December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

timestamp.c
by weidai＠eskimo.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- /* timestamp.c - Automatic PGP Time Stamper v0.1 * by * Wei Dai <weidai(a)eskimo.com> * * Put the line "|timestamp" in your .forward file, and this * program will automaticly scan all your mail for a certain subject heading * and if found, will sign the body of that mail with PGP, and send it back. * Otherwise, the mail goes to your regular mailbox. * This is probably most useful as a "trusted" time stamping service. * * Use for experimental purposes only. Feel free to modify it, but please * send me some e-mail if you do more than change the #defines. */ #include <stdio.h> #include <string.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <sys/types.h> #include <fcntl.h> #define MAILBOX "/usr/spool/mail/weidai" #define MAILLOCK "/usr/spool/mail/weidai.lock" #define PGPPATH "/u/w/weidai/.pgp" #define LOG "/u/w/weidai/.timestamp.log" #define COMMAND "Time Stamp This Mail" #define MAXLINE 1024 #define FROM "From " #define SUBJECT "Subject: " void Remove_nl (char *); main() { char sLine[MAXLINE], sFrom[255], sFile[255], sTmp[255]; char *p; FILE *fOut, *fMail, *fLog; int bDoIt, fd; fLog = fopen(LOG, "a"); sprintf(sFile, "/tmp/pts_%d", getpid()); fOut = fopen(sFile, "w"); sFrom[0]=0; while (fgets(sLine, MAXLINE, stdin) != NULL) { fputs(sLine, fOut); if (strncmp(sLine, FROM, strlen(FROM)) == 0) { fputs(sLine, fLog); for (p = sLine + strlen(FROM); *p && *p != ' '; ++p); *p = '\0'; strcpy(sFrom, sLine+strlen(FROM)); Remove_nl(sFrom); } else if (strncmp(sLine, SUBJECT, strlen(SUBJECT)) == 0) { fputs(sLine, fLog); bDoIt = (strncasecmp(sLine+strlen(SUBJECT), COMMAND, str } else if (strlen(sLine) <= 1) break; } if (sFrom[0]==0) bDoIt=0; if (bDoIt) { fclose(fOut); fOut = fopen(sFile, "w"); while (fgets(sLine, MAXLINE, stdin) != NULL) fputs(sLine, fOut); fclose(fOut); sprisFile); system(sTmp); fputs(sTmp, fLog); fputs("\n", fLog); unlink(sFile); sprintf(sTmp, "/usr/ucb/mail -s 'Time Stamp Output' '%s' < %s.as system(sTmp); fputs(sTmp, fLog); fputs("\n", fLog); sprintf(sTmp, "%s.asc", sFile); unlink(sTmp); fputs("*** time stamped ***********\n\n", fLog); } else { while (fgets(sLine, MAXLINE, stdin) != NULL) fputs(sLine, fOut); fclose(fOut); while ( (fd=open(MAILLOCK, 0)) != -1) { close(fd); sleep(5); } fd=creat(MAILLOCK, 0600); close(fd); fOut=fopen(MAILBOX, "a"); fMail=fopen(sFile, "r"); while (fgets(sLine, MAXLINE, fMail) != NULL) fputs(sLine, fOut); fputs("\n", fOut); fclose(fMail); fclose(fOut); unlink(MAILLOCK); unlink(sFile); fputs("--- personal mail -----------\n\n", fLog); } fclose(fLog); return(0); } void Remove_nl (char *string) { int i=0; while(string[i]!='\n' && string[i]!=0) i++; string[i]=0; } -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLlRcjjl0sXKgdnV5AQEv2AQAid9urvFjtaQjPYvpqcwhWLy8CCH2OI+O 9mWNnubDZuReH97upNvFYWbDQkFew2Gjfbsj7RwrYSe85gQm+RV0F+/ud64lTCe1 eoPuFrBy2kXugbtJVtp+HB2BGSNc2GtgxIfc61Z3x3E6F4eDagZxtAn2m3ht9Vib n41IQtRk1uA= =ojFS -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- PGP Public Key available

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Re: NSA Spy Machine and DES
by jdd＠aiki.demon.co.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In message <9408190809.ZM4528(a)simple.sydney.sgi.com> Ian Farquhar writes: > Actually, I would be surprised if the "SIMD" processors were not a huge > array of reprogrammable FPGA's, quite possibly Xilinx's. The possibilities > of a large array of these chips, each with local memory, is quite > interesting. I have personally seen an array of 64 Xilinx chips in a DEC PeRL > box doing RSA, at speeds similar or better to almost all available custom > hardware implementations of the cipher. The delays in getting data on and off the chip are too large and the amount of space wasted in redundant functions is too great. You might prototype it using FPGAs, but even this is unlikely. Why not just buy one of the existing SIMD processors and simulate your target system? People used to build fast processors out of separate chips (bit slices). They don't do that any more because it's too slow and too expensive if you are building in volume. -- +-----------------------------------+--------------------------------------+ | Jim Dixon<jdd(a)aiki.demon.co.uk> | Compuserve: 100114,1027 | |AIKI Parallel Systems Ltd + parallel processing hardware & software design| | voice +44 272 291 316 | fax +44 272 272 015 | +-----------------------------------+--------------------------------------+

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Re: NSA Spy Machine and DES
by jdd＠aiki.demon.co.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In message <9408182235.AA07044(a)snark.imsi.com> perry(a)imsi.com writes: > > Actually, I would be surprised if the "SIMD" processors were not a huge > > array of reprogrammable FPGA's, quite possibly Xilinx's. > > Since SIMD implies array processing, this makes much more sense than > general purpose 64 bit processors. What would make even more sense is an array of special purpose 64 bit processors. This is how most people who build real SIMD machines do it. -- +-----------------------------------+--------------------------------------+ | Jim Dixon<jdd(a)aiki.demon.co.uk> | Compuserve: 100114,1027 | |AIKI Parallel Systems Ltd + parallel processing hardware & software design| | voice +44 272 291 316 | fax +44 272 272 015 | +-----------------------------------+--------------------------------------+

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Re: Are \"they\" really the enemy?
by jdd＠aiki.demon.co.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In message <199408182252.SAA26632(a)pipe3.pipeline.com> John Young writes: > >Personally, I find these statements very disturbing, > >because they are so empty. > > Might be applied to your own later comments: > > >You won't tear down the government without replacing > >it. And I would argue that the more violent the means > >used to tear down the government, the more repressive > >its successor. Governments exist in part because we > >are such dangerous animals. I do not think that these statements are empty. Do I really need to prove that people are dangerous? One of the main functions of government is to stop us from harming one another. If you replace government with something else which has the same function (and works), you may call it something else, but it is acting in the same role as a government. Cases of violent replaces of governments from within: the French Revolution, the Bolshevik Revolution, the victory of the Chinese communists, Pol Pot -- in all of the cases that I can think of, the violence of the revolution was a good predictor of the repressiveness of the government that followed. The revolutions in Eastern Europe over the last few years have almost gone unnoticed, because they have been so peaceful. But they are genuine revolutions. I have seen no one claim that the new governments are repressive, except possibly for Rumania, where the revolution was violent. > This rhetorical ploy comes across as an apology for the status > quo and seems to offer counter-revolutionary cant instead of > your best arguments for making rational, evolutional > improvements to our inheritance. I am not justifying some status quo. My observation is pretty much equivalent to saying that accidents at high speeds tend to be fatal. If you drive a little more slowly and look where you are going, you are more likely to get to your destination in one piece. -- Jim Dixon

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Re: Are \"they\" really the enemy? (Systems commentary)
by jdd＠aiki.demon.co.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In message <199408181927.MAA00813(a)sleepy.retix.com> joshua geller writes: > > > > When a system is designed to organize human behavior (as in > > > "governing" it) it has the inherent mistake of being based on > > > the presumption of complete knowledge of human nature (yet who > > > agrees on what that comprises). > > > Only a philosopher could make such a statement. Only a philosopher could believe that it is necessary to presume complete knowledge to design a system. > > A family is such a system, but it is based on no such presumption. > > Families begin in what is usually a completely mindless activity. > > And any honest parent of teenage children will admit that he or > > she is almost totally ignorant of human nature. If the parent > > doesn't admit it, the child will let the parent know. > > only a rhetor could make such a statement. ? I don't teach rhetoric. > families are not designed. Many people think that they are. But my point is that we all take part in the creation of systems, and we usually do not think about what we are doing when we do it. Blanc said, esssentially, that systems are designed rationally. Most aren't. -- Jim Dixon

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EFF Analysis of Leahy/Edwards Digital Telephony Bill
by dance＠cicero.spc.uchicago.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I hope this is helpful (and not too out-of-date, 9 days ago!). It's the EFF's justification.... --------------------------Begin Message----------------------------- Date: 10 Aug 1994 16:58:23 -0500 From: mech(a)eff.org (Stanton McCandlish) Subject: EFF Analysis of Leahy/Edwards Digital Telephony Bill EFF SUMMARY OF THE EDWARDS/LEAHY DIGITAL TELEPHONY BILL ======================================================= OVERVIEW -------- The Edwards/Leahy Digital Telephony bill places functional requirements on telecommunications carriers in order to enable law enforcement to continue to conduct authorized electronic surveillance. It allows a court to impose fines on carriers that violate the requirements, and mandates that the processes for determining capacity requirements and technical standards be open and public. The bill also contains significant new privacy protections; including an increased standard for government access to transactional data (such as addressing information contained in electronic mail logs), a requirement that information acquired through the use of pen registers or trap and trace devices not disclose the physical location of an individual, and an expansion of current law to protect the radio portion of cordless telephone conversations from unauthorized surveillance. SCOPE OF THE BILL. WHO IS COVERED? ----------------------------------- The requirements of the bill apply to "telecommunications carriers", which are defined as any person or entity engaged in the transmission or switching of wire or electronic communications as a common carrier for hire (as defined by section 3 (h) of the Communications Act of 1934), including commercial mobile services (cellular, PCS, etc.). The bill also applies to those persons or entities engaged in providing wire or electronic communication switching or transmission service to the extent that the FCC finds that such service is a replacement for a substantial portion of the local telephone exchange. The bill does not apply to online communication and information services such as Internet providers, Compuserve, AOL, Prodigy, and BBS's. It also excludes private networks, PBX's, and facilities which only interconnect telecommunications carriers or private networks (such as most long distance service). REQUIREMENTS IMPOSED ON CARRIERS -------------------------------- Telecommunications carriers would be required to ensure that they possess sufficient capability and capacity to accommodate law enforcement's needs. The bill distinguishes between capability and capacity requirements, and ensures that the determination of such requirements occur in an open and public process. CAPABILITY REQUIREMENTS ----------------------- A telecommunications carrier is required to ensure that, within four years from the date of enactment, it has the capability to: 1. expeditiously isolate the content of a targeted communication within its service area; 2. isolate call-identifying information about the origin and destination of a targeted communication; 3. enable the government to access isolated communications at a point away from the carrier's premises and on facilities procured by the government, and; 4. to do so unobtrusively and in such a way that protects the privacy and security of communications not authorized to be intercepted (Sec. 2601). However, the bill does not permit law enforcement agencies or officers to require the specific design of features or services, nor does it prohibit a carrier from deploying any feature or service which does not meet the requirements outlined above. CAPACITY REQUIREMENTS --------------------- Within 1 year of enactment of the bill, the Attorney General must determine the maximum number of intercepts, pen register, and trap and trace devices that law enforcement will require four years from the date of enactment. Notices of capacity requirements must be published in the Federal Register (Sec. 2603). Carriers have 4 years to comply with capacity requirements. PROCESS FOR DETERMINING TECH. STANDARDS TO IMPLEMENT CAPABILITY REQUIREMENTS ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Telecommunications carriers, through trade associations or standards setting bodies and in consultation with the Attorney General, must determine the technical specifications necessary to implement the capability requirements (Sec. 2606). The bill contains a 'safe harbor' provision, which allows a carrier to meet its obligations under the legislation if it is in compliance with publicly available standards set through this process. A carrier may deploy a feature or service in the absence of technical standards, although in such a case the carrier would not be covered by the safe harbor provision and may be found in violation. Furthermore, the legislation allows any one to file a motion at the FCC in the event that a standard violates the privacy and security of telecommunications networks or does not meet the requirements of the bill (Sec. 2606). If petitioned under this section, the FCC may establish technical requirements or standards that: 1) meet the capability requirements (in Sec. 2602); 2) protect the privacy and security of communications not authorized to be intercepted, and; 3) encourage the provision of new technologies and services to the public. ENFORCEMENT AND PENALTIES ------------------------- In the event that a court or the FCC deems a technical standard to be insufficient, or if law enforcement finds that it is unable to conduct authorized surveillance because a carrier has not met the requirements of this legislation, the Attorney General can request that a court issue an enforcement order (an order directing a carrier to comply), and/or a fine of up to $10,000 per day for each day in violation (Sec. 2607). However, a court can issue an enforcement order or fine a carrier only if it can be determined that no other reasonable alternatives are available to law enforcement. This provision allows carriers to deploy features and services which may not meet the requirements of the bill. Furthermore, this legislation does not permit the government to block the adoption or use of any feature or service by a telecommunications carrier which does not meet the requirements. The bill requires the government to reimburse carriers for all reasonable costs associated with complying with the capacity requirements. In other words, the government will pay for upgrades of current features or services, as well as any future upgrades which may be necessary, pursuant to published notices of capacity requirements (Sec. 2608). There is $500,000,000 authorized for appropriation to cover the costs of government reimbursements to carriers. In the event that a smaller sum is actually appropriated, the bill allows a court to determine whether a carrier must comply (Sec. 2608 (d)). This section recognizes that telecommunications carriers may not be responsible for meeting the requirements if the government does not cover reasonable costs. The government is also required to submit a report to congress within four years describing all costs paid to carriers for upgrades (Sec. 4). ENHANCED PRIVACY PROTECTIONS ---------------------------- The legislation contains enhanced privacy protections for transactional information (such as telephone toll records and electronic mail logs) generated in the course of completing a communication. Current law permits law enforcement to gain access to transactional information through a subpoena. The bill establishes a higher standard for law enforcement access to transactional data contained electronic mail logs and other online records. Telephone toll records would still be available through a subpoena. Under the new standard, law enforcement is required to obtain a court order by demonstrating specific and articulable facts that electronic mail logs and other online transactional records are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation (Sec. 10). Law enforcement is also prohibited from remotely activating any surveillance capability. All intercepts must be conducted with the affirmative consent of a telecommunications carrier and activated by a designated employee of the carrier within the carrier's facilities (Sec. 2604). The bill further requires that, when using pen registers and trap and trace devices, law enforcement will use, when reasonably available, devices which only provide call set up and dialed number information (Sec. 10). This provision will ensure that as law enforcement employs new technologies in pen register and trap and trace devices, it will not gain access to additional call setup information beyond its current authority. Finally, the bill extends the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) protections against interception of wireless communications to cordless telephones, making illegal the intentional interception of the radio portion of a cordless telephone (the transmission between the handset and the base unit). CELLULAR SCANNERS ----------------- The bill makes it a crime to possess or use an altered telecommunications instrument (such as a cellular telephone or scanning receiver) to obtain unauthorized access to telecommunications services (Sec. 9). This provision is intended to prevent the illegal use of cellular and other wireless communications services. Violations under this section face imprisonment for up to 15 years and a fine of up to $50,000. IMPROVEMENTS OF THE EDWARDS/LEAHY BILL OVER PREVIOUS FBI PROPOSALS ------------------------------------------------------------------ The Digital Telephony legislative proposal was first offered in 1992 by the Bush Administration. The 1992 version of the bill: * applied to all providers of wire or electronic communications services (no exemptions for information services, interexchange carriers or private networks); * gave the government the explicit authority to block or enjoin a feature or service that did not meet the requirements; * contained no privacy protections; * contained no public process for determining the capacity requirements; * contained no government reimbursement (carriers were responsible for meeting all costs); * would have allowed remote access to communications by law enforcement, and; * granted telecommunications carriers only 18 months to comply. The Bush Administration proposal was offered on capitol hill for almost a year, but did attract any congressional sponsors. The proposal was again offered under the Clinton Administration's FBI in March of 1993. The Clinton Administration's bill was a moderated version of the original 1992 proposal: * It required the government to pay all reasonable costs incurred by telecommunications carriers in retrofitting their facilities in order to correct existing problems; * It encouraged (but did not require), the Attorney General to consult with telecommunications industry representatives and standards bodies to facilitate compliance, * It narrowed the scope of the legislation to common carriers, rather than all providers of electronic communications services. Although the Clinton Administration version was an improvement over the Bush Administration proposal, it did not address the larger concerns of public interest organizations or the telecommunications industry. The Clinton Administration version: * did not contain any protections for access to transactional information; * did not contain any public process for determining the capability requirements or public notice of law enforcement's capacity needs; * would have allowed law enforcement to dictate system design and bar the introduction of features and services which did not meet the requirements, and; * would have allowed law enforcement to use pen registers and trap and trace devices to obtain tracking or physical location information. * * * Locating Relevant Documents =========================== ** Original 1992 Bush-era draft ** ftp.eff.org, /pub/EFF/Policy/FBI/Old/digtel92_old_bill.draft gopher.eff.org, 1/EFF/Policy/FBI/Old, digtel92_old_bill.draft http://www.eff.org/pub/EFF/Policy/FBI/Old/digtel92_old_bill.draft bbs: +1 202 638 6120 (8N1, 300-14400bps), file area: Privacy - Digital Telephony; file: digtel92.old ** 1993/1994 Clinton-era draft ** ftp.eff.org, /pub/EFF/Policy/FBI/digtel94_bill.draft gopher.eff.org, 1/EFF/Policy/FBI, digtel94_bill.draft http://www.eff.org/pub/EFF/Policy/FBI/digtel94_bill.draft bbs: +1 202 638 6120 (8N1, 300-14400bps), file area: Privacy - Digital Telephony; file: digtel94.dft ** 1994 final draft, as sponsored ** ftp.eff.org, /pub/EFF/Policy/FBI/digtel94.bill gopher.eff.org, 1/EFF/Policy/FBI, digtel94.bill http://www.eff.org/pub/EFF/Policy/FBI/digtel94.bill bbs: +1 202 638 6120 (8N1, 300-14400bps), file area: Privacy - Digital Telephony; file: digtel94.bil ** EFF Statement on sponsored version ** ftp.eff.org, /pub/EFF/Policy/FBI/digtel94_statement.eff gopher.eff.org, 1/EFF/Policy/FBI, digtel94_statement.eff http://www.eff.org/pub/EFF/Policy/FBI/digtel94_statement.eff bbs: +1 202 638 6120 (8N1, 300-14400bps), file area: Privacy - Digital Telephony; file: digtel94.eff --------------------------End of Message----------------------------- _/_/_/ _/_/_/ _/_/_/ _/ _/ The strongest reason for the _/ _/ _/ _/ _/_/ _/ people to retain their right to _/_/_/ _/ _/ _/_/_/ _/ _/ _/ keep and bear arms is, as a last _/ _/ _/ _/ _/_/_/_/ _/ resort, to protect themselves _/_/_/ _/_/_/ _/_/_/ _/ _/ _/_/_/ against tyranny in government. _/ --Thomas Jefferson

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Re: Are "they" really the enemy?
by jdd＠aiki.demon.co.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In message <199408182230.PAA15298(a)netcom7.netcom.com> "James A. Donald" writes: > Jim Dixon writes > > You won't tear down the government without replacing it. > > We can certainly drastically weaken and seriously impair > and obstruct government without replacing it. Can you prove this? Or at least show some historical example? In France, the monarchy was replaced by a republic which quickly descended into the Reign of Terror. There was no gap. Orderly rule drifted into terror, which was succeeded by Napoleon's iron rule. Napoleon took over in part because people wanted order. In the American South after the Civil War, the Union smashed local government and replaced it with something acceptable to them. This did not have the consent of the white population. The Ku Klux Klan developed as a way for the whites to enforce their rules. The Ku Klux Klan was in its way an instrument of democracy. In Russia, the monarchy was replaced by a republic which was destroyed by the Bolsheviks. There was widespread civil war. But there whenever there was a governmental vacuum, people filled it. Russia was full of bands of armed men. People needed governments to protect them from the marauders. Stalin was an expression of the people's will. There have been cases where government was torn down and replaced by something else which was not called the government. The Ku Klux Klan was not part of the formal government of the South. But it functioned as part of the apparatus of government. The US government is a large and powerful organization. Let us say that somehow you contrive to successfully weaken, impair, and obstruct it. How will you do this? Not by yourself. One person cannot defeat millions. You need a group of some size, at the very least of thousands. This group must have a set of common goals and some sort of administrative structure to effect those goals... I could continue, but you must understand what I am going to say: governments can only be defeated by organizations with the attributes of governments. The alternative is to take over the government to some degree. But then in time you will find that there are people out there who regard you as part of the government, and set out to drastically weaken, seriously impair, and obstruct your government. -- Jim Dixon

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15 years!
by Mats Bergstrom 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

About the EFF Wiretap Bill: ----------------- The bill makes it a crime to possess or use an altered telecommunications instrument (such as a cellular telephone or scanning receiver) to obtain unauthorized access to telecommunications services (Sec. 9). This provision is intended to prevent the illegal use of cellular and other wireless communications services. Violations under this section face imprisonment for up to 15 years and a fine of up to $50,000. ----------------- I commented on this before but feel like repeating myself: So an alt.2600 tec-addict makes some hardware hacks on his cellular - and gets 15 years in the slammer for catching some airwaves. A punishment scale suggestive of a very repressive state! And why outlawing it in the first place? What is crypto for? Mats

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\"they\" and Real Bullets
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The c'punks vote on continuing the "they" topic: 1 yes 1 maybe 1 no 2^512,000 plonks The "plonks" have it, but to hell with them. ----------------------------------- Responding to msg by wcs(a)anchor.ho.att.com (bill.stewart(a)pleasantonca.ncr.com +1-510-484-6204) on Thu, 18 Aug 8:46 PM >> From: Hal >> What does it mean to speak of a government in >cyberspace? It is the >> government in physical space I fear. Its agents >carry physical guns >> which shoot real bullets. >> >........................................................ >Without cryptography, all you've got left is security >by obscurity, the main technique used by the hackers in >the book; even cryptographic systems need strong >enough implementations built around the >mathematically-strong parts to be truly safe. Bill's suggestion about obscurity through strong crypto as a defense against real bullets is a provocative version of "the pen is mightier than the sword" homily. That rephrasing of the topic seems to be a good way to mix software and hardware issues that originated the "they" topic. Is it possible for mind stuff and its gadgets to beat the tools of physical violence? It seems that is what this list is about. Jim Dixon's elegant disquisition (and that of other respondents) on the rise and fall of governments is less persuasive than his (and others') remarks, say, on the NSA spy machine where he (and they) shows nitty-gritty expertise. I vote for the nit-grit as more pertinent to Hal's "real bullets" problem. Sorry, but geo-political bullshit apologizes for real killers of all political bent, in power or out. Geo-pol is overdone by talking heads who sound numbingly alike. The distincitive sound of crypto and techno stuff is what charms here, because it's rarely heard in public venues. We got to take responsibility for our individual actions, day by day, and resist the delusionary temptation of hallucinating on great problems to mask our daily marginalization. Ahem. John

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Zimmermann/NSA debate
by Loren Fleckenstein 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

For those who haven't heard, Philip Zimmermann and Dr. Clinton Brooks of the National Security Agency will debate the national encryption and privacy policies Thursday Aug. 25 at the Thousand Oaks Inn, 75 West Thousand Oaks. Blvd. in Thousand Oaks, Calif. A cocktail hour will start at 5:45 p.m. The debate will start at 6:30 p.m. If there is anyone in the Moreno Valley-to-Riverside, Calif., area who is interesting in carpooling with me to Thousand Oaks., contact me by private e-mail. We'd return that night. -- Loren

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