December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

A gauntlet thrown down by PC-Magic?
by bureau42 Anonymous Remailer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Tue, 16 Dec 1997 at 00:02:27 -0800, "Alex Woolfson" <abdiel(a)worldnet.att.net> wrote: > Hey guys > > Just FYI here is the response I got from PC-Magic. >> Thanks for the feedback. We are considering an established >> standard. >> >> BTW, for all the "crap" we get from supposed crypto experts >> no one has come close to breaking our method. It does make >> for humorous reading tho. >> >> Scott > Anyone care to take him up on his challenge? > Please say yes. :-) > > Alex What fucking challenge? Is he or are you so dimwitted as to think that people have nothing better to do than provide Scott and his cretinous friends with a first-hand education? A "challenge" would be something like: "PC-Magic has encrypted a [file/message/whatever] containing ecash in the amount of $50,000, has deposited with [an arm's-length third party] the original text, the encrypted [file/message/whatever], the software that decrypts it and the [password or passphrase], and hereby agrees to leave the ecash prize current and unrepudiated until [deadline date], after which we will re-deposit the ecash and instruct the [third party] to reveal the message and demonstrate its decryption as a proof that the challenge was genuine." The prize amount would have to be relatively high since these people have not published technical information and no one has any real interest in investing time and money to demonstrate that people who appear to be idiots are, in fact, idiots. The $10K and lower challenges that have been issued in the past have mostly come from known entities with published algorithms. Scott's characterization, "the 'crap' we get from supposed crypto experts." is indicative that he really didn't read and understand much of the criticism. It is typical of the ignorant who have embarked on a flawed course to become annoyed at well-founded criticism and to belittle their critics. "...no one has come close to breaking our method" is indicative only of the lack of motivation on the part of qualified cryptanalysts, most of whom have much better things to do. It is the responsibility of the advocate of a cryptographic technique to raise the level of interest in testing it sufficiently high that it will in fact be thoroughly tested. To claim that a technique has never been compromised is to claim nothing at all. I have a message I encrypted when I was 16 that no one has yet cracked. I could challenge PC-Magic to crack it. If they were sufficiently introspective to be able to examine their reasons for ignoring my "challenge" they would understand why theirs is not a challenge. OTOH if they had that many brain cells to rub together they would already have understood the logic of the criticisms they so glibly dismiss. Perhaps a more satisfying exercise would be if PC-Magic were to encrypt a ton of the worst child pornography, hate literature and conspiratorial assassination plans imaginable, then present themselves and the computer containing the encrypted goodies to the office of the Bavarian prosecutor. CryptoMongerII

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Kremlin 2.0
by Mark Rosen 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

What's the use of encrypting your files if they remain unencrypted, lying around on your hard drive, reported as "deleted" space, ready for anyone to steal? And why bother to encrypt your sensitive documents if your word processor leaves scraps of these documents floating around your hard drive? Security in the Windows environment seems to be a futile effort. Kremlin 2.0 offers an easy-to-use solution to the problem of Windows data leakage. When you log off your computer, Kremlin can clear your computer's memory (both the RAM and the swapfile), wipe the unused portions of your hard drives (where temporary word processing files most often lurk), and erase all records of your Windows access (such as the most recent documents accessed, your Internet history, etc). And to securely delete a file or folder, just drag it to the Kremlin Secure Recycle Bin. Of course, the encryption in Kremlin is also first rate. You can encrypt a file with one of six algorithms (including IDEA, Blowfish, and RC4), just by right-clicking and choosing "Encrypt". And Kremlin can automatically encrypt your sensitive documents when you log off and decrypt them when you log back on, preventing unwanted access to your files. Kremlin has been peer reviewed by the best in the business: Chris Hall, from Counterpane Systems (Bruce Schneier's company), and Alexander Pukall have both examined the Kremlin source code. Kremlin is fast, easy-to-use, and secure; it's the right choice to protect your data. You can download Kremlin from: http://www.mach5.com/kremlin/ Mark Rosen Mach5 Software http://www.mach5.com/

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freeh/crypto/reno
by Vladimir Z. Nuri 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

------- Forwarded Message Date: Wed, 10 Dec 1997 15:36:21 -0800 From: "J. Orlin Grabbe" <kalliste(a)aci.net> To: snetnews(a)world.std.com Subject: SNET: [Fwd: FREEH SPEECH (repost)] - -> SearchNet's SNETNEWS Mailing List This is a multi-part message in MIME format. - --------------F4A2244C1A5A763B01795119 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit - --------------F4A2244C1A5A763B01795119 Content-Type: message/rfc822 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Content-Disposition: inline From: softwar(a)us.net Subject: FREEH SPEECH (repost) Date: Wed, 10 Dec 1997 14:11:51 -0600 Reply-To: softwar(a)us.net Message-ID: <881784054.228196354(a)dejanews.com> Newsgroups: alt.politics.clinton,alt.politics.org.cia,alt.politics.org.fbi,alt.politics.org.nsa,talk.politics.crypto Organization: Deja News Posting Service Path: news.alt.net!wnfeed!worldnet.att.net!128.230.129.106!news.maxwell.syr.edu!nntp2.dejanews.com!grunt.dejanews.com!not-for-mail X-Article-Creation-Date: Wed Dec 10 20:00:55 1997 GMT X-Authenticated-Sender: softwar(a)us.net X-Http-User-Agent: Mozilla/3.0 (Win16; I) X-Originating-IP-Addr: 198.240.101.30 (host30.richmond.us.net) Xref: news.alt.net alt.politics.clinton:375281 alt.politics.org.cia:25294 alt.politics.org.fbi:13697 alt.politics.org.nsa:10505 talk.politics.crypto:20929 General Reno has declined to appoint an Independent Counsel to investigate campaign abuses by the Clinton White House. Several Congressional leaders have sputtered they are concerned about Ms. Reno's conflict of interest in the matter. Of course, the Republican specifics of her "conflict" never go past the fact that she was appointed by Clinton. However, the connections between Ms. Reno and the Clinton scandals are well known to at least one person inside the Beltway. One example of Reno's conflict is the Clinton China Crypto Scam. It was Reno's Justice Anti-Trust Division that authorized the merger of a major company backed by a big donor to the DNC. The companies, RSA and Security Dynamics, sought the merger in 1996 just after RSA Chairman James Bidzos signed a memo of understanding to perform "encryption research" with China. The donor, Sanford Robertson, paid $100,000 to the DNC just prior to the merger. Furthermore, Mr. Robertson was on the list of those called by Al Gore from the White House and the MONEY arrived just after Gore's call. In fact, $20,000 of Robertson's donation was split into a HARD money account by the DNC. Of course, Mr. Robertson's investment firm made a cool two million dollars on the merger deal, spurred in part by the lucrative RSA contract with the PRC. Yet, Ms. Reno was also directed officially by President Clinton to oversee the "encryption problem" and enforce policy. For example, according to recently declassified documents from the Clinton National Security Council, Ms. Reno was tasked by President Clinton in 1993 to oversee the Clipper project. Ms. Reno was directed by Clinton to purchase 9,000 Clipper phones for the FBI. In addition, Clinton directed Ms. Reno to prepare Clipper for export. Finally, Reno was tasked to convince the US communications and computer industry to voluntarily implement the Clipper "key escrow" back door into all US made products. Simply put, Ms. Reno was, and is still, in charge of bugging America's telephones. Yet, how far can Ms. Reno go? According to the Presidential Directive, "Should (US) industry fail to fully assist the government in meeting its requirements within a reasonable period of time, the Attorney General will recommend legislation which would compel manufacturers to meet government requirements." Thus, if we do not voluntarily give up our rights to privacy, Ms. Reno is tasked by President Clinton with drawing up the laws for "mandatory" government phone bugs. Yet, there is overwhelming evidence that Ms. Reno quietly turned her head as a major DNC backer managed a deal involving the Communist Chinese and advanced encryption technology. Other than approving the lucrative RSA merger/export, Ms Reno and the Justice Department are also major players in export policy. They are part of an Inter-Agency Working group specifically tasked to cover crypto and exports. As proof, Reno's Justice Department has written most of the Clinton encryption policy papers. In fact, some of the secret documents written by Reno's Justice Department on crypto policy were compromised by former DNC fund-raiser Ira Sockowitz. Sockowitz walked out of the Commerce Department with over 2,000 pages of secrets in 1996. Ironically, included in the Sockowitz papers are secret documents covering the 1996 RSA/China deal. Curiously, Ms. Reno has chosen NOT to look into the matter. The connections between Ms. Reno and the Clinton scandals are also well known to at least one person inside the Beltway. FBI Director Louie Freeh knows. He is aware of that advanced technology was being shipped to China while draconian laws banning the same technology were considered here. Director Freeh also knows that his boss, Ms. Reno, is deeply involved in criminal obstruction involving high tech exports, DNC donors, and her own Justice Department. He knows she is covering for crimes that she and her Department were charged to prevent. The question now is... Does Freeh have the guts to tell America? 1 if by land, 2 if by sea. Paul Revere - encryption 1775 Charles R. Smith SOFTWAR http://www.us.net/softwar Pcyphered SIGNATURE: 3B766150F4B90D30688C657BB44EE7016793781A184F584E7C129D2A8A03F3F5 0B833ABFCE759CC129AF6A33B104406F19EB68AF61050087B65A66C94EA8B0B9 1D70D66883BCA304 - -------------------==== Posted via Deja News ====----------------------- http://www.dejanews.com/ Search, Read, Post to Usenet - --------------F4A2244C1A5A763B01795119-- - -> Send "subscribe snetnews " to majordomo(a)world.std.com - -> Posted by: "J. Orlin Grabbe" <kalliste(a)aci.net> ------- End of Forwarded Message

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Re: Radio Free Cypherpunks... (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > Date: Mon, 15 Dec 1997 15:49:40 -0800 > From: Steve Schear <schear(a)lvdi.net> > Subject: Re: Radio Free Cypherpunks... (fwd) > > Over a year ago I started a heated thread on the Telecom Regulation list,= > "Basis of FCC jurisdiction," which posited that the Commerce Clause basis= > for FCC authority might not hold for very low power and tens of GHz= > transmissions. My argument, in short, was that if a transmission couldn't= > reasonably be expected to be detectable (using common receiver technology)= > across state lines then the FCC shouldn't have jurisdition. So, are you considering such a broadcast? What I envision is a text-to-speech and/or a digital format. ____________________________________________________________________ | | | | | We built your fort. We will not have it used against us. | | | | John Wayne - Allegheny Uprising | | | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http://www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

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NYT Account Request
by forgot＠nytimes.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

You have requested your ID and password for The New York Times on the Web. Please follow the instructions below. 1. Please make a note of your subscriber ID: nifft 2. Next, to get the password for this account, using your Web browser go to this unique URL: http://www1.nytimes.com/forgot/snp.cgi?ul=nifft~475280 This page will allow you to choose a new password. Make sure you have copied the address EXACTLY as it appears here. (If you're getting an "Error" page, the address was probably entered incorrectly. See "Help With Copying and Pasting" at the bottom of this e-mail.) 3. Follow the instructions on the screen to choose a new password. After you have entered a password you will automatically enter our Web site. The New York Times on the Web Customer Service forgot(a)nytimes.com ******************** Help With Copying and Pasting 1. Using the mouse, highlight the entire Web address, (e.g. http://www1.nytimes.com/forgot/snp.cgi?ul=nifft~475280) shown above in step 2. It's essential to highlight the entire address, even if it extends over two lines. 2. Under the Edit menu at the top of your screen, select "Copy". 3. Go into your Web browser (open it if it's not already opened). 4. Click in the "Netsite" or "Address" bar -- the place in your Web browser where it says what Web address you're currently looking at -- and delete the address that's currently there. 5. In the blank "Netsite" or "Address" bar, paste the address by selecting the "Edit" menu at the top of your screen and choosing "Paste". 6. Press Enter. 7. Follow the instructions to choose a new password. ******************** If you did not request your ID and password for your NYT Web registration, someone has mistakenly entered your e-mail address when requesting their password. Please simply ignore this message, or, if you wish, you may go to the address above to select a new password for your account.

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Re: UK spooks invent RSA, DH in 1973
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Peter Gutmann wrote: >There's an interesting paper at http://www.cesg.gov.uk/ellisint.htm which >claims that UK spooks invented both RSA and DH in 1973 and 1974 respectively. We've converted the Ellis Postscript doc to HTML: http://jya.com/ellisdoc.htm

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No Subject
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hotmail, Juno, Aol... > > How about using the email address as the hostage info? The goods are sent to > the email address, so the sender knows that the email address is good. On > breach of contract, the sender has the option of selling the email address of > the reciever to a bunch of known spammers. > > More rambling... ;) > > -- > Steve > > P.S. If this particular contribution to your idea goes anywhere, I want credit. :) > --

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Re: Comparing PGP to Symantec's Secret Stuff
by Vin McLellan 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

(I just posted this in a discussion on alt.security.pgp, and thought it might also be of interest to the List. _Vin) ALCO Jakarta <alcojkt(a)bit.net.id> queried the Newsgroup: > Could anyone give me a quick trun-down on the difference between these two > programs and which one is more secure? Is the latter more practical to use > than PGP 2.6.2? That's comparing real crypto vs a sophisticated version of the Captain Crunch crypto ring. PGP in all of its forms uses strong crypto, which is why it is difficult to legally export it from the US to any overseas entity, except branches and subsidiaries of US firms. (Thus, the effort to sustain the international version of PGP, and PhilZ's long travail while the US govt tried to investigate how those sneaky non-Yanks got their hands on this oh-so-useful RSA/IDEA utility.) Norton Secret Stuff secures the data using the 32-bit Blowfish encryption algorithm -- which is why it's approved for unrestricted export outside the US by the U.S. government. It's far better than, say, ROT13 -- but it would not provide meaningful confidentiality or security for anything of any worth, or anything which might otherwise spur a curious and clever grad student to spend somewhere between a couple hours (with a college computer lab at his proposal) to a few days (on a fast PC) doing a brute force search of all possible 32-bit keys. A more complex comparison would put PGP against Norton's YEO, but that too is an apples to oranges matchup, albiet with strong crypto on both sides. PGP was designed to be a mail encyptor. YEO -- with RSA + RC4, RC5, DES, DES3, and Blowfish too, I think -- was designed as a file and disk encryptor. Each is optimized for its primary function. The lack of published source code is an issue, but if you see such a product being purchased by multinationals or US defense contractors you can be certain the implementation -- which is the real arena of vulnerability, once the algorithm is chosen -- has been carefully studied by informed cryptographers. (For non-American product, look for similar purchases by government-connected agencies in the vendor's nation.) You don't sound like the source code is going to do _you_ any good, right? Like most buyers, you have to trust the judgement of talented pros somewhere. > > I use PGP and don't find it's use so difficult to master even as a rookie > in cryptographic matters. But this Secret Stuff program is commerical so I > don't trust it's degree of security to gov't snooping based on my suspicion > of corporate submission to gov't will. Is that a reasonable assumption? Actually, corporate or commercial products are better than that. Secret Stuff is overtly weak crypto. It's also free from Symantec. Norton YEO from Symantec, or any competitive heavy-duty product like RSA SecurPC, will be clearly labelled as to the relative strength (key length) of their crypto -- strong for domestic user; weak for the intl mass market -- in terms anyone with a basic understanding of crypto and crypto export regs can understand. Export permits for the strong domestic versions of products like these will be all but impossible to obtain for mass market sales to non-American individuals. (Neither of these firms probably sells or even tries to sell the export version overseas; the weaker products exist largely because US corporate buyers demand an interoperable product that _can_ be shipped to overseas associates.) Export permits to ship the strong-crypto version of these products American corporations will require that the vendor have a key recovery mechanism -- no big deal, since we are dealing with stored files, so backup access is a standard requirement for disaster recovery -- which is to be held by the US firm in a location which makes it accessible to legal US court orders. Any and all US firms will respond to a legal court order to provide information. (Commercial firms in other nations will provide any info they hold when confronted with a court order too, right?) It is always rash to expect any commercial firm in any nation to be either a martyr or an arbiter of moral or political issues. Corporate officers have fiduciary responsibilities and they can be replaced. Corporations get a set of rules from the society in which they operate, and then -- within the context of those rules -- they seek to maximize their profit and their stockholders' return on investment with a certain degree of ruthless intensity. That's the nature of the beast. When corporate self-interest and some corporate executive's personal philosophy line up, we get some interesting fireworks -- sometimes even heroic moments which dramatically change the course of a government's industrial policy, as in the US banks vehement rejection of the NSA's CCEP and Clipper programs. The apparent exception really validates the rule. It's really rare for the US govt to try to overtly challenge or crush an American firm like they did with RSADSI for a decade. The NSA tried to bully the US banking industry and got handed its collective head -- and got branded as naive and turned into something of a laughingstock as well. On the other hand, commercial vendors which provide a product for sale have to describe and warranty that product as having certain properties. If those products are used by individuals or commercial customers and fail to measure up to their advance billing, the vendor is thereafter liable for significant (even company-threatening) losses, in both recompense and punitive damages. That's commercial law in the US -- no matter what sort of mealy-mouth language might be in the shrink-wrap license. US lawyers get a blueprint of an altar upon which they can sacrifice such firms when they get their law degree. Corporate "submission to gov't will" is a real issue, particularly for vendors of privacy and security tech -- but for US firms, it is far more likely to play out formally (as with a court order for a message recovery key) or in some negotiated backroom deal where the government demands some feature added, or asks for some feature to be removed from free-market product, before the vendor is given some commercial advantage like a government contract, or GSA approval, or an export permit. You see the whole American IT industry being put through this sort of blackmail in the current US crypto export policy. Only vendors which have or agree to design key/message "recovery" mechanisms in file or communications crypto apps get export permits to ship their 56-bit versions of their crypto products -- or (among other vendors,) crypto-enhanced applications like RDBSs and operating systems -- to the international market. Nothing subtle or secret about that -- and historically, the model has probably been pretty much the same, if less blatent. US export controls in crypto exist to bludgeon the vendors, so that the US govt can obtain something it wants in that company's domestic or overseas product lines. (It certainly does not restrict the international bad guy's access to strong crypto, no matter what the latest Four Horseman propaganda is.) Today, I think this leverage is probably being applied more on the big US vendors of operating systems and networking software and major applications -- all of which require crypto for their commercial products today -- than it is upon the puny crypto vendors (who are, relatively speaking, small potatos and aren't allowed to sell strong versions of their products -- even with message-recovery -- to anyone interesting, anyway;-) In commercial encryption products, the hidden backdoors of myth and legend are far less likely, given the liability issue and US commercial law. Overt and well-labelled backdoors are a different story. <sigh> Surete, _Vin "Cryptography is like literacy in the Dark Ages. Infinitely potent, for good and ill... yet basically an intellectual construct, an idea, which by its nature will resist efforts to restrict it to bureaucrats and others who deem only themselves worthy of such Privilege." _ A thinking man's Creed for Crypto/ vbm. * Vin McLellan + The Privacy Guild + <vin(a)shore.net> * 53 Nichols St., Chelsea, MA 02150 USA <617> 884-5548

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No Subject
by David Honig 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

You will note that you are reading prima facie evidence of violation of this new law. Wednesday December 17 11:58 AM EST New Law Crack Down on Internet Theft WASHINGTON (Reuters) - President Clinton signed into law on Tuesday a controversial bill imposing criminal penalties on copyright violators even if they do not profit from their actions, the White House executive clerk's office said Wednesday. The No Electronic Theft Act, passed by Congress last month, was strongly backed by the software and entertainment industries but opposed by science and academic groups. Under the law, a person who "willfully" infringes on copyrighted material worth at least $1,000 could be subject to criminal prosecution even if he does not make money. Under current law, copyright violators cannot be charged with criminal misconduct unless they profit from the violations. Software and entertainment groups, including the Business Software Alliance, the Motion Picture Association and the Association of American Publishers, said the change was essential to protect software, music recordings and other creative products easily pirated over the Internet. They cited a 1994 court case dismissing criminal copyright charges against an Massachusetts Institute of Technology student who posted on the Internet for free downloading copies of popular software programs. But last month a leading group of scientists, the Association for Computing, wrote to Clinton asking him to veto the bill because it might inadvertently criminalize many scientific publications available over the Internet, and might limit the "fair use" doctrine. The new law includes a sliding scale of penalties depending on the severity of the copyright infringement. For making one or more copies with a total retail value of at least $1,000 but less than $2,500, the violator could be imprisoned for up to one year and fined up to $100,000. For copies with a retail value of $2,500 or more, the violator could imprisoned for up to three years and fined up to $250,000. A second offense could lead to a prison term of up to six years. ------------------------------------------------------------ David Honig Orbit Technology honig(a)otc.net Intaanetto Jigyoubu M-16 : Don Quixote :: PGP : Louis Freeh Let freedom ring (or screech at 28.8)

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"where would you find"
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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