December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: M A F_i o s
by rah＠shipwright.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 6:35 PM 3/2/96, Bill Stewart wrote: * "Buckaroo Banzai against the World Crime League".... Onk? ...another BB movie? Did they make another one???? Cheers, Bob (I may have been one of the four people who saw the movie in an actual theatre...) ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "Reality is not optional." --Thomas Sowell The e$ Home Page: http://thumper.vmeng.com/pub/rah/

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NYT login
by David Lesher 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At one point, some kind souls were entering "username: cypherpunks" logins for all the various "free" www sites. Did anyone catch the www.nytimes.com one? If so, what password? -- A host is a host from coast to coast.................wb8foz(a)nrk.com & no one will talk to a host that's close........[v].(301) 56-LINUX Unless the host (that isn't close).........................pob 1433 is busy, hung or dead....................................20915-1433

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Re: Truelly Random Numbers
by Mutant Rob 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Timothy C. May wrote: [..] > Now, is the modulus, n = pq, any more factorable than if a "more > random" source of p and q were used? > > (I am actually asking this as a real question. Does anyone know if > factoring is significantly easier for such not-completely-random > numbers? I would expect that in theory it is, but in practice this is > not a useful point of entry into factoring n. Just a hunch.) > Only if I can have a good enough idea of the non-random method for generating numbers, or if I can find some useful statistical correlations in your numbers. (And then again, what do you mean by "significantly easier"? Knowing 1 bit reduces the work by half, but with orders or thousands of bits, it's not much help.) Whether I can realisitically reproduce or work with that non-random method of key generation is another matter, though. Rob. - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBMTkHYCoZzwIn1bdtAQHdSgGAzgoS4Y1BQuI5hzlsLsfnoKyzVALJD3TR Mm5Dmu/I5N3Rnk9TxNviwLFjKp6Fd35Z =UnWo -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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No Subject
by nobody＠vegas.gateway.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Thought that this was worth reposting: >I attended last weeks "Information, National Policies, and International >Infrastructure" Symposium at Harvard Law School, organized by the Global >Information Infrastructure Commission, the Kennedy School and the >Institute for Information Technology Law & Policy of Harvard Law School. > >During the presentation by Paul Strassmann, National Defense University >and William Marlow, Science Applications International Corporation, >entitled "Anonymous Remailers as Risk-Free International Infoterrorists" >the questions was raised from audience (Professor Chaarles Nesson, >Harvard LAw School) - in a rather extended debate - whether the CIA and >similar government agencies are involved in running anonymous remailers >as this would be a perfect target to scan possibly illegal messages. > >Both presenters explicitly acknowledged that a number of anonymous >remnailers in the US are run by government agencies scanning traffic. >Marlow said that the government runs at least a dozen remailers and that >the most popular remailers in France and Germany are run by the >respective government agencies in these countries. In addition they >mentioned that the NSA has successfully developed systems to break >encrypted messages below 1000 bit of key length and strongly suggested >to use at least 1024 bit keys. They said that they semselves use 1024 >bit keys. > >I ask Marlos afterwards if these comments were off or on record, he >paused then said that he can be quoted. > >So I thought I pass that on. It seems interesting enough, don't you >think? > >Best > >Viktor Mayer-Schoenberger >Information Law Project >Austrian Institute for Legal Policy > Groundfog(a)alpha.c2.org

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RNG method
by jf_avon＠citenet.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I thought of that for a long time. - Use a microphone on your sound card and locate it close to the computer fan. - generate a (relatively short) set of random number, maybe using the PRNG of the computer. - Use the LSB of the sampled sound, the sampling being done at intervals fixed by the serie of numbers generated by the PRNG. - when the numbers generated by the prng are exausted, re-use part of the output stream as a random source of numbers for the sampling interval. - keep doing this up until: 1) you are fed up of looking at RND numbers on your screen 2) you have no use for rnd numbers anymore 3) your hard disk is full 4) your computer cpu is so mixed up that it starts outputting all your PGP encrypted files in Serbo-Croatian cleartext 5) any other reasons deemed reasonable by the computer operator 6) none of the above Whaddyathink of it? Regards to almost all Cyphering Punksters JFA Please note, my new key signature is: 2048 bits key Id: C58ADD0D 1996/03/01 Jean-Francois Avon <jf_avon(a)citenet.net> fingerprint = 52 96 45 E8 20 5A 8A 5E F8 7C C8 6F AE FE F8 91 But I'll still use my old key for signing for a while. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2i iQCVAwUBMTi0fwOWptJXIUrtAQE2DgP/S8VRX3PbrKHMKl6JJrFvZgZhdhzOk8Am 8qLJzvwjGZ7ll1gZTYT5iLfAEw+03wpy0eS/ohYdlgQ0Xu9AI418uLP6dReQbsjg ndz9/LIaQeOmrZgL1BlAtk9119QmtCdzx59gwwngz1qNYUZNhJ4l10UGz2EWksXI 51Lve+FjKE0= =zdM0 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- **** OLD KEY: USE ONLY FOR VERIFYING SIGNATURES **** 1024 bits Key ID:57214AED 1995/10/04 Jean-Francois Avon <jf_avon(a)citenet.net> 84 96 76 AE EB 7C AB 15 88 47 87 B0 18 31 74 9F

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Re: Remailers run by spooks
by Just Rich 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- On Mon, 4 Mar 1996, Anonymous (or so he thinks!) wrote: > >Both presenters explicitly acknowledged that a number of anonymous > >remnailers in the US are run by government agencies scanning traffic. > >Marlow said that the government runs at least a dozen remailers and that > >the most popular remailers in France and Germany are run by the > >respective government agencies in these countries. In addition they > >mentioned that the NSA has successfully developed systems to break > >encrypted messages below 1000 bit of key length and strongly suggested > >to use at least 1024 bit keys. They said that they semselves use 1024 > >bit keys. > > I don't know about everyone else, but I consider this, if true, to be a > MAJOR worry. It never ceases to amaze me how lightly the government takes > lying to the people. Unfortunately I don't have the contacts or resources > to do any further investigation, I hope this thread is resolved one way or > another soon. Yeah, didn't you know that Sameer was on the CIA payroll? How do you think he paid for his new Ferrari? I have no doubt that the CIA can break 1000-bit keys on a case-by-case basis, *if they decide to allocate the resources*. I think it's possible that some remailers are run by spooks. However, I seriously doubt that anyone is breaking stuff routinely, and I think the web of trust is pretty good. Of course, the CIA had Ames... the reverse could easily be true. However, I also have no doubt that Strassmann and Marlow are spreading disinformation and exaggerating their capabilities in an attempt to break the web of trust and incite a witch hunt. It won't work. The answer in any case is more use of remailers, not less. Just turn up the noise level. You already know that nothing is 100% secure, but you do what you can. It's a war of attrition. - -rich - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBMTp7ayoZzwIn1bdtAQFJXgGAg8I4+IwZYrDI46bMj2nED+Dh0AeoMJVs PP10Ui5u46sXDAUjpMzJSwv5EqdIOEKy =611k -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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(Fwd) White House mail bomb protest?
by Deranged Mutant 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In regards to the few messages about mailbombing the prez's box... ------- Forwarded Message Follows ------- |From jms(a)tennis.opus1.com Sun Feb 11 06:57:22 1996 |From: jms(a)tennis.opus1.com (Joel M Snyder, writing fool) |Subject: High mail volumes at whitehouse.gov |Newsgroups: comp.mail.misc,comp.security.misc,news.admin.net-abuse.misc |Date: 9 Feb 96 16:03:20 -0700 |Organization: Opus One, Tucson, Arizona |Message-ID: <1996Feb9.160320.495(a)tennis.opus1.com> Folks: Good day. By way of introduction, I'm the consultant who did the "anti-mailstorm/anti-mailbomb" software that runs on the MX host for WHITEHOUSE.GOV. Now that the Telecom. Act of 1996 has been signed, the volume of mail through WHITEHOUSE.GOV has gone up significantly. For example, there were about 85,000 lines in the mail log file yesterday. Most of that is just people who want to express their opinion. However, several misguided individuals have decided that they want to throw a monkey wrench into the works by storming the President's email. I'm writing this to let any system administrators out there know that you may find mail from your site to WHITEHOUSE.GOV is not moving very quickly. This is normal; it's a sign that the automatic protections of that system have kicked in. Without going into details, if too many messages come from a single site, the mail handler will throttle back accepting messages. Eventually, though, the mail will be accepted for delivery. If you have legitimate mail, it will eventually get through (many messages from the same correspondent will be flushed without acknowledgement). However, correspondents who were used to getting a reply within seconds telling them that their message was accepted may see a substantial delay. Finally, if any users on your site have any delusions about the effect of a mail bomb or storm of mail, let me help you dispel them: (1) no one important enough to make a difference will be affected or know or care; (2) if the messages are nasty or threatening enough, someone equally nasty may come and visit; (3) what you'll succeed most in doing is ruining the weekends and/or days of underpaid civil servants as well as wasting federal tax dollars. Please feel free to redistribute this or use parts of it in your motd. Joel Snyder (jms(a)opus1.com) PS: I don't read these newsgroups and am spending most of the weekend trying to make sure that the mail system doesn't melt down anyway, so if there is discussion on this, I won't see it. --------- end forwarded mesage ------------- Rob. --- Send a blank message with the subject "send pgp-key" (not in quotes) to <WlkngOwl(a)unix.asb.com> for a copy of my PGP key.

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PGP PRNG seeds?
by jf_avon＠citenet.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi! I tinkered with the switch pgp +makerandom=size output.fil Is there a way to "seed" the PRNG with another file, say , part of an encrypted text file? Thanks JFA

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Mainstreaming PGP on Usenet
by Bruce Baugh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I'm surprised nobody has brought this up before.... FIRST CALL FOR VOTES (of 2) moderated group soc.culture.russian.moderated <snip> 6. Individuals in the database of known readers may post freely to the group, subject to the conditions in sections 1-4 above. If need arises, the robomoderator may perform PGP verification of the identity of the known reader and, if the reader requests so, automatically reject all the submissions from the reader without a valid PGP signature. -- Bruce Baugh bruce(a)aracnet.com http://www.aracnet.com/~bruce

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Re: RNG method
by Mutant Rob 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Jean-Francois Avon (JFA Technologies, QC, Canada) wrote: > > I thought of that for a long time. > > - Use a microphone on your sound card and locate it close to the > computer fan. It's been thought of before, along with scraping the microphone against the desk. I've been told this works best when first turning the gain up on the soundcard and setting it for stereo input. The raw data and be processed cryptographically (with a cipher or run through a hash). This method will be an option for the NOISE.SYS driver eventually. - --Rob PS - noise049.zip has been uploaded to a few sites today. When I get confirmation I'll announce it... - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBMTke4SoZzwIn1bdtAQHQ3wF9GsZjk+jbtWrap8sKcSXDQ3n8GVksofBX CaVPqXKiE7CxB41hbo2ftSFqQ+P3XhFX =gdTO -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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