December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Monthly Remailer Perfs, Prelims
by Bruce Baugh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I'm in the process of running what I guess will be my monthly series of remailer tests, where I send posts through a given remailer to a nym at c2 and then back through the remailer to me. While it'll be most of a week before I'm done, some preliminary observations. - armadillo and hroller are sorely missed. - remailer(a)valhalla.phoenix.net is, so I'm told, not a valid address. And I get a failure to find the host name at wmono(a)spook.alias.net. Anyone want to shed light on this? - performance is noticeably slower throughout. In January I routinely got messages back in five to ten minutes. Now the shortest round trip is about fifty minutes. Is the load on the remailers that much higher, or are other factors at work? -- Bruce Baugh bruce(a)aracnet.com http://www.aracnet.com/~bruce

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Re: True random numbers
by Sandy Harris 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Deranged Mutant <wlkngowl(a)unix.asb.com> wrote: >maruishi(a)netcom.com wrote: >> >> I was trying to think of a way to come up with true random numbers... >> And knowing a bit of UNIX socket TCP/IP programming I made a small [..] > >I wouldn't trust the samples taken from networked sources. Me neither, in general. A possible exception: I wonder if the checksums on Ethernet or IP packets use a reasonably strong CRC algorithm. If so, they might be a decent source of randomness in an environment where you could be sure the Black Hats couldn't see them. e.g. using only packets from your own LAN, suitably protected by firewall & good administration. >You're better >off with a kernel patch that samples from local sources directly like >disk or keyboard timing variations... such patches already exist, with >similar drivers developed for DOS and OS/2 systems as well. I'd be more inclined to hash the kernel's internal tables, e.g. process & file descriptor tables. These should vary quite a lot & if the enemy can see them, random number quality is the least of your worries. RFC 1750 is a good reference on this problem. -- Sandy Harris sharris(a)fox.nstn.ca

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Re: Computer unmasks Anonymous writer...
by um＠c2.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>in the Mathematics Department took part in a statistical analysis of the >Letters of Junius, which appeared anonyously in the Morning Advertiser in >London in the early 1760s. They were ascribed to almost every writer of You can find some more information by searching for "stylometry" or "forensic stylometry" on the net, and probably more in libraries.

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Denver area meeting today, 2/18, 2 pm
by awestrop＠crl.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- The Usual Suspects will congregate today at the Tivoli, and may visit Majordomo's Net Cafe or other sites of interest. Anyone who's not hanging out with Steve Jackson, Larry Niven, et al, at the Lakewood Sheraton is welcome to drop by; send me a note if you need directions. N. B. -- The Tivoli was built in 1890 to brew Denver beer, Aspen beer, Tivoli beer, etc., and is NOT affiliated with IBM!$%#&@! :-) Alan Westrope PGP public key: http://www.nyx.net/~awestrop <awestrop(a)nyx.net> <awestrop(a)crl.com> PGP 0xB8359639: D6 89 74 03 77 C8 2D 43 7C CA 6D 57 29 25 69 23 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMSc0hFRRFMq4NZY5AQEvvAQAqPy2YsGsbjiLz2vWvB0RPvdpcURCytRS hgCNlbNdMIA5upDzIjhRW4YlkM73cfwl/PQBRy+maXNrNM1QYXVh4wh3khcJoRh1 kVPUNYycz3HaDIH/PFGojgzJXUFhcDhRvEtTsywfhkK8OvifnkFCXAOST8rrygip n+FYY4taFTc= =OhuU -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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PUF_fup
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

2-18-96. NYT: "Nerds' Revenge: A How-To Manual. Silicon Valley Is Paved with Paper Fortunes, And Quick Ways To Enjoy them." A long look at how Netscapers are able to quickly get around stock locks and gorge on roadkills while predatory Wall Street and vulture banks eat their guts. Fancy cars and tacky houses are lampooned. "Internet Dreams: from $.10 to $30." A squint at creating instant wealth in the Cybercash puff-up. PUF_fup

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Re: Using lasers to communicate
by ericd＠shop.internet.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

That URL should be: httpd://www.lasercomm/lasercomm Eric P.S. Thanks John for pointing this out! At 8:42 PM 2/17/96, Eric Davis wrote: >Woooa there.... > >Lasers are not exactly expensive or complicated.... > >Check out www.lasercomm.com. 4-15Mb/s lasers. >or Cannon 10-100Mb/s lasers. > >I have installed these products *many* times and their setup and operation >is fast and efficient. (used to work for Interop) > >Exmaple: >We used a pair of these, and MBONE, to provide a 2 way real time video >confrence link joining an IETF session between a room of >users at Japan Interop (local) and a group in Sweeden (IETF). The setup >a was last minute point to point Ethernet link from the confrence center >to a local hotel acress the road. We had 1.5 hours to perform ALL >of the work, from wiring both roofs, seting up the lasers, wiring >the internal hotel/confrence center, and setting up systems and projectors. >!!The Laser setup took about :15 minutes, tops!! > >BTW: With this system the transmit "beam" is focused into a "spot" half >way between the sending and receiving units. The receiving unit >is tuned to look for that focused "spot". This means that there is a >very large (area wise) low power laser pattern behind each of the >receivers! With a sensitive enough receiver, it is possible to hear >this signal! > >When you need to transport a data stream (1-155Mb/s) to a remote >site, this solution works out to be *MUCH* cheaper than leasing >circuits from bell, bypass folks, etc.. > >Another case in point: We (ISN) needed to transport a 100Mb/s (FDDI) between \ >2 sites. Upon checking, the price of PacBell "dim" fiber was outrageous! >We had no MFS/TCG/etc fiber in the man hole to latch onto. The choice was >clear. > >As for security, the bottom line is that encryption devices are cheap. > >Last plus for these units is that most foreign countries do not prevent >the use of these point to point optical devices. This is not the case >for spread spectrum multipoint or microwave point to point radio devices. > >Eric Davis > > > >At 10:44 PM 2/17/96, SINCLAIR DOUGLAS N wrote: >>> If you have a secure link you don't need encryption. Arguably, the >>> converse is true; if you have secure encryption you don't need >>> a secure link. Isn't the ability to transmit secure data over >>> insecure channels one of the primary justifications for encryption? >>> >> >>Of course. My point, though I seem to have failed to state it, >>is that encryption is a cheap software thing while laser beams >>are expensive, complicated, and still not secure. > >------------------------------------------------------------- >Eric Davis -- ericd(a)internet.net >Director, Information Systems >Internet Shopping Network -- http://www.internet.net/ >415-846-7449 Voice -- 415-842-7415 Fax -- KD6HTO Radio >------------------------------------------------------------- >- One by one our rights are taken, One by one we loose our >- freedom. Step by step we're coming for them, One by one >- we're coming. - Inka Inka - Myth of the Machine - Step Back ------------------------------------------------------------- Eric Davis -- ericd(a)internet.net Director, Information Systems Internet Shopping Network -- http://www.internet.net/ 415-846-7449 Voice -- 415-842-7415 Fax -- KD6HTO Radio ------------------------------------------------------------- - One by one our rights are taken, One by one we loose our - freedom. Step by step we're coming for them, One by one - we're coming. - Inka Inka - Myth of the Machine - Step Back

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Style Analyzer (was Re: Computer unmasks Anonymous writer)
by Mark M. 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Since I got more e-mails asking for the "style faking" program then I expected, I have decided to put it on my homepage (mentioned in my .sig). I will try to compile it for DOS, but I don't know how system dependant it is. - --Mark =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= markm(a)voicenet.com | finger -l for PGP key 0xf9b22ba5 http://www.voicenet.com/~markm/ | bd24d08e3cbb53472054fa56002258d5 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3 Charset: noconv iQCVAwUBMSdJnbZc+sv5siulAQEVEgQAj4/HEorDRAHl8ncOfEYekRWo0/3a5357 FMQZn7ABpqxOXnVSAxlYeb84Y6yKg73gEeZUfbnn2LVCxBLr3lW5EeIpUgjI9AMt fXTA6ExqcIEk+5249YKx9h+9eHbV+8iK/fAzVzV5oHoTyCV0K8B+Lmx2hCtYZPyG fW2WSyW+ML8= =iQO+ -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Numbers don't lie...
by A. Padgett Peterson P.E. Information Security 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Have finally gotten around to reading the Jersey Seven paper on keylengths. Is rather amazing since if anything they are being conservative with some of their numbers - are using 30 Mhz for the FPGA where I have been using 40 & using 200 Mhz for ASICs where I would use 300 (year and a half ago I used 150mhz based on what I knew *had* been built, not what I knew X-ray lithography is capable of. In their figures, they do seem to gloss over a couple of minor points: The most compelling to me is "how do you know when you broke it ?". Bruce has always used the "known plaintext" approach, however using modern techniques for messaging, *every* message has a different session key, negotiated using assymetric keying so the only message that will be broken is one that you already have - not terribly helpful. The second point is that their scalability seems to be based on costs per chip alone, cost for which the engineering cost has been recovered and for which the yeild is significant, hardly givens when you are talking pushing the state of the art, given this 200 Mhz Pentiums would be U$10.00 also (well, maybe U$25.00). Finally, no cost is allocated to the sustem required to program/evaluate the ponderings of these 100's of ASICs. As anyone who has ever programmed a massively parallel computer (which is what they are talking about in their brute force machine, it is the boundary communications that kill you. True, each machine could operate on a specific portion of the keyspace with bits fixed as a function of its address, but each will need to be loaded with the plaintext to match and have some means to communicate success. You also have to consider that dividing the keyspace may result in some processors running slower than others due to the values used. Another minor problem in parallel processors. The cost is given of U$300,000 to build a SOA machine that could break DES in 3 hours. Using the 200 Mhz (2*10^8) figure and assuming 1 trial per clock (being nice), a single chip will test 2.2*10^12 keys in that period. 2^55 is otoa 3.6*10^16 so will require 16,680 thingies running in parallel. If they can get the chips for U$10, they will be able to allocate another whole U$10.00 per chip to the support structure and basic programming to stay inside the budget. Since this will hardly be a production process, I suspect that the cost might be a tad higher. Now often banking and EDI (as opposed to EC) does make the mistake of using the same key for more than one message. Similarly a firewall<>firewall connection might beep a single keyed channel open for multiple sessions. This would be at risk. But for individual messages. The paper does make an appropriate observation: the cost is essentially fixed per key (scaling is not perfect but can ignore that for the moment - has to do with why Crays are circular and Grace's "nanosecond"). This means that the strength of cryptography should be appropriate to the value of the information protected. If less than U$10,000, the message is individually encrypted, and has value only today, then DES is probably "good enough". Strategic information of higher value arguably needs "more" but how much ? 64 bits is 256 times stronger than DES. This would indicate effective security up to say U$2.5 million. More is better but I would not be quite so alarmist nor would I dismiss the cost of engineering. Non-trivial. Do agree that 40 bits is the same as no crypto at all (reminds me of Bob Clampett's "No Bikini Atoll" but is another hobby entirely). Still, at what point is it simply easier/cheaper to buy someone who knows the secret ? Warmly, Padgett ps calculation made with a Sharp EL-5806 "scientific" calculator that is probably older than some readers. If I dropped a digit, please let me know.

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Re: Some thoughts on the Chinese Net
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 05:38 PM 2/14/96 -0500, Perry wrote: >Jon Lasser writes: >> The more complex portion (from my perspective, at any rate) is a >> modification of the standard TCP/IP protocol, requiring that each packet >> be signed by its originating user. This would require lots of software >> modification on the Chinese end, as well as a conversion process at the >> National firewall. > >They could use no stock software, and they would grind every machine >in the country to its knees doing the signatures. RSA signatures >aren't cheap. Could you use IPv6 / IPSP authentication to do the job? You'd obviously need to create network software for the various operating systems, but for most of them it's not a big change and various well-known people are working on implementations :-) You could get by with something cheap like an RSA-signed key used for a MAC with either RC4 or MD5, reducing the problem to one RSA signature per connection plus faster algorithms. For email, that's probably still one signature per mail message, but it's a manageable load... #-- # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com / billstewart(a)attmail.com +1-415-442-2215 # http://www.idiom.com/~wcs Pager +1-408-787-1281 ! Frank Zappa for President !

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Re: DES_ono
by Frank Willoughby 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Two brief questions about DES, if I may. I have heard of a couple of rumours that DES is considered to be fairly weak. Specifically, the rumors mentioned that there were some questions about the design of the S-boxes and the possibility that there was a trap door which would permit the NSA or other gov't agency to quickly obtain the cleartext. Another rumour was that the French & Israeli intelligence agencies downgraded the classification of DES to one of the lowest strengths of encryption algorithms. I have been wondering about these issues off & on for a while & have tried to do some research on them, but have come up with nothing which would amount to more than hearsay. It's tough to tell if the rumours stem from urban legends or are based on fact. If it isn't too much trouble, I'd appreciate an expert opinion of the two rumours mentioned above. Assuming the rumours of the weakness of DES are true, which symmetric encryption algorithms would you recommend which are substantially more secure than DES (and which are obtainable from Internet or commercial sources)? (It doesn't haver to be exportable). Thanks in advance for your help. Best Regards, Frank <standard disclaimer> The opinions expressed above are of the author and may not necessarily be representative of Fortified Networks Inc. Fortified Networks Inc. - Management & Information Security Consulting Phone: (317) 573-0800 - http://www.fortified.com/fortified Home of the Free Internet Firewall Evaluation Checklist

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