December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

A.Jensen doesn't like Sympatico.ca
by dlv＠bwalk.dm.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

What do Timmy May and A.Jensen have in common? They hate Toto's ISP: From: pavanas(a)meridio.ccia.com (pavanas abludo incusus) Newsgroups: news.admin.net-abuse.email Subject: Re: Addresses for sympatico.ca and netcom.ca Date: 16 Jul 1997 00:02:54 GMT Organization: Aragorn Asteria Lines: 45 Message-ID: <slrn5so3sq.jr.pavanas(a)meridio.ccia.com> References: <5qfv4p$ce3(a)camel3.mindspring.com> <33CBE926.495E(a)swva.net> <33d6f xt.36276030(a)news.erols.com> Reply-To: pavanas(a)bbs.mpcs.com X-Newsreader: slrn (0.9.4.2 UNIX) Path: altavista!news1.digital.com!data.ramona.vix.com!sonysjc!sonybc!newsjunki xtns.net!newsfeeds.ans.net!portc02.blue.aol.com!bignews.mediaways.net!news-han xtfn.de!newsserver.rrzn.uni-hannover.de!baghira.han.de!news.rz.uni-hildesheim. xtfu-berlin.de!nntprelay.mathworks.com!infeed2.internetmci.com!newsfeed.intern xtci.com!news.alt.net!pavanas On Tue, 15 Jul 1997 22:07:46 GMT, Roswell Coverup <Majestic7(a)ALIENcryogen.SPAMcom> mused and hath written: > >On Tue, 15 Jul 1997 17:18:30 -0400, while digesting the latest ration >of Spam & UCE "Patricia A. Shaffer" <ramsa(a)swva.net> wrote: > >> >>I've(a)Enough.Of.It wrote: >>> >>> Anyone have complaint addresses for these? I can't seem to find any that w xt. >>> >>> btw, Anyone noticed increasing spam from Canada? >>> >>> ...... >>> :)avid >> >>Yes, sir ... about a half-dozen in the last week. One complaint sent to >>sympatico's Administrative Contact bounced back "user unknown". I had >>sent to postmaster as well, and that didn't bounce ... I'm learning ... >>but no response, yet. >> >>Patricia > >I have never received a response from sympatico - they are a spam >factory. > > And then some... Despite repeated attempts I have never managed a response of any kind from anyone at sympatico. Consider them a write off. >-------- >JOWazzoo..aka Roswell Coverup >BlueLister Tracker Downer - Robert. whatcha gonna do when they come for you?? >Very Disturbed Nerd,InterNUT BlueList,NetScum & NJ Swearer List >Fight spam, support Rep. Chris Smith's TCPA extension by joining >CAUCE: http://www.cauce.org cheers -- IHS pavanas We are but dust and shadow. Quintus Horatius Flaccus --- Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM Brighton Beach Boardwalk BBS, Forest Hills, N.Y.: +1-718-261-2013, 14.4Kbps

3 2

Something of Interest
by IRS Inspection 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

United States Attorney Western District of Washington FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE July 18, 1997 JAMES D. BELL PLEADS GUILTY TO OBSTRUCTING THE IRS AND USING FALSE SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBERS United States Attorney Kate Pflaumer announced that JAMES DALTON BELL, 39, pleaded guilty today in the federal court in Tacoma to two felony charges. BELL, a resident of Vancouver, Washington, pleaded guilty to obstructing and impeding the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), and to falsely using a social security number with the intent to deceive. United States District Court Judge Franklin D. Burgess presided over today's proceedings. The charges stem from an investigation initiated in October, 1996 by IRS Internal Security Inspectors into reports that BELL was gathering the names and home addresses of IRS employees. In previous court hearings, IRS Inspectors testified that BELL had obtained the names and home addresses of 70 IRS employees as part of "Operation LocatIRS." In the eight page plea agreement signed by BELL, he acknowledged that he had gathered the names and addresses of the IRS employees in order to intimidate them in the performance of their official duties. During the course of their investigation, IRS Inspectors discovered that BELL was advocating a scheme called "Assassination Politics", whereby persons would be rewarded with "digital cash" for killing certain undesirable people. BELL identified these undesirables as government employees, such as IRS employees, who would be intimidated from enforcing internal revenue laws for fear of being assassinated. In the plea agreement, BELL admitted that he suggested using "Assassination Politics" as an enforcement mechanism for the "Multnomah County Common Law Court", and that this was part of his effort to obstruct and impede the enforcement of internal revenue laws. In affidavits previously filed in this case, IRS investigators identified BELL as a participant in the "Multnomah County Common Law Court", which was described as a self-appointed anti-government extremist group which purports to hold "trials" of IRS and other Government employees for the performance of their official duties. The affidavits indicated that in January, 1997 the "Multnomah County Common Law Court" held a "trial" of IRS and other Government officials. In the plea agreement, BELL also admitted that on March 16, 1997, he conducted a chemical "stink bomb" attack on the IRS office in Vancouver, Washington, using the noxious chemical mercaptan. In affidavits filed with the Court, IRS Inspectors tied BELL to two previous mercaptan attacks against non-government targets: one being a lawyer's office in 1984, and the other a vehicle in 1989. The IRS investigators also linked BELL to two purchase orders for noxious chemicals, one in 1994 and one in 1996. According to the plea agreement, the attack on the IRS office resulted in a cost to the government of $1,359, and caused a number of IRS employees to have to leave work. In an affidavit previously filed in this case, IRS Inspectors indicated that the mercaptan attack may have been linked to the February 20, 1997 seizure of BELL's vehicle by the IRS for unpaid taxes. As part of the plea agreement, BELL also admitted that he used several different social security numbers in order to hide assets from the IRS and thus to impede the IRS's ability to collect taxes he owed and to prevent the IRS from levying his wages. Federal agents had previously executed two search warrants on BELL's residence. On April 1, 1997, IRS agents seized computers, documents, and firearms during a search. In a follow-up search, the Environmental Protection Agency seized a variety of dangerous chemicals which had been discovered during the execution of the IRS warrant. BELL was arrested by IRS Inspectors on May 16, 1997. BELL continues to be held in custody based on a May 23, 1997 ruling by Magistrate Judge J. Kelley Arnold that BELL posed a danger to the community and was a flight risk. BELL faces a maximum sentence of three years in prison and a $250,000 fine for the obstruction charge, and five years and a $250,000 fine for using a phony social security number. The IRS received assistance in the investigation of BELL from the Portland Police Bureau, Oregon Department of Justice, Oregon State Police, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Vancouver, Washington Police Department.

1 0

Something of Interest
by IRS Inspection 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

United States Attorney Western District of Washington FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE July 18, 1997 JAMES D. BELL PLEADS GUILTY TO OBSTRUCTING THE IRS AND USING FALSE SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBERS United States Attorney Kate Pflaumer announced that JAMES DALTON BELL, 39, pleaded guilty today in the federal court in Tacoma to two felony charges. BELL, a resident of Vancouver, Washington, pleaded guilty to obstructing and impeding the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), and to falsely using a social security number with the intent to deceive. United States District Court Judge Franklin D. Burgess presided over today's proceedings. The charges stem from an investigation initiated in October, 1996 by IRS Internal Security Inspectors into reports that BELL was gathering the names and home addresses of IRS employees. In previous court hearings, IRS Inspectors testified that BELL had obtained the names and home addresses of 70 IRS employees as part of "Operation LocatIRS." In the eight page plea agreement signed by BELL, he acknowledged that he had gathered the names and addresses of the IRS employees in order to intimidate them in the performance of their official duties. During the course of their investigation, IRS Inspectors discovered that BELL was advocating a scheme called "Assassination Politics", whereby persons would be rewarded with "digital cash" for killing certain undesirable people. BELL identified these undesirables as government employees, such as IRS employees, who would be intimidated from enforcing internal revenue laws for fear of being assassinated. In the plea agreement, BELL admitted that he suggested using "Assassination Politics" as an enforcement mechanism for the "Multnomah County Common Law Court", and that this was part of his effort to obstruct and impede the enforcement of internal revenue laws. In affidavits previously filed in this case, IRS investigators identified BELL as a participant in the "Multnomah County Common Law Court", which was described as a self-appointed anti-government extremist group which purports to hold "trials" of IRS and other Government employees for the performance of their official duties. The affidavits indicated that in January, 1997 the "Multnomah County Common Law Court" held a "trial" of IRS and other Government officials. In the plea agreement, BELL also admitted that on March 16, 1997, he conducted a chemical "stink bomb" attack on the IRS office in Vancouver, Washington, using the noxious chemical mercaptan. In affidavits filed with the Court, IRS Inspectors tied BELL to two previous mercaptan attacks against non-government targets: one being a lawyer's office in 1984, and the other a vehicle in 1989. The IRS investigators also linked BELL to two purchase orders for noxious chemicals, one in 1994 and one in 1996. According to the plea agreement, the attack on the IRS office resulted in a cost to the government of $1,359, and caused a number of IRS employees to have to leave work. In an affidavit previously filed in this case, IRS Inspectors indicated that the mercaptan attack may have been linked to the February 20, 1997 seizure of BELL's vehicle by the IRS for unpaid taxes. As part of the plea agreement, BELL also admitted that he used several different social security numbers in order to hide assets from the IRS and thus to impede the IRS's ability to collect taxes he owed and to prevent the IRS from levying his wages. Federal agents had previously executed two search warrants on BELL's residence. On April 1, 1997, IRS agents seized computers, documents, and firearms during a search. In a follow-up search, the Environmental Protection Agency seized a variety of dangerous chemicals which had been discovered during the execution of the IRS warrant. BELL was arrested by IRS Inspectors on May 16, 1997. BELL continues to be held in custody based on a May 23, 1997 ruling by Magistrate Judge J. Kelley Arnold that BELL posed a danger to the community and was a flight risk. BELL faces a maximum sentence of three years in prison and a $250,000 fine for the obstruction charge, and five years and a $250,000 fine for using a phony social security number. The IRS received assistance in the investigation of BELL from the Portland Police Bureau, Oregon Department of Justice, Oregon State Police, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Vancouver, Washington Police Department.

1 0

Re: court order required for keys?
by TruthMonger 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Roger Schlafly wrote: > Posted online news accounts of the McCain-Kerrey bill have implied > that the a court order is required under the bill to get keys. > [AP, 07/09/1997] > As with wiretaps, authorities would have to obtain court orders to make > the keys available for law enforcement. ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ > [Wired, 11.Jul.97] > Law enforcement could then access that copy of your key > through a court order. > ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ > > I find this distressing, because I have read the bill, and a court order > is most emphatically NOT required. Only a form specified by J. Reno. Most people don't realize that many of the so-called protections that are in place to guard our constitutional rights and our privacy only apply to _use_ of the material in an _official_ proceeding, such as a trial or hearing. Government, private agencies and corporations daily exchange all manner of supposedly private information, often using court orders only to _officially_ get portions of what they already had. It is no accident that LEA's often get court orders asking only for access to certain incriminating information (since they've already done the "fishing"). This is a tricky point in the bill, but notice that: > (1) Court orders are not required for wiretaps in the US. While it may > be true that court orders are used most of the time when wiretap evidence > is used in a criminal trial, there are a number of exceptions. Also, many of the wiretaps have already been in place when the court orders are applied for. "Redating" of wiretap records is a common and sophisticated part of LEA practice. NSA has a database that is used to cull out wiretap references which are out of sync with the purported time-stamp on records. It lists all worldwide social and religious time-sequence indentifiers such as Easter, Hannuka, the running of the bulls, sports contests and playoffs, etc. > (2) There is no restriction in the bill to getting keys to decipher > communications covered by the wiretap > Under S.909, > if the cops can get access to the data, then they can get the keys > without any court order. Which they no doubt will do and apply for the court order after they have found what they want. This will be even more effective than their voice-wiretap methods have been because their will be no need to redate the information they claim as being found after getting the court order since files, unlike voices, linger. > (4) In S.909, all of the requirements on law enforcement officials > can be lifted by executive order. Which means it can be done _retroactively_ with a nod, a wink, and a few simple strokes of a pen. S.909 quite simply butt-fucks the Constitution and the citizenry. The shameless criminals on Capitol Hill of Manure no longer even seriously pretend to be in the least concerned with Constitutional issues. They think (and may be right) that they only have to chant the "National Security" mantra a couple of times to absolve all of their sins against the Constitution. TruthMonger

1 0

spawn of Vulis
by Zooko Journeyman 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> FWIW, my 8 y o has his own IBM Aptiva, his own Internet access, his own > e-mail box, and I exercise absolutely no control over what he reads or > says on the Internet. You need to help him set up a pseudonym, Dmitri. Think about 10 or 20 years down the road when he wants to get a contract/ join a phyle/avoid an enemy or whatever, and his entire childhood e-mail and virtual-community history is greppable via a 2-second, 2-cent search. This would give his employers/ partners/competitors/enemies/governments a great deal of leverage over him in various ways. Also it might be very embarassing socially, which is no less important. Get him a pseudonym. You can always (more or less) claim the reputation capital that your pseudonym accumulated, but you can never (probably) lose history accumulated under your True Name. Of course he could always change his name/adopt a strong 'nym in the future in order to get a clean start, but this might not be easy, especially since people can find him through you and perhaps other of his relatives or friends. Sincerely, Zooko Journeynym

1 0

mondex
by Ryan Lackey 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

So, it appears (at least to me and many others) that Mondex is the most likely to succeed of all the serious electronic cash systems currently publically announced. I think I like some parts of their architecture, but to a great extent they seem to be completely at odds with the "free money" goals I have for electronic cash -- they're totally owned by the banking industry, willing to give up a great deal of privacy and anonymity in the name of preventing money laundering, and they appear committed to supporting only current national currencies, rather than allowing corporate scrip from either existing large companies (I trust at&t more than most governments) or organizations which buy a bunch of gold, charge minimal overhead, and issue currency totally backed by their assets. I'd be somewhat annoyed if the big electronic cash system only moved current statist cash into the electronic realm. Does anyone know how open the Mondex architecture is? Is it in any way possible to set up a competing system with your own card manufacture and issuing bodies for currencies which can be used in deployed Mondex POS terminals without too much hassle? Would this be analagous to the problem of replacing InterNIC with other NICs -- you need to make the user servers know to look at the rival systems and understand their keys? It would be kind of impressive in a way if Mondex were lame about allowing other currencies to proliferate free of state influences, yet managed to get the basic technology employed around the world, then some cypherpunkish group came up with their own cards, a little bit of software, etc. and then issued currency with more behind it than Mondex franchisees, had higher profits than Mondex, and then were to be the only currencies anyone would trust after the collapse of a few state-backed currencies. Also, I'd trust the cypherpunkish crowd to do a better job of hardware and software design for the cards and system, so they're likely to be more secure in that fashion as well. Am I being utterly out of touch with reality, or only tangential to it? --- Ryan Lackey rdl(a)mit.edu http://mit.edu/rdl/www/

2 1

FTC privacy comments from CEI and National Consumer Coalition
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Fri, 18 Jul 1997 10:30:59 -0700 (PDT) From: Declan McCullagh <declan(a)well.com> To: fight-censorship-announce(a)vorlon.mit.edu Subject: FTC privacy comments from CEI and National Consumer Coalition The Competitive Enterprise Institute and the National Consumer Coalition filed these comments in response to the FTC's four-day privacy hearing last month. Some excerpts: The fear over children seeing sexually explicit materials online led to hasty calls for Internet censorship in the Communications Decency Act. Yet the Supreme Court recently struck down the law, ruling that the Federal government should not be in the business of trying to protect children with such a blunt - and patently unconstitutional - instrument. Similarly, the rhetoric surrounding the issue of children's privacy on the Internet has led to hasty calls for regulation. Indeed, the Administration has taken a strong, even ominous position: "This problem warrants prompt attention. Otherwise, government action may be required." [...] Sometimes information has been released to anybody and everybody, via chat rooms or other forums. Since this information becomes part of the knowledge of others, our "property right" to control this information is actually a "right" to control the actions of other people who now have this information. This is an infringement upon our basic freedoms of association, contract, and speech. There is nothing wrong with collecting information freely placed in public, as much of this information is. [...] More info: http://pathfinder.com/netly/editorial/0,1012,1050,00.html http://pathfinder.com/netly/opinion/0,1042,1055,00.html -Declan ---------- Forwarded message ---------- July 14, 1997 Secretary Federal Trade Commission Room H-159 Sixth St. and Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Washington, D.C. 20580 Consumer Privacy 1997 Additional Comments P954807 To the Secretary: The Competitive Enterprise Institute and the National Consumer Coalition hereby file additional comments on the Commission's June 10-13 hearings on "Consumer Privacy Issues Posed by the Online Marketplace." CEI is a non-profit, non-partisan free-market research and advocacy group. The NCC is a coalition of nine organizations dedicated to the proposition that consumers are best served by a free market in goods and services. We thank the Commission for including us in the four Roundtable discussions during the hearings, and appreciate the opportunity to elaborate upon some of the issues raised during the course of the hearings. What is Privacy? - Part II In our opening comments, we wrote that when it comes to collection of consumer data, "privacy is not a right, it is a preference." The evidence presented during the hearings regarding ways to "protect" privacy, as well as the surveys showing consumer views, have convinced us that this remains true. The Harris/Westin survey was an interesting contribution to the discussion of privacy on the Internet. We are not convinced, however, that everyone interviewed understood "privacy" in the same way. Privacy is an abstraction, like "freedom" or "justice," so it is likely that the people surveyed imposed their own concerns upon the term "privacy." One point on which the survey is clear is that people who are concerned about their privacy have done something about it. In this case, it is more illuminating to look at what people do than at what they say. Nevertheless, some have used this survey to support their arguments for federal regulation and congressional privacy legislation. Neither of these would be appropriate responses to consumers' hesitance towards Internet commerce. It is the job of companies operating on the Internet to gain consumer confidence, not the duty of the government. Indeed, the proper role for the government is to guard against force, theft, and fraud. Property Rights on the Internet Professor Alan Westin said that web users "are worried that their e-mail communications may be intercepted, their visits to web sites can be covertly tracked, their participation in chat rooms and forums can be monitored without their consent." One possible solution was to give individuals a "property right" in the information they have released onto the Internet. From this follows a call for federal protection of this "property right" via limits on the collection and sale of personal data. The argument that people have a "property right" in their personal data is ironic, as it comes from those who would have the government infringe upon the property rights of both ISPs and companies on the Web. We believe that this upside-down conception of "property" will work against consumers' interests in freedom of contract and association. Traditionally, private property rights have been understood to be the means by which we secure our privacy, as expressed in the old adage, "A man's home is his castle." Our system of property rights enables us to enjoy privacy (i.e. from government intrusion). In recent years, however, the basis for legal claims has become the idea of an inviolate personhood. A "legal right" to information about oneself on the Internet, as some have advocated, is the next step. >From this comes the "right" to control information about oneself after one has already released it. This is a step in the wrong direction. If an individual has released information about himself in a contractual agreement with certain limits on it, then he has a right to see that that information is treated in a certain way. For example, if a company web page says that it will not collect information, and it does, then that is a broken contract. On the other hand, if a company says it will collect all kinds of information, then privacy-sensitive individuals have been warned and should avoid that site. From the examples discussed at the hearing, it seems that many companies are still getting used to the way the Internet works, and they are only beginning to understand the utility of publishing privacy policies. For example, the New York Times discovered during the course of the hearings that it had no published privacy policies on its web site, a situation it addressed immediately. Time-Warner's Pathfinder site recently added prominent links to its privacy policy as well. Sometimes information has been released to anybody and everybody, via chat rooms or other forums. Since this information becomes part of the knowledge of others, our "property right" to control this information is actually a "right" to control the actions of other people who now have this information. This is an infringement upon our basic freedoms of association, contract, and speech. There is nothing wrong with collecting information freely placed in public, as much of this information is. Nor is there anything wrong with one party selling information to another party as long as it was not under fraudulent circumstances. If a person objects to this information being sold, then it is up to the individual to make alternative arrangements with which he is more comfortable. . In other words, protecting your privacy is your responsibility. That is the value inherent in the freedom to contract. Bringing back the original conception of property rights, as well as freedom of contract, is the best way of protecting an individual's privacy preferences on the Internet. Rather than implementing a system of government regulation of data collection practices, people should be able to choose whether or not to contract with a company or otherwise. Restricting the downstream actions of others based upon a made-up right will undercut our other valued freedoms. On Self-Regulation We laud the Federal Trade Commission for its cautious response toward calls to regulate the Internet. We are also pleased with the Clinton Administration's stated intention to refrain from regulating most parts of the Internet. We agree in principle that data-gatherers ought to inform consumers what kinds of data they are collecting and how that data will be used. If it really is true that consumers are highly concerned about this, then companies scrambling to sell goods and services over the Internet will accommodate them. (We also note that there are already strong incentives for information brokers to ensure the accuracy of information they collect, since there is no market for inaccurate information.) What troubles us is the concept of "self-regulation." Although the term implies a lack of government regulation, many of these codes are being developed in response to a threat of regulation. As the Clinton Administration's recently released report on Internet commerce stated, "We believe that private efforts of industry working in cooperation with consumer groups are preferable to government regulation, but if effective privacy protection cannot be provided in this way, we will reevaluate this policy." We believe that the Commission should not use "self-regulation" as a way to steer the development of policies on the Internet without going through the standard process for proposing regulations. The Commission must still defend whatever goals it proposes. One component of this "self-regulation" was the Platform for Privacy Preferences. This template would allow consumers to fine-tune their preferences and allow them to know what sort of policies a web site has. This may be a fine idea, and we hope that if consumers find it acceptable, it will be adopted by many organizations. However, we do not believe that a single privacy standard is necessarily desirable. There are many real-world examples of competing standards co-existing peacefully. There are different monetary systems, there are different systems of measurement (English and metric, Celsius and Fahrenheit), there are different languages. The Commission should be wary of backing a single standard for the Internet. The threat of regulation is nearly as serious as actual regulation. It may well be that the solutions supported by the Commission and the Administration are the best ones. It also may be that there is an alternate solution around the corner, one which we cannot predict now but one which might be stifled because it does not match the goals supported by current government officials. This could have very serious ramifications for the future development of the Internet. After all, companies already entrenched in a particular market that ask for regulation often do so in order to constrain the actions of future competitors and to derive windfall benefits, a practice known as "rent-seeking." If regulation stymies the growth of the Internet, we will have no way of knowing what we have given up as a result. The idea that federal regulation of the Internet is somehow better than a market solution to privacy questions is completely unfounded. Indeed, the evidence is that federal regulation in every other sector of American life has had adverse and unforeseen consequences which end up hurting consumers. There is no reason to believe that federal regulation of privacy practices will be any better than the current situation, and it may well be worse. Children and The Internet The fear over children seeing sexually explicit materials online led to hasty calls for Internet censorship in the Communications Decency Act. Yet the Supreme Court recently struck down the law, ruling that the Federal government should not be in the business of trying to protect children with such a blunt - and patently unconstitutional - instrument. Similarly, the rhetoric surrounding the issue of children's privacy on the Internet has led to hasty calls for regulation. Indeed, the Administration has taken a strong, even ominous position: "This problem warrants prompt attention. Otherwise, government action may be required." We believe that before the Commission begins to regulate in the name of children, it should recognize from the start that today's children are tomorrow's adults, and that these regulations may restrict their rights when they are grown up. The Commission should be wary of proposals which would effectively treat adults like children. The Center for Media Education's report on the privacy practices of some web sites seemed to shock the Commission. Yet we are not sure why the fact that a toothpaste company which sends a solicited e-mail to a child in the name of the Tooth Fairy - an e-mail which contains neither the name of the product being sold nor the name of the company -is so disturbing, especially since for many years people have been able to have letters from Santa Claus sent to children. We are in fact puzzled as to why similar "information collection practices" which have gone on for decades (e.g. children sending box tops away for magic decoder rings) are suddenly sinister when performed over the Internet. We note that CME's primary objection is advertising itself, and "privacy" is just a means to criticize it. For example, one target of CME's outrage is "animated product spokescharacters," e.g. Tony the Tiger, which "interact with your children...fostering intimate relationships that compel your children to buy specific products and services." That these "spokescharacters" also ask children for e-mail addresses appears to be a slightly less urgent concern. CME's recommendations to the Commission include restrictions on the use of these cartoons: "Product and other fictional figures should not be used to solicit personally identifiable information from children." Indeed, elsewhere CME states explicitly that "there should be no direct interaction between children and product spokescharacters" on web pages. This is tantamount to a ban on selected content simply because of its advertising nature. This is not the proper forum for a discussion of the great value of advertising to consumers, and why advertising is not, and never was, a sinister seducer of consumers. We will, however, say that children are far more skeptical of advertising than CME gives them credit for. No matter how much advertising, or how little, there is, children will still want things and their parents can still tell them, "No." In short, it appears that this issue has very little to do with privacy on the Internet, and far more to do with CME's anti-advertising agenda. Nonetheless, CME did introduce some interesting issues. CME looked at the existence and content of privacy practices on children's web sites, and publicized them. There is nothing wrong with this; indeed, if children's privacy is such a high concern for individuals, then companies will respond (many of the web sites in question addressed the issue as soon as it was brought to their attention). As more and more people become comfortable with the Internet, and become aware of its capabilities, we expect to see all kinds of practices - from content, to advertising, to data collection - to become more refined in response to consumer demand. CME also raised the question of how and when to obtain verifiable parental consent to collect information from children. One suggestion was to have parents mail in a signed form indicating that their child may use the web page and may divulge certain information. Not only would this curtail what is an essentially benign practice - not even CME can explain what actual harm might result from this collection - but anyone who has ever known a child to forge his parent's signature to play hooky knows that this is not a good solution. It is an irony of the Internet that the technology which enables data-gatherers to collect information on what people look at can easily be thwarted by Anonymizers and other disguising technologies. It still holds true that sometimes on the Internet, as the famous New Yorker animal cartoon showed, "nobody knows you're a dog." Nobody has to know that you are or are not a child, either. Obviously, forcing children to identify themselves as minors, especially in such a public area as the Internet, would be unwise. Consequently, regulations aimed at "protecting children's privacy" are going to hit adults as well. For this reason, we urge the Commission to refrain from drawing up regulations specifically targeted towards children. Nor should the role of parents be underestimated or tossed aside in favor of federal regulation. Though the Harris/Westin survey showed a nearly unanimous belief that children's privacy ought to be protected on the Internet, the survey also said that not even a plurality of parents have done much to protect it. There are a plethora of technologies available to enable parents to monitor and adjust what their children see, and more are on the way. We urge parents to keep in mind that just as they would think twice before allowing a child wander around New York City alone, they should supervise their children on the Internet. Conclusion The Commission is under a great deal of pressure, from within the government and without, to regulate at least some parts of the Internet. As more and more people become Internet users, it is even more important for the government to refrain from regulating. The Commission should confine itself to policing fraud and investigating any actual injury. Julie DeFalco on behalf of the Competitive Enterprise Institute and for the National Consumer Coalition Endnotes ------------------------- Declan McCullagh Time Inc. The Netly News Network Washington Correspondent http://netlynews.com/

1 0

Re: FC: Brookings Inst. on crypto: "There are reasonable compromises" (fwd)
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Fri, 18 Jul 1997 10:40:17 -0700 From: Mike Godwin <mnemonic(a)well.com> To: declan(a)well.com, fight-censorship-announce(a)vorlon.mit.edu Subject: Re: FC: Brookings Inst. on crypto: "There are reasonable compromises" At 9:17 AM -0700 7/18/97, Declan McCullagh wrote: > Which >is all you'll find at Morton's, where the menu lists a fine >selection of slabs, all thick, bloody, expensive. The last three words, of course, are an excellent description of most Washington politicians. --Mike ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- We shot a law in _Reno_, just to watch it die. Mike Godwin, EFF Staff Counsel, can be reached at mnemonic(a)eff.org or at his office, 510-548-3290. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------

1 0

Re: mondex
by Wesley Felter 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On 7/18/97 3:26 AM, Ryan Lackey said: >Does anyone know how open the Mondex architecture is? Is it in any way >possible to set up a competing system with your own card manufacture >and issuing bodies for currencies which can be used in deployed Mondex >POS terminals without too much hassle? Would this be analagous to the >problem of replacing InterNIC with other NICs -- you need to make the >user servers know to look at the rival systems and understand their >keys? As I understand it, Mondex is a completely closed system. Everything that you don't absolutely need to know is undocumented. Since you can settle offline, the potential for fraud is frightening; unless I'm getting the benefit of these, um, weaknesses in the system, I don't want there to be any. The lack of privacy seems to be somewhat of a smokescreen; since you can settle offline, they don't have a really accurate way of tracking transactions except at the interface between e$ and other forms of money or goods (like their POS terminals and ATMs). Can you hack Mondex? They say you can't... Wesley Felter - wesley(a)binarycompass.com - Binary Compass Enterprises In BizRate we trust - <http://www.bizrate.com/> Disclaimer: My employer knows I'm crazy.

1 0

'Thanks for This Important Commitment'
by Dave K-P 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

'Thanks for This Important Commitment' by Dan Brekke and Rebecca Vesely 6:06pm 17.Jul.97.PDT Some words that came out of President Clinton's mouth the other day signaled that the Web's biggest search and directory services were on board for a major effort to get sites to rate themselves. "We ... need to encourage every Internet site, whether or not it has material harmful for young people, to label its own content," Clinton said Wednesday at a White House event to announce his new Net self-regulation initiative. "... To help to speed the labeling process along, several Internet search engines - the Yellow Pages of cyberspace, if you will - will begin to ask that all Web sites label content when applying for a spot in their directories." And then the self-described techno-idiot went on to thank Yahoo, Excite, and Lycos "for this important commitment." What the president and most of those who reported the big news missed is that the companies made no such commitment. Calls to Yahoo's PR department minutes after the president spoke for details on what the company would do to get site owners to rate themselves were met with puzzlement. Eventually, callers were pointed to a press release issued in the name of Yahoo, Infoseek, Lycos, and Excite that pledged the companies would do ... almost nothing. The release announced "an initiative to work together to promote self-regulation of the Internet." Got that? The statement talked about the importance of the First Amendment and how the directories could make a difference "by making it easy for Web site developers to rate themselves and to identify their sites appropriately." Regardless of how wide of the mark they were, Clinton's words did make news. And Thursday, some of the directory mavens were trying to clarify things. A spokeswoman for Excite said the search engines will continue to monitor evolving plans on how to keep kids from accessing pornography online. "We have committed to a) finding a system or systems for rating sites, and b) after finding that system, allowing our users to voluntarily rate themselves," said Jerry Yang, co-founder of Yahoo.

1 0