December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

US Air Force IPSEC Requirements
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text From: "Boyter, Brian A." <boyter(a)afiwc01.af.mil> To: "'ipsec(a)tis.com'" <ipsec(a)tis.com> Subject: US Air Force IPSEC Requirements Date: Tue, 25 Nov 1997 17:03:03 -0600 MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: owner-ipsec(a)ex.tis.com Precedence: bulk First, I would like to introduce myself... My name is Brian Boyter, I'm a Senior Consulting Engineer with the Computer Sciences Corp, and I am under contract to the US Air Force Information Warfare Center in San Antonio, Texas, working on USAF computer security... The USAF is evaluating the use of IPSEC products to help secure its unclassified networks... These unclas networks are used to communicate with contractors, and to process financial, logistic, personnel, and medical data... The IPSEC would be used to protect the data from unauthorized viewing and to protect the networks and computers from hackers... Our goal is to eventually IPSEC encrypt all unclassified computer communications end-to-end... The USAF recently completed a hasty evaluation of several IPSEC products... Most products would work fine for a small organization, but do not scale to an enterprise the size of the USAF (500,000 computers)... Here is a short list of basic USAF requirements which we found lacking in the current IPSEC products: 1. The Department of Defense will soon deploy a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)... The IPSEC products need to use this existing PKI (not require a separate keying product)... 2. The USAF uses HP OpenView as its standard SNMP management product... Error logging and other IPSEC status information needs to interoperate with OpenView... 3. The USAF needs to be able to manage the IPSEC security policy sanely... An example of a USAF IPSEC security policy might be: "all USAF computers can talk to all other USAF computers using DES, all other computers it talks in-the-clear"... It will not be possible to manage 500,000 different rule sets... The security policy must be made simple... We need the X.500 equivalent of *.mil, *.af.mil, *.lackland.af.mil, and *.hospital.*.af.mil so that we can generate rule sets using these wild cards... I don't think rules based on IP addresses will work either... I'm not including interoperability in the above list because the ANX has done a good job of making that requirement visible.... What I'm trying to point out is two things: 1. The IPSEC products need to re-use as much of our existing infrastructure as possible (for example PKI, SNMP, etc)... If the USAF were a small company that didn't have a large infrastructure investment already, it wouldn't be an issue... But if each IPSEC product requires a management console at each air force base, then that can add up to millions of dollars, thousands of man hours, training costs, etc... 2. I'm also trying to point out that there is no standard (that I can find) for representing, storing, or disseminating the security policy.... Although these are Air Force requirements, I'm sure the same requirements will exist for any large enterprise contemplating the use of IPSEC products... I plan to be at the IETF meeting in December and will be glad to speak to anyone about these issues... Perhaps an IPSEC security policy BOF could even be arranged??? Thanks, Brian Boyter boyter(a)afiwc01.af.mil (210)977-3113 --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) Philodox e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/ Ask me about FC98 in Anguilla!: <http://www.fc98.ai/>

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Quoting Portions of a Signed Document
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- It would be neat if you could quote people and prove that they signed the particular paragraph quoted without supplying the entire text. Is there a way to do this? (It seems impossible, but so does mental poker.) A crude approach would be to sign every paragraph or line separately, but that's obviously inelegant. Monty Cantsin Editor in Chief Smile Magazine http://www.neoism.org/squares/smile_index.html http://www.neoism.org/squares/cantsin_10.htm -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAwUBNHscCpaWtjSmRH/5AQHlUAf+MgXC6uKGn+EMsOzw9wumJeYdjNWYTlnl IxaksIHa2o1HL88GZlrve7F3lATOM1IpDlZIIwe56rGZzqTQci+ImMIG3kqKWyTE 6NjtTqKY0Qr028MsudhVE+RwTvUIzbsi+6Qh4wJo+AzfEmnKlMkPHBxMmgem/+sQ Cm3PasUW91N6xakkoR/M9x6ZtJ8MlAAI1C460LIndzV2DqxnFnyNs9cCxVYaZ+FQ BMK8Mwf8EXhnSrfv6CQ3oKgi8cO1jd0FHyLr7uYQ8n0HWWMMcC06k3rYyo8EXInc WyJ/oeuSewhQjTumrPn5e3+aP55k3IzttBhE2TQy6tBX9r1nX7fVVg== =feAO -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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RE:: [NTSEC] - cheap tempest solution (fwd)
by Ray Arachelian 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

=====================================Kaos=Keraunos=Kybernetos============== .+.^.+.| Ray Arachelian |Prying open my 3rd eye. So good to see |./|\. ..\|/..|sunder(a)sundernet.com|you once again. I thought you were |/\|/\ <--*-->| ------------------ |hiding, and you thought that I had run |\/|\/ ../|\..| "A toast to Odin, |away chasing the tail of dogma. I opened|.\|/. .+.v.+.|God of screwdrivers"|my eye and there we were.... |..... ======================= http://www.sundernet.com ========================== ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Mon, 24 Nov 1997 20:50:10 -0500 From: "Stout, William" <StoutW(a)pios.com> To: "'ntsecurity(a)iss.net'" <ntsecurity(a)iss.net> Subject: RE: OFF-TOPIC RE: [NTSEC] - cheap tempest solution > ----- Original Message ----- > From: Tim Lebrun [SMTP:tlebrun@internetmci.com] > > This may be a stupid question, but what is tempest monitoring? And > what kind of information can you get from doing it? Ooh, ooh, something I was trained in once. Tempest protection is the ability to prevent undesirable signals from escaping a computer system. In the old days, electro-mechanical teletypes were used by the military. Someone discovered that placing a signal analyzer on the power feed shows what character is represented by each signal spike. Automating the translation gives you a mirror output of each message someplace else. Electrical filters (not just transformers which can pass these signals) prevent this. Present day keyboards and mice also radiate signals, readable even though the device is within the FCC part 15 class A or B device signal emanation restrictions. Both tube-type and LCD displays are big transmitters, and can be read by receivers connected to similarly phased displays. The receivers can be in a nearby building, van, plane or satellite. Makes you think twice when typing PGP messages or 'accidentally' hitting a 'can be used against you' newsgroup. Search for 'Van Eck' for more data. Physical metallic shielding (and thorough testing) fixes this. Network wires and equipment are also major radio transmitters, metallic types are readable from a distance, and of course networks can be directly tapped, even glass fiber. (It's been found in military environments, a simple wire was surreptitiously stretched above a ceiling, and which would act as a retransmitter.) All cables are guilty of transmitting readable signals if not properly shielded and filtered. Van Eck/tempest exploiting devices are used in the military/spy/wire-fraud/'drug war' business and in both government sponsored and private corporate espionage. Don't confuse EMP (Electro-Magnetic Pulse) protection with Tempest, since EMP is a high-energy pulse (such as created by a nuclear burst) that generates a high-voltage electrical pulse in both plugged in and off-line electronic equipment, and typically frys all unshielded electronics. Same effect as a power surge, but affects all circuits, even parts sitting on shelves. HERF guns do the same thing. Damn. I'm also guilty of contributing to the noise and 'firewalls-list' demise of NTsecurity list. Bill Stout

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New Algorithm (reposted)
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hello I send you links to my site where my crypto algorithm is published. I hope you will find time to visit it and see what I have discover. Algorithms I have design are Anigma and MEX128. Anigma is encryption algo based on use Variable Function Technology, it main characteristic is possibility to create unique encryption function for every possible key. This make algorithm strong to all known attacks, this is only my thesis I look for your help to find out is it true. Please visit <http://eon.pmf.ukim.edu.mk/~kbajalc/algo/index.html>. Documentation about Anigma and Mex128 now are available only in Macedonian. I will appreciate very much if you give me your opinion about Anigma and Mex128 or give me address of people who can do. Koki ------------------------------------------------------------------------ ------------------------- Kostadin Bajalcaliev http://eon.pmf.ukim.edu.mk/~kbajalc/ 26th of April Str. No: 14 91480 Gevgelija kbajalc(a)eon.pmf.ukim.edu.mk Macedonia kbajalc(a)informa.mk ------------------------------------------------------------------------ ------------------------

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Cato Institute request for policy papers on encryption
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---- Date: Tue, 25 Nov 1997 10:18:33 -0500 From: Solveig Singleton <solveig(a)cato.org> Subject: Request for short policy papers Cato Institute's progam for information studies (that is, privacy and crypto) is interested in receiving proposals for **short** policy papers (five to thirty pages) on different aspects of the encryption debate. In particular, I am interested in detailed, well-argued but concise papers addressing the following: * The costs (narrowly conceived) of mandatory key recovery: OMB has one estimate with no particular empirical support beyond the assertions of national security folks. We are interested in cost estimates that move the debate forward in being based on something more concrete and reliable than what has been offered thus far--so, we won't need years of carefully calibrated econometric data (which just isn't there)--but we do want something more than speculation. * Also needed, a short paper illustrating the impact of the export control regime on experimental software or hardware ventures. What are the costs of the regulatory process in time and money, from the standpoint of the developer? Anecdotes welcome. * I would also like to do a paper on the uses of encryption in combatting human rights violations worldwide, again replete with examples and anecdotes... * and A short paper on the ease of evading export controls--detailing the ease with which encryption programs can be homemade, purchased from foreign sources, etc.; * and a short paper on the strength of U.S. assertions that other countries are likely to go along with U.S. attempts to foist mandatory key escrow upon everyone by international agreement. Please contact me if you are interested. Solveig Singleton (202) 789-5274 (202) 842-3490 (fax) Director of Information Studies Cato Institute 1000 Mass. Ave. NW Washington, DC 20001

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Re: FCPUNX:Internet Casinos
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 01:49 PM 11/26/1997 -0500, Sal Denaro wrote: >If you can't see the tables, how do you know the games aren't rigged? There's a lot of cryptography work addressing this problem, with variants like "Mental poker". You can do things like have the participants each - pick a random number, - share the hash of their numbers with each other, - then share the random numbers with the casino - then XOR everybody's random numbers together to feed the casino's card shuffler - play the game, lose the money - casino reveals its random number - everybody compares hashes to verify that it was honest >And do they offer Wayne Newton over streaming Video? I'm sure that can be arranged :-) > What about free drinks? By Fedex. Thanks! Bill Bill Stewart, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com Regular Key PGP Fingerprint D454 E202 CBC8 40BF 3C85 B884 0ABE 4639

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Student Writer Harrassed by SS
by Eric Cordian 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

BERKELEY, Calif. (AP) -- Secret Service agents searched the apartment of a University of California student newspaper columnist who wrote a satirical attack on Chelsea Clinton, the writer says. Guy Branum, a columnist for the Daily Californian, said agents searched his off-campus apartment Monday, the same day Chelsea Clinton's mother, Hillary Rodham Clinton, visited the university for a meeting on foster care. Chelsea Clinton is a freshman at rival Stanford University. The Secret Service office in San Jose refused to comment or confirm Branum's account. A White House spokeswoman also would not comment. The agents checked for weapons, Branum said Tuesday. They also had him sign a release giving them access to his medical records, he said. ``They wanted to make sure there wasn't anything that would demonstrate mental instability on my part,'' he said. ``No pictures of Chelsea with X's through them or something like that.'' He said he gave two agents permission for the search after they threatened to detain him while getting a search warrant if he didn't. Branum said his column, which appeared Thursday, was meant to be satirical. It was intended to rally spirit before the UC-Stanford football game. In the column, Branum revealed which dormitory Chelsea lives in and wrote: ``Show your spirit on Chelsea's bloodied carcass, because as the Stanford Daily (newspaper) lets us know, she is JUST ANOTHER STUDENT.'' ``She embodies the Stanford ethos of establishment worship that must be subverted and destroyed,'' the column continued. ``Is hate a strong word? Yes. Is it applicable? Certainly.'' The newspaper apologized Friday for undermining a ``student's physical safety'' and its own reputation. Stanford went on to beat UC, 21-20, in Saturday's game. Branum said the agents who searched his apartment lectured him about the column and about a previous column in which he referred to the president as ``Sexual Predator in Chief.'' -- Eric Michael Cordian 0+ O:.T:.O:. Mathematical Munitions Division "Do What Thou Wilt Shall Be The Whole Of The Law"

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Swedish policy paper on key/message escrow
by Martin Minow 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Today's "Svenska Dagbladet" has an article on a policy paper released by the Swedish Foreign Office that follows the American agenda. "Only simple encryption that is easy to decypher should be sold outside the country without restriction." Also, "it is required that capability is created for legal access to clear-text or keys." (My ugly, but precise, translation from the article's quote from the report.) The report authors suggest a complicated structure with key depositories, "preferably privately owned" that "can be granted control over all of the encryption keys that are used on the Internet." Police and proscecutors can obtain these encryption keys as needed to access secret documents. The report has been widely criticized. Martin Minow minow(a)apple.com

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Global Strategic Structure - Speculative
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Thesis: Given, - n-party political systems evolve/devolve into binary or unitary party systems. - a binary system is stable provided each individual party is stable. - no truly global unitary system has ever existed. - historicaly we see multi-party systems devolve into 2-3 primary parties. - it may be possible that the US is the first country in history to reach the unitary model. - that unitary position, if it exists, is not total, there being at least 1 3rd world level participant. in fact there being 200+ such parties. Then, - does the unitary position evolve/devolve back to a n-party system where the unitary party is either eliminated or reduced in stature. - is it reasonable that a single governmental system can possibly manage a global resource pool. - will we then see an averaging of political systems across the total set of parties. - is it possible, considering the range of human desires & beliefs, that a multiplicity at todays level of parties is a stable state, because of the averaging effect. In effect creating a global government rule-set for inter-national and intra-national behaviour. the root cause being that this averaging reduces the pay-off for violence and maximizes the pay-off for cooperating. ____________________________________________________________________ | | | The financial policy of the welfare state requires that there | | be no way for the owners of wealth to protect themselves. | | | | -Alan Greenspan- | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http://www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

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The Databasix gang (Paul Pomes @ Qualcomm) is now harrassing the bureau42 remailer
by dlv＠bwalk.dm.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Paul Pomes is one of the least intelligent members of the Databasix gang. He's been harrassing Jeff B.'s upstreams and employers with false complaints at the same time Gary Burnore, Belinda Bryant, and the rest of the Databasix gang did, eventually killing the huge cajones remailer. Now they're after on bureau42. For some reason Pomes slipped and cc'd me one his false complaints (even though he was ordered not to send me any more e-mail). I ask everyone to a) complain about Paul Pomes to Qualcomm, his employer b) discuss what we can do to protect bureau42 from Databasix harrassment Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by zelkova.qualcomm.com (8.8.5/8.8.5) with ESMTP id SAA10389; Tue, 25 Nov 1997 18:52:26 -0800 (PST) From: Paul Pomes <ppomes(a)Qualcomm.com> Organization: Qualcomm, Inc. Subject: More spam from vulis Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Id: <10385.880512741.1(a)zelkova.qualcomm.com> To: dlv(a)bwalk.dm.com, remailer-admin(a)bureau42.ml.org Date: Tue, 25 Nov 1997 18:52:25 -0800 Message-Id: <10387.880512745(a)zelkova.qualcomm.com> Sender: ppomes(a)Qualcomm.com A mis-edit of my killfile let the following gem from Dimi Vulis through. FYI /pbp ------- Forwarded Message Return-Path: owner-cypherpunks(a)cyberpass.net Received: from warlock.qualcomm.com (warlock.qualcomm.com [129.46.52.129]) by zelkova.qualcomm.com (8.8.5/8.8.5) with ESMTP id SAA10273 for <ppomes(a)zelkova.qualcomm.com>; Tue, 25 Nov 1997 18:37:14 -0800 (PST) Received: from moria.qualcomm.com (qualcomm.com [192.35.156.11]) by warlock.qualcomm.com (8.8.5/1.4/8.7.2/1.13) with ESMTP id SAA19074 for <ppomes(a)Qualcomm.com>; Tue, 25 Nov 1997 18:35:25 -0800 (PST) Received: from sirius.infonex.com (sirius.infonex.com [206.170.114.2]) by moria.qualcomm.com with ESMTP id SAA19347 for <ppomes(a)Qualcomm.com>; Tue, 25 Nov 1997 18:36:21 -0800 (PST) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by sirius.infonex.com (8.8.8/8.7.3) id LAA07735 for cypherpunks-outgoing; Tue, 25 Nov 1997 11:56:04 -0800 (PST) Received: (from cpunks@localhost) by sirius.infonex.com (8.8.8/8.7.3) id LAA07459 for cypherpunks(a)infonex.com; Tue, 25 Nov 1997 11:54:18 -0800 (PST) Received: from rigel.cyberpass.net (root(a)rigel.infonex.com [206.170.114.3]) by sirius.infonex.com (8.8.8/8.7.3) with ESMTP id LAA07440 for <cpunks(a)sirius.infonex.com>; Tue, 25 Nov 1997 11:52:56 -0800 (PST) Received: from toad.com (toad.com [140.174.2.1]) by rigel.cyberpass.net (8.8.8/8.7.3) with ESMTP id LAA10626 for <cypherpunks(a)cyberpass.net>; Tue, 25 Nov 1997 11:48:59 -0800 (PST) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by toad.com (8.7.5/8.7.3) id LAA03665 for cypherpunks-unedited-outgoing; Tue, 25 Nov 1997 11:43:02 -0800 (PST) Received: from corsica.shorelink.com (mail(a)corsica.shorelink.com [207.155.180.7]) by toad.com (8.7.5/8.7.3) with SMTP id LAA03660 for <cypherpunks(a)toad.com>; Tue, 25 Nov 1997 11:43:00 -0800 (PST) Received: from uucp by corsica.shorelink.com with local-rmail (Exim 1.62 #1) id 0xaQss-0008Rq-00 (Debian); Tue, 25 Nov 1997 11:42:58 -0800 Received: (from remailer@localhost) by bureau42.ml.org (8.8.8/8.8.8) id OAA27483; Tue, 25 Nov 1997 14:47:01 GMT Date: Tue, 25 Nov 1997 14:47:01 GMT Message-ID: <EPtLawOnbaoGUl8PvUSglw==(a)bureau42.ml.org> From: bureau42 Anonymous Remailer <nobody(a)bureau42.ml.org> Comments: This message did not originate from the Sender address above. It was remailed automatically by anonymizing remailer software. Please report problems or inappropriate use to the remailer administrator at <remailer-admin(a)bureau42.ml.org>. To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com Sender: owner-cypherpunks(a)cyberpass.net Precedence: bulk Reply-To: bureau42 Anonymous Remailer <nobody(a)bureau42.ml.org> X-List: cypherpunks(a)cyberpass.net X-Loop: cypherpunks(a)cyberpass.net Content-Type: text Content-Length: 206 May Timothy C[ocksucker] Maya's forgeries get stuck up his ass so he'll have to shit through his filthy mouth for the rest of its miserable life. /~~~\ {-O^O-} Timothy C[ocksucker] Maya \ o / (-) ------- End of Forwarded Message

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