December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

ANY OF YOUR ANSWERS YES?
by BIZ-BEST＠profits.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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Secure Phone: Making man in the middle audible.
by James A. Donald 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Here is a method to render Man in the Middle audible on a telephone connection. Before speech can be encrypted, it is digitized and compressed. It is turned into digital packets. There is some choice in the size and other properties of the digital packets. Suppose that Bob's computer from time to time formulates a plan to do groups of a particular size and form, and sends Ann's computer a hash of that plan and the DH negotiated shared secret. Malloc (the man in the middle) cannot send this hash to Ann's computer for Ann would discover the shared secret she is using is not the same as the shared Bob is using. So his computer must formulate its own plan, and send its own hash, which will not agree with Bob's plan, because Bob's computer does not reveal the plan except by actually sending the packets. So malloc must decompress Bob's speech packets, repacketize them, and recompress them, Often he will not be able to send off a packet, until he has received two of Bob's packets. So this triples the delay, and increases the speech degradation. This should quite noticeable, noticeable enough to provoke Bob and Ann into verifying their connection by reading the hash digits of their shared secret. --------------------------------------------------------------------- | We have the right to defend ourselves | http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ and our property, because of the kind | of animals that we are. True law | James A. Donald derives from this right, not from the | arbitrary power of the state. | jamesd(a)echeque.com

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Re: What's really in PGP 5.5?
by Brian B. Riley 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On 10/9/97 12:42 PM, Anonymous (anon(a)anon.efga.org) passed this wisdom: >It still satisfies the government's requirement to get routine >access to most email communications, and to allow criminals who >use standard email packages to be watched. This sums up the stupidity of the whole thing. The *only* thing the government achieves is invasion of honest people's privacy and catching a few stupid crooks who would most likely fuck up anyway and get caught if they are actually stupid enough to think government escrowed encryption is gonna hide their communications. Brian B. Riley --> http://www.macconnect.com/~brianbr For PGP Keys <mailto:brianbr@together.net?subject=Get%20PGP%20Key> "He's mad that trusts in the tameness of a wolf ... or a whore's oath." -- SHAKESPEARE, "King Lear," III, 6

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Re: America as a Shake Down Extortion State
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Tim May wrote: >The debate over crypto almost certainly fits this pattern. If and when a >domestic ban on crypto is likely to pass and be signed, companies like RSA >and PGP will face extinction. This will then "incentivize" executives of >these companies to release funds, in the form of campaign >contributions--either directly or through back channels--to the Republican >and Democratic parties. Then a "compromise" will be found which lets RSA >and PGP, as examples, survive. And they may also be given government >business, with suitable GAK features made mandatory. Netscape has just been awarded a major contract with the Department of Defense for "secure" browsers, with options for "annual renewals." One of the best ever for NSCP. This is a public deal, as distinguished from the secret others pointed to in mandatory public notices in the Federal Register of meetings closed for national security by the Defense Science Boards, the National Defense Panel, and a welter of mil/gov advisory groups composed of members from industry, education and policy orgs eager to get advance word of market and contribution opportunities.

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Re: Applying ``Crowds'' idea to anonymous e-cash.
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Lucky Green wrote: >On Thu, 9 Oct 1997, John Kelsey wrote: >> Crowds, for those who haven't seen it, is a way of giving web users >> partial anonymity by making it impossible to determine which member >> of some ``crowd'' of users did some action (such as requesting a >> document). (This is a very rough summary--read the paper for the >> real analysis.) > >Some people from MSFT proposed a similar concept at FC'97. As for its >real life value, the legal term for such a system is "conspiracy". Almost everything we do could be called "conspiracy". John has a good idea here. Let's give it room to grow.

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export jobs not crypto
by Jim Burnes 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I know this is probably like preaching to the choir, but I remember Freeh recently saying that there were no significant losses of software exportation to foreign software companies. Well he is obviously ignorant or lying through his teeth. I'm about to recommend a software purchase from a foreign software company that might exceed #300k. Is that on Freeh's radar yet? Mind you, I don't care where people get their software, but if Freeh is trying to calm the America Firsters by saying that crypto imports aren't important I think someone is congress ought to be informed. Declan? You're still out there in the pit of vipers. Why don't you tell them. My congressman doesn't seem to listen to me. "How do you explain school to higher intelligence?" Elliot to his brother in ET

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Re: Pipes & inodes ... redux (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > From: mhahn(a)tivoli.com (Mike Hahn) > Subject: Re: Pipes & inodes ... redux > Date: Thu, 9 Oct 1997 21:57:22 -0500 (CDT) > > > > As for as the "getting old" thread of Kenny Z's: > > > > Speaking of Kenny Z, did you know that Kenny G was majority > > stockholder of Starbucks? > > Man, you would think with all that coffee, he could play something better > than the crap he plays...Heck, Miles Davis and Charlie Parker survived on > Folgers for all we know... How about Robert Johnson....Terraplane Blues rules....;) Ravage Black Leather Monster

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Re: What's really in PGP 5.5?
by James A. Donald 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 02:27 PM 10/7/97 -0700, Jon Callas wrote: [Explaining PGP's rather alarming "data recovery" features.] > Well, that's mostly all it is. There are other bits of the system. For > example, if I look up Alice's key on a key server and Alice has a recovery > key, I get Alice's recovery key, too. If Alice's recovery key is a "please > use" key, then I can encrypt to Alice alone. In any case, the PGP software > tells me that Alice has a recovery key, so I can decide to use some other > mechanism to talk to her. Sending a copy to the boss of everything Alice sends is OK. If Alice wants to send something her boss should not read, perhaps she should use her private account, rather than a company paid account. Sending a copy of everything Alice receives to the boss or HR is not OK. Alice should get to control it. It would be acceptable for the company system to keep track of what Alice has received, and flag "Alice received something, and has not yet filed the cleartext copy with us" It is not acceptable to just plain snoop on what Alice receives. > Note that design satisfies the opt-in and fair-warning requirements. Also, > since Alice's recovery key is an attribute of her self-signature, she can > change it. She can even have a second user name (let's call it Bob), that > has no recovery key. Alice needs finer granuality of control. The leakage to her boss primarily affects her, rather than the sender. Furthermore any auto-snoop feature sets a very dangerous precedent. It is politically a lot more difficult for the FBI to mandate that they can recover your data, if such a mandate leads to the message flashing up, "now sending a copy to the FBI" every time you decrypt something. --------------------------------------------------------------------- | We have the right to defend ourselves | http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ and our property, because of the kind | of animals that we are. True law | James A. Donald derives from this right, not from the | arbitrary power of the state. | jamesd(a)echeque.com

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The Sovereign Individual - ignorant authors
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi, Finaly getting back to reading some more of the book [1], Chpt. 9 in particular. This chapter deals with various aspects of social issues (eg rise of national languages) and how they led to the growth of nationalism in general. Toward the end of the chapter (pp. 265 in the hardback) these idiots (don't know a better term) actualy have the audactity to claim that Stephen Jay Gould is a neo-creationist, in short they claim that Gould holds there is a 'higher power' (ie transcendance) directing evolution and the impact of inhereted traits on society. The author of this section has apparently never read a word that Gould has written. Gould is known as a leading supporter of Punctuated Equilibria and its various spawn, and with Ernst Meyr lead the battle against creationist theories and others of that ilk. Gould and Meyr's theories flatly reject transcendance as a force in evolutionary theory. Considering that no supporter of transcendance in evolutionary theory has ever succesfuly weathered a reasoned attack I simply stand in awe of the authors expectation of the readers ignorance. The more I read of this book the less respect I have for either author. I previously recommended this book as an intellectual challenge at least, I retract that recommendation. Don't waste your money on this drivel from a couple of snake oil salesmen who continously contradict themselves and pose flawed theory after flawed theory. ____________________________________________________________________ | | | The financial policy of the welfare state requires that there | | be no way for the owners of wealth to protect themselves. | | | | -Alan Greenspan- | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http:// www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________| [1] The Sovereign Individual: How to survive and thrive during the collapse of the welfare state J.D. Davidson, Lord W. Rees-Mogg ISBN 0-684-81007-7

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Re: Pipes & inodes ... redux (fwd) [oops]
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > From: Jim Choate <ravage(a)ssz.com> > Subject: Re: Pipes & inodes ... redux (fwd) > Date: Thu, 9 Oct 1997 22:53:50 -0500 (CDT) Sorry, that was meant for a completely different set of readers. I hit the wrong key. ____________________________________________________________________ | | | The financial policy of the welfare state requires that there | | be no way for the owners of wealth to protect themselves. | | | | -Alan Greenspan- | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http:// www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

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