December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Alta Vista caches queries
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Here's one more reason to worry about the implications of web search engines: I just stopped in on Digital's new Alta Vista page, and was surprised to find that the query field was filled in--with a search I ran 3 or 4 days ago. I doublechecked my end pretty thoroughly (scrubbing all the files that Netscape 2.0b3 [Mac] generates--caches, global history, etc., and eventually reinstaling Netscape from scratch). And it look an awful lot like Alta Vista cached by query according to my IP address. Maybe dynamically assigned IPs ain't such a bad idea after all... Hieronymous -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQBVAwUBMNoVRb3g0mNE55u1AQEWxAIAiknajMTLiPzKxl4Wz3hoJsE4ntsXQJiV zNoz9LAW16+7+oFKKPwcjQCTi7heMstT9dP0GjCHmYuCl2cFcmQRbQ== =HQ12 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

3 2

Re: What ever happened to... Cray Comp/NSA co-development
by anon-remailer＠utopia.hacktic.nl 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- First, thanks for the obvious 'kind' thoughts Tim... It's heartening that you took the time to add some substantial info to the thread. However... > On 12/18/95 At 12:36 AM -0500, Timothy C. May wrote: > >What caught my attention was the architecture. > > > >A "hybrid design linking two supercomputer processors with an > >array of HALF A MILLION inexpensive processors" that were > >designed by the U.S. government laboratory affiliated with the > >NSA. The same chip house that brought us Clipper. > First, half a million chips is not that big a deal...the Connection Machine > had up to 64,000. Very few cryptographic problems of interest to us will be > affected by a mere factor of a million or so. O.K. Just a factor of 16 increase over the CM architecture right? Not knowing the computational capabilities of the individual processors, it might be difficult to say what the machine is capable of. Wouldn't that have some bearing? > Second, there was work on a "processor-in-memory" architecture, in > conjunction with a Bowie, Maryland spook-connected company. Perhaps this is > what you are thinking of? I didn't mention a 'processor-in-memory' architecture and neither did the NYT article. Don't know about any other company involvement, just CCC and NSA. > Third, all avenues of continued funding having fallen through, Cray > Computer (not Cray Research, of course) was shut down and assets > liquidated. I haven't heard what's become of Seymour, though. (He is > undoubtedly an asset, buy I doubt the Agency would have him liquidated.) You mean the avenues that are of PUBLIC record. The possibility could always exist that the development continues 'in-house'. It wouldn't be the first time that sort of move has been played. > >I've not kept up with the "ultimate" demise that eventually > >befell Cray Computer Company, but the October 16 FBI filing > >on capacity for Digital Telephony got me thinking back to this > >article. 1% seems like a rather huge need for horsepower. And > >what if GAK doesn't fly? And the widespread use of hard crypto > >just keeps increasing? > The tightly-coupled supercomputers are hardly needed for these sorts of > problems. You mean the problem of data collection? Well, it's true that this would be a misuse of a supercomputer's specialized talents. > >This kind of machine could, in theory: > > > >1) Implement ALL Clipper(II) based Key Escrow functionality in > > silicon (the easy part) AND allow for simultaneous decrypt and > > surveil of 'who knows how many' Clipper based data streams. > Huh? First, what evidence do you have for this claim? Second, who cares? > Implementing Clipper in a Cray Computer machine--why bother? [Rant mode on] Speculation Tim... I'm SPECULATING. Could, in theory... AND my kind of theory probably has holes you could drive a FLEET of Mack trucks through. I have NO evidence. I'm not sure WHO would care. I'M A PARANOID DILLUSIONAL PSYCHOPATH! O.K. well maybe not that last part... but I'm asking the questions, remember? I said I'm new here, so if your going to blow holes in my pet theories, then do me the 'kindness' of using an accurate weapon... that's why I posted... > As to the claim that a million-processor machine could do this, you need to > work out the math. (If a backdoor exists, or the LEAF has been gotten, a > supercomputer is not needed....) Again... I claimed NOTHING! SPECULATED MUCH! Now it's your turn... Why would YOU build a machine like this? What could POSSIBLY be it's capabilities? Speculate with me for a moment... *_take a chance_*. > >2) Implement general RSA based Prime Factoring functionality in > > silicon (the not so easy part) AND allow massively parallel > > decrypt and surveil of 'who knows how many' RSA/etc. based > > data streams. > Prime Factoring? Primes are easy to factor, of course. (Hint: Every prime > has two factors.) Yes, my terminology sucks! But you get the drift don't you? Math is not a strength of mine, I only know in very general terms what is involved (why, then, am I even bothering to bring this up?). Because I AM however, VERY concerned in the continual erosion of privacy rights in all forms communications, electronic and otherwise. [Rant mode off] > If you mean using supercomputers to brute force the general factoring of an > RSA modulus, this is nonsense. While there may be math shortcuts we don't > yet publically know about which make factoring easier than we currently > think it is, a mere million or even a billion processors will not make a > dent in the factoring of, say, a 700-digit modulus. See the tables in > Schneier and elsewhere for some estimates of factoring efforts needed. Nonsense? Is that 700 decimal digits or 700 binary digits? I don't have the tables that you refer to. Where may I find them? (LOL) > >3) Implement it all, AND 'on-line' transaction based surveillance > > via the FBI's 1% capacity infrastructure. > Let's see some numbers. (On second thought, let's not.) No, I've already said that math is not a strength I possess. I've wondered about the ability of the FBI to count on ten fingers and ten toes given some of the justification that I've read for this capacity figure... > >Chilling... Who needs key escrow (or RSA private keys) when > >you've got a massively parallel prime factoring machine. What if > >GAK was to become a 'non-issue'? How fast do you think a machine > >such as this could factor RSA 129? > Well, do the math. The MIPS-years for the RSA-129 crack were publicized, so > the computation for a million SPARC-equivalent (or even > UltraSPARC-equivalent) can be done. Sorry... I asked the question... and your speculation is (I would hope) MUCH more accurate than mine. Again, math is not a strength of mine. > When you've done this, and concluded that RSA-129 could be done in, say, X > minutes, then move on to RSA-384 (the BlackNet key cracked by the MIT > group), and on to the 1024- and 2048-bit keys. Tell us how many years or > centuries it will take. (Hint: Rivest and Schneier have done these > calculations....) Yes, I believe that I've read Rivest's paper on the statistical probabilities. I've never really believed in statistics, AND I'm sure you don't have the time to convince me Tim (I'm sorry if I've been less than reverencial about this, but I'm from Illinois which is right next door to Missouri). > --Tim May, who fears that he's just been trolled by Derek Atkins No Tim, you have not... but on another note... > It'll be _many_ years before a 384-decimal-digit number is factored, I > suspect. Let alone a 600-digit modulus, with or without the mysterious > "transphaser" technology mentioned by Anitro. The "transphaser" is an optical equivalent to the transistor. It is a quantum threshold optical switch, but it is not a 'mystery'. You should read Scientific American more often ;> O.K. I'm done with this line of discussion, you may however, continue to elaborate as I will, no doubt, continue to read... Anitro "I have a little shadow that goes in and out with me, And what can be the use of him is more than I can see" R. L. Stevenson - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBMNiv8SoZzwIn1bdtAQHyewF+OXlM8KueHrCynKGhjqXy8eHLSonn12Df vcAdDoaajoi5t7CfY9lP/+FNeO2JKE+v =SIKC -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

1 0

900mhz digital phones - how much to trust ?
by John Pettitt 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Whats the current thinking on the security level of 900Mhz digital spread sectrum cordless phones? Clearly it's not a basic scanner job but how much more equipment is needed to monitor one ? John Pettitt, jpp(a)software.net VP Engineering, CyberSource Corporation, 415 473 3065 Favorite quote: "Security is mostly a superstition. It does not exist in nature, nor do the children of man as a whole experience it. Avoiding danger is no safer in the long run than outright exposure. Life is either a daring adventure, or nothing." - Helen Keller

2 1

Re: revised time quantization package (Unix & WIN32) available
by Dan Harmon 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Perry, the only crypto code you seem to do is the unintelligble postings that you send to the list. .d On Wed, 20 Dec 1995, Perry E. Metzger wrote: > > Dan Harmon writes: > > If this is what you consider contributing them you seem to have some > > deep problems that cannot be solved here. You may have to seek professional > > help. Your continued and at times seemingly uncontrollable use of vulgar > > language may indicate a neurobiological disorder such as Tourette's > > syndrome. You really should have it checked out before you harm yourself > > and possibily others. > > Thank you for the pseudopsychology, but really, all you've done is > further confirm my diagnosis of "non-contributing asshole". > > When was the last time you did anything to actually help spread > cryptography, eh? > > If you'll pardon me, I have crypto code to get back to. > > .pm >

3 2

Re: ex encrypted script
by Rich Salz 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Is there a way to encrypt a script yet still allow it to be runnable? I >know that the simple answer is to write it in C and compile it but I don't >have the means of doing that at the moment. (i.e. there is not compiler on >the system) Given your constraints: no. /r$

1 0

Re: The Problem With Blaze And Weinstein
by Rich Salz 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> MIT is practically floating on government subsidies. Actually, if you discount Lincoln Labs, not really. /r$

1 0

An Apology to Mr. Merzger
by Dan Harmon 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Perry and members of this list, I want to publicly apologize to Mr. Metzger. On reviewing the events of the day, it seems that I misunderstood a post by Perry. It seems that I was missing a previous post that was being referenced. As to the misunderstood message, I have to now agree with Perry and his reponse. Please accept this apology. Dan

2 1

Re: Microsoft Flame[tm] [NOISE]
by RobL 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 06:32 AM 12/21/95 CST, Roy M. Silvernail wrote: >-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > >There's a lot of finger waving going on over Microsoft's alleged >predatory practices. I just want to remind the pro-MS folks of >something. Microsoft has a documented track record of using >undocumented entry points in their OS and Windows products. These entry >points allow MS apps to do some things more efficiently than a [snip] > >While this isn't the grand-scale conspiracy some people seem to see, >IMHO it's still predatory. Perhaps the call to separate the OS and apps >divisions is a good idea. It would be interesting to see if Microsoft >could maintain its edge in applications when it had no sub rosa >advantage in OS access. IMHO, I see nothing wrong with predatory behavior.. then again, I hunt in the fall, so it must be a redneck thing.. MS and any of the other software companies are competing for domination in a narrow field.. MS just happens to be the only real choice for OS anymore.. well, for a standard, out of the box OS anyways. The fact that they have to leave in undisclosed hooks to get their own software to excell over others just points to the poor software they produce overall. I have to admit that I like, possibly admire, the way the Bill and crew have captured the market.. from a marketing standpoint, they did a first rate job of running with the ball until there was no pursuit.. Sure, from time to time, someone tries to throw a blocker in thier path, but they just overrun it and keep going.. Forget about the monopoly aspects for a second and look at MS as an American success story. It has all the classic elements: started small, with a crew of social misfits and eventually grew up. Just a few cents worth.. RobL ------------------|----------------------------------------------------------- Rob Lowry | PO Box 288 | Rockford Wa 99030 | ral(a)otc.mhs.compuserve.com robl(a)on-ramp.ior.com

1 0

Digicash and capital adequacy
by Simon Spero 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This came out of a corridor discussion yesterday as to how digicash would affect future banking systems: How does digicash interact with capital adequacy requirements? Should each digi-dollar issued require a corresponding hunk'o'assets in the customers account, or should the bank be able to issue digicash using existing rules? Digicash can have a much faster velocity than real cash, so I can sort of imagine their being periods where adequacy limits could be exceeded. What's the panels view? Simon p.s. I got to see the movie "Hackers" while I was sick in bed after WWW IV. The movie was pretty bogus, but the soundtrack was pretty cool. The wonderful movie website had nothing about any soundtrack albums; anyone know if there was one?

1 0

QCF_dec
by James A. Donald 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--------------------------------------------------------------------- | We have the right to defend ourselves | http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ and our property, because of the kind | of animals that we are. True law | James A. Donald derives from this right, not from the | arbitrary power of the state. | jamesd(a)echeque.com

1 0