December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

List of reliable remailers
by Raph Levien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I have written and installed a remailer pinging script which collects detailed information about remailer features and reliability. To use it, just finger remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu There is also a Web version of the same information, at: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html Please let me know about any other remailers which I missed. I've only included remailers which can mail to arbitrary addresses, so I already know chop and twwells are missing. This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP encrypting client for outgoing mail, which is available at: ftp://kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu/pub/raph/premail-0.20.tar.gz This is the current info: REMAILER LIST This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration options and special features for each of the remailers. The second part shows the 10-day history, and average latency and uptime for each remailer. You can also get this list by fingering remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu. $remailer{"chaos"} = "<remailer(a)chaos.bsu.edu> cpunk hash ksub"; $remailer{"vox"} = "<remail(a)vox.hacktic.nl> cpunk oldpgp."; $remailer{"avox"} = "<anon(a)vox.hacktic.nl> cpunk oldpgp"; $remailer{"extropia"} = "<remail(a)extropia.wimsey.com> cpunk pgp special"; $remailer{"kaiwan"} = "<ghio(a)kaiwan.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut"; $remailer{"portal"} = "<hfinney(a)shell.portal.com> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"alumni"} = "<hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"bsu-cs"} = "<nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu> cpunk hash ksub"; $remailer{"rebma"} = "<remailer(a)rebma.mn.org> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"jpunix"} = "<remailer(a)jpunix.com> cpunk hash"; $remailer{"wien"} = "<remailer(a)ds1.wu-wien.ac.at> cpunk pgp hash nsub"; $remailer{"c2"} = "<remail(a)c2.org> eric pgp hash"; $remailer{"soda"} = "<remailer(a)csua.berkeley.edu> eric pgp."; $remailer{"penet"} = "<anon(a)anon.penet.fi> penet"; $remailer{"ideath"} = "<remailer(a)ideath.goldenbear.com> cpunk hash ksub"; $remailer{"usura"} = "<usura(a)hacktic.nl> cpunk pgp hash latent cut"; $remailer{"leri"} = "<remail(a)leri.edu> cpunk pgp hash"; Last ping: Mon 29 Aug 94 6:00:01 PDT remailer email address history latency uptime ----------------------------------------------------------------------- kaiwan ghio(a)kaiwan.com ####*+**+*** 4:21 99.99% portal hfinney(a)shell.portal.com #####*#***+* 4:54 99.99% jpunix remailer(a)jpunix.com ####******+* 6:35 99.99% wien remailer(a)ds1.wu-wien.ac.at ####*****-** 10:32 99.99% alumni hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu ####******+* 7:30 99.99% usura usura(a)hacktic.nl ##*#-******* 13:35 99.99% bsu-cs nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu ##-#**##**++ 18:22 99.99% extropia remail(a)extropia.wimsey.com ****++++--++ 1:13:54 99.99% vox remail(a)vox.hacktic.nl ----------- 7:04:23 99.99% c2 remail(a)c2.org ***++-+-.-++ 2:33:05 99.97% chaos remailer(a)chaos.bsu.edu ### *###*#** 0:58 99.56% ideath remailer(a)ideath.goldenbear.com ###+*+****-* 40:42 99.27% leri remail(a)leri.edu ###*++*--+* 1:41:41 99.03% soda remailer(a)csua.berkeley.edu +*-+++++++++ 1:30:41 97.61% rebma remailer(a)rebma.mn.org ----+ 5:46:02 64.79% penet anon(a)anon.penet.fi __ ._. 45:04:39 26.55% Suggested path: jpunix;portal;kaiwan For more info: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html Options and features cpunk A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To: field. eric A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead. penet The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses X-Anon-To: in the header. pgp Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email address, should be used as the encryption key ID. oldpgp Remailer does not like messages encoded with MIT PGP 2.6. Other versions of PGP, including 2.3a and 2.6ui, work fine. hash Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of outgoing messages. ksub Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode. nsub Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode. latent Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option. cut Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option. special Accepts only pgp encrypted messages. History key * # response in less than 5 minutes. * * response in less than 1 hour. * + response in less than 4 hours. * - response in less than 24 hours. * . response in more than 1 day. * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days). If you've got a Web page, please feel free to include a link to this page. If you think your Web page is relevant to the subject of remailers, let me know and I'll link it in. Comments and suggestions welcome! Note to remailer operators: this script generates hourly ping messages. If you don't want that, let me know and I will take your mailer off the list, or increase the interval between pings. Raph Levien

1 0

Re: Cypherpunk U
by Ryan Lackey 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I think any of the schools which have been mentioned are great for undergrad. After being at MIT for a while (and now being eited by financial reasons, hopefully to be resolved before fall...), I learned to really appreciate the research programs offered by some universities to undergrads -- MIT has a really good program in that area, I'm not sure about the others. I think if there were one thing which I used to pick an undergrad school again, it would be the potential to get involved in faculty research. At MIT, the media lab does a fair amount of applied cryptology, and there is of course the theoretical computing lab which does a lot of application and theory. It's not that hard to get in, either. After all, I got in. There are a few useful tricks for your application -- email me if you'd like help. One of the big annoying parts of going to MIT is that firearms are banned from college campuses (except at ranges) in the state. Sigh. --- Ryan Lackey rdl(a)mit.edu 3 Ames St http://mit.edu/rdl/www/ Cambridge, MA 02142

1 0

A Different EFF on DigiTel Bill
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Mike Godwin of EFF attacks the Digital Telephony Bill by challenging Professor Denning's advocacy in the September Internet World. (If anyone cares, Mike posts zingers and unhealthy thoughts like c'punks' regularly on list Cyberia-L.) John

1 0

send info
by TomHyphen＠aol.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

send info cypherpunks tomhyphen(a)aol.com tom steinert-threlkeld

1 0

technical information on Clipper
by smb＠research.att.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

------- Forwarded Message Return-Path: ISL.Stanford.EDU!hellman Received: by research.att.com; Sun Apr 18 02:06 EDT 1993 Received: by inet.att.com; Sun Apr 18 02:06 EDT 1993 Received: by ISL.Stanford.EDU (4.1/25-eef) id AA22827; Sat, 17 Apr 93 23:05:23 PDT Date: Sat, 17 Apr 93 23:05:23 PDT From: "Martin Hellman" <hellman(a)isl.stanford.edu> Message-Id: <9304180605.AA22827(a)ISL.Stanford.EDU> To: DAVIDNEWMANPC(a)mcimail.com, NORMILE.J(a)applelink.apple.com, adw(a)research.att.com, amo(a)research.att.com, bach(a)cs.wisc.edu, berson(a)sri.com, biham(a)cs.technion.ac.il, branstad(a)st1.ncsl.nist.gov, brassard(a)iro.umontreal.ca, burt(a)rsa.com, carl(a)joe.math.uga.edu, caronni(a)nessie.cs.id.ethz.ch, clipper(a)csrc.ncsl.nist.gov, denning(a)cs.cosc.georgetown.edu, diffie(a)eng.sun.com, eor(a)ISL.Stanford.EDU, erdmann@leland, fahn@cs, gfung%ccm.UManitoba.CA(a)cornellc.cit.cornell.edu, gill(a)ISL.Stanford.EDU, gormish(a)ISL.Stanford.EDU, infort%czheth5a.BITNET(a)forsythe.stanford.edu, jeffr(a)sco.com, jhwang(a)ISL.Stanford.EDU, jim(a)rsa.com, jwarren(a)well.sf.ca.us, jwolf(a)ucsd.edu, kurlberg@leland, langford(a)ISL.Stanford.EDU, lenstra(a)flash.bellcore.com, markoff(a)nyt.com, matt(a)rsa.com, merkle(a)xerox.com, minnieho(a)ISL.Stanford.EDU, mitran(a)asic.sc.ti.com, ovseev(a)ippi.msk.su, rivest(a)theory.lcs.mit.edu, roche(a)ISL.Stanford.EDU, rotenberg(a)washofc.cpsr.org, scholtz(a)jimmie.usc.edu, shamir%wisdom.bitnet@forsythe, smb(a)research.att.com, taher(a)rsa.com, voois(a)ISL.Stanford.EDU, welch(a)irving.usc.edu, wesel(a)ISL.Stanford.EDU Subject: Clipper Chip Most of you have seen the announcement in Friday's NY Times, etc. about NIST (National Institute of Standards & Technology) announcing the "Clipper Chip" crypto device. Several messges on the net have asked for more technical details, and some have been laboring under understandable misunderstandings given the lack of details in the news articles. So here to help out is your friendly NSA link: me. I was somewhat surprised Friday to get a call from the Agency which supplied many of the missing details. I was told the info was public, so here it is (the cc of this to Dennis Branstad at NIST is mostly as a double check on my facts since I assume he is aware of all this; please let me know if I have anything wrong): The Clipper Chip will have a secret crypto algorithm embedded in Silicon. Each chip will have two secret, 80-bit keys. One will be the same for all chips (ie a system-wide key) and the other will be unit specific. I don't know what NIST and NSA will call them, but I will call them the system key SK and unit key UK in this message. The IC will be designed to be extremely difficult to reverse so that the system key can be kept secret. (Aside: It is clear that they also want to keep the algorithm secret and, in my opinion, it may be as much for that as this stated purpose.) The unit key will be generated as the XOR of two 80-bit random numbers K1 and K2 (UK=K1+K2) which will be kept by the two escrow authorities. Who these escrow authorities will be is still to be decided by the Attorney General, but it was stressed to me that they will NOT be NSA or law enforcement agencies, that they must be parties acceptable to the users of the system as unbiased. When a law enforcement agency gets a court order, they will present it to these two escrow authorities and receive K1 and K2, thereby allowing access to the unit key UK. In addition to the system key, each user will get to choose his or her own key and change it as often as desired. Call this key plain old K. When a message is to be sent it will first be encrypted under K, then K will be encrypted under the unit key UK, and the serial number of the unit added to produce a three part message which will then be encrypted under the system key SK producing E{ E[M; K], E[K; UK], serial number; SK} When a court order obtains K1 and K2, and thence K, the law enforcement agency will use SK to decrypt all information flowing on the suspected link [Aside: It is my guess that they may do this constantly on all links, with or without a court order, since it is almost impossible to tell which links over which a message will flow.] This gives the agency access to E[M; K], E[K; UK], serial number in the above message. They then check the serial number of the unit and see if it is on the "watch list" for which they have a court order. If so, they will decrypt E[K; UK] to obtain K, and then decrypt E[M; K] to obtain M. I am still in the process of assessing this scheme, so please do not take the above as any kind of endorsement of the proposed scheme. All I am trying to do is help all of us assess the scheme more knowledgably. But I will say that the need for just one court order worries me. I would feel more comfortable (though not necessarily comfortable!) if two separate court orders were needed, one per escrow authority. While no explanation is needed, the following story adds some color: In researching some ideas that Silvio Micali and I have been kicking around, I spoke with Gerald Gunther, the constitutional law expert here at Stanford and he related the following story: When Edward Levi became Pres. Ford's attorney general (right after Watergate), he was visited by an FBI agent asking for "the wiretap authorizations." When Levy asked for the details so he could review the cases as required by law, the agent told him that his predecessors just turned over 40-50 blank, signed forms every time. Levi did not comply and changed the system, but the lesson is clear: No single person or authority should have the power to authorize wiretaps (or worse yet, divulging of personal keys). Sometimes he or she will be an Edward Levi and sometimes a John Mitchell. Martin Hellman ------- End of Forwarded Message

1 0

correction from Hellman
by smb＠research.att.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Here's a follow-up note from Hellman, in response to a question I sent (and also in response to my request to post his original note to netnews). ------- Forwarded Message Date: Sun, 18 Apr 93 11:41:42 PDT From: "Martin Hellman" <hellman(a)isl.stanford.edu> To: smb(a)research.att.com Subject: Re: Clipper Chip It is fine to post my previous message to sci.crypt if you also post this message with it in which: 1. I ask recipients to be sparse in their requesting further info from me or asking for comments on specific questions. By this posting I apologize for any messages I am unable to respond to. (I already spend too much time answering too much e-mail and am particularly overloaded this week with other responsibilities.) 2. I note a probably correction sent to me by Dorothy Denning. She met with the person from NSA that I talked with by phone, so her understanding is likely to better than mine on this point: Where I said the transmitted info is E{ E[M; K], E[K; UK], serial number; SK} she says the message is not double encrypted. The system key (or family key as she was told it is called) only encrypts the serial number or the serial number and the encrypted unit key. This is not a major difference, but I thought it should be mentioned and thank her for bringing it to my attention. It makes more sense since it cuts down on encryption computation overhead. ------- End of Forwarded Message

1 0

Announcement of premail v. 0.20
by Raph Levien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi all, I am releasing premail, a remailer chaining and PGP encrypting mail client, to the Net. If you are interested in using the cypherpunks remailers, but are intimidated by them or simply find them too hard to use, then this software can help. Premail will also PGP-encrypt and optionally sign outgoing mail. The README file is attached. Please check it out and let me know how you like it. Raph Levien ----------------------------------------------------------------------- README file for premail v. 0.20 27 Aug 1994 -- Raph Levien <raph(a)cs.berkeley.edu> Premail is a mail client for Unix workstations, supporting PGP encryption and anonymous remailers. It can be used either stand-alone or as a layer under your favorite user mail client. Premail has been designed to be as simple and transparent as possible. Features include: * Chaining of messages for cypherpunk remailers. * Automatic selection of reliable remailers. * PGP encryption and signing. * Online and offline operation. Premail is designed to masquerade as sendmail. It accepts mail in the same way, and takes the the same options, and providing additional header fields for its privacy features. Thus, if you can get your mail client to pass the mail to premail rather than sendmail, then you gain the use of the privacy features without changing the way you send mail. In the interest of simplicity, premail only handles outgoing mail. It does not handle incoming mail, or PGP decryption. Installation ------------ This section explains how to set up premail for basic operation, without PGP encryption. Use of PGP encryption is highly encouraged, and is covered in a later section, as are configuration and advanced features. This section assumes that your machine is connected to the net when you run premail. It is capable of offline operation as well, as discussed in a later section. 1. Get the source. Given that you are reading this file, you may have already done this; if so, go to step 3. The latest version of premail is available at: ftp://kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu/pub/raph/premail-0.20.tar.gz 2. Unpack it. To do this, run: gzip -dc premail.tar.gz | tar xvf - 3. See if you can run it. First, do "cd premail", then "./premail" (without the "" marks in both cases). If it prints a usage summary, you are in luck. If you get "command not found," then the problem is most likely that your system's copy of perl does not live in /usr/bin. Type "which perl" to find out where it actually is, then edit the first line of the file "premail" to match that, and try again. 4. Copy premail into a directory in your path (this step is optional). For example, if ~/bin is in your path, then do: cp premail ~/bin After this step, you probably want to run "rehash" so your shell knows were to find premail. 5. Set up the premail configuration file by typing: cp .premailrc ~ 6. Test whether premail really works, by typing: premail your(a)own.email.addr Path: 1 Subject: Test Does this really work? . If everything goes well, you should get a response from an anonymous remailer in a few minutes. Then, premail is set up and ready to use. You probably want to set up PGP as well, but you don't have to. This and other configuration options are covered below. The configuration options are controlled by the ~/.premailrc file, so you might want to browse through it and tweak things to your taste. Setting up premail for PGP -------------------------- When properly set up, premail will automatically encrypt outgoing mail using PGP. This applies both to traffic routed through the remailers, and to email encrypted for the final recipient, who would use PGP to decrypt it. On the other hand, you can skip this section if you don't want that. First, you need to make sure that you have PGP set up on your machine. When you do, just type: premail -getkeys This will finger Matt Ghio's remailer list at remailer-list(a)chaos.bsu.edu . If this site is down, or if you are not connected to the net, you should get the list from somewhere else. You can specify either an email address to finger or a file. For example, if you save the keys into remailkeys.asc, then you can run: premail -getkeys remailerkeys The messages from PGP will tell you that it's adding about a dozen new keys to the keyring. You also need to tell premail that you've got PGP running, and have added the remailer keys to your keyring. To do so, add the following line to the ~/.premailrc file: $config{"encrypt"} = "yes"; Also, if you've got PGP in a non-standard place, so that typing "pgp" will not call it up, then you need to add this line to the ~/.premailrc file: $config{"pgp"} = "/wherever/you/put/pgp"; The vox remailer has a problem with MIT PGP 2.6. Thus, premail will by default not encrypt mail going through vox. If your PGP version is 2.3a or 2.6ui, then it should work fine, so add this line: $config{"oldpgp"} = "pgp"; or, if PGP is in a nonstandard place, $config{"oldpgp"} = "/wherever/you/put/pgp"; Integration with user mail clients ---------------------------------- Without premail, outgoing mail works as follows. After you compose your mail, your mail client hands it off to a program called sendmail, which forwards it to the Net. Sendmail (written by Eric Allman at UC Berkeley) knows a lot about email addresses, networking, and so on, but very little about privacy and security. That's the job of premail. It is possible to use premail in either mode: under your client, or by itself. Either way will give the same features, it's just that integrating it with your client will be more convenient to use (if a bit harder to set up). To use premail, type: premail recipient(a)email.addr and enter your mail as you normally would, ending with either Control-D or a line with just a . on it. Or, you can prepare an email message with your favorite editor, and send it with premail -t < your.file To add premail support to emacs, just add this line to your .emacs file: (setq sendmail-program "/your/premail/pathname/here") With other mail clients, you should be able to use a similar technique. Contact me if you need help with a particular client. If you are root on your machine, you can install premail in /usr/lib/sendmail, so that it will work for _all_ mail clients. This is a fairly bold move, so it would be wise to test this carefully before doing so. To do so, move the existing sendmail into, say, /usr/lib/real_sendmail . Then, add the line $config{"sendmail"} = "/usr/lib/real_sendmail"; to premail. Finally, copy premail to /usr/lib/sendmail. If you choose to do this, let me know how well it works out. Using the privacy features -------------------------- Premail has two important privacy features: chaining through remailers, and PGP encrypting the messages. To chain through the remailers, simply add a header line such as Path: 3 to your mail. The number 3 says how many remailers you want it to chain through. Three is a good compromise between privacy on the one hand and speed and reliablilty on the other. The remailers will automatically be selected for their reliablity and speed, using the remailer list I maintain (finger remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu to see it). If you want to specify a particular sequence of remailers, you can do that. For example, if you are very fond of the idea of your mail crossing national boundaries, you might want to send it through Canada, Austria, and Holland, in that order: Path: extropia;wien;usura When using the Path field, your identity will be completely obscured. If the recipient tries to reply to your mail, it will get nowhere. You can specify a reply address using the Anon-From field: Anon-From: an123456(a)vox.hacktic.nl The Anon-From field only shows up in mail which goes through the remailers. In ordinary mail, it will be ignored. So, you can put it in all of your mail without worrying about compromising your identity. In fact, you can make premail automatically use it in all anonymous mail by adding this line to your ~/.premailrc file: $config{"anon-from"} = "an123456(a)vox.hacktic.nl"; Similarly, if most of the mail you send will be through the remailers, then you can set premail to do that as the default. Add this line (or whatever path you want, if not 3) to ~/.premailrc: $config{"defaultpath"} = "3"; Then, whenever you want to send non-anonymous mail, add this header field: Path: ; The other important privacy feature is the ability to PGP encrypt outgoing mail. This works whether or not you use the remailers. The recipient's key must be in your public key ring before you can encrypt mail to them. Then, all you have to do is add this mail header field: Key: user_id The mail will be encrypted with this user_id. It will be formatted using the MIME content type of application/x-pgp. If the recipient has a MIME-capable mail reader, they can set it up to automatically call PGP when receiving encrypted mail. Otherwise, you don't need to worry about it. You can also have premail automatically sign your mail, as well. This feature is a potential security problem, so use it with caution. Add these lines to your ~/.premailrc: $config{"signuser"} = "your_user_id"; $config{"signpass"} = "your pass phrase"; Again, a warning: in doing so, you have just stored your pass phrase in a disk file, which is considered a security no-no. On the other hand, if you are using this for medium-security applications, or if you have good control over access to your machine, then it should be OK; certainly a _lot_ better than not using PGP at all. The ~/.premailrc file should always have -rw------- (600) permissions. Use with caution. How to use the cypherpunks remailers like anon.penet.fi ------------------------------------------------------- Even though the cypherpunks remailers do essentially the same things as anon.penet.fi (though faster and with better privacy), they work quite a bit differently, and can be somewhat intimidating. Premail can help. First, you will need to get an anonymous alias. At this time, the only cypherpunk remailer which will do this for you is "avox", or anon(a)vox.hacktic.nl. To get the alias, do: premail your(a)own.email.addr Subject: alias Path: avox Hopefully, this will assign me an alias. . In a few hours, you will get email back with an alias of the form an123456(a)vox.hacktic.nl . Then, when you send anonymous email, give your alias as the reply address. Here is an example: premail recipient(a)email.addr Anon-From: an123456(a)vox.hacktic.nl Path: 3 Hello, if you reply to this, mail will get to me. . Unfortunately, unlike penet, avox does _not_ make the person replying anonymous. The best way for them to be anonymous is to use the cypherpunks mailers as well (hopefully by using premail!). How to post to Usenet --------------------- The easiest way is to use a mail-to-Usenet gateway. For example, to post to alt.skydiving, just send mail to alt.skydiving(a)demon.co.uk . A full list is available by fingering remailer-list(a)chaos.bsu.edu, or from http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/ghio-remailer-list.html . Extra goodies ------------- Premail supports a few more features, for advanced users. These include: offline mail preparation, logging, a password for penet, and a debugging mode. The configuration options specifying these are described in the ~/.premailrc file, which is what you would need to edit. Have fun!

1 0

Announcing Bellcore's Trusted Software Integrity (Betsi) System
by rubin＠faline.bellcore.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

A N N O U N C I N G ! ! ! ! ! Bellcore's Trusted Software Integrity (Betsi) System. Betsi addresses a security concern of software distribution in the Internet. Currently, there is no way to know that software obtained by anonymous ftp has not been modified since it was posted. Also, malicious software can be posted without the offender leaving a trace. Betsi is an experimental prototype that is meant to provide some degree of assurance about the integrity of software and the identity of its author. The current version of Betsi is an experiment. The long-term goals are: - help software venders distribute programs and patches - provide accountability by linking the author of a program to a real person whose identity is verified off-line - allow users to run software obtained on the Internet with less danger of viruses and trojan horses - use cryptographically strong techniques to preserve file integrity - scale well in the Internet community - minimize effort on the part of the users - use existing infrastructure and standards Betsi is a free, experimental service. It requires use of pgp to verify signatures from Betsi. Betsi's public key is widely available. It can be obtained from numerous public key servers by requesting the key for certify or Betsi. It also appears in a paper that was submitted for publication, in the help file (described in a moment) and at the end of this message. For additional information on Betsi send mail to certify(a)bellcore.com with subject, help. A copy of the paper describing Betsi can be obtained by anonymous ftp from thumper.bellcore.com in the directory /pub/certify. A copy of the public key for Betsi can also be found there. It is recommended that the key be obtained from at least two different places and compared. Betsi's public key: -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.6 mQCNAi5I0LwAAAEEAJZi970w+Lb7onAmrnExWKrgUFbjJku29qVRlBY6/UtUH+fW s7MtAEUKIhktJ0cDpE+5Tbi6Lev2RXmXhT1hEjwxSwVFOMJmOuMZxlj+586IKigC vVjF+hCFKQWRXsleM/axVbpH+pNUmWcK6QMdBDFlzS/9pxdAiBPcEwSgd4ahAAUR tBxCZXRzaSA8Y2VydGlmeUBiZWxsY29yZS5jb20+iQB1AgUQLkjREpti/eSkC5bZ AQFzNwL8CVk6J8jhHukKKjrkdZX5VZMwuvgs7+ZIVR8fY+vpEBs6EbWAQpmm4ekV C4D6UOYCRxARpQN09M1aE9qSz6XKkYQjs9Ul/xRLtazDAuYOAkRxO3mnrFa2u6Tc +qXcZame =68fV -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Fingerprint: 5F 34 26 5F 2A 48 6B 07 90 C9 98 C5 32 C3 44 0C

3 4

PGP shells ...
by Jim choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi all, On the issue of shells for PGP, has anyone released a REXX based shell? I have REXX working on my Dos, Linux, and Amiga boxes and the cross-compatibility would be very nifty... Any info on existing REXX shells or front-ends would be appreciated.

1 0

New Cypher ListServ (part 2) **REVISED** (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > From: "David Downey" <digital_matrix(a)hotmail.com> > Subject: New Cypher ListServ (part 2) **REVISED** > Date: Sun, 20 Jul 1997 06:16:19 PDT > The Cryptography-Politics-PGP-L ListServ is in operation.(We just > finished up with the majordomo scripts and the like). Here is what you > need to do to join. BTW, this list is a digested list. Please do not > freak if things do not go right straight from the get go. I hope to have > this as painless as possible, yet we all know that Murphy wrote Murphy's > Law just for this instance. Please bear with me. Once again, ANY > suggestions, short of flames, will be listened to 100%! > Now for the nitty gritty. Is this a new CDR node or is this a new indipendant mailing list? ____________________________________________________________________ | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http:// www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

1 0