December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

No Subject
by Sandy Sandfort 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ SANDY SANDFORT ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ C'punks, At 08:29 AM 6/7/96 -0700, you wrote, re: using ATM machines instead of couriers: >Sounds like you are suffering caffeine withdrawal. Try >wondering again after you have had some coffee. Gosh, I don't even drink coffee and I think Duncan is absolutely right on point. Snide remarks notwithstanding, what substantive critique do you have of Duncan's remarks? S a n d y ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

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Re: FOR WHOM THE BELL TOLLS
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 04:05 AM 6/7/96 -0000, nelson(a)crynwr.com wrote: >jim bell writes: > > > My impression is that it is frequently the pacifist-types who get us into > > war, because they start the process out by tolerating actions by others that > > turn into more serious actions, etc. You know, the appeasers. Are you an > > appeaser? > >A quote from Donald Wetzel's book Pacifist: > >The pacifist is often asked what he would do in the event the United >States were to be conquered by a hostile power. The assumption on the >part of the questioner is almost always that we would simply assume >the proper position in which best to have our asses kicked. I suggest >that anyone who believes that such would be the pacifist response to >the imposition in America of an oppressive, authoritarian >rule--foreign or domestic--should consult the prison authorities that >were in power when America's prisons were host to some six thousand >pacifists. I am sure it will be found that we have not been >forgotten. I propose that there has ALREADY been "the imposition in America of an oppressive, authoritarian rule." What are the pacifists doing now? Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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"EASYSAFE(R) VERSION 3.0
by caal＠hopf.dnai.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I thought this may be of interest to the list. >[PRNewswire:Computers-0605.14] 6/5/96 > > EASYSAFE(R) VERSION 3.0 FOR DOS, WINDOWS & WINDOWS 95 'FIRST > NOTEBOOK SECURITY PRODUCT' > > CHICAGO, June 5 /PRNewswire/ - EliaShim Safe Software, a leading > provider of network security products and anti-virus protection > systems, announced at Spring Comdex 96 the release of EasySafe, > version 3.0, the first security and encryption product designed > specifically for notebook computers. > > .. EasySafe provides bullet-proof protection that is easy to install. > .. EasySafe prevents unauthorized use or access through boot password > protection. > .. EasySafe prevents removal or transfer of information via full hard > disk encryption. > .. EasySafe provides keyboard locking after three incorrect password > attempts. > .. EasySafe provides screen blanking after a predetermined period of > inactivity. > .. EasySafe denies system level access to hard disk information. > .. EasySafe can be configured to disable LPT, COM, and Floppy ports. > > Upon boot-up, EasySafe asks the user for a password. A > correctly entered password grants the user access to the computer. > Encryption/decryption of data on the hard disk is dynamic and > completely transparent to the user. The system allows for three > password attempts before locking the computer, and only a cold-boot > reset is possible. After entering the correct password, the disk is > unencrypted dynamically, normal boot up takes place, and the user is > granted access to the system without disk access restrictions or > delay. > > EasySafe includes a DOS/Windows screen saving utility which > blanks the screen after a period of inactivity. The only way to re- > activate the computer is to enter the correct password. > > EasySafe offers two encryption methods. The first encrypts all > data on local hard drives. The second method encrypts boot sectors > and partitions. This prevents unauthorized users from booting from > the "A": drive and accessing the data on the hard disk. This > encryption scheme also protects against the use of disk editing > programs (such as Norton Utilities). Thus, valuable company secrets > remain hidden and secure. EasySafe can be configured to disable LPT, > COM, and Floppy ports to ensure that the information contained on > the hard drive cannot be transferred to another system for later > viewing. > > While annual purchases of notebook computers have increased > steadily, the number of notebooks reported stolen each year is much > more alarming. In 1995, 208,000 notebooks with a value of almost > $640 million were reported stolen by a Columbus, Ohio insurance > company that offers coverage for portable computers (Information > Week - May 6, 1996 issue). EasySafe is the perfect product for > those field professionals whose notebooks contain valuable, > confidential, company information and other sensitive data that is > hundreds of times more valuable than the cost of a notebook. > > Founded in 1983, EliaShim Safe Software has been providing PC > security solutions and anti-virus protection for corporate, > government, educational institutions, and program developers in both > domestic and international markets. Over four million computers are > protected worldwide. Product line includes: EasySafe, MasterSafe, > ViruSafe Gold, and ViruSafe LAN. > > -0- 6/5/96 > /CONTACT: Carl Frederick, Jr., Director of Marketing, EliaShim > Microcomputers, 800-477-5177, or at Spring Comdex 96, Booth . C5431, > 312- > 791-6708/ > > CO: EliaShim Microcomputers, Inc. > ST: Florida > IN: CPR > SU: PDT > >

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RE: Anonymous stock trades.
by Blanc Weber 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From: hallam(a)Etna.ai.mit.edu >The farmers want to get a freebie handout while pretending that they >are not on >welfare. This leads to a mechanism which is attempting socialist >policies ... [etc.] ............................................................. Okay, but what does this have to do with anonymous stock trades? > .. >Blanc

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Re: [NOISE] Banking's Physical Security
by Peter Trei 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: Sean T Carnes <crisper(a)ascensionet.com> > We all know that banks are very highly protected as far as their money = > goes but how safe are there computers? I live very close to a computer = > database collecting company that collects the data related to many banks = > in the area. It is all done through land lines and is not very well = > protected. They aren't very careful about who or what they let into the = > building also. If someone were to cut the lines the banks in the area = > would be out for days and they wouldn't have a means to do interbank = > transactions outside of the immediate area. Has anyone else seen this = > in there area or heard of it. Wouldn't it be a better idea to do the = > transactions by satellite. There's a big difference between a real bank and a data collection outfit. I used to work at a major money center bank in the Wall Street area. To get to the data center I had to: 1. Walk into the building, past an armed security guard. 2. Within sight of him, use my badge stripe to get through a turnstile - most employees had badges which were limited in the times they would work. 3. Take an elevator to the (unadvertised) correct floor. 4. Use my badge in a reader to get out of the elevator lobby - most badges were restricted in the floors they would open. 5. Use my badge to get through an unmarked door, into the 'airlock'. In the airlock, I'd hold my photo ID up to a reader, so the guard downstairs could. a. Compare my face against that on the photo ID. b. Check that I was authorized to enter the data center. c. Check that there was no one else in the airlock with me. If he was satisfied, he'd open the inside door remotely. 6. The data center was manned by at least two operators (usually more), 24 hours a day, seven days a week. Only they were permitted to touch terminals connected to operational systems. (There were other security features I won't go into.) Sure, our fiber optic lines to CHIPS and the Fed occasionally went out - that's what backup dialout phone lines are for. If we had phone problems, the lines were fixed in a couple hours, not days. At a pinch, I imagine you could use now a cellphone and modem to keep things moving. Peter Trei

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Remailer thoughts
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi Adam, Forwarded message: > From: Adam Shostack <adam(a)homeport.org> > Subject: Re: Remailer chain length? > Date: Tue, 4 Jun 1996 22:57:10 -0500 (EST) > > Jim Choate wrote: > > | > I don't think multiple remailers at the same site help anything. > | > > | > | I agree completely. If traffic analysis is going to be done on a single box > | it isn't going to matter how many remailers are there. The monitor will > | simply grab them all. At this point it simply maps them thusly: > > | incoming message > remailer #1 > .... > remailer #n > outgoing > | > | > | That this really maps to is obvious: > | > | > | incoming message > remailer #1-#n > outgoing > > Analyzing the traffic through three remailers is more > difficult than analyzing the traffic through one. One remailer with > three N messages per day is more secure than an equivilant remailer > with N mesasges. Not if they are on the same box, simply treat the box itself as the remailer. The internal mechanics are for the most part irrelevant to this issue. N messages go in, N messages with (number of remailers)(# of cover traffic/real message) messages of cover. My contention is that it does not matter how many remailers are on a single box. It is the number of connections in and out of the box available. The above equation is clearly linear and therefore not what I would consider computationaly challenging. If I may introduce some terminology (unless their is an existing stnd.), x number of messages y message multiplier N#() remailer number # R#() number of remailers on machine # C() number of cover messages/original messages E# number of connections on machine # T() total traffic through remailer system $i() cost per message, incoming $o() cost per message, outgoing C fixed cost items of operation (eg rent) Note: each of these represent a family of functions. My contention: T(R#(n)) is equivalent to T(R#(N1(x), N2(x)..., Nn(x))) Where, T() = R#(n)(2N#(x) + C(yN#(x))) The term 2N#(x) represents the number of valid messages the remailer handles. x incoming & x outgoing, hence 2x. The total income of such a remailer: $(T(x))=$i(x)-$o(T(x)-x)-C It is important to recognize the profit dependancy on the input/output message ratio. If it gets too high, you got nothing to spend on yourself. Your contention (if I may translate): N1(3x) is more secure than N1(x), assuming identical remailer configuration. Do you consider N#(ax) equivalent to aN#(x)? May I inquire into your reasoning? > [much good thought deleted.] > > | 5. Automaticaly limits spamming unless a remailer allows cloning > | AND all recipients share a commen private key. > > Or unless the remailer mails to a mail to news gateway. This is a limitation of the mail-news gateway and not of the remailer technology. What it points to is a serious shortcoming in mail-news gateway software. The technology required for truely efficient newsgroup handling is something sorely in need of work. > | 6. It maps 1:1 onto the physical remailer model with the same limits > | on information at each stage. This allows one to directly apply > | the current history of precedence involving anonymity and > | physical remailers. > > With physical remailers, you can open the inner envelopes and > read the message, leaving the end user to wonder where the post office > lost the message. With 'real' remailers, the lost message can't be > read, only not delivered. If the encryption technology is secure. The point I am making here is that the encryption envelope is 'secure' only so long as nobody is trying to crack it. Sooner or later somebody is going to decrypt your message, if not the entire encryption system. This is synonymous with the physical model. The paper envelope is secure as long as somebody isn't breaking the law by tampering with the mail. > | This is the basic model that the Austin Cypherpunks are working on at the > | currrent time. The big problem we have right now is determining if the body > | is actualy encrypted. We have done some basic tests of encryption-spoofing > | using pgp and it is looks to be a thorny problem. It simply is not trivial > | to look at a block of characters and determine if they are actualy > | encrypted. You can't rely on the wrapper around the data put there by the > > I'm not sure I see why this matters? If you check that the > message is not obviously readable, why not assume that its well > encrypted? You're rarely required to contort yourself to ensure your > customers are obeying the law (weaponsmiths, cryptographers, and banks > excepted.) Ok. Let's for a moment assume that to send a message to 'president(a)whitehouse.gov' with 'Die Bill!' is a crime. Would it not be a crime to foil a packet of encryption by inserting 'Die Bill!' messages in clear text in the encryption block? To date, provided no attempt at actual decryption is attempted, there is nothing in the standards that prevent this other than digital signatures. And again, a specific program has to be executed. A person might very well look at it as plaintext w/o ever running digital signatures (or they just assume its always right). Would this also be a crime? Jim Choate "Reality is observer dependant" \ \ \\///// | | (.) (.) ===========================oOO==(_)==OOo========================== Tivoli an IBM company CyberTects: SSZ Customer Support Engineer SOHO Consulting/VR/Robotics 9442 Capitol of Texas Highway North 1647 Rutland Suite 500 #244 Austin, TX 78759 Austin, TX 78758 Email: jchoate(a)tivoli.com Email: ravage(a)ssz.com Phone: (512) 436-8893 Phone: (512) 259-2994 Fax: (512) 345-2784 Fax: n/a WWW: www.tivoli.com WWW: www.ssz.com Modem: n/a Modem: (512) 836-7374 Pager: n/a Pager: n/a Cellular: n/a Cellular: n/a ===================================================================

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E-Data Systems ~ patent #4,528,643
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I think this has made the rounds here, already. If it hasn't, any comments? Cheers, Bob Hettinga --- begin forwarded text Date: Fri, 7 Jun 1996 15:53:52 GMT X-Sender: jnferree(a)postoffice.worldnet.att.net Mime-Version: 1.0 To: Robert Hettinga <rah(a)shipwright.com> From: "J. Neil Ferree" <jnferree(a)worldnet.att.net> Subject: E-Data Systems ~ patent #4,528,643 Has anyone else received the *Amnesty* documentation from E-data Systems of Secaucus, NJ regarding their patent on: ... system for reproducing information in material objects at a point of sale location ... "The patent generally describes the system and methodology whereby products composed of digital data are purchased and embedded electronically at a point of sale location from a host computer. The products are typically delivered in usable form only after payment is made. The purchaser requests delivery after the money requirements are satisfied and authorized for the delivery is granted. In today's vernacular, the patent covers on-demand electronic distribution". [taken from the accompanying brochure] Their licensing agreement (with fee schedules) addresses; 1) Content providers; Owners and sellers of products which are sold and delivered electronically by the provider or through a distribution network owned by another within the scope of at least one of the E-data Systems patent claims. 2) Resellers; Distributors who provide a distribution network for content providers to sell products within the scope of at least one of the E-data Systems patent claims. 3) Service providers for Electronic Distribution Applications; Providers of various services, (ie) encryption, locking, unlocking metering, etc. who provide applications for content providers and/or resellers within the scope of at least on of the E-data Systems patent claims. Contact information for E-data Systems regarding how to obtain a license .... Tele 800-406-1668 Web www.3wnet.com/corp/edata e-mail gift(a)planet.net --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "If they could 'just pass a few more laws', we would all be criminals." --Vinnie Moscaritolo The e$ Home Page: http://www.vmeng.com/rah/

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Re: Anonymous stock trades.
by frantz＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:52 AM 6/7/96 -0400, Perry E. Metzger wrote: >... As >any free market economist would tell you, the way to stop a resource >from being destroyed is not to pray that people won't buy it but to >assure that someone has an ownership stake in the resource, thus >assuring that their investment would be destroyed if the resource >vanished. Thats why, for instance, timber companies happily clear cut >government land that they have leased (after all, not clear cutting >would mean that they wouldn't extract maximum value for their lease >under the idiotic terms that the leases are made under) but will >almost never clear cut their own lands, because that would reduce >their long term value. I find this analysis a bit superficial because it does not consider the difference between short-term and long-term value. To use Perry's example of the timber industry. Before the late 1980s, the lands owned by Pacific Lumber were managed for long-term production. When the company was taken over as part of the "maximize present value" movement in the late 1980s, the management goals changed to increase timber production without regard to long-term production. (I seem to remember that the takeover was one of Michael Milken's deals.) My conclusion from this example is that if your interest is in the long-term preservation of ecosystems, you need institutions that are structured so they take a long-term view, and can not be subverted by short-term trends in markets. As far as I can tell, the US National Park Service, for all its faults, does as good a job of preserving ecosystems as any other institution, and better than most. (If you disagree, please provide examples of institutions that do as well.) ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Bill Frantz | The CDA means | Periwinkle -- Computer Consulting (408)356-8506 | lost jobs and | 16345 Englewood Ave. frantz(a)netcom.com | dead teenagers | Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA

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Re: NSA/CIA to snoop INSIDE the U.S.???
by declan＠well.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This is a fucking big story. Allowing the CIA and NSA to snoop domestically, and using only a handful of suspicions and anecdotes about cybernastiness and evil cryptohackers to justify this major policy shift -- well, it's fucking amazing. Nunn's proposal, unfortunately, was more than a "suggestion." But Rory's right. DC *is* in the throes of Internet fever, and it'll just get worse as the summer gets hotter and hotter. It's almost 80 degress right now. -Declan >What?! What the *@#!! is wrong with the people who supposedly smart >people representing us?! > >Ern > >-------- From SJ Mercury: > > NET FEVER ON THE HILL > > Published: June 6, 1996 > > BY RORY J. O'CONNOR > Mercury News Washington Bureau > > WASHINGTON -- The White House wants a coordinated task force to fight > terrorism on the Internet. Some senators think the CIA should be > allowed to work hand in hand with the FBI to fight computer crime on > U.S. soil. Meanwhile, the federal courts are deciding a major First > Amendment case that might ban certain information from the Net. > > The nation's capital is in the throes of Internet fever. > > For the past several months, the condition has become acute, and by > the end of the year the Internet itself may look far different as a > result: more tightly regulated, more carefully monitored and more > expensive. > > The latest symptom: a suggestion Wednesday for the elimination of laws > that prohibit U.S. intelligence agencies -- notably the National >>>> Security Agency and the Central Intelligence Agency -- from snooping <<< >>>> on home soil. The reason: The potential for computer crime and <<< > terrorism is so great, and the Internet so decentralized and > international, that police and the FBI must combine forces with spy > agencies in order to successfully analyze the threat and investigate > criminal activity. > > ''If we're going to live in this kind of world, we're going to have to > link the intelligence world with law enforcement,'' said Sen. Sam > Nunn, D-Ga. > > For many people in government who work on computer and law-enforcement > issues, the course of the disease seems painfully slow. They often > describe the Internet as the Wild West that's sorely in need of a good > marshal. But for many people who use the Internet, the government's > efforts are moving far ahead of any real knowledge of a technology > that, two years ago, almost nobody had heard of. > > ''There are not dead bodies in the street,'' said Donna L. Hoffman, a > professor at Vanderbilt University who studies the Internet. ''It just > doesn't make sense to rush into legislation.'' > > [ SNIP ]

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Re: E-Data Systems ~ patent #4,528,643
by Yanni 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> I think this has made the rounds here, already. > > If it hasn't, any comments? > > Cheers, > Bob Hettinga yea, we got a couple of them from those guys... whatever... how can you claim a patent on that stuff? geeezzz... -jon Jon (no h) S. Stevens yanni(a)clearink.com ClearInk WebMagus http://www.clearink.com/ finger pgp(a)sparc.clearink.com for pgp pub key What I just wrote is beta. Please report all bugs directly to me.

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