December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Piracy Bests ITAR
by Mutant 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Alan Horowitz wrote: > Yes, when Mr Anon travels to a beach in Jamaica or in Mombasa, he > shouldn't complain when the taxi driver takes him, not to his requested > destination, buit some dark alley where Mr Anon gets clunked over the > head and his wallet removed. The locals need the money more than Mr > rich-tourist-on-vacation Anon. They're only doing socialist justice, > after all. > > Property is property. Theft is theft. Such absolutism! And an awful analogy (not entirely worthless, but not very good either). Has nothing to do with socialism... even works nice in a capitalist as in the case where people try the software, decide they like it, and then buy it latter when they can afford it. Sidekick and WordStar became popular because of this "borrowing". MS-DOS probably would not be so widespread if it weren't pirated. Oh yeah, patents as well... I assume from your post that you didn't use PGP before the MIT version (assuming you're in the US...). - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBMSgfQSoZzwIn1bdtAQFVKwGA2lngCVinsxHtw45XdbNfTHc/Whv3BGey IvKs3cspDmvLe4cdyHWNXfzaw/u3aoCm =JClJ -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Piracy Bests ITAR
by Mutant 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Bruce Murphy wrote: > > Has nothing to do with socialism... even works nice in a capitalist > > as in the case where people try the software, decide they like it, > > and then buy it latter when they can afford it. Sidekick and WordStar > > became popular because of this "borrowing". MS-DOS probably would > > be so widespread if it weren't pirated. > > Uh huh? And you are saying that there were *heaps* of computers out > there which could run MS-DOS which didn't come with it? And how much > more would those companies have made had the products been *forced* to > be sold rather than pirated. The point of the original article was that those products probably would *not* have been sold. What life would be like in other circumstances is hard to consider... and rather moot (a friend of mine has an expression for describing hypotheticals... "What is my grandfather had four arms?"). FSF/GNU and projects like FreeDOS, if they were several years earlier, would have made things quite interesting.... A point NOT in the orig. article but hinted at in the subject, though: if people cannot *buy* the software because of regs like ITAR, they'll steal it. - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBMSiSGioZzwIn1bdtAQHIzwF+NiBHyvvJRviXZv91iqEnMKc0LQWGok+z m8TiKOspP7wAZgGNmeRXWFXwrt2BV7sO =LEUO -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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List of reliable remailers
by Raph Levien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I operate a remailer pinging service which collects detailed information about remailer features and reliability. To use it, just finger remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu There is also a Web version of the same information, plus lots of interesting links to remailer-related resources, at: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP encrypting client for outgoing mail, which is available at: ftp://ftp.csua.berkeley.edu/pub/cypherpunks/premail/premail-0.33a.tar.gz For the PGP public keys of the remailers, finger pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu This is the current info: REMAILER LIST This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration options and special features for each of the remailers. The second part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each remailer. You can also get this list by fingering remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu. $remailer{"extropia"} = "<remail(a)extropia.wimsey.com> cpunk pgp special"; $remailer{"portal"} = "<hfinney(a)shell.portal.com> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"alumni"} = "<hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"bsu-cs"} = "<nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu> cpunk hash ksub"; $remailer{"c2"} = "<remail(a)c2.org> eric pgp hash reord"; $remailer{"penet"} = "<anon(a)anon.penet.fi> penet post"; $remailer{"ideath"} = "<remailer(a)ideath.goldenbear.com> cpunk hash ksub reord"; $remailer{"hacktic"} = "<remailer(a)utopia.hacktic.nl> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"flame"} = "<remailer(a)flame.alias.net> cpunk mix pgp. hash latent cut post reord"; $remailer{"rahul"} = "<homer(a)rahul.net> cpunk pgp hash filter"; $remailer{"mix"} = "<mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord ?"; $remailer{"ford"} = "<remailer(a)bi-node.zerberus.de> cpunk pgp hash ksub ek"; $remailer{"vishnu"} = "<mixmaster(a)vishnu.alias.net> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord"; $remailer{"robo"} = "<robo(a)c2.org> cpunk hash mix"; $remailer{"replay"} = "<remailer(a)replay.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"spook"} = "<remailer(a)valhalla.phoenix.net> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek reord"; $remailer{"rmadillo"} = "<remailer(a)armadillo.com> mix cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"ecafe"} = "<cpunk(a)remail.ecafe.org> cpunk mix"; $remailer{"wmono"} = "<wmono(a)valhalla.phoenix.net> cpunk mix pgp. hash latent cut"; $remailer{"shinobi"} = "<remailer(a)shinobi.alias.net> cpunk mix hash latent cut ek reord"; $remailer{"amnesia"} = "<amnesia(a)chardos.connix.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub"; $remailer{"gondolin"} = "<mix(a)remail.gondolin.org> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek reord"; $remailer{"tjava"} = "<remailer(a)tjava.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut"; $remailer{"pamphlet"} = "<pamphlet(a)idiom.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ?"; $remailer{'alpha'} = '<alias(a)alpha.c2.org> alpha pgp'; $remailer{'gondonym'} = '<alias(a)nym.gondolin.org> alpha pgp'; $remailer{'nymrod'} = '<nymrod(a)nym.alias.net> alpha pgp'; $remailer{"lead"} = "<mix(a)zifi.genetics.utah.edu> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"treehole"} = "<remailer(a)mockingbird.alias.net> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; catalyst(a)netcom.com is _not_ a remailer. lmccarth(a)ducie.cs.umass.edu is _not_ a remailer. usura(a)replay.com is _not_ a remailer. Groups of remailers sharing a machine or operator: (c2 robo hroller alpha) (gondolin gondonym) (flame hacktic replay) (alumni portal) (vishnu spook wmono) Use "premail -getkeys pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu" to get PGP keys for the remailers. Fingering this address works too. Note: The remailer list now includes information for the alpha nymserver. Last update: Mon 19 Feb 96 6:46:32 PST remailer email address history latency uptime ----------------------------------------------------------------------- alumni hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu #-###-**#*#+ 4:52 99.99% lead mix(a)zifi.genetics.utah.edu +++++++ 40:29 99.97% treehole remailer(a)mockingbird.alias.net ++--+++ 1:38:55 99.95% nymrod nymrod(a)nym.alias.net **#* **+--+* 16:15 99.89% c2 remail(a)c2.org +*** +****++ 15:58 99.84% gondolin mix(a)remail.gondolin.org -__.-------- 7:43:33 99.83% gondonym alias(a)nym.gondolin.org -__-------- 7:15:55 99.81% portal hfinney(a)shell.portal.com #*###-## ### 2:07 99.76% flame remailer(a)flame.alias.net ++++ ++++++ 54:43 99.72% extropia remail(a)extropia.wimsey.com -._.--.---- 12:10:04 99.65% vishnu mixmaster(a)vishnu.alias.net -*** ------ 1:12:38 99.60% mix mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com ..-- -+-+-- 2:32:14 99.56% ecafe cpunk(a)remail.ecafe.org *### +#*###* 1:01 99.47% alpha alias(a)alpha.c2.org *** -+* ++* 46:19 99.34% hacktic remailer(a)utopia.hacktic.nl **** +****** 7:46 98.96% replay remailer(a)replay.com +*** +*+**** 5:47 98.41% shinobi remailer(a)shinobi.alias.net ##* *.-++** 1:29:59 97.16% penet anon(a)anon.penet.fi . **------ 18:48:16 90.53% rahul homer(a)rahul.net ***#*+#+#### 1:26 99.94% tjava remailer(a)tjava.com # -*# 41:23 80.93% pamphlet pamphlet(a)idiom.com ++++ ++ 42:17 42.14% ford remailer(a)bi-node.zerberus.de 4:33:06 6.65% History key * # response in less than 5 minutes. * * response in less than 1 hour. * + response in less than 4 hours. * - response in less than 24 hours. * . response in more than 1 day. * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days). cpunk A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To: field. eric A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead. penet The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses X-Anon-To: in the header. pgp Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email address, should be used as the encryption key ID. hash Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of outgoing messages. ksub Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode. nsub Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode. latent Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option. cut Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option. post Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header. ek Encrypt responses in reply blocks using Encrypt-Key: header. special Accepts only pgp encrypted messages. mix Can accept messages in Mixmaster format. reord Attempts to foil traffic analysis by reordering messages. Note: I'm relying on the word of the remailer operator here, and haven't verified the reord info myself. mon Remailer has been known to monitor contents of private email. filter Remailer has been known to filter messages based on content. If not listed in conjunction with mon, then only messages destined for public forums are subject to filtering. Raph Levien

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Re: CPF: Feb-17-1996.cpf
by John Stumbles 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Sat, 17 Feb 1996, Damaged Justice wrote: > Date: Fri, 16 Feb 1996 09:20:30 -0800 > From: sasha1(a)netcom.com (Alexander Chislenko) > Subject: Re: Computer unmasks Anonymous writer... > > I ran my essays through Word grammar checker a while ago, > and was surprised how stable the grammar statistics were. > Complexity of the text (grade level) was the same to the decimal point, > average length of sentences was consistent, etc. > People also use the same styles of smileys or *highlights*, make > consistent spelling errors, have their habits of indentation, etc. > > My suggestion at the time was to have randomizing output filter that > would substitute synonyms, change spelling, modify paragraph formatting, > etc. - Style anonymizer, I'd call it. Also, if small random changes are > applied to every copy of the message you send out, and you keep track of > what recipient got which version, you will find it easier to identify > the leaks if you send private messages. A dishonest recipient, to > protect himself, would have to further randomize the message, which > has apparent consequences for the ease of your identification and attributability of the message. A similar method was (is?) allegedly used by H.M. Government depts (and no doubt others) in restricted documents: the apparently even spacing of letters along a line to acheive proportional spacing was in fact slightly uneven and different on each copy, so a whistleblower (or spy) who photocopied and leaked a document in their posession could be identified if the copied document were examined. -- John Stumbles j.d.stumbles(a)reading.ac.uk Computer Services, University of Reading http://www.rdg.ac.uk/~suqstmbl +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ Just pray that there's intelligent life somewhere out in space - because there's bugger all down here on earth!

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Re: Piracy Bests ITAR
by Alex de Joode 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Alan Horowitz sez: : > From: Anonymous <nobody(a)REPLAY.COM> : > Some economists have made a good case that slack : > enforcement of such rules may sometimes do little harm. : > Local firms benefit by acquiring pirated technology more : > cheaply than the real thing; consumers acquire affordable : > high-tech products and close copies of branded goods. : Yes, when Mr Anon travels to a beach in Jamaica or in Mombasa, he : shouldn't complain when the taxi driver takes him, not to his requested : destination, buit some dark alley where Mr Anon gets clunked over the : head and his wallet removed. The locals need the money more than Mr : rich-tourist-on-vacation Anon. They're only doing socialist justice, : after all. : Property is property. Theft is theft. Then the question arises is software property .. If I steal your money, you don't have it any more; if I copy your software, you still have it so one can't simply conclude that copying is theft. Besides copyright law, patent law et al. are all rip offs designed to suck money out of Citizen-Units. I you create a new and improved methode to do accounting your idea will not be protected, also concepts and principles are unprotected. Intelectual Property Law is only designed to protect the investor, publishers/authors wanted copyright laws, the industrial age brought us patent laws, bio-genetics are patenting 'dna strings', the computer age brought us patenting of mathematic principles, and soon databases will be protected. Copying software isn't theft, copying software is a vote against rip offs, copying software is the first step in liberating the Citizen-Unit ! !noitulover -- " The way to combat noxious ideas is with other ideas. The way to combat falsehoods is with truth. " -- Justice William O. Douglas, 1958

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Russian Crypto Laws
by Michael Froomkin 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Does anyone know whether 1) the russians have issued any crypto licenses to either russians or foreigners? 2) whether anyone has been prosecuted for unlicensed crypto use in Russia? or even been charged or warned? [The above may have been dictated with Dragon Dictate/Win 2.0 voice recognition. Be alert for unintentional strange word substitutions.] A. Michael Froomkin | +1 (305) 284-4285; +1 (305) 284-6506 (fax) Associate Professor of Law | U. Miami School of Law | froomkin(a)law.miami.edu P.O. Box 248087 | http://www.law.miami.edu/~froomkin Coral Gables, FL 33124 USA | It's warm here.

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Re: Patents and Trademarks invalid
by jf_avon＠citenet.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Here's an idea: whenever someone uploads something like the RC2 source code, >why not have everyone attach it to their .signature? Is criminal justice >seriously going to pursue tracking down millions of people that did this? >Or would they pull the plug. Man's survival tool is his mind. Patents and copyright are establishing the ownership and protection the result of the exercise of his survival tool. Therefore they are good. To try to eliminate them is equivalent to promote slavery. JFA **** NEW PGP 2.6.2 KEY ********* This key is actually suspended, as of Feb, 16 1996, was never distributed, and might be subject to deletion. Sorry for the trouble my mis-management might have caused. 2048 bits Key ID:24201BA1 1996/02/13 Jean-Francois Avon <jf_avon(a)citenet.net> Key fingerprint = 23 B6 24 31 86 67 FB 35 C7 A7 AF 12 A1 61 E9 3D **** OLD KEY: DO NOT USE ANYMORE UNLESS FOR VERIFYING SIGNATURES **** 1024 bits Key ID:57214AED 1995/10/04 Jean-Francois Avon <jf_avon(a)citenet.net> Key fingerprint = 84 96 76 AE EB 7C AB 15 88 47 87 B0 18 31 74 9F

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Pentagon net-trolling (from RRE)
by E. ALLEN SMITH 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

People should find this interesting. It looks like the Pentagon, at least publically, may be a bit behind the CIA/NSA/etcetera in Internet stuff. -Allen From: IN%"rre(a)weber.ucsd.edu" 19-FEB-1996 01:13:01.46 [I've removed the header, but the author's e-mail address is in the text.] =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= This message was forwarded through the Red Rock Eater News Service (RRE). Send any replies to the original author, listed in the From: field below. You are welcome to send the message along to others but please do not use the "redirect" command. For information on RRE, including instructions for (un)subscribing, send an empty message to rre-help(a)weber.ucsd.edu =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= The following is an article from The Nation magazine (March 4, 1996) that reports on a Pentagon study on how the military can exploit the Internet. The Pentagon paper suggests using the Internet for the routine interception of global e-mail, for covert operations and propaganda campaigns, and for tracking domestic political activity, particularly that of the left. The article was written by David Corn, the Washington editor of The Nation. If you have any comments or leads for follow-up stories, please contact him at 202-546-2239/ph 202-546-1415/fx dacor(a)aol.com To subscribe to The Nation, a magazine of politics and culture, call 800-333-8536. Pentagon Trolls the Net By David Corn c1996 Internet users beware; Pentagon snoops are taking an interest in your cyber-communications. Last summer, Charles Swett, a policy assistant in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, produced a report that assessed the intelligence value of the Internet for the Defense Department. His study discovered the obvious: By monitoring computer message traffic and alternative news sources from around the world, the military might catch "early warning of impending significant developments." Swett reports that the "Internet could also be used offensively as an additional medium in psychological operations campaigns and to help achieve unconventional warfare objectives." A striking aspect of his study is that there is one sort of Internet user who attracts a large amount of attention from Swett: cyber-smart lefties. The thirty-one-page, unclassified study is mostly cut and dry. Much of it describes what the Internet is and what can be found within its infinite confines. Swett lists various "fringe groups" that are exploiting the Internet: the white-supremacist National Alliance, the Michigan Militia, Earth First, and People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA). He highlights MUFON--the Mutual UFO Network--which uses the Internet to disseminate information on "U.S. military operations that members believe relate to investigations and cover-ups of UFO-related incidents." MUFON computer messages, Swett notes, "contain details on MUFON's efforts to conduct surveillance of DoD installations." The report does not suggest that the computer communications of MUFON and these other groups should be targeted by the military--though X Filers will be forgiven for wondering if something sinister is afoot. What Swett apparently finds of greater interest than MUFON and the "fringe groups" is the online left. A significant portion of the report is devoted to the San Francisco-based Institute for Global Communications, which operates several computer networks, such as PeaceNet and EcoNet, that are used by progressive activists. I.G.C. demonstrates, he writes, "the breadth of DoD-relevant information available on the Internet." The paper refers to I.G.C. conferences that might be considered noteworthy by the Pentagon, including ones on anti-nuclear arms campaigns, the extreme right, social change, and "multicultural, multi-racial news." Swett cites I.G.C. as the home for "alternative news sources" that fill gaps in the mainstream media. (It might be good for Pentagon analysts to read I.G.C. dispatches from Holland's Peace Media Service.) Yet he seems to say that one can also track the left around the world by monitoring I.G.C.: "Although [I.G.C.] is clearly a left-wing political organization, without actually joining I.G.C. and reading its message traffic, it is difficult to assess the nature and extent of its members' actual real-world activities." Swett's paper presents the world of opportunity awaiting a cyber-shrewd military and intelligence establishment. The Pentagon and intelligence services will conduct "routine monitoring of messages originating in other countries" in the search for information on "developing security threats." That means overseas e-mail, like overseas phonecalls, will be intercepted by the electronic eavesdroppers of the National Security Agency or some other outfit. The data will be fed into filtering computers and then, if it contains any hot-button words, forwarded to the appropriate analyst. "Networks of human sources with access to the Internet could be developed in areas of security concern to the U.S." (But bureaucrats rest assured; "this approach"--using computer-assisted spies--"could never replace official DoD intelligence collection systems or services.") The Internet "can also serve counterintelligence purposes" by identifying threats to the Pentagon and U.S. intelligence activities. As an example, Swett refers to a message posted in a discussion group for "left-wing political activists" that repeated an A.P. article about an upcoming U.S. Army Special Operations Command training exercise at an empty Miami Beach hotel. Another growth area is the dirty tracks department. Noting that government officials, military officials, business people, and journalists all around the world are online, Swett envisions "Psychological Operations" campaigns in which U.S. propaganda could be rapidly disseminated to a wide audience. He adds, "The U.S. might be able to employ the Internet offensively to help achieve unconventional warfare objectives." Swett does not delve into details on how the Internet could serve such a mission. But he tosses out one possibility: communicating via the Internet with political and paramilitary groups abroad that Washington wants to assist while "limiting the direct political involvement of the United States." Imagine this: contras with computers. Swett does point to a few potential problems. The Internet is chockful of chit-chat of no intelligence value. Retrieving useful nuggets will require monumental screening. He also predicts that one day video footage of military operations will be captured by inexpensive, hand-held digital video cameras operated by local individuals and then up-loaded to the Internet. Within minutes, millions of people around the world will see for themselves what has happened--which could lead to calls for action (or calls to terminate action) before government leaders have had a chance to react and formulate a position. Such a development, he observes, "will greatly add to the burden on military commanders, whose actions will be subjected to an unprecedented degree of scrutiny." And opponents of the Pentagon might try to exploit the Internet for their own devilish ends: "If it became widely known that DoD were monitoring Internet traffic for intelligence or counterintelligence purposes, individuals with personal agendas or political purposes in mind, or who enjoy playing pranks, would deliberately enter false or misleading messages." The study ends with a series of vague recommendations--all to be carried out "only in full compliance with the letter and the spirit of the law, and without violating the privacy of American citizens." The Swett paper is "refreshingly candid," says Steven Aftergood of the Federation of American Scientists, who placed a copy of the document on the FAS web site on government secrecy, where it is being downloaded about twenty times a day (at http://www.fas.org/pub/gen/fas/sgp/.) The I.G.C. staff is amused by Swett's interest. "We must be doing something right," notes George Gundrey, program coordinator of I.G.C.'s PeaceNet. "But it is interesting that all of his [I.G.C.] examples are the most left-wing items [on the network]." Swett's study is not the first of its kind. Under the rubric of "information warfare," other Pentagon outfits and military contractors have studied how to use computer networks to collect public information, disseminate propaganda, politically destabilize other governments, and plant computer viruses into the information systems of foes. (The latter task is particularly foolhardy. Deploying viruses into cyber-space--even if targeted against an enemy--would likely pose a danger to the United States, since this country is more networked than any other.) But Swett's office--the Pentagon's dirty tricks shop--is a newcomer to this scene, acoording to David Banisar, a policy analyst for the Electronic Privacy Information Center. Banisar's group has been helping international human rights groups use encryption to protect their global e-mai, "so the spooks don't listen in" It is natural that the national security gang will try to infiltrate and use a communication medium like the Internet to its advantage. What is most troubling about Swett's paper is its preoccupation with left-of-center travelers in cyberspace and _domestic_ political activities. In the appendix, Swett reproduces four examples of notable e-mail. One (written by progressive activists Richard Cloward and Frances Fox Piven) calls for 100 days of protest in response to the Republican's Contract with America, another announces plans for a demonstration at the 1996 G.O.P. convention in San Diego, the third relays to lefties information on the U.S. Army exercise at the Miami Beach hotel, and the last is a communique from the Zapatistas of Mexico. Swett's use of these cyber dispatches can be explained one of two ways. Either the left has made much more progress in cyber-organizing than the right and "such fringe groups" as PETA, or Swett, true to institutional tradition, is overwrought about the use of the Internet by a certain parties. In any case, the would-be watchers in the defense establishment ought to be watched closely--especially if Swett's report refelcts broader sentiment within the Pentagon.

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Assassination Biz
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hey, Jim Bell, here are some clients, or competitors, or best, targets? The Hit Men (Newsweek, Feb 26, 96) Call it "in-your-face-capitalism." You lose your job, your ex- employer's stock price rises, the CEO gets a fat raise. Today, the more people a company fires, the more Wall Street loves it, the higher its stock price goes. Cheer up, you're serving the greater good by being blown away by what economist Joseph Schumpeter christened "the gale of creative destruction." The world is changing and no matter how big and rich a company is, it has to adapt or die. But Wall Street and Big Business have made a bad problem worse by being greedheads. Lots of CEOs have messed up big time. They let payrolls get bloated. Then to recoup, the offer up employees as sacrifices to Mammon, god of Wall Street, hoping to get their stock price back up. When the price rises, it's like Wall Street spitting on the victim's bodies. Corporate heads, salaries and layoffs: Robert Allen, AT&T. Salary: $3,362,000, 40,000 layoffs. Louis Gerstner, IBM, $2,625,000, 60,000. Robert Palmer, Digital Equipment, $900,016, 20,000. Walter Shipley, Chemical/Chase, $2,496,154, 12,000. Charles Lee, GTE. $2,004,115, 17,000. Ronald Allen, Delta Air Lines, $475,000, 15,000. John McDonnell, McDonnell Douglas, $577,791, 17,000. Robert Stempel, General Motors, $1,000,000, 74,000. Edward Brennan, Sears, Roebuck, $3,075,000, 50,000. Michael Miles, Philip Morris, $1,000,000, 14,000. Frank Shrontz, Boeing, $1,420,935, 28,000. William Ferguson, CEO Nynex, $800,000, 16,800. Albert Dunlap, Scott Paper. $100,000,000 in salary, stock profits and other perks, 11,000.

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Re: Should *WE* Sue Under CDA
by E. ALLEN SMITH 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: IN%"tallpaul(a)pipeline.com" 19-FEB-1996 08:49:19.72 >On a personal and emotional level I *love* the idea of watching a group of >pro-CDA fundie christers having to sweat in court explaining how their >support for things like incest and murder are protected under the First >Amendment but other people's speech is not. It is a rather humorous idea. >But on a logical level, should we use (or advocate) the court system under >CDA-related topics. >I think not. >Allen's post has great emotional appeal, but it creates at least one >danger. >The first is the hypocrisy involved in advocating something with which we >disagree, like asking the courts to support CDA and use CDA to punish those >we don't like. That does have its problems. I've got the same sort of dilemma in my life; to take government funding (for science) or not, when I disapprove of most such funding. I wind up deciding to, because otherwise the funds in question could be spent less efficiently on science (thus further wasting taxpayer funds) or on something even less legitimate (i.e., the Wo(S)D), given that bureaucratic budgets tend to be decided by who uses up the most money. I can justify this by that one would pick a target that had done something directly wrong: participating in the writing of a bill that violates individual rights. In other words, pick a target that deserves it enough, and striking back at them is justified. The problem is the old ends justify means debate. >The second is creating an Orwellian doublethink in politics where we first >advocate something, like useing the courts. Then, when challenged (about >hypocrisy or anything else) turn around and state that we really did not >adovate what we so clearly did advocate or that we did not "mean" what we >so clearly said. >Ultimately, we reinforce a form of political behavior where nobody is >responsible for their political behavior and nobody expects to be held >accountable for it. >Witness the behavior of people like Rep. Shroeder who voted for CDA etc. >including the anti-abortion aspects, but does not want this to count among >the pro-choice crowd because she didn't "really" vote for CDA etc. to get >it to limit abortions. You have a point. -Allen

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