December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

IMDMP 8192 PKCS and IMDMP Summary
by DataETRsch＠aol.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi, You have probably read a few of my past messages about UDCM and IMDMP. The variation of IMDMP implemented within UDCM V2.0 and UDCM V3.0 does not include a public key cryptosystem. However, on March 1st, 1997, new versions of UDCM and IMDMP will be released that do support the public key cryptosystem method. The future versions will also support multi-party key integration features, four platform independent random number generator algorithms, as well as 1024 (8192 bit) keys. Note that the current version of IMDMP only allows 256 byte (1024) bit keys. The current shareware version and the future shareware version of UDCM will still only allow 5 byte (40 bit) keys so as to comply with ITAR unless a key recovery infrastructure is established. A public key directory infrastructure is being considered for development as well. Also note that versions of UDCM are being planned for the UNIX, DOS, and Macintosh System platforms. There are a few major mistakes in a couple of my previous delegated messages. An end-user application that supports IMDMP will not be released until March 1st, 1997. A detailed description of IMDMP will not be released as planned, but, instead, the undocumented primary source code of UDCM (containing the IMDMP encryption algorithm) will be released on February 1st, 1997. A partially detailed summary of the IMDMP is now included in VENDOR.DOC file of the UDCM V2.0 software package / archive. UDCM V2.0 was modified to restrict keys to 50 bits so as to comply with the latest ITAR details. The extensively confusing exportation restrictions sections of UDCM's documentation were modified as well. I am extremely sorry about the apparently extraneous information that is present in a few of my first messages to this mailing list. Such a negative level feedback was not anticipated. I do admit that single key encryption methods are not too comparable to PKCS methods. What I was referring to when I said IMDMP is more advanced than RSA, etc. is the actual encryption procedure itself, not the way keys are secured. Again, irrashional claims were not intended at all. The amount of analytical research invested in IMDMP was thought to be sufficient. By the way, has anyone out there even tried using UDCM to encrypt a file or two? I do not know how some of you can say that IMDMP is a simple XOR-ing and AND-ing algorithm without trying it first. I find it extremely hard to believe that the celebrated creator(s) of Blowfish, IDEA, etc. had to go through all of this ritualistic screening complexity too. (Please do correct me if I am wrong.) (For the record: DataET Research's promotional agent has been fired.) Again, the web site address of UDCM is: http://members.aol.com/dataetrsch/udcm.html. The web site includes has a link to the VENDOR.DOC file which includes the aforesaid updated information. UDCMV20.ZIP is currently unavailable on the web site as the software is undergoing additional security modifications. By the way, the web page's ugly background his been removed. The IMDMP encryption algorithm itself combines various simple and complex methods to secure digital data: standard randomized and fixed substitution, standard randomized and fixed AND and XOR logic, integrated and interlaced randomized XOR logic, NOT logic, randomized and fixed bit shifting, randomized transposition scrambling, linear sequential bit incrementation and decrementation, integrated and interlaced randomized and fixed byte dependency structuring, sequential byte pyramid structuring, asymmetric non-linear chaos and complexity based binary selection equation key integration, anomalous key bit factoring, and continuous key bit modification structuring. Sub-algorithms of IMDMP are basically additional applications of one or more of the aforesaid techniques. Questions, queries, or comments ("gulp")? E-Mail: DataETRsch(a)aol.com, JKYuRamos(a)aol.com, or DataETResearch(a)geocities.com. Note: From now on, any messages to DataET Research that do not contain the text "NO FLAME" somewhere in the subject heading will be ignored completely. If a message is a indeed flame, the associated server's administrator will be contacted, and a complaint will be filed accordingly. Thank you very much for your time. Jeremy K. Yu-Ramos President DataET Research Data Engineering Technologies

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What!
by DataETRsch＠aol.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Excuse me? What is faulty about IMDMP? - Jeremy

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Re: IMPORTANT: Additional information about UDCM.
by Clay Olbon II 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

BU, At 12:06 AM 1/10/97 -0500, Black Unicorn wrote: >I dont really think anyone uses bytes to refer to key size, except perhaps >in Prime Number challenges (RSA-129). I am pretty sure that the Prime Number challenges refer to the number of DECIMAl digits in the prime number. Otherwise excellent responses to the simplistic mumbo-jumbo. Good to see you posting again! Clay ******************************************************* Clay Olbon olbon(a)ix.netcom.com sys-admin, engineer, programmer, statistitian, etc. **********************************************tanstaafl

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Satellite Gone (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi all, I just got this a few minutes ago and thought it migh be interesting. For obvious reasons I am not going to identify the source. Forwarded message: > Date: Sat, 11 Jan 1997 11:46:51 +0000 > To: Ravage(a)einstein.ssz.com > Subject: Satellite Gone > > dunoo if this might interest you > Last night at apx 10:00 satellite T1 (Telstar 401) went away... > > Fox and ABC News one channel are now over on T2 (Telstar 402) located at > 89 degrees west... > Fox is on transponders 1,2,7,10,13,17,20,23 > ABC has feeds on 8,21,22 > > I haven't yet found where the UPN feeds are going to be.... > > ATT Satellite Enginering support has said that it is gone with no hope > of recovery... > > Some ugly roumors are starting to float about alleged threats to FOX to > do this by unnamed Gov agencys due to the negetive views that FOX had > been reporting to the public about them.... > > Have you heard anything?? Jim Choate CyberTects ravage(a)ssz.com

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Remailer
by Ryan Perkins 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I've recently had a surge of remailing attempts made through the remailer which I used to have running. It is no longer running. If I do reset it, I'll notify the cypherpunk list.. the address(es) were: rperkins(a)nyx.cs.du.edu rperkins(a)nyx10.cs.du.edu or: rperkins(a)nox.cs.du.edu rperkins(a)nyx.net .. whatever, they all went to the same place.. These accounts are all _forwarded_ to my account: rperkins(a)uvic.ca, and are not forwarded.. Please remove my the addresses from any list of remailers you may mantain. I will alert you if the remailer goes back up. For those of you who don't maintain remailer listings, please make note of these addresses: they are _not_ remailers. Thank you. --- Ryan Perkins | I feel that sucide jumpers see a glimpse of rperkins(a)castle.uvic.ca | sanity as they throw themselves from the ledge. Ask for PGP public key | That's why they scream all the way down. 8C5357 : 9F FF BA 93 54 D5 18 78 4B 1E DA GC E3 4E

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Re: Ma Bell
by LoRd oRiOn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This may not have to do with you guys..but I have a question...why do Telco people and the government blame us hackers for costing them billions of dollars a year to fix the security holes that they have??? Instead of charging us with felony's and with money they should thank us and/or hire us to find thier holes and fix them!! I don't like to screw Ma Bell..but she does have to lighten up. --------------------------------------------------------- Get Your *Web-Based* Free Email at http://www.hotmail.com ---------------------------------------------------------

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Ethnic origins of the ASALA/Earthweb terrorist Ray Arachelian
by dlv＠bwalk.dm.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

]Message-Id: <3.0.32.19970111192414.006a29c0(a)pop.netaddress.com> ]X-Sender: iverson(a)pop.netaddress.com (Unverified) ]X-Mailer: Windows Eudora Pro Version 3.0 (32) ]Date: Sat, 11 Jan 1997 19:28:56 -0500 ]To: dlv(a)bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM) ]From: Casey Iverson <iverson(a)usa.net> ]Subject: Re: A vote of confidence for Sandy ]Mime-Version: 1.0 ]Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" ] ]At 03:28 PM 1/11/97 EST, you wrote: [about the ufh.wirenet.net mailbomber terrorist] ]>This is the jerk responsible for the mail loop last Xmas, which the Armenian ]>liar Ray Arachelian tried to blame on me. ] ]This probably won't penetrate your sick mind but the fact is that Ray ]Arachelian is *not* an an Armenian. ] ]OTOH *you* are a lying, vicious, sick, perverted, homophobic Russian scumbag. Ray "Arsen" Arachelian admitted being an Armenian. You can complain about his net-abuse to his boss <jack(a)earthweb.com>. In the words of the Russian-Scottish poet Mikhail Lermontov, "Ty rab, tu trus, ty armyanin." ASALA is the terrorist Armenian organization responsible for the murders of dozens of Turkish diplomats and civilians. No wonder they want to use strong crypto to cover up their terrorist acts.

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Re: Private Idaho source code now available
by Lou Zirko 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit To: lucifer(a)dhp.com, cypherpunks(a)toad.com Date: Sun Jan 12 00:08:20 1997 It is just a front end for PGP. It requires that you have PGP installed in order to make use of its encryptiom services. There should be no export controls. Lucifer says: > > My understanding is that Private Idaho uses PGP internally > and provides the same functionality as premail, with an > easier to use GUI. > > Given that, it would still be export controlled, since it > enables cryptography. That is why Raph doesn't allow export of premail. > > Lou Zirko (502)499-8729 Zystems lzirko(a)c2.org "We're all bozos on this bus" - Nick Danger, Third Eye -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3i Charset: latin1 iQEVAwUBMth/4MtPRTNbb5z9AQF62wf/anuZ3p8CHhnYGQhVkQXyT4zUppF2gc5H PyJJcXp1C2wMyw2INKBEHvjUGvtSkXXW2GOZaEgeUKR0rsmCSGqgtd9mrx0JZE/Y ue3g8EtaqiezUNsTq7ElNK1v0AW3b6/eIWFvG55dzEP5l2yOCD0Um+wa09Xh6YMY VsQJw32vnnxCroM/gPFqbtyhTw/F+oGOSCCxa8W8QGrtpWan3awMvavlhhSGrBDt elMRH+L03PebhJxajnLSz9+A5x0W+3rTzW+G8KUGDBqG/7DEppw7eltBw6K55LxJ IgTOi0kUbz9k9IsXG3HN9RPsJTGII4/UlrXJv05tpO1Qsihu0cln8Q== =j5i+ -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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RSA over Rubics cube?
by cypherpunks＠toad.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Just for fun, not that I am sugesting it as a serious encryption method, but has anyone tried exponetion cyphers on the group defined by the Rubics cube? :)

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Re: IMDMP 8192 PKCS and IMDMP Summary
by Three Blind Mice 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Sat, 11 Jan 1997 DataETRsch(a)aol.com wrote: > include a public key cryptosystem. However, on March 1st, 1997, new versions > of UDCM and IMDMP will be released that do support the public key > cryptosystem method. The future versions will also support multi-party key Oh, so you're just going to fix up your program a little bit, and immediately your private key system will turn into a public key system? Are you sure you read A.C. and didn't just look at the pictures? > algorithms, as well as 1024 (8192 bit) keys. Note that the current version of > IMDMP only allows 256 byte (1024) bit keys. The current shareware version and I'm beginning to see this <insert long acronym here> as being a variation on XOR. > the UDCM V2.0 software package / archive. UDCM V2.0 was modified to restrict > keys to 50 bits so as to comply with the latest ITAR details. The extensively The amazing shrinking key... pretty soon we'll have 1 bit keys, and they'll have to be registered with this company for ITAR compliance. ;) > methods are not too comparable to PKCS methods. What I was referring to when > I said IMDMP is more advanced than RSA, etc. is the actual encryption > procedure itself, not the way keys are secured. Again, irrashional claims Says who? You? Hahahahahaha. > were not intended at all. The amount of analytical research invested in IMDMP > was thought to be sufficient. So a cryptosystem that's been in existence for an entire eleven days (you said it was created January 1, 1997) has had "sufficient" "analytical research invested"? My, you ARE clueless. > AND-ing algorithm without trying it first. I find it extremely hard to > believe that the celebrated creator(s) of Blowfish, IDEA, etc. had to go > through all of this ritualistic screening complexity too. (Please do correct > me if I am wrong.) You're right, they didn't. It's because they published code first and then asked for review. They didn't try to make a profit on an operating system-specific piece of pre-compiled code before explaining the system and giving full details. > (For the record: DataET Research's promotional agent has been fired.) Then why are you still posting? > UDCMV20.ZIP is currently unavailable on the web site as the software is > undergoing additional security modifications. You mean you're changing XOR to AND? > structuring. Sub-algorithms of IMDMP are basically additional applications of > one or more of the aforesaid techniques. SUB encrypt1 'Super secret encryption routine SHARED text_to_encrypt$ text_to_encrypt$ = "[SECRET]" + text_to_encrypt$ + "[SECRET]" END SUB (Will you sue me for copyright infringement now? I bet it looks identical to your code -- and in the same language, too.) --3bmice

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