December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

[hrdware] Is Tempest detecting only video?
by Jean-Francois Avon 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On 11 May 96 at 20:35, jim bell wrote: > I'm waiting for cheap flat-panel displays for desktop computers > to arrive, because they will probably be almost impossible to > detect usably by Tempest systems. Does Tempest detects only the emission from the electron gun in the monitor or can it get a usable "lock" on some other signals generated within a computer? As an example, can it grab the keystrokes? If the answer is yes, can it do it: a) rarely b) occasionally c) most of the time d) almost all of the time e) never Could somebody knowledgeable in Tempest can rate the various emissions from a computer? (such as: keyboard, COM port, modem, lpt, video signal(from the card), disk write, monitor emission, network comms, etc) Ciao JFA Just curious... PGP key ID# C58ADD0D at: http://w3.citenet.net/users/jf_avon Key Fingerprint: 529645E8205A8A5E F87CC86FAEFEF891 Unsollicited commercial e-mail will be proofread at US165 $/h Any sender of such material will be considered as to have ac- cepted the above mentionned terms.

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Re: Again: [hrdware] anti-Tempest video settings
by Jean-Francois Avon 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On 12 May 96 at 13:51, Julian Assange wrote: <technical tips snipped> > Equipment > capable of the latter would be extremely complicated and expensive > to design and produce; Even too expensive for entities with the power of taxation? > I suspect there has been no call for it to > date, given that if you are dealing with a target who understands > the risks of van-eck they usually have shielding and or a faraday > cage. You have a point for big outfits. But for small companies or cypherpunks on a restricted budget, they also know that there is most likely *no* shielding of any sort... Regards jfa Why is it that govt employees makes the best spouses? Because after they come back from work, they are not tired and they already read the newspapers. PGP key ID# C58ADD0D at: http://w3.citenet.net/users/jf_avon Key Fingerprint: 529645E8205A8A5E F87CC86FAEFEF891 Unsollicited commercial e-mail will be proofread at US165 $/h Any sender of such material will be considered as to have ac- cepted the above mentionned terms.

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Again: [hrdware] anti-Tempest video settings
by Jean-Francois Avon 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> It won't make any diifference to the potential attacker. > His aim is to recover the text/shapes of what you are displaying. He > is not generally concerned with the "niceness" of the display, but > rather the contents. But of course. But what I want to know is: is there some combination of display colors that will be visible for the eye, but not for the Tempest equipment? > Also, many guns - red, blue, green actually do > radiate on slightly different frequencies, allowing differentiation > of signals - due to the slightly different physical geometry of the > guns themselves. That might answer it. I suppose that if some "stealth" settings exists, they are highly hardware dependent. My question was not "would it work in all instances?" but rather "had this tactic been implemented successfully in *some* instances?" Or, to the contrary, is it reasonable to assume that modern Tempest equipment can work around theses impediments almost all of the time, therefore making any attempts at this futile? Regards JFA PGP key ID# C58ADD0D at: http://w3.citenet.net/users/jf_avon Key Fingerprint: 529645E8205A8A5E F87CC86FAEFEF891 Unsollicited commercial e-mail will be proofread at US165 $/h Any sender of such material will be considered as to have ac- cepted the above mentionned terms.

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Re: Again: [hrdware] anti-Tempest video settings
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 08:02 PM 5/11/96 +0000, Jean-Francois Avon wrote: >Or, to the contrary, is it reasonable to assume that modern Tempest equipment can >work around theses impediments almost all of the time, therefore >making any attempts at this futile? It's probably worth investigating. Chances are good that as long as the total beam current remains as constant as possible, the signal will be much harder to interpret. One way to investigate this comparatively easily is to measure the total power consumption of a monitor when the screen is filled with different colors at different saturations, etc. Supply the AC to the monitor through a 1-ohm resistor, measure the AC voltage across the resistor to 1 mv accuracy or better, and you have a pretty good way to distinguish different beam currents. I'm waiting for cheap flat-panel displays for desktop computers to arrive, because they will probably be almost impossible to detect usably by Tempest systems. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Crypto++ 2.1
by Wei Dai 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Crypto++ 2.1 has just been released. You can find download instructions on the Crypto++ home page at http://www.eskimo.com/~weidai/cryptlib.html. Crypto++ is a free C++ class library of cryptographic primitives. Changes made in version 2.1 include: - added Tiger, HMAC, GOST, RIPE-MD160, LUCELG, LUCDIF, XOR-MAC, OAEP, PSSR, SHARK - added precomputation to DH, ElGamal, DSA, and elliptic curve algorithms - optimizations in elliptic curves over GF(p) - changed Rabin to use OAEP and PSSR - changed many classes to allow copy constructors to work correctly - improved exception generation and handling This is likely to be the last major revision of Crypto++. Future versions will probably only be released for bug fixes and compliance to new standards. Wei Dai P.S. A new set of benchmarks done using Crypto++ 2.1 is available at http://www.eskimo.com/~weidai/benchmarks.txt.

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Re: Why I Pay Too Much in Taxes
by Ecafe Mixmaster Remailer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Black Unicorn wrote: >Looks like someone paying offshore for Mr. May to me. Again, 30% >withholding requirement unless you intend to hide it. You just don't get it, do you. The offshore payment is for licensing (or computer operations, consulting advice, buying worthless software, investment in penny stocks, use your imagination...) It has NOTHING to do with Mr.May. Those payments are something that the (drunk) CEO decided on and he is completely responsible for it. Why he ordered all those expensive services before he left on permanent vacation is anybody's guess. >The only way to avoid this is to conceal Mr. May's involvement. Right! >Also note that payments to an account for which Mr. May is the >beneficiary can trigger realization in several circumstances. The beneficiary is a trustee that doesn't ask too many questions. There are plenty of those available. >You also fail to mention the reporting requirements for U.S. citizens >holding offshore assets of significant size. "Laws are for people who can't think for themselves." >Either it is a tax avoidance plan, or it is a tax evasion plan. >Which is it? A little of both, to confuse the enemy. >Practically speaking I think you have merely altered the plan to >adjust for my comments and are stuck between both fact scenarios now. Nothing altered. I just didn't explain it in too much detail before. There are still details left out (like how to find a cooperative CEO, offshore bank and trustee). This is an extremely cheep setup. For most high bracket wage earners it could break even in the first month or two. Once the structure is in place it doesn't cost any more. To stop paying taxes completely you would need to lower your taxable profile slowly. If you already have enough money in the bank for your living style, you could take out a significantly smaller salary. If the tax man asks what happened to your high income, you explain that you lost your old job and had to accept a less attractive offer. That can happen to anybody. >I would think you'd advertize it here if you had anything worth selling The problem with selling services like this is that any buyer with half a brain worries that it is a sting operation. Therefore the customers are mostly friends and acquaintances. >Off the shelf companies and trusts have their uses but anyone proposing >to sell a standard tax avoidance/evasion setup off the shelf should >trigger major alarm bells. I agree completely. This is not an advertisement, just a chat on the theory of tax planning in the modern day of worldwide strong encryption. Today it is easier to communicate with an offshore trustee than it has ever been before. Just keep your pass phrase away from the tax man and you'll be fine. X

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Re: Remailer in a box
by Matts Kallioniemi 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 00:24 1996-05-12 -0700, Lucky Green wrote: >May I suggest convincing that Swedish ISP to offer up a signup form >accepting Ecash? They probably will once the Post Bank gets going with ecash. Until then there are legal difficulties. Swedish online merchants can't even accept credit cards. They need an order in hand writing or voice before they can charge the card. My offer was to open an account with any ISP, whether they accept ecash or not. I think that improves the anonymity of the account. Matts

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Re: distinctive properties of ecash, netbill, cybercash and iKP
by shamrock＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 16:40 5/11/96, Jüri Kaljundi wrote: >This is one question why the central bank in Estonia (I am not sure about >other countries) does not allow issuing e-cash here in Estonia. While the >banks issue e-cash to people, they get some real cash from people. This >leads to actually doubleing the money in circulation, each monetary unit, >either dollar or kroon, can at the same time be used by owner of e-cash >and at the same time by the bank. The central banks are afraid that when >the amount of e-cash in circulation gets big, this could lead to >devalvation of money, especially a small country like Estonia is afraid of >such development. That's simply silly. The same argument would hold true for travelers checks. Are Estonian banks allowed to issue them? I thought so. Disclaimer: My opinions are my own, not those of my employer. -- Lucky Green <mailto:shamrock@netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred.

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Re: Remailer in a box
by shamrock＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:52 5/11/96, Matts Kallioniemi wrote: >-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > >At 17:39 1996-05-10 EDT, E. ALLEN SMITH wrote: >>Yes, for the cryptographic purposes. It doesn't make much difference >>on the juristictional end of things - I'd need to locate a UNIX account >>in another country for that. Hmm... possible. >> -Allen > >Anybody who want's an anonymous shell account in Sweden, send me MTB ecash >and I'll get an account opened for you with a local ISP. Sweden has the best >Internet access outside North America. A 34 Mbps line to the US, soon to be >upgraded to 155 Mbps! May I suggest convincing that Swedish ISP to offer up a signup form accepting Ecash? Disclaimer: My opinions are my own, not those of my employer. -- Lucky Green <mailto:shamrock@netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred.

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need nym-differentiation, perpetual motion, and FTL travel please
by bryce＠digicash.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hi. I was thinking as I stood in the lunch line talking with Arnaud that what I like about <a href= "http://www-ugrad.cs.colorado.edu/~wilcoxb/faq/DefnOfPseudonymity"> pseudonymity </a> is the part about being free from the threat of violence. I _don't_ like the part about being able to have multiple identities nearly as much. It would really please me if I could figure out a way to reliably determine that Alicenym is not the same human as Bobnym without compromising the anonymity of the human(s) behind Alicenym and Bobnym. (Since if their anonymity was thus compromisable, they would be susceptible to the threat of violence.) Unfortunately I can't think of a good way to have both pseudonymity and nym-differentiation. I think that it is possible, however. Can anyone suggest a mechanism? Regards, Bryce -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2i Comment: Auto-signed under Unix with 'BAP' Easy-PGP v1.1b2 iQB1AwUBMZTal0jbHy8sKZitAQFn0gL+M5h/G1WlI6DMF2ZqQhllx+YDu23HGVdp VJbSd0VuBvqKLtDeJ+css9uZ90nUDcsqT8Dws1xxdU+ejSe2Zh3HYLip3+L3LmWV YDf446Pfswgkgs20HRyPzBs2B8c8JpNm =xJYR -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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