December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Easy Nuclear Detonator
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:14 PM 2/19/96 EDT, E. ALLEN SMITH wrote: > I would have appreciated it if you'd sent this to me privately, or at >least didn't enclose my message to you (which was sent in private email). Among >other reasons, it is rather off-topic (unless one wants to count it among bomb >information available on the net). > -Allen Uh, okay, sorry. See, I wrote the response for you, and at the last minute I realized that I might as well include it to the list as well. Yes, it is "off topic" but I thought it was interesting reading anyway. In addition, I gave the list 12+ hours of "warning" and asked if anybody objected... All I got was an "attaboy" from Dr. Dmitri Vulis. As for the inclusion of your private note: sorry again. But at the time, it just didn't occur to me that you'd object to this. "Nettiquette" is new to me. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com.

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Re: Remailers not heard from; info?
by David E. Smith 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- At 01:31 PM 2/19/96 -0800, bruce@aracnet wrote: >A fix along the lines of > >:: >don't-send-anything-after-this > >might be readily applicable. Don't some remailers support the "Cutmarks" header, which does essentially that? A useful reference for this is Raph's remailers list; among the numbers and cryptic little charts is a listing of which remailers support which features. dave -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAwUBMSkaFDVTwUKWHSsJAQGCjAf+K5TW4yRol6a0L2xclbrU84MMA3FtmpCE xyx016KEOxEfVGBflsg3phRYSfY13Ezjxkrmkv449wsOAlRamwFpgCTcpDNU+dKk YXrJGnQ2PMNYPXZNNK/CObHEFA2xl3peITMF27NrLcGkC2On4r+geajyV8QZo+RF bNmPJ6fc5FTyl1BNAe0L/spucxx1wDG+IgKZP9IX+I3niJJBdxj73N4AAz3loesq +qwB9NRceFtNYdoigYUxC9nhB0s90C1fJtkc0/M8Jv0Qd0S4FosU+e1HSCkNLgXU ALuoXkhhRFmBAIW9Qf6aLKK4ANgt9DfmKIoHaBYy1B1GBKhxLHEWqw== =Fzjc -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ----- David E. Smith, c/o Southeast Missouri State University 1000 Towers Circle South MS 1210 Cape Girardeau MO 63701 dsmith(a)midwest.net, dsmith(a)alpha.c2.org, PGP 0x961D2B09 (573)339-3814 http://www.midwest.net/scribers/dsmith/ "Reality is only for those lacking in true imagination."

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Re: Remailers not heard from; info?
by Mutant 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I think it would be better to use some commands indicating the start and end of the messages... ::begin-body [message goes here] ::end-body - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBMSke8ioZzwIn1bdtAQEQBgGAq91bmP74lyy4PIiTrZmYkg3zDBbt3Ke/ fLcVQNmXFZuYR5s5FkfX9DKLmY3Vkg1v =jI5z -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Remailers not heard from; info?
by Mutant 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- The c2 remailers always bounce from full disks for the last couple of months when I've tried to use them. I've had problems with amnesia as well. I've noticed some that allegedly allow replacement of subject do not. - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBMSkeaSoZzwIn1bdtAQF1YAF8DQDN1BnrJ0DU5Vp3Ac9Z8id91UGurocG kAyHUUEnMXD2eFa1K4PPI+VCrFQBFKgs =pC+m -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Remailers not heard from; info?
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:41 PM 2/19/96, Alex Strasheim wrote: > >o Depending on a remailer to strip your sig doesn't give you security wrt >the remailer operator. If you use encryption, the last remailer on the >chain will see your sig, which will be in the innermost encrypted block. >That defeats the purpose of chaining. If you're not using encryption, you >don't have any security anyay. Exactly. Further, in an earlier message Bruce Baugh asked why some remailers did not more promptly remail their messages. Bruce, you need to look at Raph Levien's statistics on remailers, inclduding batching/latency: rapid responses tend to defeat the traffic analysis features of remailers! Also, preserving subject lines through remailings, another feature Bruce is requesting, is kind of like barium-tagging one's messages! Why use remailer chains if the messages are tagged all the way through? (There are wrinkles that work, such as adding a subject line based on stuff stored inside the encrypted block a remailer opens for furhter processing. The nth remailer can add a suject line that may be different for every hop, or only added near or at the end of the remailings...) Those who want more "user-friendly" remailer features would do well to think about what the properties of an "ideal mix" are. >A better solution might be a specialized remailer that strips sigs for >people who need the service. People who need sig stripping could put >that remailer in the chain, and the rest of us could handle our sigs on >our own. And for "casual-grade remailing," where no encryption is used and where minimal other mix features are used, there are Web pages that will send simple messages through a user-selectable remailer (http://www.c2.org:80/remail/by-www.html) This Web remailer will _not_ automatically add a .sig, as it is not a mail program per se, and the only text that is remailed is what is entered into the on-screen window. --Tim May Boycott espionage-enabled software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 - 1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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SOTP = Snake Oil Time Pad
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:53 PM 2/19/96, Mike McNally wrote: >IPG Sales writes: > > For short messages, a true OTP is used directly. > >Quick question: does anybody at IPG know what the "O" in "OTP" stands >for? I think it is "O for Oil," as in Snake Oil. The view of some seems to be "We're selling Internet Security products because that's where the money and the suckers are, and anything with "Internet" and "Security" in it will mean a quick couple of million when we take our company public." --Tim May Boycott espionage-enabled software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 - 1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: Optical repeaters
by droelke＠rdxsunhost.aud.alcatel.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> > > > Optical > > > repeaters have to pass your signal through an intermediate electronic > > > stage anyway, since we have no purely optical valve/transistor > > > equivalents (bosons don't interact with each other at all). > > Dave Emery responds: > > This is not true. There is now a whole technology of optical > > amplifiers for fiber communications systems that used Ettrium doped > > fibers pumped with strong light from a laser at a slightly shorter > > wavelength. These fiber optical amplifiers have gains in the order of > > 10-12 db in a section of special doped fiber only about 10 feet long. > > You're right, I do remember reading about these somewhere... didn't > realize they were already in use. Optical amplifiers - they are in use all right. Want to buy one? My employer sells them. (get out a big checkbook though - gotta cover my salary ;-) > Even so, I still don't think such a repeater would pass quantum-crypto > signals, excepting any photons that happened to just "leak" directly > through. Your useful quantum state information resides in the > individual photons originally sent, and any even the optical repeaters > you describe achieve gain by by gating in *more* photons under the > incoming signal's control. In so doing it will collapse the > wavefunctions of these incoming photons. > > Not to say repeaters on the line aren't possible, but they'll have to > decode your data using a copy of the "secret" key, then re-encode for > transmission... so this will be a potential break-in point and need > good physical security. This is essentially true for the purpose of quantum-crypto. The cascade of phontons triggered from the incoming photons would mask most of your original phontons - necesitating a secure "repeater". > > The current generation of undersea cables from the US to Europe > > use these amplifiers instead of the more traditional regenerating > > repeaters that convert the light to electronic signals, reclock the data > > stream and convert it back to light with another laser diode. There is > > no conversion from light to digital electronic signals all the way from > > Rhode Island to England - the same light pulses that go into the fiber > > on one side of the Atlantic come out on the other end without ever > > having been converted to electronic form in between. > > You said power for the amps comes from a high-intensity, > shorter-wavelength beam... can this be superimposed on the original > signal at the point of origin, as with in-line coax-cable amplifiers? Power for the amps must be electrical. So, a seperate power cable must be run seperate with the optical-fiber. This normally isn't a problem since the casing/etc of the fibers has lots of metal for protection anyways. > > These amplfiers have enourmous bandwidth, and can be used to > > amplify several slightly different wavelengths of light allowing > > wavelength division multiplexing of multiple streams of light flashes of > > slightly different "colors" (all the current technology works at around > > 1500 nm which is well into the infrared). This can expand the capacity > > of a single fiber to four to six times the 5 Gb/sec that is the current > > state of the art. > > Nice... :) > Very nice! ;-) Flouride based amplifiers should be able to handle up to 16 channels. Using state of the art time-multiplex stuff of 10 Gb/sec gives a total throughput of 160 Gb/Sec.... smoking! Of course the parts for all of this will set you pack a sizeable chunk of change. If you want to see some further reading about optical amplifiers as applied in a telephone network - find a copy of "Telephony" a trade rag. There is an article by John Moss and ??? here at Alcatel that explains stuff in high level terms. (little to no physics stuff) Dan ------------------------------------------------------------------ Dan Oelke Alcatel Network Systems droelke(a)aud.alcatel.com Richardson, TX

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No Subject
by ricksorak＠ichange.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

unsubsribe rick.sorak(a)ichange.com

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Re: Optical repeaters
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:45 AM 2/20/96, Alexandra Griffin wrote: (about inline optical amplifiers/regenerators) >You're right, I do remember reading about these somewhere... didn't >realize they were already in use. > >Even so, I still don't think such a repeater would pass quantum-crypto >signals, excepting any photons that happened to just "leak" directly >through. Your useful quantum state information resides in the >individual photons originally sent, and any even the optical repeaters >you describe achieve gain by by gating in *more* photons under the >incoming signal's control. In so doing it will collapse the >wavefunctions of these incoming photons. Given that a quantum cryptography system depends on *single photons* to work, I'm not sure that talk of amplifification makes sense. Between source and receiver, a photon either makes it or doesn't. If it makes it, it makes it will its full "quanta" of energy, of course. If it doesn't make it, due to tunnel-penetrating the walls of the fiber or scattering off an impurity in the fiber, then it just doesn't make it, so no amplification/regeneration is possible. (Regenerate _what_?) But the quantum measurement issue, aside from the above, is an interesting one. We have to be careful here (and I'm including myself, not just using the royal "we"). It isn't clear to me that the amplification/regeneration process counts as making a measurement, from some recent work I've read (sorry, don't recall the references, but could be a recent issue of "Scientific American"). In interference measurements, the wave function collapses if individual photons are counted and recorded (whatever "recorded" really means...) and the interference pattern vanishes. If the photons are not counted and/or recorded, the pattern reappears. By analogy, it is not clear to me that a simple regeneration mechanism, with no local observer or recording apparatus, will collapse the wave function. Seems to me an experiment may have already been done along these lines: separate fibers producing an interference pattern and then these inline amps added...if the interference pattern remains, as I would expect, then the amps/regenerators did not constitute a "measurement" in QM terms. --Tim May Boycott espionage-enabled software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 - 1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Guaranteed snake-oil, er, privacy...
by geeman＠best.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>> Sigh. Here comes another one..... We have been trying to post this News Release to several places in USENET, but are seemingly being thwarted by person or persons unknown. Shortly after the posting, on 01-26-96, our postings were all methodically removed without any trace evidence. We have been unable to maintain their posting since. We believe that the obvious malefactor may be at the root of these problems. Why would 'they' try to keep this from coming to light? Because 'they' know what is best for all of us. >> Maybe they know it's a waste of bandwidth! The posting(s) concern an extremely easy to use, unbreakable system for encrypting all user sensitive data going out over Internet. As a reference to its unbreakability, I refer you to an article by Paul Leyland on Internet at: http://dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/otp.html Mr. Leyland refers to some problems, which our PCX system addresses and resolves. >> That piece discusses true one-time pads. To anyone reading the posts on Cpunks and sci.crypt regarding another purported purveyor of OTP technology, this is g oing to ring some very familiar bells. Again: you can't create pseudo-randoms on-the-fly, algorithmically, and call it OTP. Just stop it! [SNIP] The good obviously outweighs the bad. We must stop this insanity of some imagined fear being advanced as the rationale from keeping us from doing something that will immensely benefit us all. If we allow some crazed terrorist fear keep us from doing something important, then we become the victims of that terror. That is not right! We cannot let faceless terrorists dictate what we can and cannot do. With the forgoing in mind, we are pleased to make the following press release: >> I suppose it's possible that some intelligible text was run thru this package's transform, producting this example of random unintelligible gibberish! If You Break our System, You've Bought our Company! Internet.Privacy.Guaranteed, IPG, today announced a new product line that guarantees privacy for 2 to 20,000 or more or more people on Internet. They back up there Guarantee with their Corporate motto, 'If You Break our System, You Have Bought our Company.' IPG Guarantees Absolute Privacy on Internet. Using the trademark CRE transform, >> If I can find an explanation of what a CRE transform really is in any IPG material, what do I get? the IPG PCX Nvelopes system translates any intelligble digitized information into random gibberish. >> So does XOR-ing a message with the output of my compiler's "rand()" function: does this make it secure? Ridiculously not. Only one other user, or more in certain instances where there is a need to know, will have the Nvelopener required to transform the random gibberish back into intelligible digitized information. CRE Transforms, trademark IPG, are the only acknowledged unbreakable method of so transforming digitized information. >> Acknowledged by whom? Where are they? What do they really say? What information was given them about the implementation? Who is IDG, what are their bona-fides? Did they work for the Mossad once, per chance? That's always a good line..... There are no passwords, encryption keys, or anything like that to conjure up, remember, and perhaps forget. PCX Nvelopes usage is automatic, similar to PKZIPand PKUNZIP. Easy to install, use, add to, and administer. It is Unbreakable If an individual, or any group of individuals, break the IPG Privacy System, IPG will sell them their company for $1.00, and even give them the dollar to buy it with. If you think you can, just try and find out that it is impossible. There may be rumors that someone has broken the system, but that is not possible, it will never happen. Don't Waste your time ! How dare IPG have the unmitigated gall? When you are certain, then you are certain, and IPG is certain! Others dare not make such a brazen boast because they cannot possibly back it up, but IPG most certainly can. Every informed expert of the technology will confirm, without reservation, that the IPG system is not breakable, as many already have! There, we have thrown down that gauntlet, dare you pick it up? Be forewarned, if you do, in your quest, you will never become a knight; but instead, will only become utterly benighted. >> Would you buy an encryption system from this (wo)/man? CRE Transforms The system uses CRE transforms, called Nvelopes, to translate any meaningful digitized information into random gibberish. In order to convert that random gibberish back into intelligible usable form, a Nvelopener is required, and only the recipient has the required Nvelopener. >> OH, **THAT** explains it! ROTFL!!!!

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