December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

List of reliable remailers
by Raph Levien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I operate a remailer pinging service which collects detailed information about remailer features and reliability. To use it, just finger remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu There is also a Web version of the same information, plus lots of interesting links to remailer-related resources, at: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP encrypting client for outgoing mail. For more information, see: http://www.c2.org/~raph/premail.html For the PGP public keys of the remailers, finger pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu This is the current info: REMAILER LIST This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration options and special features for each of the remailers. The second part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each remailer. You can also get this list by fingering remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu. $remailer{"extropia"} = "<remail(a)miron.vip.best.com> cpunk pgp special"; $remailer{"c2"} = "<remail(a)c2.org> eric pgp hash reord"; $remailer{"penet"} = "<anon(a)anon.penet.fi> penet post"; $remailer{"flame"} = "<remailer(a)flame.alias.net> cpunk mix pgp. hash latent cut post reord"; $remailer{"mix"} = "<mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord ?"; $remailer{"replay"} = "<remailer(a)replay.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"ecafe"} = "<cpunk(a)remail.ecafe.org> cpunk mix"; $remailer{"amnesia"} = "<amnesia(a)chardos.connix.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ksub"; $remailer{'alpha'} = '<alias(a)alpha.c2.org> alpha pgp'; $remailer{'nymrod'} = '<nymrod(a)nym.jpunix.com> alpha pgp'; $remailer{"lead"} = "<mix(a)zifi.genetics.utah.edu> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"nemesis"} = "<remailer(a)meaning.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut"; $remailer{"exon"} = "<remailer(a)remailer.nl.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"vegas"} = "<remailer(a)vegas.gateway.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut"; $remailer{"haystack"} = "<haystack(a)holy.cow.net> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"ncognito"} = "<ncognito(a)rigel.cyberpass.net> mix cpunk pgp hash latent"; $remailer{"lucifer"} = "<lucifer(a)dhp.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"jam"} = "<remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"winsock"} = "<winsock(a)c2.org> cpunk pgp hash cut ksub reord"; $remailer{'nym'} = '<config(a)nym.alias.net> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"balls"} = "<remailer(a)huge.cajones.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"squirrel"} = "<mix(a)squirrel.owl.de> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"middle"} = "<middleman(a)jpunix.com> cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek reord"; $remailer{'cyber'} = '<alias(a)alias.cyberpass.net> alpha pgp'; $remailer{"dustbin"} = "<dustman(a)athensnet.com> cpunk pgp hash ksub latent cut ek mix reord"; catalyst(a)netcom.com is _not_ a remailer. lmccarth(a)ducie.cs.umass.edu is _not_ a remailer. usura(a)replay.com is _not_ a remailer. Groups of remailers sharing a machine or operator: (cyber mix) The alpha and nymrod nymservers are down due to abuse. However, you can use the cyber nymserver. The nym.alias.net server will be listed soon. See http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/n.a.n.html for details. 403 Permission denied errors have been caused by a flaky disk on the Berkeley WWW server. Hopefully, this is fixed by now. The penet remailer is closed. Last update: Mon 9 Sep 96 6:45:23 PDT remailer email address history latency uptime ----------------------------------------------------------------------- jam remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca +**+******** 18:19 99.99% mix mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com ++++++++++++ 1:04:20 99.98% exon remailer(a)remailer.nl.com +*******#**# 1:51 99.98% squirrel mix(a)squirrel.owl.de --.++++-+++ 1:54:34 99.97% replay remailer(a)replay.com +*** *+***** 5:02 99.83% amnesia amnesia(a)chardos.connix.com +---------- 3:22:14 99.78% balls remailer(a)huge.cajones.com +*********** 5:08 99.75% cyber alias(a)alias.cyberpass.net +*+*+*+* *** 27:34 99.47% lead mix(a)zifi.genetics.utah.edu ++++++++ -++ 1:00:20 99.36% dustbin dustman(a)athensnet.com -+* 2:46:09 98.70% middle middleman(a)jpunix.com --+++++ -- 1:08:18 98.27% haystack haystack(a)holy.cow.net +### #*#### 3:19 95.26% extropia remail(a)miron.vip.best.com ---------- 4:55:16 94.74% winsock winsock(a)c2.org -+-------- 3:14:43 91.19% nemesis remailer(a)meaning.com +******* 24:33 57.62% History key * # response in less than 5 minutes. * * response in less than 1 hour. * + response in less than 4 hours. * - response in less than 24 hours. * . response in more than 1 day. * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days). cpunk A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To: field. eric A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead. penet The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses X-Anon-To: in the header. pgp Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email address, should be used as the encryption key ID. hash Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of outgoing messages. ksub Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode. nsub Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode. latent Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option. cut Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option. post Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header. ek Encrypt responses in reply blocks using Encrypt-Key: header. special Accepts only pgp encrypted messages. mix Can accept messages in Mixmaster format. reord Attempts to foil traffic analysis by reordering messages. Note: I'm relying on the word of the remailer operator here, and haven't verified the reord info myself. mon Remailer has been known to monitor contents of private email. filter Remailer has been known to filter messages based on content. If not listed in conjunction with mon, then only messages destined for public forums are subject to filtering. Raph Levien

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China joins Singapore, Germany, ....
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

CNN is presenting coverage of China's decision to pull the plug on more than 100 sites, and issuing a list of sites which are illegal to connect to. (Net censorship is getting to be a big story....when the list of countries reaches 15, it will of course no longer be news. And when the United States block access, this will all be transmogrified into an "Anti-Terrorist Action.") --Tim May We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, I know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^1,257,787-1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: Job for netescrow ? (was Secure anonymouse server protocol...
by peter.allan＠aeat.co.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Adam and Matt put my casual remark under the grill: Peter Allan <peter.allan(a)aeat.co.uk> writes on cpunks: > [Matt Blaze's Oblivious Key Escrow paper] ftp://ftp.research.att.com/dist/mab/netescrow.ps > > This all hinges on a policy to be followed by archive holders defining > the conditions under which they release their shares. > This could be receipt of a signed request from the owner (remailer). > > Maybe the table relating nyms to reply addresses could be stored in > netescrow style so that captured remailers reveal nothing. The problem > of operator coercion is not addressed by this. Adam: > Just to clarify, if I understand correctly you are proposing a penet > style system with the database held in `netescrow'. Yes. What I had in mind resembled the split list scheme used at a church I used to go to. UK tax law has concessions for regular giving (Covenants, in the jargon) and the church needed to know that comittments were being met. At the same time it was preferred not to know who was giving what. This was done by having 2 lists eg Namelist: Mr J Smith = member 999 Cashlist: member 999 gives 1000 / month If member 999 didn't give as planned, cashlist-holder could say to namelist-holder "have a word with 999". These were held by 2 people, trusted not to collude. Also I suppose committee reshuffles shouldn't put one person straight into the other post. My idea was to replicate this split list so that addrlist: leukos.gleukos(a)c2.org = index97b6150200000564 nymlist: index97b6150200000564 = an0001002304000101(a)this.remailer This would be altered for the remailer table as: addlist: leukos.gleukos(a)c2.org = index97b6150200000564 addlist: an0001002304000101(a)this.remailer = index97b6150200400281 and these 2 mappings would be escrowed: index97b6150200000564 -> index97b6150200400281 index97b6150200400281 -> index97b6150200000564 (Or just escrow the _keys_ for the latter, as Matt first thought.) > However the aim is not to prevent others > censoring your publically available writings, but to allow a second > avenue of access only in the case of `mob cryptography'. The aim is to prevent a seized remailer having its data read. The "angry mob cryptanalysis" is a side issue. > If the police are unsucessful (seems likely) does this offer the > operator much solice in his jail time for contempt of court, to > know that he has a vote of confidence in the moral correctness of > his decision from a population of the net? > Does it offer him any legal benefit? Are the share holders guilty > of contempt also, does this lessen his guilt, and harshness of > prosecution? (Remember that the share holders' identity and > location are unknown to the operator... > I'm not sure how useful this part is, unless the possibility of > `mob cryptography' is the desired feature. I'd have thought an > individual remailer operator would be more likely to fold than a > group of anonymous crypto-anarchists. I did say this didn't address operator coercion. The widespread cross-jurisdiction aspects of netescrow will be important here. Capture of hardware without scope for operator coercion would be protected against - but is an easy problem anyway. > 2. You could add the twist of an alternative duress key, that would > stand a real chance of successfully nuking the database. More > satisfying. I was thinking of calling this the "shredder ticket" and giving it to the sender (who can then distribute it to all remaining remailers without needing to use the seized one). This would depend on him realising that the remailer was (about to be) seized, and would have to be done before the enemy rounded up the shares. [Incidentally I'm not that keen on regarding the police as the enemy. My mention of "angry mob cryptanalysis" in the event of a crime was to show that it was not the ideal vehicle for crime. But then maybe I'm a statist pig.] In any case it would be necessary to > 3. Negative comment on the system: TLAs have a vested interest in > themselves being most of the share holders. True of the ownership > of the current remailers also of course. > The widespread cross-jurisdiction aspects of netescrow will be important here. (Perhaps including compulsory cross-border secret reassembly. ) I was envisaging this being combined with Mixmaster. (I see from your Eternity post that you'd run a netescrow scheme that way.) This gives us "vertical integration" a sort of "of the remailers, by the remailers and for the remailers". Careful design of message formats could make it hard to tell the escrow mechanics from the traffic. To mount this collusion attack the TLAs would have to be part of the scheme - helping to pass most anonymous messages in order to trace some random ones, not necessarily those they want to trace. (If there was nothing in it for them they wouldn't join.) (Compare that to the current state quoted as near as I can remember from AC2 "It seems reasonable to assume that the NSA can break any message that it intercepts, but not all messages") It takes time to collect the shares and determine the next destination, during this time the message is sat in a pool. (Is there scope for traffic analysis in the fact that the average speed of messages will be lower than that of shares ?) With that in mind I was looking at the scope for cheating. Cheating seems possible by: 1) Collusion (as mentioned) 2) Not releasing (valid) shares when requested This can be caught by traps. The list of where the shares went is usually destroyed, but need not be. The shareholders are none the wiser, and when they get known for not releasing shares the remailer excludes them from future share issues. 3) Flooding attacks - storing rubbish in escrow servers who are eventually forced to accept no more shares, or ditch some existing ones. So far as I can see Matt's Netescrow scheme has exactly this problem. Ecash payments might help. If existing shares are ditched the reply-ability will not last long. You might get a message you can reply to for 2 weeks, but no later. Sender might resend periodically - a bit like following up an unanswered snail mail. > At the same time it would provide an argument against GAK, all > legitimate (in the publics eyes, what other opinions count, this is a > democracy isn't it) law enforcement needs met. As in the last sentence or so of the OKE paper. Matt: > My original idea for OKE was as a way to backup long-term, > slow-changing sensitive data without also introducing a single point > of failure for either security or availability. The remailer model is > a bit different, and I'm not sure it's a good fit, in particular > because I haven't thought about the various new failure modes in this > application. But let me think ``out loud.'' > > So can this scheme be improved upon? Is there a better way to run a > persistent-reply-address remailer? These are interesting, and I think > largely open, questions. -- Peter Allan peter.allan(a)aeat.co.uk

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Test...sorry about this - Reply
by Barbara Gamble 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I got it too. And since I am a new subscriber, I thought it might be the normal traffic. The Welcome msg *did* say the list is high-traffic. Still, I was aghast--300 all at once, another 100 just in the last hour. Is that typical? (Please forgive such a question from a newcomer to the list.) >>> Z.B. <zachb(a)netcom.com> 09/06 10:38 am >>> I'm just posting this to see if there's something wrong with my mail filter - it dumped a ton of messages from this list over the night, and I'm trying to figure out why the !@%$# it did that. Sorry for the interruption. --- Zach Babayco zachb(a)netcom.com <----- finger for PGP public key http://www.geocities.com/SiliconValley/Park/4127

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Re: Conservation Laws, Money, Engines, and Ontology
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 4:03 AM 9/9/96, Greg Kucharo wrote: > One thing that occurs here. I imagine a scenario where you have a >"share" of resources on a system(and ISP for example). You're metered as >to how much you can post or store. Actually as it is now posting is >regulated through extra payments per meg above the limit. Spam is being >somewhat regulated by Terms of Service type things, but my point is what is >to prevent pooling resources among several system to achive the same Spam >pursuits some have. Say for example that an individual gets several >accounts to balance the load at thier point. The Usenet for example has no > "choke point". How could ISP's apply conservation here? If you limit the >amount of traffic you still aren't holding back the flow of "spam". > Here's where reputations could come in. You cound't open a new account >anywhere without a good "reputation". This could aid in balancing the load >of certain people. The most basic principle is this: those with resources they control (and "own") set the rates and policies. We don't have to figure out how the pricing will ripple down the line, or whether what some call "spam" will be controlled. (My view is that the whole focus on "spam" has been singularly unfruitful. We don't call magazine or television advertising "spam," though it meets operational definitions of spam, or velveeta, or whatever the latest terms is. While much advertising is disgusting, unwanted, noisome, etc., we understand that the publisher of a magazine can choose what to include and we can choose whether to buy it or not. (Television and radio are somewhat different, due to the FCC licensing and limited bandwidth, but the principle is the same.)) Thus, when carriers of packet traffic begin market pricing of packets, the pricing will ripple back. Eventually. (Or not, should some steps in the chain decide not to pass on costs...) I expect the failure of the Internet to have proper conservation laws to be solved in this way: Removal of Market Distortions + Auctioning Mechanisms + Several Large Network Crashes = A More Rational Market Model for Network Usage --Tim May We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, I know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^1,257,787-1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Conjuring up the latest utopia for a minoritarian sect of illuminati
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:04 AM 9/9/96, Enzo Michelangeli wrote: >I and you may well choose to do so, but the vast majority of the human >beings believe just anything that is repeated loud and long enough. >Otherwise, nobody would hire PR and pay for advertisement, politicians >wouln't be fedwith taxpayer's money, Bosnians would trade goods instead >of gunshots, etc. I'm personally not interested in conjuring up the latest >utopia for a minoritarian sect of illuminati: I need to live in the real >world, and push for viable solutions that change it for better, now. Yes, Bosnians and Serbs would not be killing each other if only they could receive government-approved information! (Hint: This shows that neither governments nor churches nor the United Nations knows any better solutions to the "who do you trust" problem. And, I believe, mostly governments and other such entities exist to serve their own interests.) As to what I presume is an insult to the folks on this list ("I'm personally not interested in conjuring up the latest utopia for a minoritarian sect of illuminati"), you know where the exit is. --Tim May We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, I know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^1,257,787-1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: Voluntary Disclosure of True Names
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:18 AM 9/8/96, James A. Donald wrote: >At 10:49 AM 9/5/96 -0700, Vladimir Z. Nuri wrote: >> I have seen it repeated here often that somehow anonymity is some kind >> of a "right" that one should have in all kinds of different & important >> transactions, not merely on "cyberspace debate societies". I see >> here frequently the implication that *private*entities* that want to >> enforce identity in their own transactions are somehow implementing >> a corrupt, orwellian system. > >We hold that private entities have the right to attempt to impose corrupt >orwellian systems provided they do not do it at gunpoint, but we doubt >that they will succeed without guns. An overstatement which diminishes the power of your arguments. Namely, many, many corporations have Orwellian surveillance systems and policies which would be unacceptable if imposed by a government. No guns are involved, only the considerations of employment, paychecks, and the like. Likewise, many private schools have such systems. Likewise, no guns are involved. And so on. (Naturally, I am not criticizing these voluntarily-entered-into arrangements, merely rebutting the point that people will generally not put up with Orwellian schemes unless threatened with guns.) --Tim May We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, I know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^1,257,787-1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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E-Cash Poses Worldwide Banking Threat - Report 09/06/96
by Joseph M. Reagle Jr. 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>PALO ALTO, CALIFORNIA, U.S.A., 1996 SEP 6 (NB) -- By Richard Bowers. >By the year 2000, consumers, businesses, governments, and >educational institutions worldwide will use electronic cash (e-cash) >for nine billion payment transactions. According to a new study by Killen >& Associates, this increase in e-cash will pose a great threat to some of >the biggest institutions in the world. > >The report specifically highlights the risk to the retail and banking >industries. Speaking to Newsbytes, a spokesperson for Killen said that >the report, which will be issued later this month, gives little solace to >the problems facing traditional retail companies. The report does >however, say that the banks can regain the leadership position in >payments by moving quickly to leverage their payment transaction >infrastructure to fully support e-cash. > >"By 2005, e-cash transactions will escalate to almost 30 billion," >stated Michael Killen, president of the market research firm. "Banks >must act quickly to leverage their position in payment services. Non- >banks see this as a new opportunity to carve further market share >away from the banking industry. All will compete for new revenue >streams including Internet-based micropayments." > >The report uses a very broad definition of e-cash including among >others; secured debit cards, phone cards, electronic checks, ATM >transactions, point of sale loans, and automated tolls. > >Using this broad definition they estimate that in 1995 there were 536 >billion non e-cash transactions worldwide compared to only 1 billion >e-cash transactions, or about .0019 percent. By the year 2005, of a >total estimated 1 trillion transactions, the report predicts 3 percent >or around 30 billion transactions will be e-cash. > >"The impact of e-cash will be widespread on both banking and >commerce," Killen added. "Opportunities will open for financial and >other product and services players, including ATM vendors such as >NCR, Diebold, and IBM; credit card authorization firms, including First >Data, Total Systems, Equifax, and National Data; ATM/POS terminal >manufacturers and network suppliers, including bank-owned >networks, American Express, Deluxe, ACS, and VeriFone; and cash >handling/cash management services firms such as ADP, GEIS, National >Data, and Brinks. Software firms that understand the enormous >system integration opportunities of adapting legacy systems to on- >line, secured environments will also benefit from the need to support >e-cash transactions." > >The report will include forecasts of the overall payments environment >and the impact of e-cash on cash, checks, credit cards, and other >electronic payment systems though the year 2005. It will also have a >section on the opportunities for new business, dislocations, and >threats to existing businesses, with emphasis on acquisition and >alliance opportunities. > >"E-cash provides the necessary payment options to support new and >low-cost products and services, including micropublishing," Killen >continued. "Information services such as AC Nielsen, Dun & Bradstreet, >and Wall Street investment and advisory firms will fill their clients' >needs for customized news. This will lead to a new understanding of >personal and commercial buying patterns, wants, and needs. >Individual consumer purchase, transaction, and life-style profiles will >be developed. Advertisers can then use this information to target >market-customized advertising and marketing programs." > >(19960906/Press Contact: Jules Street, Killen & Associates, 415-617- >6130) > > > _______________________ Regards, Nothing is so strong as gentleness, and nothing is so gentle as true strength. -Ralph Sockman Joseph Reagle http://rpcp.mit.edu/~reagle/home.html reagle(a)mit.edu E0 D5 B2 05 B6 12 DA 65 BE 4D E3 C1 6A 66 25 4E

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IBM to unveil Internet banking alliance
by Joseph M. Reagle Jr. 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Date: Mon, 9 Sep 1996 11:20:03 -0400 >From: reagle(a)rpcp.mit.edu (Joseph M. Reagle Jr.) >To: reagle(a)rpcp.mit.edu >Subject: IBM to unveil Internet banking alliance > > > > SAN FRANCISCO (Reuter) - International Business Machines >Corp. <IBM.N> has made an alliance with more than a dozen >major banks to provide consumer banking services using >Internet technology, IBM and industry executives said Friday. > The consortium will be dubbed Integrity and will be owned >equally by IBM and each of the partners. > Banks will be able to use IBM's worldwide private network >as well as the Internet to enable their customers to do their >banking electronically. Specific details of the banking >arrangement have yet to be worked out, one of the executives >said. > IBM and the banking instititutions involved are due to >unveil the Integrity project in New York on Monday. > The alliance is one of several industry projects that >IBM's Internet Division is establishing to help large >companies utilize the Internet. > The banking alliance will have competition from other >electronic banking services being organised by companies like >Intuit Corp., America Online Inc. and Microsoft Corp. > Just this week, Intuit and America Online said a number of >leading financial institutions would offer their customers >online banking via AOL, using software developed by Intuit >known as BankNOW. > At an Internet and Electronic Commerce conference in San >Francisco this week, Intuit Chairman Scott Cook said the new >service targets people who want to use electronic transactions >to speed up their banking. > Cook said he expects the new service will differ from what >the IBM-led consortium might provide. > NationsBank has been among companies frequently mentioned >as participating in the IBM consortium, but a spokesman late >on Friday declined to discuss a Wall Street Journal report >that it would be involved in the consortium. > > > _______________________ Regards, Nothing is so strong as gentleness, and nothing is so gentle as true strength. -Ralph Sockman Joseph Reagle http://rpcp.mit.edu/~reagle/home.html reagle(a)mit.edu E0 D5 B2 05 B6 12 DA 65 BE 4D E3 C1 6A 66 25 4E

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Re: [WAS xs4all.nl] Terrorists
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:50 AM 9/9/96, Jon Lebkowsky wrote: >At 11:01 AM 9/9/96 +0200, Stephan Schmidt wrote: > >>One thought : How many of you would support terrorist >>web server (say Oklahoma, TWA, Iran, Lybia, RAF, IRA, ...) ? > >I.e. "How many of you support the right to free speech regardless of content." > >Wellll...there is the rule about speech which endangers; "fire in a crowded >theatre" is the cliche-example. What could a terrorist SAY that would >endanger? Personally, I'd rather have terrorists building html than bombs. As Dettweiler is usually so fond of pointing out, it would be disingenuous of us not to acknowledge that the systems we are talking about (fully untraceable, strong anonymity, digital pseudonyms, digital cash, information markets, i.e., "crypto anarchy") will in fact be used for all sorts of things. Including folks who want to blow up Parliament, the Congress, the People's Tribunal, etc. And by folks who wish to trade in CBW secrets, who wish to arrange contract killings, and so on. This has been well-known for many years. My paper on "Crypto Anarchy and Virtual Communities" was villified by no less than Dorothy Denning for describing how these things may evolve. I don't worry overmuch about a few thousand or even a few million people dying as a result of something we have had an influence on developing, anymore than the developers of many technologies need to worry about how others use their technologies. And the net effect of crypto anarchy is to destabilize and marginalize central governments, which is a net positive effect. If some eggs get broken in the process, the biological imperative will generate more eggs. No big deal. --Tim May We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, I know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^1,257,787-1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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