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Re: Single Value Pseudonyms
by Karl Lui Barrus 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Karl Barrus posted this, and I've been meaning to respond to it. > Basically Karl's scheme doesn't work. With any cut-and-choose > protocol, there must be some assurance that the two things offered What? It doesn't work? Care to elaborate? I mean, a person can satisfy to any degree desired that the last unblinded document is of a particular value. I agree that it becomes real expensive to do so, and for digital banking purposes, there are several alternatives: 1) all cash is of same denomination, 2) different exponents for different denominations, 3) different keys for different denominations. I think I mentioned the application towards digital cash is a bit forced because of the above. The real point is in avoiding signing a blinded document that is later unblinded to reveal something undesirable, in which case the signature and the document signed have value. The application of cut-and-choose I described applies best when for some reason (poor choices of the bank?) the document itself contains value, like the denomination it represents. -- Karl L. Barrus: klbarrus(a)owlnet.rice.edu keyID: 5AD633 hash: D1 59 9D 48 72 E9 19 D5 3D F3 93 7E 81 B5 CC 32 "One man's mnemonic is another man's cryptography" - my compilers prof discussing file naming in public directories

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Re: PGP in Fidonet
by doug＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> I know of no case in which a >sysop has been "arrested" merely because of allowing so-called "illegal >traffic" that he or she didn't know about. Some time back (maybe quite a long time ago, I forget) I heard rumors that a BBS that someone had uploaded child porn or some such to, without the sysop's knowledge, resulted in the sysop's arrest. Was that merely a rumor? Or is that a different category than the mail traffic you're commenting on? Doug

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ECPA and Remailers?
by hfinney＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Not being a lawyer (despite my recent spate of "legal" posts, which were based on several hours browsing through the library), I wonder whether any provisions of the ECPA would apply to anonymous remailers. Several operators keep logs of messages and read them, occasionally rebuking or perhaps even blocking users who send inappropriate messages. (As far as I know, no cypherpunks have done blocking, but other remailer operators have. Several cypherpunks have said they read messages.) My feeling is that it is better for me as a remailer operator to have as little to do with the content of the messages as possible. I just don't want to know. If someone complains I will have, to the best of my ability, NO POSSIBILITY of breaking the anonymity of the message they were upset about. Paradoxically, this very blindness to the content of messages will, I hope, protect me if and when abusive or illegal messages are sent. Frankly, I find it paradoxical for remailer operators to try to keep secret information which will allow them to break the very service they are providing, anonymity. I think it represents confusion about just what they are trying to accomplish. And I think it could even get them into trouble if illegal messages go through their systems. Like the Fido sysops, in trying to protect themselves they may be exposing themselves to even more liability. Hal Finney hfinney(a)shell.portal.com

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FBI on BBS operator liability (fwd)
by L. Detweiler 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

also from Computer underground Digest Sun Oct 3 1993 Volume 5 : Issue 77 ISSN 1004-042X ===cut=here=== Date: Thu, 30 Sep 1993 11:38:00 -0400 (EDT) From: "Daniel P. Lieber - (617) 642-7697." <LIEBER_DANI(a)BENTLEY.EDU> Subject: File 4--Summary of BBLISA meeting (CuD 5.75) Account of BBLISA Meeting (posted in CuD #5.75) On Wed., Sept. 29, the BBLISA (Back Bay [Boston] Large Installation Systems Administration Group) group had their monthly meeting where they hosted both an FBI agent and a federal prosecutor from the U.S. Attorney General's office. Both speakers were knowledgeable about the subject and tried to answer all of the questions that they could. (I am omitting names as I am not sure of the correct spelling or titles -- both were substitutes for the original speakers.) After a brief welcoming by the leader of the group, the prosecutor spoke extensively on the different types of intruders into systems. Her particular area of expertise in the field of "computer crime" is with kiddie porn. However, she was knowledgeable on the major topic at hand -- intrusions. The most common and least threatening type of break-in artists are the solo hackers and crackers (usually young males) who break into systems for the thrill and to brag about their accomplishment. Usually, they cause little or no damage and no crime is prosecutable (just utilizing resources is not prosecutable). By far, the most serious threat is internal. Disgruntled workers and recently dismissed employees cause the most damage and are usually motivated by revenge and want to inflict injury. The third type of intrusion, for-profit, is growing rapidly. This includes bank and ATM fraud, among other types of information theft. The FBI agent relayed stories about cases he has worked on and the scope of the FBI office in Boston. To be investigatable by the FBI, a monetary or equivalent loss must be $100,000 or the loss must be shared amongst many different parties. He also informed us that there are no agents that just cruise around BBSs looking for crime. The FBI is too busy to do that. From the information discussed at the meeting, there were some conclusions and suggestions that were brought out: * System banners informing all users that unauthorized access is prohibited and that privacy is limited are helpful. * E-mail is usually considered private unless specifically stated otherwise. * System administrators are not obligated to report illegal activities that they detect on their systems. * Law enforcement does not like to confiscate systems and will usually get the information out of the machine without taking it. * To be prosecuted for a crime utilizing a computer, the defendant must have prior knowledge of the criminal materials or intent. For more information on BBLISA, send a message to majordomo(a)cs.umb.edu with the subject line: subscribe bblisa. Next month's meeting will discuss large-site Internet services. --Daniel Lieber, Systems Manager- _The Vanguard_ at Bentley College

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Elm 2.4 patch
by nate＠VIS.ColoState.EDU 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I have written an Elm 2.4 patch for remailing, anon service, and signing/encrypting of mail. ftp://129.82.156.104/pub/elmhack/* - -nate - -- +-------------------------------------------------------------------- | Nate Sammons email: nate(a)VIS.ColoState.Edu | Colorado State University Computer Visualization Laboratory | Finger nate(a)monet.VIS.ColoState.Edu for my PGP key | #include <std.disclaimer> | Always remember "Brazil"

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Another application for stego (was POISON PILL)
by remail＠tamsun.tamu.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Matthew Gream: > ....if you have something > you _don't_ want found, then simply encrypting it leaving it sitting on > your system is probably not going to work. You may decide not to answer > any questions about it, you may refuse and so on, but they are going to > want the magic little key and keep pressing (maybe while you are under > oath). To prevent any of this occuring, the best approach (in my mind) is > to encrypt it into a form that will never be suspect as anything more than > harmless, trivial, information. Interesting: an application of steganography that is quite useful even where crypto is legal.

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Re: NPR?
by Christian Void 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Sun, 3 Oct 1993, L. Detweiler wrote: > >Has anyone considered forwarding and/or send NPR an information packet to > >help bring the encryption/clipper issues to the general public, or is that > >looked upon as a bad idea? > > I think I may have called them once. didn't get a call back. ^^^^^^ They do have a mail address via AOL, and IMHO are not biased towards anything except the left wing. Getting them to discuss the Clipper/Crypto issue on the science program could help get it out in the open in a positive manner, rather than waiting for someone to have his equipment/life seized, or some other such thing making it's way into the mainstream, and thus causing the general public to be biased towards the government (which is what we don't want). Christian Void /T71 | "I don't like it, and I'm sorry I | VMResearch, Inc. cvoid(a)netcom.COM | ever had anything to do with it." | P.O. Box 170213 Tel. 1+415-807-5491 | -Erwin Schrodinger (1887-1961) | SF, CA 94117 * PGP v2.3a Public Key Available Via Finger *

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Re: FBI on BBS operator liability (fwd)
by smb＠research.att.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

(just utilizing resources is not prosecutable). It's worth mentioning that that's true of Federal law, but isn't necessarily true of state law. For example, California Penal Code section 502 provides for the conviction of anyone who ``knowingly and without permission accesses or causes to be accessed any computer, computer system, or computer network''. Some other states have similar provisions. --Steve Bellovin

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...
by Martin.Greifer＠f28.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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