December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Java
by Gary Howland 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Clay Olbon II wrote: > > Has anyone written a Java app to implement the Chinese Lottery? Seems like > a natural way to do it. A small cash prize might entice lots of folks to > let it run in the background... We have plenty of Java code that does crypto. If anyone can think of a suitable target (and perhaps a suitable prize for the winner), we'll help knock up some code. Click this if you're interested http://systemics.com:79/ (alternatively finger @systemics.com) The only targets I can think of are the Sun/Microsoft crypto API keys (but I would guess that these keys are too large for an attack to be feasible), and the unix password of David Sternlight (which was posted to sci.crypt last summer). Gary -- pub 1024/C001D00D 1996/01/22 Gary Howland <gary(a)systemics.com> Key fingerprint = 0C FB 60 61 4D 3B 24 7D 1C 89 1D BE 1F EE 09 06

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Re: Richard Stallman on RSA, Zimmermann, crypto
by Deranged Mutant 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Not to defend or condemn RSA folx or patents, etc., but sometime ago (recently) I read or was told or perhaps hallucinated that PGP3 was going to include non-RSA algorithms that didn't suffer the patent stickiness (El Gammel based on DSA?) Derek? On 4 Jun 96 at 18:00, Declan McCullagh wrote: [..] > Richard's comments below are very much worth reading. Also check out the [..] > The version of PGP used outside the US is free software, but if you > use it within the US, RSA Inc. can sue you. > > This is very bad for people who would like to use PGP. But it is > worse than that. It affects the political battle too. > > PGP had a chance to create a constituency of Americans who demand the > right to use encryption. If PGP had been allowed for use in business, > not just by hobbyists, we would have far more Americans who care > enough to fight against Clipper--and they would include businesses > which have the funds to influence legislators. RSA Inc. prevented > this from happening, and did so for no reason except money. [..] --- No-frills sig. Befriend my mail filter by sending a message with the subject "send help" Key-ID: 5D3F2E99 1996/04/22 wlkngowl(a)unix.asb.com (root@magneto) AB1F4831 1993/05/10 Deranged Mutant <wlkngowl(a)unix.asb.com> Send a message with the subject "send pgp-key" for a copy of my key.

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Re: Security of PGP if Secret Key Available?
by Gary Howland 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Jun 3, 2:36, "Robert A. Hayden" wrote: > However, I got to wondering about the security of PGP assuming somebody > trying to read my PGPed stuff has my 1024-bit secret key. ie, if I have > it on my personal computer, and somebody gets my secret key, how much > less robust has PGP just become, and what are appropriate and reasonable > steps to take to protect this weakness? If the secret key is available then an attacker knows the length of p & q. Admittedly this will not usually help matters much, but I still feel that the lengths of p and q should be encrypted with the passphrase - perhaps in PGP3.0? (Derek?) Gary -- pub 1024/C001D00D 1996/01/22 Gary Howland <gary(a)systemics.com> Key fingerprint = 0C FB 60 61 4D 3B 24 7D 1C 89 1D BE 1F EE 09 06

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Markoff in NYT on NTT/RSA chip
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Heh. You read it first in the CyberWire Dispatch Brock and I put out earlier tonight. :) -Declan --- Japanese Data-Scrambling Chip Renews Debate By JOHN MARKOFF W ASHINGTON -- Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corp. has quietly begun selling a powerful data-scrambling chip set that is likely to undermine the Clinton administration's efforts to restrict the export of the fundamental technology for protecting secrets and commerce in the information age. The existence of the two-chip set, which will have broad potential application for local computer networks, the Internet and telephone switching networks, was disclosed in Washington in a speech Monday at a public policy workshop by the chief executive of RSA Data Security, a Silicon Valley-based company that has frequently dueled with the administration over its export-control policies. [...]

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How to explain crypto?
by declan＠well.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Brock, the crypto-challenged, humbly apologizes for his gaffe. He was looking for a way to draw an understandable comparison of how much harder a 1024-bit implementation of RSA is to break than what current export controls allow. He's asking for suggestions on how in future articles he could word this so a layman could understand it... Preferably something that could be said in a few sentences. (Brock cops to the fact that it does an incredible disservice to a complex topic. Remember, tho, he writes for a broad audience with a way diverse range of understanding -- or misunderstanding, as the case may be!) For example, someone sent me this explanation: "The 1024 bit key is likely an RSA key, and is not comperable to a 40 bit symetric key. From memory, 1024 bit RSA is about as hard to crack as 90 bit symetric." Is this a reasonable comparison? -Declan

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FOR WHOM THE BELL TOLLS
by Sandy Sandfort 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ SANDY SANDFORT ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ C'punks, In a recent exchange, Carl Ellison wrote: >After the meeting ended it hit me what the problem is and I >mentioned it to PRZ. We're complaining that the Executive >has gone rogue -- is disobeying the will of the people. >PRZ likened it to Nixon's war in Cambodia. To which Jim Bell replied: >I have a solution to that problem. My question for member of this list is: When Bell finally goes too far and they arrest or shoot him, how can we best capitalize on his martyrdom? Or in a more negative light, what damage control will we need to do in that case? Now I know that barking dogs rarely bite, but Jim may just fool us and find his cajones. In any event, the sort of yapping he is doing could itself be considered a crime that could attract the sort of negative attention he apparently craves. Any suggestions? S a n d y ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

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Re: How can you protect a remailer's keys?
by loki＠infonex.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The best solution I could come up with (and was willing to write and use) is to specify the passphrase on the command line argument to the compiler make solaris -DPASS="foozooblue" -Lance At 11:55 PM 6/1/96, Bill Stewart wrote: >Encryption is critical for protecting against traffic analysis, >but it's tough to protect a remailer's keys. Unlike regular email, >where you can type the key in as you read it, remailers need to >run automatically once you set them up. Some of the choices are: >- leave it around in plaintext with only Unix file protections > (Ghio2 works this way - does Mixmaster? My ghio2 version has it > compiled into the binary, and I try to delete it from source.) >- type it in to a long-running remailer process > (with human intervention to start) >- SSL-based remailers, where the web server handles crypto on > a per-machine basis instead of per-remailer >- use unauthenticated Diffie-Hellman (either hanging off > a TCP port somewhere instead of mail, or > 3 pieces of email) >- off-line or off-site remailer such as a POP3 winsock remailer > that makes it Somebody Else's Problem, and separates > the remailer's public interface from the working parts >- human intervention on every message (which may not be totally > worthless for moderated news postings, if you want to > take that approach to spam prevention.) > >Anybody have any other approaches? These are mostly weak, >annoying, or both. > > ># Thanks; Bill ># Bill Stewart +1-415-442-2215 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com ># http://www.idiom.com/~wcs ># Rescind Authority! ---------------------------------------------------------- Lance Cottrell loki(a)obscura.com PGP 2.6 key available by finger or server. Mixmaster, the next generation remailer, is now available! http://www.obscura.com/~loki/Welcome.html or FTP to obscura.com "Love is a snowmobile racing across the tundra. Suddenly it flips over, pinning you underneath. At night the ice weasels come." --Nietzsche ----------------------------------------------------------

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Re: Electronic Signature Act Of 1996
by Sandy Sandfort 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ SANDY SANDFORT ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ C'punks, At 11:11 AM 6/4/96 -0400, Perry E. Metzger wrote: >...I get the impression that under the common law, an ink >signature is merely a demonstration that a party assented >to a contract, and except for certain contracts (which >usually require witnesses etc.) there is no requirement in >the law that a contract even be on paper... The "Statute of Frauds" lists the exceptions and they cover most important contracts. I seem to recall that contracts over a given amount or for interests in real property for periods of a year or more are covered. I'm sure someone with current access to legal research resources will post a better explanation. S a n d y ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

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Re: Java
by frantz＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:22 PM 6/3/96 -0400, Perry E. Metzger wrote: >I've been rather hard on Java here lately. I'll say. You have also ignored some of Java's other features. Machine independence is probably the most important. A nice, small, easy to learn language is another. [As an aside, when I attempted to compile Wai Dei's crypto lib 2.0 with the Symantec Project Manager C++ compilers, none of the 3 would compile it. The one which generated the fewest errors had "internal error" on two modules. This problem occurs because C++ is such a large language, with a number of obscure features which compiler writers don't always handle. In addition, C++ is in no way machine independent. The simplest example is that sizeof(int) is machine dependent.] > >... > >Sun is, unfortunately, suffering from a substantial hubris problem. As >I have noted, the original Java applet security model and all the >followups have had exactly the same problem -- they depend on perfect >implementation of every element of the security model for the security >to work, instead of having the realistic and conservative assumption >that portions of the model will be misimplemented, and designing for >defense in depth. If you want defense in depth, run your Java interpreter in an OS environment which limits the interpreter's access to only those resources you wish it to access. I get the impression that the environment you are concerned with is a bunch of PCs running W95 or NT. These OSs are fragile enough, particularly to the denial of service attacks your users can not tolerate, that the only way to approach safety is to only run software which has been approved by an in-house testing authority. Even with the in-house testing authority, you really need a better OS to protect against testing failures. >Beyond that, however, they have created the ultimate hype >monster. Java is a neat idea looking for a good application. I use the >web all day long and I have yet to see a good use for Java. There have been discussions of crypto applications in Java. Doing the crypto on the user's system before sending data thru the net is a useful application. While, as a number of us have pointed out, there are problems doing crypto with Java, it may be the easiest way to deliver strong crypto quickly to Joe Websurfer. In the long run, I hope to use Java to sell cycles. Java has the advantage in a cycle market that it is machine independent, and the Just In Time compilers should make the performance reasonable. Regards - Bill ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Bill Frantz | The CDA means | Periwinkle -- Computer Consulting (408)356-8506 | lost jobs and | 16345 Englewood Ave. frantz(a)netcom.com | dead teenagers | Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA

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Re: Electronic Signature Act Of 1996
by Greg Broiles 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I think more apropos to the discussion of electronic signatures is UCC 1-201(39), "'Signed' includes any symbol executed or adopted by a party with present intention to authenticate a writing." Comment 39 to 1-201 indicates "[a]uthentication may be printed, stamped or written; it may be by initials or by thumbprint. It may be on any part of the document and in appropriate cases may be found in a billhead or letterhead. No catalog of possible authentications can be complete and the court must use common sense and commercial experience in passing upon these matters. The question always is whether the symbol was executed or adopted by the party with present intention to authenticate the writing." And comment 2 to 3-401 (re negotiable instruments) indicates that a signature may be "handwritten, typed, printed or made in any other manner." So I don't see why that wouldn't include a PGP signature, a traditional ".signature" block, or the typed "/s/ Greg Broiles" used in some circumstances. (Of course, the UCC doesn't apply to every transaction, nor is it adopted in identical form in every state, blah blah blah.) But it's always nice if the legislature is willing to say "This is the right way to create an electronic signature" because then we don't have to wonder. (However, a signature and a contract are not the same thing - and you don't need to have a contract to have an enforceable obligation. A nonrepudiable document still isn't a self-executing one.) -- Greg Broiles |"Post-rotational nystagmus was the subject of gbroiles(a)netbox.com |an in-court demonstration by the People http://www.io.com/~gbroiles |wherein Sgt Page was spun around by Sgt |Studdard." People v. Quinn 580 NYS2d 818,825.

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