December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Some ideas (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi Doug, Forwarded message: > From: "Douglas R. Floyd" <dfloyd(a)ssz.com> > Subject: Some ideas > Date: Sun, 28 Dec 1997 16:18:14 -0600 (CST) > I have been pondering this: To save on bandwidth, I wonder about having > two types of OSS sites OSS? > -- a "control" site which switchboards incoming/outgoing > stuff to "data" sites. Which needs to have access to at least *all* incoming requests for data as well as a channel to other switchboard sites so they can catalog those requests and won't have to look them up more than once, after that they simply use the request as a key to a index of sources. > This would help with distributing bandwidth load, > and since "data" sites just store encrypted items, the "control" site can > be made more secure. I suspect all the traffic would need to be encrypted to get this to work well. The channels between the switchboards and the databanks also need to be encrypted in such a manner that it is transparent even to the operators what the keys are at any given time. Also, assuming the user provides a request to a switchboard, who then determines the correct server through some mechanism, contacts that databank server and requests a transmission, and finaly the databank server sends the data to the user. How do we track the various keys and verify that the user making the request is the user getting the data? Is the switchboard and databank servers simply tracking the key provided by the original request sufficient? > Another random thing is a way to build a CD-ROM jukebox that would > automatically burn a CD when data meets the requirements of "valuable", and > "offline". Then, when the data is needed again, its fished out and loaded. What you need is a pick-and-place system. It would consist of a handling mechanism, a burning mechanism, a jukebox mechanism, and a CD storage mechanism. Personaly I wouldn't want them all in one in case any one broke down the rest of the system could still keep working. Valuable to who? For how long? Who pays for the stack of CD's up front? What kind of amortization schedule are we looking at for paybacks? Since we are looking at a automated system, what does 'offline' mean when the pick-and-place goes over to the rack and pulls the CD to place in the jukebox and it is now online? How do we charge the user? > Some type of IP encapsulation using public key encryption, so machine A > that is talking to machine D would encapsulate the whole packet with machine > D's key, C's key, and B's key. Then the packet is sent to box B, which > decodes it, looks where to send it, then kicks it to C. C then looks at > it, sends it to machine D. Basically a "remailer", where each packet is > a message. > > Is this feasable at all? Yeah, mixmaster does something similar to this. The problem I have with mixmaster is that the sender has to set up the chaining and keys and such. There simply isn't a clear mechanism (as I understand mixmaster) to do this transparently. One look at the chaining file that is required is enough to explain why granny doesn't use chained mixmaster remailers. Now if we want to do it in the protocol stack then we have a problem because it isn't supported in the standard. What I would do is a little different. An example... Let's assume we have 4 remailers, A to D. The sender sends a packet to A that's header is in the clear. Once A gets it, addressed to an appropriate user to invoke the decryption process, it decrypts the body of the packet. What it assumes is there is another valid packet with unencrypted header which it passes on to B. B gets it and de-crypts it and passes it on. This happens in C and D as well. At no point does any of the processes need to do anything other than use its own key to decrypt. If that fails the packet is trashed. Since no information about its previous source was passed to D from C this failure won't propogate back up the chain, providing a measure of source security. D takes the packet, whose body is still encrypted and remails it to the next address in the header, in this example the actual destination. The issue for me is how do the remailers handle the pass-off. Here are a few of the choices: - the existing mechanism which is completely dependant on the user and their technical skill. I don't like this one, too people intensive. - the sender does it by reference to a key-server and automated chaining software. The software would ask for a sequence of available remailers from the user, go off to the key-server and get the appropriate keys, and create the nested encrypted packets. Then it only has to send them on their way. Still a tad too technical for granny I suspect. - the sender provides a source destination and a number of remailers. The software goes to the key-server, looks up the available remailers (hopefuly there are more than the number requested by the sender) and selects the appropriate number through some mechanism (PRNG is my choice). It then creates the chained packet and sends it on its way. I suspect granny could deal with this one, she knows how to count and has sonnie's email address in her mailer software. What I like about this is the key server represents a mechanism for income. It would cost say $1/month to store your key on the server and then anyone who made the request would get it. The key would automaticaly age and expire if the user didn't keep paying the fee. Further, there would be no distinction between remailers, users, or other processes as to the actual key. It would consist of a list similar to: <user_id>:<expiration_date>:<encryption_protocol>:<encryption_key> for example: ravage@ssz.com:12/30/98:PGP:3$@48@DDcq* (note that some sort of escape mechanism needs to be included so that :'s can be used in keys as well. I put the actual key last. That way I know that any : after the encryption_protocol is a part of the key.) I would have to make requests of the sort: <user_id>:<encryption_protocol> ie: ravage@ssz.com:* Where '*' would return a complete listing for that ID of all registered keys. So to use it I would send an email with the key request(s) in the body one to a line and sent it to 'key-server(a)ssz.com'. The key-server would return something like: Request: ravage@ssz.com:* Key(s): ravage@ssz.com:12/30/98:PGP:#sD81xD@)d Now there is a problem if the key is multi-part. To handle those I would put each key part on a seperate line: Key(s): ravage@ssz.com:12/30/98:Multi-Key:23$@%dSk* ravage@ssz.com:12/30/98:Multi-Key:4dseP2*! So what you would end up with is: Request: <data> Key(s): <data> Request: <data> Key(s): <data> <data> Request: <data> Key(s): <data> Hope that helps. If you use the key server idea as I am explaining it please make shure I get credit for it. As far as I am aware nobody else is using a system similar, nor has one been proposed by other parties. If you find this is an error on my part please let me know. ____________________________________________________________________ | | | Those who make peaceful revolution impossible will make | | violent revolution inevitable. | | | | John F. Kennedy | | | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http://www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

1 0

Some interesting WWI Info
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

SFRT 1 - Reading Category 22, Topic 2 Message 621 Wed Dec 17, 1997 T.TELENKO [MilTech Bard] at 08:05 EST The Autumn 1997 issue of MILITARY HISTORY QUARTERLY had an article by Norman Polmar and Thomas Allen on U.S. military plans to gas Japan during Operation Olympic. They ran accross references and put in a FOIA request. Eventually they got a copy of a document labeled "A Study of the Possible Use of Toxic Gas in Operation Olympic." The word "Retaliatory" was PENCILED in between possible and use. Apparently there were only five of these documents circulated during WW2. After the war in 1947 the document was requested by the chemical corp for historical study. In an attempt to "Redact" history, another document was issued to change all the copies to emphisis "Retaliatory" rather than the reality of the US planning to use it offensively in support of the invasion of Japan. The plan called for US heavy bombers to drop 56,583 tons of gas in the 15 days before the invasion of Kyushu than another 23,935 tons every 30 days after that -- and that was just the STRATEGIC bombing campaign. Tactical air support was in addition to that. The ground weapons would contribute 1,400 tons of gas shells. At the time of the invasion, 144,762 tons of gas shells were available. Another 9,356 tons would arrive every 30 days after the invasion. Chemical Corps casualty estimates for this attack plan were 5 million dead with another 5 million casualties. Ultimatly, it looks like the plan was not approved, but prepared for since the gas to impliment it was sent to the Pacific -- Likely as a back up to the A-bomb. Had the Japanese carried out their plan to kill Allied POW's and civilians, the Allied responce would have been horrific. ------------ SFRT 1 - Reading Category 22, Topic 2 Message 622 Wed Dec 17, 1997 T.HOLSINGER [Tom] at 09:53 EST I wasn't aware there was an _offensive_ plan, but I knew of the scale of the planned "retaliatory" use of gas. These things have a tendency to snowball. Trent doesn't mention that the plan called for mass spraying of mustard gas over urban areas _at the beginning_ of this attack. That isn't retaliation. It is extermination. My estimate of 25-30 million Japanese dead during the US conquest of Japan was based on such a use of chemical warfare, though most of the dead, IMO, would have been from starvation and malnutrition- boosted disease. Trent's discovery here shows some elements of the US government planned overt genocide on Japan. The coverup makes it appear that someone at least felt guilty about it. I'd be a lot more comfortable if there was evidence that these planners were then aware, via SIGINT, of the orders the Imperial Japanese Army had already given, when the invasion of Japan started, to murder all Allied POW's, all interned Allied civilians, and every Allied civilian they could catch in areas occupied by the IJA. My estimate is that the IJA could have murdered at least several million Allied civilians a week for months. The A-bomb, IMO, saved more lives than were lost in all of WWII. ------------ SFRT 1 - Reading Category 22, Topic 2 Message 623 Wed Dec 17, 1997 T.ZBARASCHU1 [Tony] at 10:28 EST I believe that the U.S. considered using gas at Iwo Jima, but decided not to. Trent, any evidence that this was a seriously considered plan, as opposed to a staff study that the planners drew up just to see what the necessary requirements would be? ------------ SFRT 1 - Reading Category 22, Topic 2 Message 624 Wed Dec 17, 1997 JOHN.BARNES [John Barnes] at 11:35 EST Moving poison gas in those quantities strikes me as reasonably good evidence that somebody was doing more than playing paper games. ------------ SFRT 1 - Reading Category 22, Topic 2 Message 625 Wed Dec 17, 1997 T.TELENKO [MilTech Bard] at 13:12 EST According to Allen and Polmar, the June 18, 1945 meeting where Harry Truman was briefed on Operation Downfall -- the over all plan to invade Japan -- by Adm King, Gen Marshall and the rest of the Joint Chiefs was probably when the topic was broached. We know now that the decision to drop the atomic bomb was made then, although the notes for the meeting only refered to "undisclosed topics.". On 21 June 1945, orders were issued by the Army to produce and ship the necessary quantities of war gas to the Pacific Theater to impliment the plan. The key passage from that Gas Attack Plan was: "Gas is the one single weapon hitherto unused which we can have readily available which assuredly can greatly decrease the cost in American lives and should materialy shorten the war." I'd say that this meeting decided that the US was unwilling to take the kind of mass casualties, using Okinawa as a model, that a conventional landing would cost and any available WMD would be used to reduce American casualties. ------------ SFRT 1 - Reading Category 22, Topic 2 Message 626 Wed Dec 17, 1997 T.HOLSINGER [Tom] at 21:43 EST Trent, Your 625's logic is convincing. The timing makes it look as though there was a Presidential decision on June 18 to conduct a strategic gas attack on Japan in preparation for the invasion, if the A-Bomb didn't work. This presents a completely different picture than what I had imagined. I thought the Japanese would have initiated genocide in the event of invasion. Instead there is fair evidence that we would have started it. My recollection is that Imperial Headquarters gave the genocide orders to Field Marshal Teruachi in July. ------------ SFRT 1 - Reading Category 22, Topic 2 Message 627 Wed Dec 17, 1997 T.TELENKO [MilTech Bard] at 22:39 EST The thing that sticks out for me is that Truman's choice was not Invasion or the A-Bomb. It was Gas, Invasion and the A-Bomb. Any way promised a great deal of dead. Truman chose the route that was most likely to shock the Japanese into surrendering with the least loss of life. History will judge him differently in the long term because of the finding of this document. This also explains his expressed strong faith in having taken the correct corse of action. Still, we don't know exactly what was said on the subject of gas in that meeting. I suspect the full, genocidal, aspects of the gas attack plan would not have been implimented until Operation Coronet. That is, after the Japanese started murdering Allied POW's and interned/occupied civilians. Operation Olympic -- the invasion of Kyushu -- would probably have been limited to gasing the beaches and air fields after a series of raids by the carrier fleets. To lay the proper political ground work for the use of gas, the US Government would have released the newsreels of the Kamikazi attacks on the US Navy off of Okinawa and Japan. The shock that would have delivered to the American public would have prepared them for the arguement that gas was needed to win. ------------ SFRT 1 - Reading Category 22, Topic 2 Message 628 Wed Dec 17, 1997 L.TILTON [Lois] at 23:18 EST I wonder if there were not contingency plans for gassing Berlin. The A-bomb was originally proposed to be used against Berlin, but it wasn't ready in time. ------------ SFRT 1 - Reading Category 22, Topic 2 Message 629 Wed Dec 17, 1997 JOHN.BARNES [John Barnes] at 23:26 EST There was also some hope, in late '43 when things looked like they were coming together faster than they did, of either using the bomb to create a no-resistanc e landing area, or using it on a rail center to prevent reinforcement for D-Day. I think the biggest hope was really just to get it before Hitler, who, had the Nazis not been such nitwits, had what looked like overwhelming odds of getting there first. ------------ SFRT 1 - Reading Category 22, Topic 2 Message 630 Thu Dec 18, 1997 T.ZBARASCHU1 [Tony] at 00:43 EST Orders to produce and ship that much gas? OK, I'll accept that as evidence that this was more than a "staff plan". OTOH, we did keep a fair amount of gas on hand in the European theater for retaliatory purposes, but this particular document does look like it was a bit more than retaliatory. Thank God for the atom bomb. Thank God I didn't have to make that decision. ------------ SFRT 1 - Reading Category 22, Topic 2 Message 631 Thu Dec 18, 1997 T.TELENKO [MilTech Bard] at 12:48 EST The American Army in WW2 carried around huge amounts of war gas as a matter of course. In Early 1943, MacArther had at his disposal in the South West Pacific area the following: o 15,000 gas Howitzer shells o 19,000 gas mortar shells o 22,500 five inch rocket shells o 18,000 aerial bombs of various sizes o 6,500 aerial spray tank kits. By the end of 1945, the US had 4.4 million gas artillery shells, 1 million mortar rounds, 1.25 million gas aerial bombs and 112,000 aerial spray tank kits. What counts is policy and the intent to follow it. The article mentions that Gen Marshall brought up the use of gas in a 29 May 1945 meeting with War Sec. Stimpson. He wanted to use gas against the "outer japanese islands" with less than our best war gas (Mustard gas) to "take the fight out of" the Japanese soldier and reduce American casualties. He then commissioned a the study I have been quoting using chemical warfare officers and USAAF targetiers -- one Col and three Capt. -- who introduced the major strategic gassing angle. I got the impression that they wanted to use their toy to the fullest, rather than smooth the invasion via reduced American casualties. I suspect my idea of military gassing only -- landing beaches and airfields -- during Operation Olympic was the most likely policy result. After the Japanese Army went on its killing spree, all bets are off. ------------

1 0

New hi-tech dog tags use encryption?... [CNN]
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > PENTAGON INTRODUCING HIGH-TECH DOG TAGS > > electronic military dog tag December 27, 1997 > Web posted at: 7:58 p.m. EST (0058 GMT) > > From Correspondent Jonathan Karl > > WASHINGTON (CNN) -- Through triumph and tragedy and two world wars, > the military dog tag has been an American icon for generations of > soldiers and sailors. > > Today's armed forces wear the same basic dog tag that their > great-grandparents wore. But that's about to change. > > By 1999, the 1.4 million members of the active duty military will be > issued a high-tech dog tag that contains a computer chip. CNN's > Jonathan Karl reports > icon 2 min. VXtreme video > > The old dog tags had just five lines for information, which included > spaces for name, religion and blood type. The new digital tags, > however, can contain volumes of multi-media information, including > medical histories, X-rays and cardiograms. [text deleted] > "We have to be very concerned about how we protect the information > -- in who's hands would it be, should it be encrypted, could the > encryption be broken, what would happen if it ended up in the wrong > hands," says Defense Secretary William Cohen. [text deleted] > If issues of cost and privacy can be solved, the old metal dog tags > seem certain to become just another piece of military history. ____________________________________________________________________ | | | Those who make peaceful revolution impossible will make | | violent revolution inevitable. | | | | John F. Kennedy | | | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http://www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

2 1

Let's get the US Gov. to give us guns!...
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES Section 8. The Congress shall have Power To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions; To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the authority of training and Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress; ____________________________________________________________________ | | | Those who make peaceful revolution impossible will make | | violent revolution inevitable. | | | | John F. Kennedy | | | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http://www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

1 0

Basic Cryptanalysis
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Recently it was noted here that US Army Field Manual 34-40-2, Basic Cryptanalysis, (1990) has been withdrawn from the Army's Web site. Thanks to archiving by a cpunk we offer the full manual in PDF format. See the contents at: http://jya.com/fm/fm34-40-2.htm

1 0

Re: Freedom Forum report on the State of the First Amendment
by lord_buttmonkey＠juno.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>> You aren't being oppressed the other party doesn't want to interact >> with you, unless that party is government providing base services to >all >> (e.g. police/courts/border protection). > >Actually, you can be. How? >> You *are* being oppressed if mutually consensual behavior is >interfered >> with by >> others including the State. > >> You *are* being oppressed if you are coerced into a relationship you >don't >> want. > >You are not being coerced into anything. If you don't want to serve >food to Blacks, don't open a restaurant. It's your choice. Umm, no, freedom doesn't work like that. If you open a *private* establishment, you have the right, according to the constitution, to deny *anyone* the right to enter or eat in your restraunt. However, if you were banned from using the government postal service for being Jewish, then yes, you are being oppressed. >By the way, you are also not allowed to dump toxic waste in your own >backyard. Are you being oppressed? Depends. Does it affect your neighbors? If so, then no. If not, then yes. >> An employer-employee relationship is like a marriage or any other >arrangement >> between adults -mutually consensual. > >In a fantasy world, it is mutually consensual. It the real world, it >is >seldom mutual. Tough shit. If you don't like your job, no one's forcing you to stay. Just leave it and get another one.

7 11

Re: Freedom Forum report on the State of the First Amendment
by Colin Rafferty 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

David Honig writes: > At 02:37 PM 12/23/97 -0500, Colin Rafferty wrote: >> You are not being coerced into anything. If you don't want to serve >> food to Blacks, don't open a restaurant. It's your choice. > Where do you get the right to tell others how they can make a living? I don't have that right. However, the Supreme Court has said that the Congress has that right. >> By the way, you are also not allowed to dump toxic waste in your own >> backyard. Are you being oppressed? > I am not allowed to place toxic waste, or noise, where it can affect > others; I can > ingest toxins privately and listen to whatever music I like so long as you > don't detect it in your backyard. Well, racism is hiring decisions is something that is detected in other people's backyards. That's why its illegal. >>> An employer-employee relationship is like a marriage or any other >>> arrangement between adults -mutually consensual. >> >> In a fantasy world, it is mutually consensual. It the real world, it is >> seldom mutual. > You prefer a shotgun or otherwise arranged marriage? I prefer a level playing field. >>> Colin, do you consider >>> yourself oppressed when someone choses not to date you? What about >>> a rejection by someone who takes out a public advertisement in the paper? >> >> Nope. Of course, this has nothing to do with anything. > Private behavior is private behavior, and trade is a private behavior. Not in this country. If you don't believe me, check out Article I, Section 8 for one explicit example. >>> Freedom is only tested when it hurts. >> >> With freedom comes responsibility. Decency is one of them. > But obligate decency at gunpoint is not worth it. It's called civilization. You should try it some time. -- Colin

4 3

NRA vs. KRA
by David Miller 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From www.jya.com/cn122297.txt quoting 15 December 1997, Interactive Week: > Network Associates dropped out of the Key Recovery Alliance. But there > are plenty of major players left, even if they include some of the harshest > foes of current crypto policy. Remaining members include: > America Online Inc. > Compaq Computer Corp. > Digital Equipment Corp. > Entrust Technologies Ltd. > Frontier Technologies Corp. > Fujitsu Ltd. > IBM Corp. > Intel Corp. > NCipher Corp. > Novell Inc. > RSA Data Security Inc. > SafeNet Trusted Services Corp. > Silicon Graphics Inc. > Sun Microsystems Inc. > Trusted Information Systems Inc. Some of these players I would expect to sit at the key recovery table, but why SUN? Any of you California dudes know what's up with that? Am I right in assuming that the International Elvis marketing deal will never go through? --David Miller -- middle rival devil rim lad Windows '95 -- a dirty, two-bit operating system.

3 3

Governments want to change Net architecture, from Comm Daily
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Date: Wed, 7 Jan 1998 07:44:57 -0800 (PST) >From: Declan McCullagh <declan(a)well.com> >To: politech(a)vorlon.mit.edu >Subject: FC: Governments want to change Net architecture, from Comm Daily >MIME-Version: 1.0 >Sender: owner-politech(a)vorlon.mit.edu >Reply-To: declan(a)well.com >X-Loop: politech(a)vorlon.mit.edu >X-URL: Politech is at http://www.well.com/~declan/politech/ > >[Apologies to Art for not forwarding this earlier. --Declan] > >---------- Forwarded message ---------- >Date: Thu, 18 Dec 1997 10:28:49 -0500 >From: Art Brodsky <arb(a)well.com> >To: declan(a)smtp.well.com >Subject: comm daily story > >Declan, > Here's the story from Comm Daily, Dec. 17 > >'Optimistic and Damned Silly' > > INTERNET CHANGE FOCUS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ENFORCEMENT > > Law enforcement officials of U.S. and 7 other industrialized >countries want to make fundamental changes in Internet technology >in order to aid in their ability to track and catch criminals, >Justice Dept. sources said. > > Program to consider changes in Internet architectures comes as >part of agreement announced last week by Attorney Gen. Janet Reno >and Justice ministers from around world after meeting in Washington >(CD Dec 11 p10). However, one leading Internet authority, MCI >Senior Vp Vinton Cerf, said international group's plan wouldn't >work. > > Justice ministers are considering approach similar to that of >Communications Assistance to Law Enforcement Act (CALEA) program in >U.S., which would make traffic from advanced telecom networks more >accessible to law enforcement entities. Representatives of Canada, >France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia and U.K., as well as U.S., >agreed as part of "statement of principles" issued in communique >following 2-day session that: "To the extent practicable, >information and telecommunications systems should be designed to >help prevent and detect network abuse, and should also facilitate >the tracing of criminals and the collection of evidence." Several >items on "action plan" issued in support of those principles refer >to working with new technologies to collect critical evidence, >developing standards for authenticating electronic data for use in >investigations and encouraging standards-making bodies to provide >public and private sectors "with standards for reliable and secure >telecommunications and data processing technologies." > > DoJ officials said Dept. may want to talk later with telephone >industry on trap and trace issues, but it's premature to involve >them now in follow-up to international summit. Instead, they said, >they are looking at broader picture of telecom networks that >haven't worked as closely with law enforcement as they could, and >have begun thinking about Internet protocols. Internet operates >globally with common protocols, currently Internet Protocol version >4. Internet engineers are working on next iteration, version IPv6 >(Internet Protocol version 6 -- 5 was experimental attempt that was >dropped). Justice official said that one problem now is that it's >easy to send and receive e-mail with false address, called >"spoofing." > > It would be helpful to law enforcement if information sent >over Internet were tagged, and packets would transmit information >reliably as to where they came from, including user and service >provider, officials said. Loose analogy would be to compare e-mail >messages to tagging of explosives, so law enforcement can track >explosive material to its source. DoJ said new protocols could be >designed to make it easier to authenticate messages and to make >system more reliable. Law enforcement wants to work with industry >to accomplish goal, saying it would help "keep people who are >abusing information technologies from continuing to do it." > > There will be substantial obstacles to law enforcement >concept, however. Not least of them is that IPv6 will include >sophisticated encryption capabilities as part of protocols. Such >security isn't built in to Internet now, one of reasons why >electronic commerce has yet to take off, said Mark McFadden, >communications dir. for Commercial Internet eXchange Assn. (CIX). >That feature will make it harder for law enforcement to gain access >to information, he said. > > Cerf, co-inventor of Internet protocols, said in interview >that law enforcement's concept of tagging e-mail messages wouldn't >work: "To imagine that we would instantly create the >infrastructure for that throughout the entire Internet strikes me >as optimistic and damned silly, at least in the short term. Anyone >who anticipates using tools to guarantee that everything will be >traceable is not going to have a successful outcome." Technically, >such project could be accomplished, Cerf said, but having >administrative infrastructure to administer it is quite different >issue. > > It's possible to have digital signature for every packet of >data, but it would take "an enormous amount of processing, and it's >not clear we have any network computers and routers that could do >that and maintain the traffic flow that's required," Cerf said. It >also would require that each sender affix digital signature to each >piece of mail, idea that Cerf said couldn't be enforced: "Frankly, >the idea of trying to guarantee traceability of that kind is far >from implementable." He said he didn't want to be misunderstood >that his objections were "an argument in favor of criminality." >But Cerf said he worries that "someone relies on what they think is >a technical solution without recognizing all of the administrative >mechanics that need to be put in place." > > Law enforcement has some time to work with Internet community. >McFadden said IPv6 isn't scheduled to be implemented at consumer >level for at least 5 years, possibly as much as 10. There was some >urgency when it appeared that reservoir of Internet addresses would >dry up, but with progress being made to protect addresses as scarce >resource there's less pressure for new set of protocols, he said. > > >posted with permission Warren Publishing > > >-------------------------------------------------------------------------- >POLITECH -- the moderated mailing list of politics and technology >To subscribe: send a message to majordomo(a)vorlon.mit.edu with this text: >subscribe politech >More information is at http://www.well.com/~declan/politech/ >-------------------------------------------------------------------------- >

1 0

Seeking Environmentally Friendly People ?
by tozumi44＠msn.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Welcome to the 21st Century Whoever gets in on the front end of this paradigm shift stands to make alot of money! Helps Us Replace a $20 Billion Industry (Laundry Detergent) The ULTRA 7 LaundryMaster System replaces Laundry Detergent, Fabric Softener, Bleach & Stain Remover Forever.(Sugg. Retail $89.95) *NO MORE DETERGENT *NO MORE FABRIC SOFTENER *NO BLEACH *NO STAIN REMOVER *CHEMICAL FREE WASHING * NO MORE POLLUTION *SAVES THE ENVIRONMENT * EXTENDS LIFE OF YOUR CLOTHES *60% LESS LINT *100% HYPOALLERGENIC *SAVES MONEY *Only 4 CENTS PER DAY * 7 YEAR PRODUCT WARRANTY.-PRODUCT LAST FOR 7 YEARS.. We can truly get you making money with this program and you will be doing your part to make the Earth a safer, better place for us and our children to live. I apologize for any inconvenience and hope to hear from you soon.. Please, serious inquires only. Best Regards, L. Crowder President Help Protect The Earths Water Sup

1 0