December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

What are the flaws with FV payment system?
by Kip DeGraaf 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I only received this an hour ago. I would very much like to attend, but can't put my fingers on the detailed analysis of FV's flaws in their system, which I would like to bring up in person at this seminar. Could someone please point me in the right direction? ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Thu, 10 Oct 1996 09:51:56 -0400 From: Sue Davidsen <davidsen(a)umich.edu> To: michlib-l(a)mlink.hh.lib.umich.edu Subject: Seminar Announcement Commerce on the Internet 7:00 PM Thursday, October 10, 1996 Room N130 New Business Building, MSU Dr. Nathaniel Borenstein, Chief Scientist, First Virtual Holdings, Inc., is known worldwide as a leading developer of Internet technologies, including the MIME standard and the First Virtual Payment System. In this presentation on commerce on the Internet he will discuss: The limitations of current encryption schemes The technical aspects of the First Virtual payment scheme The future of commerce on the Internet Dr. Borenstein contributed to the development of numerous Internet technologies including the MIME standard (used for email attachments and Web content typing), Andrew, metamail, ATOMICMAIL, and Safe-Tcl. Dr. Borenstein devised the First Virtual payment system, a popular mechanism for conducting commerce on the Internet. [a lot of cute biographical details left out, I'm not impressed]

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Re: pgp, edi, s/mime
by azur＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>S/MIME has come a _long_ way. An earlier version (now called S/MIME 1.0, >although I'm not sure this is going to make it into any marketing >materials) had a couple of cryptographic problems compared with PGP. >Those problems have been fixed in version 2.0, which is expected shortly >(as an internet draft). > >S/MIME 2.0 _defaults_ to 168-bit triple-DES, unless you're stupid enough >to use the export version. RSA key sizes up to 2048 bits are supported, >as are a number of alternate symmetric algorithms. In addition, digital >signatures are based on 160-biy SHA1, rather than 128-bit MD5, which is >half broken anyway. > >In the meantime, Deming software is shipping a slick Windows >implementation of S/MIME, which integrates nicely with Eudora. Netscape >is expected to ship cross-platform S/MIME capability in version 4.0 of >Navigator (their original publicity materials were only off by a factor >of two ;-), and that will make a huge dent in the market. > >In sum, S/MIME leaves PGP in the dust, both techically and as a market >force. There's still a lot of sentiment that PGP is one of "ours" and >S/MIME is one of theirs, but at this point it's the latter that has the >most promise of bringing encrypted e-mail to the masses. > >If only X.509 weren't so darned ugly :-) > >Raph How will users be made confident that the S/MIME crypto isn't somehow compromised in these products? Vendor trust (I think not, with all the government pressures)? PGP Fingerprint: FE 90 1A 95 9D EA 8D 61 81 2E CC A9 A4 4A FB A9 --------------------------------------------------------------------- Snoop Daty Data | Internet: azur(a)netcom.com Grinder | Sacred Cow Meat Co. | --------------------------------------------------------------------- Counter-cultural technology development our specialty. Vote Libertarian. Just say NO to prescription DRUGS. "Of all tyrannies, a tyranny sincerely exercised for the good of its victims may be the most oppressive." -- C.S. Lewis "Surveillence is ultimately just another form of media, and thus, potential entertainment." -- G. Beato

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Re: Why Workers Should Uphold Right Not To Talk To FBI
by dlv＠bwalk.dm.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Path: perun!news2.panix.com!panix!feed1.news.erols.com!arclight.uoregon.edu!news.bc.net!berlin.infomatch.com!not-for-mail From: bghauk(a)berlin.infomatch.com (Brian Hauk) Newsgroups: nyc.general,ny.general,ny.politics Subject: Why Workers Should Uphold Right Not To Talk To FBI Message-ID: <53k4ot$efp(a)berlin.infomatch.com> Date: 11 Oct 1996 00:35:41 GMT Organization: InfoMatch Internet - Vancouver BC Lines: 160 NNTP-Posting-Host: berlin.infomatch.com X-Newsreader: TIN [UNIX 1.3 950824BETA PL0] Why Workers Should Uphold Right Not To Talk To FBI ************************************************************************ from the Militant, vol.60/no.36 October 14, 1996 The article below is reprinted without changes from the May 16, 1986, Militant. It appeared in that issue with the same headline and accompanying graphic. It is relevant to efforts by opponents of U.S. policy toward Cuba today to protest harassment by federal agents and defend democratic rights. Author Jeff Jones is now a member of the International Association of Machinists in Minneapolis. Sam Manuel is a member of the United Transportation Union in Washington, D.C. BY JEFF JONES AND SAM MANUEL SAN JOSE - Last November Don Bechler was hauled in by plant security at Westinghouse to face interrogation by an FBI agent. The agent said he was being investigated for in-plant "sabotage." He was grilled for 40 minutes without a lawyer present, which is his legal right. He also did not have his shop steward with him. Bechler is active in the anti-apartheid movement and the fight against U.S. intervention in Central America. He is also a union activist and a member of the Socialist Workers Party. This questioning by the FBI was not only a violation of Bechler's democratic fights, but the rights of everyone who has a dissenting point of view, as well as an attack on the union. Charges of "sabotage" against workers in plants that make military hardware are part of the employers' and government's sustained offensive against democratic fights. This is why it is useful to look at what happened at Westinghouse and the lessons of that experience. Westinghouse is a major producer of military hardware. The plant is in Sunnyvale, California. The production workers are represented by International Association of Machinists Local 565. Bechler is a bench grinder. The FBI agent had Bechler's personal notebook, which Bechler thought he had lost. The agent said that plant security had given it to him. After Bechler agreed to talk with the FBI, the agent asked a number of questions about the notebook. It had notes about work, shopping lists, and information on various political activities Bechler is involved in. The FBI agent told Bechler that he thought potential saboteurs in the plant included unionists who opposed concessions to the company in the recent contract negotiations. Some workers may have been frustrated that there wasn't a strike, the agent said, and therefore decided to commit sabotage. After the grilling, the FBI agent refused to return Bechler's notebook - implying that he remained under investigation. At a union meeting 11 days later, it was reported that another worker had been subjected to a similar interrogation by the FBI. Union leaders stressed that members should always demand a shop steward when meeting with the company. Under pressure from the union, the FBI has since returned Bechler's notebook. This harassment by the FBI represents a serious attack on the democratic rights of Bechler, the union, and all working people. The FBI has no legal right to walk into a plant, roam around, and begin interrogating workers. And workers, as well as others, are under no legal obligation to voluntarily submit to such questioning. The FBI, like all other cop agencies in this country, serves and protects big business and its government. When they enter Westinghouse or other plants it is on the side of the company. This attack on democratic rights occurs in the context of the employers' antilabor offensive and drive toward war in Central America. Such assaults go hand in hand. As the government gears up for war abroad, it must erode democratic rights at home. The aim is to get workers to accept as normal such things as growing restrictions on security clearances, denying the rights of accused persons to be released on bail, having more cops in the plants questioning workers, and developing an atmosphere of suspicion against workers who buy socialist publications or travel to Nicaragua. It is part of the government's concerted effort to change workers' perception of what's "normal." Each blow to democratic rights weakens the ability of the labor movement to defend itself against austerity and fight U.S. intervention abroad. In the last period the government has concocted a series of highly publicized trials of accused "spies" - the greatest number of espionage cases at any one time in the history of the country. These "spy" trials and charges of industrial sabotage are aimed at dividing and intimidating workers. While initial targets tend to be politically active workers, the ultimate victims are all workers and working farmers. The aim is to sharply limit democratic rights and limit political discussion and debate in order to dragoon workers into war. One aspect of the employers' anti-democratic drive is seeking to establish the "right" of the FBI and other cop agencies to enter workplaces and interrogate workers. Among the ways in which the FBI and cops justify their intrusion is the alleged need to defend "national security" by stopping "saboteurs" and cracking down on "drug use." By agreeing to talk to an agent, a worker falls into the trap that has been set: the act of talking itself is a form of collaboration with the agent. This is true regardless of whether a shop steward is present or not. Although Bechler denied the charges of sabotage, the fact that he talked to the agent had already caused damage to workers' rights. The content of what a worker says in such a situation is not the key problem. The agreement to cooperate - talk - when not legally compelled to, means the cops scored a victory. The goal of the FBI in these circumstances is not to get a worker to say something "damaging" - that's just a bonus for them when that happens - but to get the worker to accept and help establish their "right" to engage in such interrogations. This reinforces the lie that cops stand above struggles between workers and bosses and in that sense are neutral. It helps reinforce one of the most elementary forms of class collaboration: actions based on the illusion that the cops are neutral, that they are simply enforcing the law without fear or favor. Moreover, it breaks down trust between workers. A precedent is set that it is okay to talk to the FBI and their finks when instead workers should have nothing to do with them. Bechler had no legal obligation to talk to the FBI. He in essence gave up his, rights by doing so. And, whatever he did say is now potential material to be used against him, the union, and others regardless of his intentions. There is no such thing as an off-the-record talk with cops. Under the Constitution and Bill of Rights, no one is ever obligated to voluntarily speak to a cop - FBI, CIA, immigration, city, state, customs. The accompanying reprint of a 1950s statement issued by the National Emergency Civil Liberties Committee explains one's rights in relation to the FBI: "The FBI, unlike courts and grand juries, does not have the power of subpoena of compulsory examination. You may decline an invitation to visit FBI agents or to receive them in your home or office.... The use of investigative power by governmental agencies to intimidate or threaten is expressly forbidden by law." In other words, one is never legally obligated to voluntarily engage in conversation with the FBI and other cop bodies. Looking back on what happened to him and the union, Bechler commented: "Once I started talking to them, they had me. I let them establish their `right' to even hold such conversations. "The fact that the union stood up for me and forced the FBI to return my notebook was a victory. It showed that it is possible to resist FBI violations of democratic rights. "The basic lesson to draw from this experience, however, is: never, under any circumstance voluntarily talk to the FBI or any other cop." Jeff Jones is a member of International Association of Machinists Local 565. Sam Manuel is the organizer of the San Francisco branch of the Socialist Workers Party. To get an introductory 12-week subscription to the Militant in the U.S., send $10 US to: The Militant, 410 West Street, New York, NY 10014. For subscription rates to other countries, send e-mail to themilitant(a)igc.apc.org or write to the above address.

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EUB Caution
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The Times [Of London] October 11, 1996 Investors cautioned over bank on Internet By Robert Miller The Bank of England has issued a blunt warning to UK investors to "think carefully" before handing over their money to an offshore bank that is advertising for depositors on the Internet. European Union Bank (EUB) is a tiny institution backed by American investors and based in Antigua. Until last month it was chaired by Lord Mancroft, 39, an Old Etonian. Lord Mancroft, who confirmed that he had met Michael Foot, the Bank's director of supervision, yesterday about EUB, said: "I understand their concerns." He added that his contract as chairman of EUB had expired last month. The sharp warning to UK investors from one of the Bank's most senior directors reflects the concerns of City watchdogs about the possible proliferation of financial services being offered on the Internet and which fall outside their regulatory scope. If any such firm failed investors would not be covered by the UK compensation schemes. The Bank said of EUB: "This bank is not authorised in the UK and has not sought authorisation. As with other offshore deposits we would advise intending depositors to carry out appropriate due diligence." [End]

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[ADMINISTRATIVIUM] Blowfish
by nobody＠replay.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Many forgeries are traceable with mathematical certainty to feebleminded Timothy C[rook] Maya's poison keyboard.

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Tim May is a fine person.
by anonymous＠miron.vip.best.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Tim May's support of cryptography is an example of his typically irreproachable behavior and exquisite maners and above all his superior consideration. Indeed, Tim May is a lord amoung lords, the most illustrious of them all.

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Re: "Drift net fishing," GAK, FBI, and NSA
by azur＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>A clarification regarding something I wrote a few days ago: > >dlv(a)bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM) writes: >> Another possibility is to issue a charge card (payable in full at the end of >> the month, getting revenue from the annual fee), rather than a credit card, s >> it could claim not to be subject to certain Federal Reserve's regulations tha >> have to do with credit card disputes. But then it probably can't be Visa/MC a >> can't use their clearginhouses. > >A charge card (like the original AmEx, not like Optima) is not the same as >a debit card. I have a debit card, tied to my checking account, and using >mastercard's clearinghouse. To issue a debit card, the organization needs >to keep checking accounts. Even if it doesn't pay interest, doesn't make >commercial loans, etc, it still would be subject to weird Fed regulations >and probably couldn't maintain anonimity. > >But the lack of a dispite resolution mechanism is really the killer. > How about companies that issue credit cards, but don't extend credit? The kind customers must maintain a postive balance at all times in order to charge against their account. -- Steve

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RE: legality of wiretapping: a "key" distinction
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 06:17 AM 10/11/96 -0700, Declan McCullagh wrote: > >Yep, seems right to me. While I share some part of your position on the >undesirability of wiretapping, Uni's remarks about it being "firmly >entrenched" in the minds of L.E. and Capitol Hill are quite on-target. > >Few here in DC believe in an absolute right to privacy. In actual fact, most public officials profess (if not practice) a belief in an 'absolute right to privacy.' That is, they profess opposition to torture. They believe that coercion for testimony should be limited to two years imprisonment (or less). There is no *official* pro-torture lobby in America (though in practice torture does occur). We've already established that they believe in an absolute right to privacy, we're just arguing over how far beyond the brain that extends. And since we control our brains and we control our i/o we can probably expand that zone of privacy in practice. My "Brain Tennis with Dorothy" post of a few weeks ago expands on this argument. DCF "You don't have to be nice to nation states you meet on the way up if you're not coming back down."

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Re: Londinium
by paul＠fatmans.demon.co.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> May be you knew this. A few months back in the UK, some nut flipped > and shot up a school full of kids, finishing up by shooting himself > (sadly for the press, his second cousin once removed, did not have an > internet account). Much media teeth gnashing about hand guns, and > tighter gun laws ensued. (The guy had a gun license, something which > is needed to legally own a gun in the UK.) Yeah, and we`re looking at more fucked up laws possibly completely banning handguns over here. > The Schoolyard Slaughter game is I think a joke by someone with a > funny sense of humor, playing on this incident. Actually the PD library distributing the game said it was produced and released some months before the incident in Dunblane, but I can`t verify whether they were just covering themselves or if this is the truth, whatever the case, it is irrelevant, the game will probably be removed from circulation now for no legitimate reason other than a few nutters on a mission against guns happen not to like it. Datacomms Technologies web authoring and data security Paul Bradley, Paul(a)fatmans.demon.co.uk Paul(a)crypto.uk.eu.org, Paul(a)cryptography.uk.eu.org Http://www.cryptography.home.ml.org/ Email for PGP public key, ID: 5BBFAEB1 "Don`t forget to mount a scratch monkey"

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Re: Clinton's Encryption Plan Fits Law and Market
by Ernest Hua 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Two serious flaws in this letter ... 1. Secretary of Commerce, Mickey Kantor said: > You assume that foreign buyers would not buy key-recovery products, > but you ignore the trend -- especially in Europe -- to require use > of key-recovery products and bar the import of stronger and stronger > encryption products that do not take law enforcement into account. A. This is an old argument constantly rehashed by the government. What it convenient ignores is that no one OUTSIDE the government wants what the government schemes. No one wants the government to mandate key recovery. Some important uses of encryption, such as secure telephone conversations, simply do NOT need key recovery for ANY reason other than law enforcement intercepts. B. The point on other nations barring imports is absurd. Since WHEN do we tailor our export limits to the import limits of OTHER nations? C. The so-called "trend" he refers to is ARTIFICIALLY created by the U.S. government through secret lobbying efforts, the most recent at the OECD in Paris. The administration uses the word "trend" as if other nations are independently pursuing the key-escrow/key-recovery path, when in fact, only a few nations are considering such a move. Other nations, such as Japan, have openly opposed such a direction, and some nations, such as Sweden, have done so secretly because such a policy could not possibliy withstand the scrutiny of democratic processes. 2. Kantor said: > The National Research Council did not say that we should allow the > export of all encryption. Again, more mincing of words. The administration, seeing that the NRC report was staunchly against key escrow and government-mandated schemes, chooses to ignore parts of the report it feels is convenient. The NRC report, in fact, said that the government should immediately relax all symmetric encryption up to 56-bits and all public domain encryption UNCONDITIONALLY. It did not say anything about signing a pledge to develope key escrow or key recovery. This condition invented by the administration is nothing short of blackmail: "play it our way, or you have no chance to compete globally". In short, Kantor's letter is yet more blatant lies and deception on the part of the administration to get what it wants for law enforcement and national security agencies without any concern for the nature of the technology nor the economic impact such policies will have. -- Ernest Hua, Software Sanitation Engineer Chromatic Research, 615 Tasman Drive, Sunnyvale, CA 94089-1707 Phone: 408 752-9375, Fax: 408 752-9301, E-Mail: hua(a)chromatic.com

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