December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

None
by ryank 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

1 0

Express Letter
by internet＠netline.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hello, How are you? I have found a great way to make an honest and ethical living on the internet. I work from home using only a computer and a modem and I have very limited computer experience. If you would like a free report on this business simply read on. Entrepreneur Magazine voted "INTERNET CONSULTING" as the #1 business opportunity for 1997!! Now any business or entrepreneur can profit from advertising on the internet. So why are so few of them doing it? Because they don't know how, and there is no one to show them! This has created an incredible need for Internet Consultants! Within 4 hours of starting my Internet Consulting business, I had sold my first ad. Now the requests to place orders are flowing in. We've had to hire help to process the orders! What I do is simply show people who are currently advertising by conventional means, how we can put their message in front of over 60 million customers on the Internet. This is a low start up, easy maintenance, turn key , risk free , 100% guaranteed business. This business is WHITE HOT! The time to get in and profit from the INTERNET is NOW! Don't let the opportunity of a lifetime pass you by! For a FREE REPORT on this business (do not hit reply) simply send an e.mail to our auto responder at: hitme(a)answerme.com and you will have the packet in you e.mail box within 30 seconds or so. Best Regards Bob Thank You and Good Luck!

1 0

FW: Anonymous Remailers
by Roger J. Jones 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 5:17 AM -0800 5/14/97, Roger J. Jones wrote: >Why is it that some who are very concerned about their personal privacy >utilize anonymous remailers that: > >1) Log all of their mail messages? Tim May Responded With chained, multiply-encrypted messages, logs are ineffective unless all of the links in the chain collude to trace messages. While this is certainly possible, it seems unlikely. Roger J Jones Responded Several of you have suggested as Tim has that the chain of remailers is secure. I suggest that the statement is only true to the extent that one wants to trace back a particular message. On the other hand, if one wants to find the source of postings to anonymous remailers and has skilled access to the Internet the task is quite simple and does not even require attacking the remailers. Of course, one could break the chain by having the remailers call each other outside of the Internet, but then of course the phone records would disclose the connection. Then again, one could hard wire a private connection between two remailers outside of both the Internet and the phone system but even this connection would be disclosed through reasonable traffic analysis. Of course, the simple fact that even encrypted streams need to include the ultimate destination of the message makes content analysis easier and weakens the encryption. Then again, all of this is a lot of work. Social Engineering and pure bribery would more likely be the most efficient and effective solution. Roger J Jones wrote: >2) Are in many cases reputed to be run by foreign intelligence services? Tim May Responded This allegation was made by some clueless Washington think tank authors. They provided no evidence, only innuendo, and they were unwilling or unable to provide any further comments when queried by several Cypherpunks. And given that many or even most of the remailer operators are members of the various related Cypherpunks or Remailers Operators lists, and are known to various of us, the notion that most (or even many) remailers are run by intelligence agencies is absurd. At 9:48 AM -0800 5/14/97, Roger J. Jones wrote: I suggest that just because you chose to characterize the sources as "clueless Washington think tank authors" does not (as they say in Star Trek - The Next Generation) "make it so". The "allegation" that foreign governments actively participate in actions to violate personal privacy ("borrowing" laptops from traveling businesspeople, taping phones, etc.) are all documented in various places. Of course, they could all the result of a single psyop with excellent results. But I doubt it. Tim May Responded Your first point, using some kind of Star Trek lingo, is beyond comment. I provided a lot more context than your original point provided, and yet you seem to want even more documentation. Go back and read the archives for a discussion of this paper (hint: search on "remailers" ANDed with "SAIC." Pay particular attention to the critique of this paper by such folks as Raph Levien, and others. Anonymous Responded Yes, you are missing a lot. The bit about foreign inteligence agencies is almost certainly a canard created by one Strassman at a conference in Boston 2 years ago, then retracted. Anyway, if you use chaining, it's irrelevant. See <A HREF="http://www.law.miami.edu/~froomkin/articles/ocean.htm"> http://www.law.miami.edu/~froomkin/articles/ocean.htm </A> and <A HREF="http://www.law.miami.edu/~froomkin/articles/arbitr.htm"> http://www.law.miami.edu/~froomkin/articles/arbitr.htm </A> for the gory details. Roger J Jones Responded Given that several of you have suggested that the "foreign agent" theory is a hoax I suggest that this does not give me much faith either. What we have is the classic case that it difficult if not impossible to prove the non-existence of anything. For example, presume that one could identify every real owner of every remailer in the Internet universe. Have we proved anything? Not really. Because in the time it has taken to prove the case, a new remailer could have been created. Or the remailer that one thinks is secure could be down with a different remailer operating as an IT spoof. Or, after checking with the owner of the "safe" remailer the owner becomes subject to the normal desires of life (fear, greed, power, etc.) and "turns." The existence of both type one and type two errors prevents even an exhaustive search from being fully satisfied. Roger J Jones wrote >Do they really trust the owner of the remailer? (Unless of course, it is >their remailer?) I seem to be missing something. Roger J Jones wrote further...... So, chaining does not seem to be a secure solution. It just makes the process more difficult, but not impossible. The non-existance of "agents" who would operate a remailer for purposes other than protecting security can not be proven. I still seem to be missing something.........

3 2

Reporting threshold for NY money transfers lowered
by daw＠cs.berkeley.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I thought this might be of interest to cypherpunks: The threshold for reporting New York money transfers was apparently quietly lowered to $750 last month. Looks like all it took was one order signed by one Treasury official -- eek. Can they lower the $10k cash threshold just as easily? * NYT Sunday April 13, 1997 * * U.S. Seizes $5.6 Million Hidden in a Truck on Way to Mexico * By Sam Dillon * * Mexico City, April 12 - United States officials said today that * $5.6 million discovered this week in a truck about to cross into * Mexico from El Paso was the largest cash seizure in memory along * the southwest border. * [snip] * * ...probably the proceeds of street drug sales... * [snip] * * Officials have seen a big increase in cash seizures lately... * [snip] * * In [another] case the authorities believe the traffickers * chose to move the cash south out of New York in bulk by * car because of an order signed by Mr. Kelly [Treasury * Under Secretary Raymond W. Kelly] which required New York * businesses transmitting cash to report all transactions * over $750. * * Although the order was not announced, word spread quickly * among traffickers, and a dramatic drop in money wires to * Colombia followed, along with a sharp increase in seizures * of cash along the eastern seaboard. Thanks to <guy(a)panix.com> for forwarding.

3 2

Re: NSA _likes_ strong crypto?
by Peter Trei 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Date: Thu, 15 May 1997 15:07:35 -0400 > To: cypherpunks(a)cyberpass.net > From: Thomas Porter <txporter(a)mindspring.com> > Subject: Re: NSA _likes_ strong crypto? > Reply-to: Thomas Porter <txporter(a)mindspring.com> > At 09:32 AM 5/15/97 -0700, Bill Frantz thoughtfully expounded thus: > > > > >During a hall discussion at CFP, I heard that people at NSA are changing > >their opinions about the use of strong crypto in the general community. > >The reason is the threat of InfoWar and the need for strong crypto in > >general use to secure the US information infrastructure. > > > I realize I may catch it for my numerical ignorance here, but a more > paranoid type might think that any acquiescence on the part of NSA might be > due to more relative ease of breaking important traffic than they might > have possessed in the past. > > Does any one on the list have any ideas on what the Intel mega-pentium > parallel processor (touted for nuclear explosion and weather simulations a > few months back, and noticeably missing any mention of NSA application) > does to the time estimates for cracking "strong" crypto keys? I am being > purposefully vague in my definitions of strong crypto, but I would present > as my test cases PGP ascii-armor traffic of 2048 key length or plain files > encrypted with pgp -c option; ie. typical crypto-criminal/narco-terrorist > fodder. > > How does this strength of encryption compare to whatever might be used to > "secure the nation's info infrastructure" [Netscape 40 bit!!??] regarding > cracking time? Clearly less, but how much less on this type of specialized > parallel processor? To put it another way, any swags on how long it would > take this pentium parallel processor to crack the current DES56 challenge? > > Inquiring (and ignorant) minds want to know, > > Tom Porter txporter(a)mindspring.com 1. You must assume that any well-heeled opponent will have built a Wiener engine, so the time to brute a DES key can be measured in hours, rather than days. A ciphertext-only attack is only a little harder than a known-plaintext attack. But that doesn't stop us from doing the calculation anyway. The fastest DES cracker I'm aware of (Bryddes) currently claims 615,000 keys/sec on a Pentium 120. The sandia machine is acheiving 1.06 Tflops with 7264 processors. The processors are 200 MHz Pentium Pros. (The Mflop rate is lower than the MHz rate). They plan to have 9200 of them when it's finished. 615k * 200/120 = 1.025Mkps (it'll actually be a bit higher on a Pro) 1.025M * 9200 = 9.430Gkps (2^56 = 7.2E16)/9.43E9 = 7.6 Msec = 88.44 days Thats a conservative, upper limit, not a SWAG. Speeds would be much higher on a 64 bit machine. I'm very curious to see how bitslice DES would run on an MMX Pentium, which has some 64 bit registers. 40 bit encryption is a bad joke = it would take about 2 min on this machine for 40 bit DES Peter Trei trei(a)Process.com Peter Trei Senior Software Engineer Purveyor Development Team Process Software Corporation http://www.process.com trei(a)process.com

2 1

[CRYPTO] Blowfish
by lucifer＠dhp.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Here, Tim C. May descends into total inanity. He should have a cold shower and/or a Turkish coffee. ___\ <o \__o Tim C. May X\ X> _/_\____<_\_

2 1

Clinton virus
by Mix 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The Clinton virus! Makes bogus DOC files randomly as it spreads.... section 1 of 1 of file bill.com < uuencode 96 (v56) by R.E.M. > begin 644 bill.com M35JK`0H````"`#H..(a)[5`8`````.`!D!'````$Q:.3'__P)<+E6)Y;B$`IK- M`J@`@?#_[/>,TX[#C-O\C;[^_O\?Q78$K*J1,.WSI([;BH9^^/`PY(OX@+OX M7'4&_C`\COGKZ]M\_197P>'5^IH]"K^_`"'Z``[VO/;K_+C_`'-T4)I7\7[Q MUOV=!A,\[_@)?._*B@"+ACS\]240`#W]L`!U`4"'_XA&_XK]B>Q=P@0`!$+3 MPDE,3%D``5G]][_C,%H!'L$`_\$QP`S,G,\(Z:A3BNB_I7ES[)'82="ZP[SX M&+_IU,7__1&M^`Z\^`P%*BYE>&6[^/_AO(L^P".Q"-/G@<?A?M`BQIJH"=3] MQP:^(P$8?K$M`:>X(`!0O]H<'ZB:B!R#/EB5C@`C1;_X[\/J`-O#^`G7]^G^ M@+WIPV#5!Z'R2*/\O?S&Q/B][T#OZ[2:81C0#=+_-O6:.P,<]Z-V8`%<`AQ- M7F'X";_-?VKX$,_-?VH0:O@1.VKH\/T\`74<[?U>^!MT^!&^=/@0Z-G^C?$N M15A%;:\!((OS!(OV!)_P#;^R(*7X"BPHY/SLL>POL>W8^`WTP/(=D/`+FIT! 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TEXTO - Text steganography
by nobody＠huge.cajones.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

------------------------------------ TEXTO - Text steganography ------------------------------------ Texto is a rudimentary text steganography program which transforms uuencoded or pgp ascii-armoured ascii data into English sentences. Texto text files look like something between mad libs and bad poetry, (although they do sometimes contain deep cosmic truths) and should be close enough to normal english to get past simple-minded mail scanners and to entertain readers of talk.bizarre. ------------- Perhaphs this explains why, when I tried it, it signed Paul Bradley's name to the output. _Mr._ Nobody to _you_, pal.

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Re: Just Say "No" to Congress
by nobody＠huge.cajones.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Declan McCullagh wrote: > Tim wrote: > > We're basically under assault from all directions. The bozos in Congress > > and state governments are spinning out new laws and obscure regulations > > faster than we can react...and of course they're using our money to > > generate these laws and lobby for them. Further, a mostly-brainwashed > > Washington media population is surprising uncritical of these blizzard > > drifts of new laws. > Hmmm... Do I get counted in the "mostly-brainwashed" category? > > FYI, here are two bills that Feinstein introduced recently: I think you just showed the answer to the question is "Yes." Politicians build a house of mirrors with bills that they "introduce"--agencies that they "propose" be funded--causes that they "support." I'm not interested in a reporter quoting "the record" to me. I can get that from Feinstein's glossy handouts. I want to know what a politician has *done* for me (or against me), not how much she purports to *love* me. I enjoy many of your articles, Declan, but please--no more "Senator XYZ introduced a bill that supports mom's apple pie and the flag." tripe. TruthMonger

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Kansas City.
by nobody＠huge.cajones.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

A new scheme to broadcast the names and faces of people arrested for trying to buy and sell sex could mushroom into a full-fledged challenge to U.S. constitutional law. Starting Thursday, a local government access cable television channel will broadcast the names and faces of people arrested for prostitution-related crimes. The first half-hour installment will feature mugshots of alleged purveyors of sex and the customers who offered to pay for it. Supporters of the plan hope that such public humiliation will help efforts to crack down on prostitution. But opponents say it violates the principle of ``innocent until proven guilty,'' a key tenet of U.S. criminal law. ``The city is setting out to punish with ridicule people who have not been convicted of anything,'' said Dick Kurtenbach, executive director of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) of Kansas and western Missouri. ``The presumption of innocence is really turned on its head with this scheme.'' Both supporters and opponents say that although U.S. media groups regularly publish the names of people arrested and charged with crimes, this may be the first time a government entity broadcasts the identities of alleged wrongdoers. ``As far as we can tell, this is the first jurisdiction that's putting on TV names of people arrested. This is a fairly novel approach,'' Kurtenbach said. The plan was the brainchild of City Councilwoman Teresa Loar, who said she hopes it will deter prostitution and the social ills -- drug use, assault and robbery -- that commonly accompany it. ``I'm not here to persecute people. I just want them to know that they run the risk of having their picture on the access channel if they try to hire a prostitute,'' Loar said. Loar said she is aware of ACLU's criticisms, but she counters by saying that arrests are a matter of public record. She noted that a disclaimer will say that those people pictured are innocent until found guilty in a court of law. When asked why the city does not air the names of people actually convicted of prostitution, Loar explained that few arrests in prostitution sting operations actually lead to convictions. ``Showing convictions wouldn't work -- because we don't get any. They (the accused prostitutes and would-be customers) plead their way down and pay a fine,'' Loar said. Loar said she understands the idea of constitutional rights but feels her constituents' rights are more pressing. ``As far as victims' rights go, my concern is my constituents' rights to quality of life. Their rights are being violated every day with this crime,'' Loar said. Constitutional law experts acknowledged that those people whose names and faces wind up on television could sue the city but would probably lose any claims alleging defamation or invasion of privacy. But Doug Linder, law professor at University of Missouri-Kansas City, said it may be possible to claim that the broadcast constitutes a form of punishment, which legally has to be meted out through due process of law. Plaintiffs could sue on the grounds that they were not given due process to defend themselves, Linder said. ``One could argue that it is a form of punishment if the police department or the city is providing their pictures,'' Linder said. ``These people should have the opportunity to prove their innocence. I think there might be a real constitutional claim there.''

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