December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

old posts saved/archived/privacy article, salon
by Vladimir Z. Nuri 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

salon article on how old posts are saved on the net, and how it affects privacy. "I felt helpless and violated" sez one poor hapless chic http://www.salonmagazine.com/21st/

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enemy of the state movie
by Vladimir Z. Nuri 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

fun wired article on new movie "enemy of the state" with privacy /cpunk implications. bamford quoted, info on NSA, rotenberg, spy satellites, etc. http://www.wired.com/news/news/culture/story/16507.html happy xgiving folks I am thankful for cyberspace <g>

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Anon Mail Server?
by James Hillenbrand 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

What is a good server that I could send mail through anonymously.. -- -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=- -------==== James Hillenbrand ====------- -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=- ICQ NUMBER (UIN) : 7621556 PERSONAL E-MAIL : JamezHill(a)Audiophile.com ALT. E-MAIL : MegaHertz(a)Audiophile.com HOMEPAGE : http://www.ThePentagon.com/DaMaGe NOTES : Pumpin' BASS lower than you can hear and louder than you can stand! -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-

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PipeNet 1.1 and b-money
by Wei Dai 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I've discovered some attacks against the original PipeNet design. The new protocol, PipeNet 1.1, should fix the weaknesses. PipeNet 1.1 uses layered sequence numbers and MACs. This prevents a collusion between a receiver and a subset of switches from tracing the caller by modifying or swaping packets and then watching for garbage. A description of PipeNet 1.1 is available at http://www.eskimo.com/~weidai. Also available there is a description of b-money, a new protocol for monetary exchange and contract enforcement for pseudonyms. Please direct all follow-up discussion of these protocols to cypherpunks.

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PipeNet 1.1 and b-money
by Steve Moyzis 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I don't know if this was supposed to have gone to Bugtraq, or it came to me because I 'visited' their "snoop server" acoupla times. If you already rec'd the original, then "Never Mind". >Date: Thu, 26 Nov 1998 15:33:49 -0800 >From: Wei Dai <weidai(a)eskimo.com> >To: cypherpunks(a)cyberpass.net >Cc: onions(a)itd.nrl.navy.mil >Subject: PipeNet 1.1 and b-money >Sender: owner-onions(a)itd.nrl.navy.mil > >I've discovered some attacks against the original PipeNet design. The new >protocol, PipeNet 1.1, should fix the weaknesses. PipeNet 1.1 uses layered >sequence numbers and MACs. This prevents a collusion between a receiver >and a subset of switches from tracing the caller by modifying or swaping >packets and then watching for garbage. > >A description of PipeNet 1.1 is available at >http://www.eskimo.com/~weidai. > >Also available there is a description of b-money, a new protocol for >monetary exchange and contract enforcement for pseudonyms. > >Please direct all follow-up discussion of these protocols to cypherpunks. >

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Rootfest
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

http://slashdot.org/articles/98/11/26/1841245.shtml "RootFest is a conference for the computer underground, as well as the computer security professionals, engineers, networking people, feds, script kiddies, and anyone else who would like a chance to meet people and learn. When: RootFest 99 will be held May 21-23, 1999. Where: Minneapolis, Minnesota,..." RootMonger

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Re: Old Hat
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On the morning of Thurs, 26-Nov-98 at 10:17:48 -0800, holist unwisely said: > "This is not too widely publicised", he went on to say, > "but all insiders are aware that all e-mail anonymiser > services in the U.S. are operated by the FBI." > Quite a few of the messages to cypherpunks seem to come > from anonymous remailers in the US. > > Comments? Comment? COMMENTS? How about this, FUDSpreaderBreath: Stick Fischer and his claims up your ass. This is not too widely publicised <whisper, whisper>, I went on to say, but all insiders are aware that this kind of FUD is unadulterated ratshit. While there is no doubt _some_ official presence in the remailer network, the proposition advanced here is preposterous. > He went on to say it took them about ten minutes to > discover with the help of their American friends which > account the mail was originating from. It would probably take more than ten minutes just to find the phone number of their FBI contact, much less find him at his desk and not humping some summer intern, much less expect that he would know a remailer from his no doubt ultra-tight asshole, much less have him run down the pointy-haired manager to give him permission to find and communicate with a suitably cleared propellor head, much less find that the remailer in question was, indeed, operated either by them or by their snaky friends over at the NSA, much less check their surreptitious logs for the offending traffic, much less find that that traffic indeed did not originate from another remailer _not_ under their control, etc. etc. Ten minutes, in bureaucrat time, is about what it takes to rub two brain cells together to make a realistic approximation of a human thought. By this time, action in the physical universe is still a long, long way off. This report is likely to be nothing more than a complete fabrication of the facts, even if the underlying case was real. > just before the Berlin wall came down, the two Germanies > agreed to provide the FBI with direct access to the > backbone of the German telephone network Except that telephone networks don't have "backbones." More fantasy. And there was no single "German telephone network," and probably still isn't. > it is easier for the FBI to listen to German phonecalls > than it is for the German authorities themselves), which, > in addition to costing a horrendous amount of money, > resulted in a bunch of data every day that took them two > days to process. Highly doubtful. First, it's not in the FBI's brief to be doing large-scale foreign-based surveillance of foreign telephone systems. Second, there is no reason to believe that the FBI would have a substantially easier time of processing large amounts of resulting data than would the Germans. The Germans know how to use computers, too, and being congenitally statist, they no doubt have more facilities in place closer to the sources of information than do U.S. authorities at home or abroad. This claim also ignores the fact that the FBI have their hands full right at home and don't have the resources to be conducting large-scale surveillance of the phone calls of entire foreign nations. Oh, sure, we see increasing extraterritorial operation by small numbers of FBI, but that doesn't equate to monitoring the entire German phone system(s) or a significant segment thereof and identifying some nitwit dialing in to AOL. Is AOL even _in_ Germany? If so, what is it called, GOL? Gassholes On Line? The idea that a state security apparatus would find an AOL account to be a significant obstacle is laughable. > So, Fischer said, it would have been hopeless if the > fellow had not owed the German tax authority one and > a half million Marks - the tax authority busted him > (following the lines of their own, independent > investigation), took his computer, and he was busted. So we are to believe that after monitoring the entire German telephone system to identify who was calling in and using a particular AOL account, and successfully pegging him, the Germans were powerless to do anything, and had to call down their Tax Zombies to have an excuse to grab the guy's computer, which presumably then provided them with the "evidence" against him. Right. If the German authorities overhear in a bar that you might have forbidden literature, they will be there the same night, ransacking your home. How is it that with evidence that a certain person was the user of an AOL account they had identified as the source of extortionary messages, they were powerless to break down his door? I could admire the FUD spreaders just a teensy bit if they weren't so completely brain dead. They can't even invent a plausible FUD scenario. That the USG is operating one or more remailers is a no-brainer. That they are operating _all_ U.S. remailers is beyond the realm of reality. That the FBI has more than a casual hand in such things is not likely. Running remailers would be right up the NSA's, uh, alley, but maintaining a traffic watch on virtually _all_ remailers worldwide would be much more their style. Now _there's_ an opportunity for the spooks to have some real fun, though it's anything but certain they would be willing to "share," for a variety of reasons. The capabilities they have are protected as secrets even more than the information they gather. FUDBusterMonger It Ain't FUD til I SAY it's FUD!

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A tad more on Goldbach's...
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I figure I'll drop a couple of more points on this since nobody else seems to have twigged to them.... Goldbach's original conjecture is crap. There is NO way that 3 odd numbers will ever equal an even number. Odd + Odd is Even. Even + Odd is Odd. Fermat was a hell of a lot more charitable to the original assertion than I would have been. Goldbach's existing conjecture can be worded another way: Any even number may be represented by the sum of 3 even numbers provided two of the numbers are 1 less than a prime and we add 2. It's obvious that an even number can always be the sum of other even numbers, it's axiomatic. The question actualy is: Is the set of even numbers whose members are one less than the corresponding member of the primes sufficient, when added to 2, to sum to all the even numbers. As far as I can find nobody has written a lot on patterns of even numbers 1 less than the odds. There's not even a name for the set that I can find. As to somebodies assertion that an odd number can be represented by the sum of two odds, better study your math a tad better. Odd + Odd is *always* Even, never Odd. Happy Thanksgiving! ____________________________________________________________________ Technology cannot make us other than what we are. James P. Hogan The Armadillo Group ,::////;::-. James Choate Austin, Tx /:'///// ``::>/|/ ravage(a)ssz.com www.ssz.com .', |||| `/( e\ 512-451-7087 -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- --------------------------------------------------------------------

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Otaku Defined
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text Resent-Date: Thu, 26 Nov 1998 05:31:08 -0500 X-Sender: dphelan(a)mailhost.pavilion.co.uk Date: Thu, 26 Nov 1998 07:45:22 +0000 To: "Lord Myren" <lordmyren(a)hotmail.com>, wear-hard(a)haven.org From: David Phelan <dphelan(a)pavilion.co.uk> Subject: [WAY OFF TOPIC] Otaku Defined (was Re: Japanese Technomads ) Mime-Version: 1.0 Resent-From: wear-hard(a)haven.org X-Mailing-List: <wear-hard(a)haven.org> archive/latest/5977 X-Loop: wear-hard(a)haven.org Precedence: list Resent-Sender: wear-hard-request(a)haven.org Status: U At 13:16 25/11/1998 PST, Lord Myren wrote: <snip> >Otaku is translated from japanese meaning "fan." This is a somewhat >flawed translation in that there is no way to transfer the powerful >connotative meaning. > <snip> >Unfortunately, I believe something was lost in the translation in the >article. Otaku is rarely used in refence to things other than anime. >This article may have failed the translation or may just be a minor >mislabeling. Otaku can be used in reference to things other than anime, >however it is rarely ever so. >From a no-longer online magazine called JapanInterface (used to be at http://www.php.co.jp/japaninface/) Nerds of a Feather Defining OTAKU by Bill Marsh IN TOKYO a recently arrived friend calls, wants to know daishikyu (ASAP, yesterday) what otaku means. He's just been told by a mutual acquaintance that no serious student of contemporary Japan could possibly not know this word-yet his Japanese accuser, when asked to define otaku, refuses even to try. It isn't easy. Once upon a time, this word-which taken alone translates as "[your] honorable house"-was no more than an obsequious, laboriously indirect way to say "you" or "you and yours." Snobs and bluestockings will use it, but there's nothing inherently sinister about the expression. The story doesn't end there. Japan has long produced bumper crops of korekuta ("collectors" of rare stamps, cars, etc) and mania (folks with a "mania" for Beatles bootlegs, etc) who gather at conventions to compare notes and stockpiles. Haughty yet insecure, many greet each other by asking, Otaku wa nani o nasatteru desu ka? This fastidious formula for inquiring "What're you into?" or "What's your thing?" became a trademark, prompting trend-watchers to smugly label them otaku-zoku (nerd tribes). Enter Tsutomu Miyazaki, arrested in 1989 and eventually charged with the abduction and murder of four little girls. Here was a man capable of videotaping himself cutting up a dead child and sending her bones, the video, and photos of her sandals and clothes to the victim's parents in a cardboard box. When a search of his premises uncovered an eclectic collection of 5,000 videotapes, the image of otaku as benign, shy dorks disintegrated. Surprise! Japan's police and media, used to playing to the crowd and blandly riding herd on the occasional misfit, discovered during the affluent 1980s that their grip on a population easily tamed by fears of what the neighbors might think was slipping. Popping up all over were intense, asocial creatures on very private missions for very private gods. Shunning contact with all but their brethren in obsession, they sent to o-mawari-san (the neighborhood cops who in Japan regularly "check up" on each household) a silent but clear message: Nothing personal, but what I'm into is the kind of thing you and people like you would never understand. Are otaku garden-variety nerds? Psychopaths? Undesirables? What otaku connotes depends on who you ask. Example: A producer friend recently berated his director on an NHK project for shooting from otaku camera angles. The point? He wanted to make a TV program for general audiences, not film-school coteries. The foreword to the superb but dated (1989) Otaku no hon (The Otaku Book, published by JICC) argues that otaku are strictly a post-1980 phenomenon, not the latest gimmick in the ephemeral parade of zoku (tribes) that postwar youth-culture reportage has served up. Their break with the values of seken (the "real world," as the editor parenthetically labels it in English) is not a byproduct of kodoku (isolation) or seijuku (adolescence). Rather, otaku desire to dokuji no sekai ni chujitsu ni ikiru (live faithfully in their own world) and find a ba (place, outlet) to meet others who onaji genso o kyoyu suru (share the same fantasy). The editor offers the example of the rorikon (otaku with a "Lolita complex"): deeply unwilling to become men (i.e., husbands and salarymen), they partake instead of kyodo genso (communal fantasy) via comic books about kaku no bi-shojo (imaginary beautiful girlchildren). Their female equivalents in ambivalence are the yaoi-zoku, girls hooked on perverted, plotless, sexually explicit parodies of conventional comics about the friendship between cute boys. Obviously neither homosexual nor homophobic, both groups prefer the chaste option of onani (onanism) to the perceived compromises of marital consummation. Otaku no hon presents an amazing variety of strategies for sidestepping the social compact. Even familiar types like hakka ("hackers"), gema ("gamers," computer game freaks), or aidorian ("idol-ians," who fixate on singing idols) seem more over the top than their American counterparts. Others, like kamera-kozo ("li'l camera monks" who sneak crotch shots with concealed strobe cameras) and akushon banda ("action banders" devoted to cracking officially "secure" radio and computer systems), aggressively court risks to enact their pranks. Whatever their stripe, the otaku are out there in droves, rifling through the latest aniparoetchimangadojinshi (animation-parody-pervert-comic-connoisseur-mag) at the corner bookstore, terrified that any minute they'll be eaten alive by common sense. from Pop Japanese, Bill Marsh's ongoing column in MANGAJIN magazine Hope that is useful Dave Ph -------------------------------------------------------------- Dave Phelan dphelan(a)pavilion.co.uk CCIE# 3590 http://freepages.pavilion.net/users/dphelan "Anyone who isn't confused really doesn't understand the situation." -- Edward R. Murrow -- Subcription/unsubscription/info requests: send e-mail with subject of "subscribe", "unsubscribe", or "info" to wear-hard-request(a)haven.org Wear-Hard Mailing List Archive (searchable): http://wearables.ml.org --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)philodox.com> Philodox Financial Technology Evangelism <http://www.philodox.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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Re: Securing data in memory (was "Locking physical memory (RAM) under Windows") (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > From: "Jim Adler" <jadler(a)soundcode.com> > Subject: Re: Securing data in memory (was "Locking physical memory (RAM) under Windows") > Date: Sat, 7 Nov 1998 22:47:48 -0800 > SCNSM 1.0 Beta, a non-swappable memory allocator for Windows 3.x/95/98, is > available and can be downloaded from [text deleted] > The SCNSM driver supports allocation of non-swappable memory on Windows > 3.x/95/98. The principal design goal of SCNSM is to provide memory that will > not be swapped to disk, under any circumstances. Typically, security > applications require such memory to store private keys, passwords, and > sensitive intermediate results of cryptographic calculations. [text deleted] Sounds cool, but I have a couple of questions: 1. Is it OpenSource? 2. I assume since it never swaps to disk the memory requirements for the computer are large. What is the minimum suggested if one runs say 5 apps that each require 16M each, 5*16M & OS overhead? And what is the suggested OS overhead with no swap to disk? (OK, that last one might be a 3rd question) ____________________________________________________________________ Technology cannot make us other than what we are. James P. Hogan The Armadillo Group ,::////;::-. James Choate Austin, Tx /:'///// ``::>/|/ ravage(a)ssz.com www.ssz.com .', |||| `/( e\ 512-451-7087 -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- --------------------------------------------------------------------

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