December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Suggested reading
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The Iron Cavalry Ralph Zumbro ISBN 0-671-01390-4 $6.99 US Note especialy the last chapter, "Puma Force". ____________________________________________________________________ What raises the standard of living may well diminish the quality of life. The Club of Rome The Armadillo Group ,::////;::-. James Choate Austin, Tx /:'///// ``::>/|/ ravage(a)ssz.com www.ssz.com .', |||| `/( e\ 512-451-7087 -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- --------------------------------------------------------------------

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Assault on Civil Liberties
by DOOM Anonymous Untraceable User 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

<http://www.sjmercury.com/columnists/gillmor/docs/dg121398.htm> "Civil liberties and privacy grew more tenuous. The Clinton administration maintained its record of utter unfriendliness toward the Bill of Rights as it applies to technology. The administration's hard-line stand on encryption, the scrambling of data to keep it away from prying eyes, shows no signs of moderation. And the administration pursued the absurd notion, which flies utterly in the face of reality, that private businesses can regulate themselves in ways that protect consumers' privacy."

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What's up with C2 and SSL?
by jim finder 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Would someone mind explaining the background of this dispute? I've seen posted several vague accusations that imply that (depending on the poster) either Sameer or Ben have acted badly and unwisely in some way, and that at least one of them has a "bad track record" with open source software. I don't have enough information to judge, which I expect is also the case for many other readers here. Could someone please lay out exactly what this bad track record is, and what was wrong with Sameer and Ben's announcements? Otherwise we all just have to guess what is going on here. Also, what happened with SSLeay? Either that, or stop making public accusations. Jim ______________________________________________________ Get Your Private, Free Email at http://www.hotmail.com

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Re: bug recipes
by Pallas Anonymous Remailer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>..someone describes the use of mutton for anthrax >breeding.. > >The mils are already vaccinated, so anthrax is >passe. What you *really* want to do is dig up a >smallpox victim... The only Mils vaccinated are the ones going into saudi and bosnia and other High-threat area's. They will not be fully vac'ed for another 3-5 years. As far as smallpox...I'd just as soon that shit NEVER get dug up. I somehow doubt a skeleton could harbor usable smallpox but I am not up on my biology tonight. --Skrill

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Roast pesky car theives with a flame thrower!
by Sunder 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/africa/9812/11/flame.thrower.car/ Don't you wish these were legal in the USA? :) -- ---------------------------- Kaos Keraunos Kybernetos ------------------- + ^ + Sunder "The real aim of current policy is to /|\ \|/ sunder(a)sunder.net ensure the continued effectiveness of /\|/\ <--*--> ALLOW FREE EXPORT OF US information warfare assets against \/|\/ /|\ STRONG CRYPTOGRAPHY! individuals,businesses and governments \|/ + v + PROTEST WASSENAAR!!! in Europe and elsewhere" -- Ross Anderson ------------------------------ http://www.sunder.net ---------------------- RESTRICTED DATA - This material contains RESTRICTED DATA as defined in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. Unauthorized disclosure subject to administrative and criminal sanctions. NOFORN ORCON WNINTEL SIOP-ESI CNWDI

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distribution scheme
by FitugMix 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I'd like to request your comments on the following idea. code for this is ready, awaiting yours and some other people's comments regarding some of the non-coding issues. for example, I'd like a lawyer or someone else familiar with the law to comment on the legal aspects. also, cryptologic expertise would be great. however, this is NOT an encryption scheme. the goals are different ones, I'll talk about that in a second. the basic idea is to take a piece of information and chop it into a number of pieces. this is basically the reverse process of "take the first letter of every word". digital information, however, can be divided at an even lower level, the bit level. imagine to chop a file into 8 parts, with the top bit of every byte going into the first file, the second bit into the second and so on. as you can imagine, the first 8 top-bits will again form a byte in the first file. now imagine the same principle, with an *arbitrary* number of files. the goal of this is not a new encryption scheme. cryptological, my limited knowledge tells me this is not too bad, but far from "secure". the nice things are that the files themselves contain no information about how many total files there are and in which order they have to be re-assembled, and without that knowledge you are in for some work of cryptoanalysis. the idea is to provide for a channel of distribution of arbitrary material, even copyrighted, patented or illegal in your country (e.g. china) in a "legal" way. that's why I'd like legal advice on this - is the idea correct? I cannot be sued for distributing a couple hundred E's and A's because they are part of a copyrighted book. can I be sued for distributing a couple of bits from a copyrighted image file? a trademarked or patented document? are there any legal precedents? I know that in the case of encryption, courts have at least once ruled that distribution of the key that unlocks this is equivalent to distribution of the copyrighted material, but in this case there is no key, no single piece of information that contains anything "central". tell me what you think. I can post code or details if you want. Falcon

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baby carrier
by chungdoo 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

We are pleased to take this opportunity to introduce ourselves as one of the leading manufacturers-exporters of high grade Baby walker, Baby carrier, Baby swing, Mickey Basketball and Accesorries with beautiful shape in Korea. We hope the articles will be just what you want for outstanding ones compared with the competitors' in quality and design as well. Our baby products has the outstanding points as follows: * Baby walker - Spring Cushion Type * Baby carrier - Comfortable, safe and ligh frame - Padded headrest and Shoulder straps - Adjustable inner seat - Large removable storage bag for baby supplies - Padded waist belt * family carrier - Ages 6 months to 2 years - Frame : Aluminum - Fabric : Nylon - Weight : 1200 g/PC - Double seats for baby and child * simple carrier - Ages 6 months to 3 years - Fabric : Nylon - Support baby with your arms - Simple fuction, simple carrying - Pouch for storage - See through vinyl package * 3+ SWING Our toys are tested to company the requirement of European Standard (Safety of Toys). This high quality product is on all age swing. If has different size settings, depending on the size of your child you can fit the back into either inside (smaller)or(larger)setting. Back Support and front restraint shield are removable. So if can be converted into three swings(infant Swing, Chair Swign and Seat swing) suitable for children 6 months up to 12 years old. * DO RE MI SWING * SEVEN MICKEY - A Mini Basketball Set - Non Toxic PVC Ball * TEN MICKEY * FIFTEEN MICKEY * Accesorries * Feeding echievements * Baby Gift Set To see the design, pls visit our web site, http://www.chungdoo.co.kr and do not hesitate to send your requirements so that we may show you our best service. We are looking forward to hearing a good news from you soon. Faithfully yours, K. J. Kang, President Chung Doo Corporation Tel : (82-2) 565-3115, 565-3885 Fax : (82-2) 565-3110 e-mail : chungdoo(a)chungdoo.co.kr URL : http://www.chungdoo.co.kr

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No Subject
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

xxxx is exactly right on this. Several years ago I posted to sci.crypt my "novel" idea for packing bits into the essentially inaudible "least significant bits" (LSBs) of digital recordings, such as DATs and CDs. Ditto for the LSBs in an 8-bit image or 24-bit color image. I've since seen this idea reinvented _several_ times on sci.crypt and elsewhere...and I'm willing to bet I wasn't the first, either (so I don't claim any credit). A 2-hour DAT contains about 10 Gbits (2 hours x 3600 sec/hr x 2 channels x 16 bits/sample x 44K samples/sec), or about 1.2 Gbytes. A CD contains about half this, i.e., about 700 Mbytes. The LSB of a DAT is 1/16th of the 1.2 Gbytes, or 80 Mbytes. This is a _lot_ of storage! A home-recorded DAT--and I use a Sony D-3 DAT Walkman to make tapes--has so much noise down at the LSB level--noise from the A/D and D/A converters, noise from the microphones (if any), etc.--that the bits are essentially random at this level. (This is a subtle, but important, point: a factory recorded DAT or CD will have predetermined bits at all levels, i.e., the authorities could in principle spot any modifications. But home-recorded, or dubbed, DATs will of course not be subject to this kind of analysis.) Some care might be taken to ensure that the statistical properties of the signal bits resemble what would be expected with "noise" bits, but this will be a minor hurdle. Adobe Photoshop can be used to easily place message bits in the "noise" that dominates things down at the LSB level. The resulting GIF can then be posted to UseNet or e-mailed. Ditto for sound samples, using the ideas I just described (but typically requiring sound sampling boards, etc.). I've done some experiments along these lines. This doesn't mean our problems are solved, of course. Exchanging tapes is cumbersome and vulnerable to stings. But it does help to point out the utter futility of trying to stop the flow of bits. --Tim -- .......................................................................... Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)netcom.com | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero 408-688-5409 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power: 2^756839 | PGP 2.0 and MailSafe keys by arrangement.

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Revealing identities
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Johan, I haven't been paying close attention to the latest on the anonymity debate, so please tell me if the following has been raised before. In your message <9302260807.aa01498(a)penet.penet.FI> of Fri, 26 Feb 93 08:50:19 +0200 on the subject "Moral dilemma." to the cypherpunks list, you mentioned that >One rule is >that I *never* reveal the true identity of an anon user, While I believe that you should be able to use any policy you want for this sort of thing, I do not believe that both your server and this policy can survive together. Because you/the-server cannot censor the content of anonymous postings/mail (you lack the time, and knowledge of what is legal in every corner of the world), you can only withdraw someone's anonymous posting permission in response to complaints to something that they have already posted. I believe that eventually, someone will post something so damaging/incensing that sufficient pressure will be applied that either: the service cannot continue (e.g. disconnected from the network), or you will be forced to reveal or destroy the mappings between alias(es) and user(s). For example, on the cypherpunks list, the question of what would happen if someone claiming responsibility for the New York bombing posted through the anonymous server. Bodies in the US (from people providing parts of the Internet service through to political and criminal bodies such as the FBI/CIA/NSA) could easily apply very strong pressure. Unfortunately, I feel that this pressure will come sooner rather than later because there is nothing preventing people opposed to the anonymous service from making these postings merely to discredit your service. I think that there *MAY* be a way around this. I assume the reasons behind your non-disclosure policy are: i. You cannot decide which identities should be revealed. ii. Revealing an identity removes their anonymity from all of their previous postings, some of which may have had reason to be anonymous. For example, I think it "unjust" to reveal what someone wrote to alt.sex.abuse because they violated copyright or whatever in some other group. The second of these reasons could be avoided by permitting anonymous users to have a different alias for each posting that they make. This would increase the loading on the alias space and records of alias<->ID mappings. I can see no reason why you would need to reveal all of the aliases of one real identity. The decision of when an identity should be revealed could be left to a jury: If you receive a reasonable complaint about a posting (not just a flame, but something more significant such as copyright violation, libel, etc) then you would post this complaint to a group of anonymous jurors who decide on what action should be taken. The plaintiff and defendant could even argue their positions to the jury, and might advertise on a newsgroup asking for assistance from relevant groups (e.g. pro/anti-anonymity groups). The problem now is how to select the jury. Some factors are: i. The number of jurors influences the probability that the decision can be swayed because of the random composition of the jury. So one juror would be too few, 12 as used in orthodox courts might be reasonable, etc. ii. Jurors would not want to spend too much time on the case, so there should be an upper limit on the number of bytes transmitted by defendant and plaintiff, and the time span of the case. iii. The degree of "consensus" required for a decision. Perhaps 2/3 majority is OK, perhaps 75%. The larger the majority required, the less likely that the case will be swayed by the composition of the jury, but also the longer it would take to reach the decision. iv. The jury can't be composed just of users of the anonymous service because of their bias. Perhaps jurors could be selected at random from the names of people who have posted to the news in the past? v. Jurors would have to accept their position -- there's no use in having a juror who doesn't read the information passed to him/her. I feel that the problem of selecting a jury would be easier to solve than that of defending the anonymous service against the uproar that may result from some postings. With this judicial process, anonymous users would also be accountable for what they post. Some other issues would be i. What happens if the jury can't decide? ii. What sort of "punishment" is possible? Warning the person? Barring the person from anonymous posting? Revealing their identity to the necessary body? etc The idea is *VERY* rough at the moment, but perhaps it has some merit? As I see it, the good part for the anonymous service provider is that they do not have to participate in the process (apart from filtering trivial flaming cases from the judicial system), which will avoid claims of bias and lessens your already considerable load. Comments? Tim ---- 8< Cut Here 8< ---- Tim Moors __________________________________________________________ Australian Telecommunications Research Institute .-_!\ GPO Box U 1987 Email: tim(a)atri.curtin.edu.au / \ Perth, WA 6001 Phone: +61 9 351 3243 \_.-._/ Australia Fax: +61 9 351 3244 o "beLIEve" -- U2 Zoo TV Tour

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No Subject
by Martin Hellman 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Subject: Clipper Chip Most of you have seen the announcement in Friday's NY Times, etc. about NIST (National Institute of Standards & Technology) announcing the "Clipper Chip" crypto device. Several messges on the net have asked for more technical details, and some have been laboring under understandable misunderstandings given the lack of details in the news articles. So here to help out is your friendly NSA link: me. I was somewhat surprised Friday to get a call from the Agency which supplied many of the missing details. I was told the info was public, so here it is (the cc of this to Dennis Branstad at NIST is mostly as a double check on my facts since I assume he is aware of all this; please let me know if I have anything wrong): The Clipper Chip will have a secret crypto algorithm embedded in Silicon. Each chip will have two secret, 80-bit keys. One will be the same for all chips (ie a system-wide key) and the other will be unit specific. I don't know what NIST and NSA will call them, but I will call them the system key SK and unit key UK in this message. The IC will be designed to be extremely difficult to reverse so that the system key can be kept secret. (Aside: It is clear that they also want to keep the algorithm secret and, in my opinion, it may be as much for that as this stated purpose.) The unit key will be generated as the XOR of two 80-bit random numbers K1 and K2 (UK=K1+K2) which will be kept by the two escrow authorities. Who these escrow authorities will be is still to be decided by the Attorney General, but it was stressed to me that they will NOT be NSA or law enforcement agencies, that they must be parties acceptable to the users of the system as unbiased. When a law enforcement agency gets a court order, they will present it to these two escrow authorities and receive K1 and K2, thereby allowing access to the unit key UK. In addition to the system key, each user will get to choose his or her own key and change it as often as desired. Call this key plain old K. When a message is to be sent it will first be encrypted under K, then K will be encrypted under the unit key UK, and the serial number of the unit added to produce a three part message which will then be encrypted under the system key SK producing E{ E[M; K], E[K; UK], serial number; SK} When a court order obtains K1 and K2, and thence K, the law enforcement agency will use SK to decrypt all information flowing on the suspected link [Aside: It is my guess that they may do this constantly on all links, with or without a court order, since it is almost impossible to tell which links over which a message will flow.] This gives the agency access to E[M; K], E[K; UK], serial number in the above message. They then check the serial number of the unit and see if it is on the "watch list" for which they have a court order. If so, they will decrypt E[K; UK] to obtain K, and then decrypt E[M; K] to obtain M. I am still in the process of assessing this scheme, so please do not take the above as any kind of endorsement of the proposed scheme. All I am trying to do is help all of us assess the scheme more knowledgably. But I will say that the need for just one court order worries me. I would feel more comfortable (though not necessarily comfortable!) if two separate court orders were needed, one per escrow authority. While no explanation is needed, the following story adds some color: In researching some ideas that Silvio Micali and I have been kicking around, I spoke with Gerald Gunther, the constitutional law expert here at Stanford and he related the following story: When Edward Levi became Pres. Ford's attorney general (right after Watergate), he was visited by an FBI agent asking for "the wiretap authorizations." When Levy asked for the details so he could review the cases as required by law, the agent told him that his predecessors just turned over 40-50 blank, signed forms every time. Levi did not comply and changed the system, but the lesson is clear: No single person or authority should have the power to authorize wiretaps (or worse yet, divulging of personal keys). Sometimes he or she will be an Edward Levi and sometimes a John Mitchell. Martin Hellman ======== And, his permission to repost. PLEASE NOTE HIS "RESTRICTION." --jim =======

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