December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: RC4 on FPGAs (Was: Bank transactions on Internet)
by E. ALLEN SMITH 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: =?ISO-8859-1?Q?J=FCri_Kaljundi?= <jk(a)digit.ee> >Once someone gets this kind of cracking device ready, I think it would be >nice to make the information freely available, or start selling these for >nominal price. >This would also make an interesting device connected to Internet. In case >of fast device people could use it either for free or pay using ecash for >using it, and crack their SSL sessions. May be Netscape or Microsoft or >someone else (may be even Community Connexion :) lobbying the government >for allowing export of strong encryption could sponsor it. It should not >be so expencive. Much more useful than amazing fish-cam or coke machine on >Internet. It would make it kind of difficult to argue that 40-bit encryption was anything near the required level, yes. Of course, I'd advise setting it up _outside_ the US or any other country with a habit of disliking cryptography - otherwise they'd just find some excuse or another to shut it down. For instance, you'd probably have to set it up if it were in the US to check where a request was from, in order to not violate some arcane ITAR rule or another. -Allen

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Re: Anonymous Remailer threat: Scientologists may subpoena
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 02:30 PM 4/13/96 -0400, s1113645(a)tesla.cc.uottawa.ca wrote: > > >On Wed, 10 Apr 1996, sameer wrote: > >> >> Frankly, I'm getting antsy. Is C2 going to get subpoena'd or >> not? I would be very disappointed if we don't. >> (Subpeonas envy!) > >All you have to do is call up CoS's lawyers. Let your fingers do the >walking... > >Seriously though, might it not be nicer (easier?) to establish some court >precedents on remailers vs. CoS rather than the government? Think of it as >a preemptive strike. Sounds like forum shopping/defendant shopping/plaintiff shopping. An excellent idea. The best part is that COS is one of the most unsympathetic organizations that could possibly be chosen, with the possible exception of the American Nazi Party or the KKK. The argument of CoS's religious copyright and trade >secrets don't seem to me be as emotionally effective horsemen as "National >Security Threats" or "Child Pornography". I really wouldn't want to see >Congress get away with legislating on remailers in a legal vacuum. I sure hesitate to "hope" that the COS thing gets turned into an SC decision, because that means that SOME defendant has to get pulled through the ringer until he eventually wins. Great for us; terrible for him. >Go for it Sameer. ;-) (Hope you won't be needing Jim's ISP-Aspol inc. >insurance against them pesky scientologists...[double ;-) ]) It's at this point that somebody usually observes that the COS could use AP to get rid of its critics. However, they're forgetting that with AP, its critics can remain absolutely anonymous and still punish COS. It would be no contest.

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Re: Scientologists may subpoena anonymous remailer records
by E. ALLEN SMITH 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: noring(a)netcom.com (Jon Noring) >On Wednesday afternoon, February 8th, three private >investigators visited the Caltech Security Office and the Campus >Computing Organization. The P.I.s wanted to know the identity of >the holder of the account "tc" on the Caltech Alumni Association >computer system (alumni.caltech.edu) They claimed to have >gotten the account name from the anon.penet.fi server via the >Helsinki police. Due to the unusual nature of this request, the >P.I.s were told that Caltech would need more information before >this type of information could be given out. Later that day, an >attorney representing the Church of Scientology called the >campus computing support office demanding the name of the >account holder. The attorney claimed that a document had been >stolen from a CoS computer system, and that the document had >been posted to the a.r.s newsgroup from alumni.caltech.edu via >the anon remailer. (The claim was the document was created on >Jan. 21 and appeared in a.r.s. on Jan. 24). The computing support >staff did not divulge the name of the account holder, and the CoS >attorney was referred to the Caltech General Counsel's office. Given that they didn't have a subpoena at this point, wouldn't the simplest way to solve this problem be to wipe the records? Somehow, I suspect that the judge is unlikely to put Caltech in contempt of court on suspicion that they're lying about the records being wiped. Now, contempt of court out of irritation... -Allen

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Re: PICS
by E. ALLEN SMITH 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: IN%"frantz(a)netcom.com" 12-APR-1996 22:58:59.49 >I had a chance for a brief look at the PICS protocol, and it seems to have >a lot of cypherpunks relevance. It includes features such as: > Multiple third party rating systems No problem. Although it looks like the CDA-replacement bill would essentially require using one with at least as great anti-minor censorship abilities. > Digital signatures This is a problem, unless one simply deletes the signature on modifying a message, and takes the deny-everything-to-minors approach. -Allen

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Re: Tense visions of future imperfect
by David K. Merriman 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- At 11:33 PM 04/13/96 EDT, "E. ALLEN SMITH" <EALLENSMITH(a)ocelot.Rutgers.EDU> wrote: >From: IN%"stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com" "Bill Stewart" 11-APR-1996 00:21:15.87 > >>Personally, I find the idea that the government could hope to track the >>economy so closely as to notice a $10M/year addition to the money supply to >>be disturbing (though it was done in a science fiction story about >>20 years ago :-) With digital cash, it's also unrealistic - we >>finally have a technology for moving money around _without_ >>them being able to track it all, if we want to deploy it. > > One related question is if the government would notice an underground >fully anonymous digital cash setup - transactions disappearing from their >"radar screen." I wouldn't expect Gov't to notice any individual transaction, of course, but doubtless they would eventually notice that the expected amounts of money weren't where anticipated. At that point, I suspect things would get "interesting" (moreso than now :-) regarding currency tracing. Dave Merriman -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMW/Ii8VrTvyYOzAZAQEkdgQAqKqqbAAn3GIaW3/pdHKMWj8zN2FPuIa+ UEwJsz0Kjs4Whlt+UzjygJtKX1sXPnNjjf47l8tDQWqknrhxO1SDBlmsk1lHeM24 FPYFSwWH+y/zhlxjfj0mn2LlLngvN5UuWU7UG2Q7lKk0DjHvxqAYdbQDNfs1bXRm pxlXPaz1T2k= =rnwR -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ------------------------------------------------------------- "Giving money and power to government is like giving whiskey and car keys to teenage boys." P. J. O'Rourke (b. 1947), U.S. journalist. <><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><> http://www.shellback.com/personal/merriman/index.htm

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Re: Enforcing the CDA improperly may pervert Internet architecture
by Alan Olsen 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:15 PM 4/13/96 EDT, E. ALLEN SMITH wrote: > Quite. It's interesting in that regard that, as well as differentiating >between homosexual and heterosexual content, the W3C PICS scheme includes a >filtration scheme for attacks on religions. One wonders if they considered that >Scientology is currently (probably unjustifiedly) considered a religion? The more the irrational and indefensible the faith, the more that the proponents of that faith view any sort of debunking attempt as "an attack". (It is not just Scientologists that suffer from this mentality. I have seen those of the more fanatical Christian varieties make the same claim.) What these schemes will do is shield children from anything resembling a "controversial" discussion. (I expect Cypherpunks to be labeled as "could cause criminal behaviour" or some such malarky by the more protective and clueless. (It may be true, but why warn them upfront? ]:> )) You will see the forces of "good" try and protect the little kidlets from anything that might get them to think for themselves. It is already happening in some sectors of public thought, I expect the net to become its next victim. Soon everything will be "Sanitized for your Protection". --- Alan Olsen -- alano(a)teleport.com -- Contract Web Design & Instruction `finger -l alano(a)teleport.com` for PGP 2.6.2 key http://www.teleport.com/~alano/ "We had to destroy the Internet in order to save it." - Sen. Exon

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Re: Lotus Notes 24-bit sellout
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 09:21 AM 4/12/96 -0700, Jerry Whiting wrote: > >When Ray Ozzie announced the work reduction sellout at the RSA conference, >both he and Ms Denning (whom I spoke with about it later) mentioned that >there was something else in Lotus Notes 4 besides the 40+24 bit compromise. > >My thought is that the NSA gave them something else in exchange for the >mandatory escrow scheme they're all talking about publicly. Perhaps some >other crypto code the NSA had lying around unused. > >So looking for a common 24-bit subkey may reduce Notes' key to a 40-bit >brute force exercise but the 40+24 is probably not ALL that's in Notes 4. > >Definitely a deal with the Devil. Given that we're talking about IBM, not >Lotus none of this surprises me given IBM's Lucifer/DES history with spook >input years ago. Then again to be fair, I don't know if the 40+24 deal >was cooked up before or after the IBM/Lotus merger. What about the following idea, which I think might have been indirectly discussed a few months ago. Let's suppose "you" agreed with the NSA to limit their effort to 40 bits, and put 24 bits at the beginning of the file. The code to do this could be separated and highlighted and identified publicly, and a software patch could be engineered by somebody to NOP this stretch of code to death. The result is that those 24-bits simply don't appear; you've already gotten the export license. The NSA doesn't have any real reason to complain: _ANY_ program can be modified by suitably changing object code bit patterns. An even smaller change would be to put the number of bits to expose ("24") in a byte value ("00011000"), one that will be zeroed by a patch later on. I guess I'm not really suggesting this; I think that even appearing to come to some arrangement with the NSA is wrong. However, it would be an excellent way to give the finger to the NSA, because there is no way that they can ensure that a given program is "finagle-proof."

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cyherpunks archive
by Kris Steven Shannon 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I can't get access to the cypherpunks archive at berkeley Is there a mirror site anywhere? (I don't have FTP access but have been using ftpmail(a)doc.ic.ac.uk) Any suggestions very welcome! Thanx. -- Kris Shannon <kss01(a)cs.uow.edu.au> 1st year Bachelor of Computer Science.

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Re: Digital Cash Escrow
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 08:51 PM 4/11/96 -0400, Jean-Francois Avon wrote: >Does anyone, especially in Canada, ever noticed that them or their local net >friends had their snail mail opened? > >A friend of mine has his regularly opened; he complained to Canada Post >three times, but it stills goes on AFAIK. He is pissed off at me, convinced >that the forwarding of Jim Bell's AP related articles is what justified the >mail opening. Actually, he does not even reply to my e-mails anymore. >We used to be great friends... >Neither of us ever engaged in any subversive activities or are involved in >illegal actions. It seems that FUD got him. ...sigh... It does sound like the guy is overreacting a bit. However, I don't know much about Quebec politics; with that close vote recently on separation, perhaps they are getting nervous about things. Is he in Quebec? I can say, however, that I've never gotten any kind of "official" feedback on the subject, not that I really expect it. I've gotten a few inquiries which on the surface appear to be innocuous, but which I suspect have hidden motives. This could be a little hidden official research, or maybe just self-motivated individuals trying to do a "good deed." It doesn't matter; my idea doesn't need any secrets in order to be successful.

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Re: Watch your language, Shabbir.
by Rich Burroughs 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 08:34 PM 4/13/96 -0800, jim bell <jimbell(a)pacifier.com> wrote: >At 08:07 PM 4/13/96 -0400, s1113645(a)tesla.cc.uottawa.ca wrote: >> >>On Tue, 9 Apr 1996, jim bell wrote: >> >>> Look, very carefully, at the last paragraph quoted above. Mr. Safdar says, >>> "No reasonable person is objecting to the FBI's right to conduct a wiretap." >> >>That's right. Because no reasonable person thinks they can convince Congress >>or the Supremes otherwise. It isn't impossible, but energies are best spent >>elsewhere, like getting the Burns bill passed. > >But that's not entirely the issue. Mr. Safdar's wording is critical, >because it concedes FAR too much about what the government is assumedly >entitled to do. Below, you've admitted that everybody here believes in what >Mr. Safdar claims "no reasonable person" believes. [snip] No. Shabbir claims just what he said, AFAIK, that "no reasonable person is objecting..." A very different matter. What I believe and what I choose to object to through organized political initiatives may be two different things. If Shabbir's wording is so critical, why did you change it by adding "believes?" I don't believe government should be able to wiretap it's citizens, but I also don't think there's a snowball's chance in hell of taking that power away from the FBI. That's why I want strong crypto. There is a far greater chance of getting some decent crypto legislation enacted than of completely removing the FBI's authority to wiretap. It's a much more "reasonable" goal, in that sense. There are people much more deserving of cypherpunk scorn than someone who works as hard on these issues as Shabbir. It's pretty pathetic, Jim. Rich ______________________________________________________________________ Rich Burroughs richieb(a)teleport.com http://www.teleport.com/~richieb See my Blue Ribbon Page at http://www.teleport.com/~richieb/blueribbon New EF zine "cause for alarm" - http://www.teleport.com/~richieb/cause

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