December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: toolkits?
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:41 AM 11/7/95, Stephen Whitaker wrote: >OK folks, nobody seems to have any ideas how to keep our little state of >Vermont from falling prey to mediocrity in the internet. I thought with so >many highly opinionated people I would at least get a few good or at least >entertaining suggestions. You may have gotten no responses because it generally is not up to a state government to ensure that "mediocrity" in the Internet is avoided (though I'm not sure what is meant by "mediocrity." If it is security and anonymity, this is definitely the state government's responsibility, or even area of interest.) >just might have a prayer of doing it right, whatever that is. What would it >look like if secure communications and anonomynity were designed in from the >start? Is this what Sameer is doing in Bezerkeley? > >What machines are considered minimum requirements to use these tools? What >are the essential reference works? "Security and anonymity" are not matters for government to ensure. Imagine two Vermont residents, Bob of Burlington and Rhonda of Rutland. The wish to communicate securely, and perhaps anonymously. Alas, the state legislature in Montpelier is oblivious to their concerns, not even answering their e-mail. What, oh what, are they to do? Not to worry, as what Vermont does is irrelevant. Bob of Burlington can encrypt his messages to Rhonda of Rutland and send them in any number of ways. Compuserve, AOL, and (probably) Netcom will have local access points. Happily, Rhonda of Rutland and Bob of Burlington (not their real names) can communicate secretly, securely, and anonymously. I urge you, Stephen, to read up on encryption and the benefits contained therein. Looking to your state capital to secure your communications is a lose. --Tim May Views here are not the views of my Internet Service Provider or Government. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

1 0

Timed-release crypto and information economics
by shields＠tembel.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- 1. Method In 1993, Timothy C. May posted a message to this list <URL:http://www.hks.net/cpunks/cpunks-0/1460.html> with some thoughts on time-release crypto. I think his system is too complex. Here I present a cleaner model, and show how it can be used in several real-life ways. In the May proposal, when you have a message to be encrypted, you encrypt it with a session key, optionally split that key with an n-of-m scheme, and then send the key into a network of escrow agents, which are instructed to hold the message for a given period of time. You then hold onto the encrypted message, though you need not keep it secret. Conceptually, you have encrypted a message and then remailed the key to yourself in such a way that it will take X length of time to arrive. I have a simpler, public-key plan. When you want to keep a message secret until date X, you ask your favorite crypto house to generate a key pair and hold the secret key until date X. You then encrypt your message with the public key, and again hold onto the encrypted message. N-of-m trust management can be implemented by secret-sharing your message and encrypting each with a key generated by a different crypto house. This method is clean, fully anonymous, and nearly stateless. 2. Economics I've worked out a payment model for both the public and secret key, which I think can be used for any sort of information in an information economy not based on (increasingly unenforceable) intellectual property laws. In this model, the creator of information charges enough to recover his costs (call this price, the price available to the first buyers, the "primary cost"). It is then possible for resellers to purchase it and try to make a profit through multiple sales at a lower price. If the reseller is hoarding the information, another one can step in, pay the same initial rate, and try to do better. This model seperates marketing of information from producing it, and gives an easy way to profit from doing either. Of course, it's possible to conflate them into a information creator that sells directly to end-users. Once you abstract this you'll notice that (a) it's much like existing models for those who create information for hire, such as writers and programmers who sign over copyright but could recreate the work; and (b) it can be applied to many less extreme scenarios, such as where the reseller makes the product available but under a restrictive licence. I think this is the basic fabric of an information economy. Applying it to the selling of timed-release pairs, the primary cost of the public key is some nominal charge, and the primary cost of the secret key is the amount required to judge whether or not it should be released -- a trivial amount for time-based release but something more for event-based release. (A corollary is that you might pay the judging fee for a secret key, and receive instead a certificate saying that it cannot yet be released.) 3. Applications * Bonds: You deliver $1000 in ecash to the issuer. In returns it gives you a unique certificate redeemable for $1100, encrypted such that it may not be decrypted until the maturity date. You also get a certificate saying that your encrypted bond is a bond, so that you may demonstrate fraud if you find something else once you decrypt it at maturity. Essentially this is the same as creating a private corporate ecash bank. Coupon bonds are a trivial extension. * Retirement plans, cryonics funds, and wills: You encrypt your assets or your will in a custom event-based key, and archive it with your executor. * Idea futures: You have a pair of key pairs generated, one for encrypting YES coupons, and the other for NO coupons. Now anyone can generate and sell their own coupons, consisting of $1 in ecash encrypted with a YES or NO event-release key, again with a certificate of authenticity to verify fraud. * Bonding: You pay $1001 for a reputable institution to give you a $1000 bond encrypted in the event-release key based on your breech of contract, and its complementary negative key, and send you and the other party each one bond. If you default on your contract, the injured party can ask the crypto house to release the default key; if you do not, you can ask the crypto house to release the other key. 4. Cypherpunks write code I'll let everyone tear into this for a few days, and then I'll put up a server for timed-release key generation, charging maybe c$1. I'd like to then enhance it to be capable of issuing bonds and loans denominated in c$. (I like the cyberbucks trial because it's officially play money, so there aren't any regulatory burdens.) This should be interesting. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMJ6jgeyjYMb1RsVfAQHKPAP8CF8HAN3dPa0QaJ3knDuv5gKd2yIUE57G icK5flsVOHcmq2+y3LkB8uCWBT1IxyoWv9I2u1yQbujYtttjgparCoCeErXk7uPe h7yY/eZzx3wgIrGxMEGePZftwoA2aGfyO+wDy/5lPZ0yWxLpoLr67RfpWbutqinf bmn6xeL64lg= =iXOF -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -- Shields.

2 1

FWD:Religious Right Threatens to Shut Down Net: Call NOW
by Lynne L. Harrison 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Return-Path: <ACLUNATL(a)aol.com> >Date: Mon, 6 Nov 1995 13:43:13 -0500 >From: ACLUNATL(a)aol.com >To: beeson(a)aclu.org >Subject: Religious Right Threatens to Shut Down Net: Call NOW >Content-Length: 27519 > >Here are the advocacy instructions for individuals opposed to the Federal >Online Indecency Legislation that we promised last week. > >======================================================================== > CAMPAIGN TO STOP THE EXON/COATS COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT > (SEE THE LIST OF CAMPAIGN COALITION MEMBERS AT THE END) > > Update: -Latest News: > The Christian Coalition is pushing Congress to censor > the net more heavily than even Sen. J.J. Exon ever imagined. > There is the very real possibility that they may succeed. > > You should be very worried. We are. > > -What You Can Do Now: > Follow the directions below and call House Speaker > Gingrich and Senate Leader Dole. Implore them > to allow parents to make choices for their children, instead > of government censors. > > Volunteer to join the fight by helping organize in your > home town. > > CAMPAIGN TO STOP THE UNCONSTITUTIONAL COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT > Nov 2, 1995 > > PLEASE WIDELY REDISTRIBUTE THIS DOCUMENT WITH THIS BANNER INTACT > REDISTRIBUTE ONLY UNTIL December 1, 1995 > REPRODUCE THIS ALERT ONLY IN RELEVANT FORUMS > >________________________________________________________________________ >CONTENTS > The Latest News > What You Can Do Now > The letter from Ed Meese and the Christian Right > Chronology of the CDA > For More Information > List Of Participating Organizations > >________________________________________________________________________ >THE LATEST NEWS > >Since the very first day that Senator J.J. Exon (D-NE) proposed censorship >legislation for the Internet, the Christian Right has pushed for the most >restrictive regulations they could think of. > >The Religious Right (which does not necessarily speak for all religious >people concerned with this issue) recently tipped their hand in a letter >to Sen. Larry Pressler (R-SD) and Rep. Thomas Bliley (R-VA) requesting >a new and more restrictive net censorship proposal. > >There are essentially three new dangerous elements of their campaign >to shut down cyberspace: > > >INTERNET PROVIDERS, ONLINE SERVICES, AND LIBRARIES CRIMINALLY LIABLE FOR > EXPRESSION ONLINE >The Religious Right has proposed to hold anyone who provides access to the >Internet or other interactive media, including online services providers, >ISP's, BBS's, Libraries, and Schools, criminally liable for all speech >carried on the network. > >In order to avoid liability under this provision, service providers would be >forced to monitor user's electronic communications to be assured that >no "indecent" material is transmitted across their networks. > >This proposal is MORE RESTRICTIVE than the Exon Communications Decency Act, >or any other net censorship legislation currently in Congress. > >In their letter to Congress, the Religious Right says: > > [Providers] would simply be required to avoid KNOWING violations of > the law. [emphasis added] > >However, the "knowing" standard is vague enough that the mere knowledge >that such material exists could be sufficient to trigger criminal liability. >A single complaint or even a news report could force a service provider to >take down a web page, remove posts to chat rooms or other discussion >forums, or shut down listservs in order to avoid going to jail and facing >huge fines. > > >A STANDARD FOR INDECENCY >The proposals pushed by the Christian Coalition relies on the >unconstitutional "indecency standard". Like the Exon Communications >Decency Act, the Christian Coalition seeks to regulate all indecent >speech online. > >Indecency is a broad category that includes everything from George Carlin's >"seven dirty words" to such classic novels and "The Catcher in the Rye" and >"Lady Chatterly's Lover". > >The Supreme Court has ruled that restrictions on indecent speech are >Constitutional only if they rely on the "least restrictive means". Broad >indecency restrictions on interactive media do not satisfy the "least >restrictive means" test, because interactive media allows users and >parents tremendous control over the information they receive. > >Any legislation which attempts to apply an indecency restriction to the >Internet is unconstitutional on its face. > >The Christian Coalition's proposal that relies on an indecency >restriction contemplates dumbing down every conversation, web page, >newsgroup, and mailing list on the Internet to the level of what is >not offensive to children. > >What kind of discussions between adults are possible in an arena >where everything has been reduced to the level of the Lion King? > > >UNPRECEDENTED CONTROL OVER ONLINE SPEECH FOR THE FCC >The Christian Coalition would give the FCC broad jurisdiction over >cyberspace. It would allow the FCC jurisdiction over your online >speech, and over the design Internet software, such as web browsers and >filtering programs that parents can use to control their children's >access to the Internet. > >The Internet has developed from a government project to a market-driven >economic boom for thousands of businesses. Giving the FCC authority over >this medium would significantly hinder the growth of this new industry. > >________________________________________________________________________ >WHAT YOU CAN DO NOW > >1. The proposals from the Religious Right will literally destroy online > speech as we know it. The odds of stopping this are not certain. > > There is a very real chance that this legislation will pass, and > we will experience a period of uncertainty and chilling of speech > while an appropriate test case attempts to reach the Supreme Court > (should it even get there!) > > The Religious Right has a strong grass-roots network. We need to > counter their energy and ensure cyberspace is not lost due to them. > > IMMEDIATELY CALL House Speaker Gingrich (R-GA) and Senate Leader > Dole (R-KS) and urge them to oppose the Christian Coalition's > proposal. > > Name, Address, and Party Phone Fax > ======================== ============== ============== > R GA Gingrich, Newt 1-202-225-4501 1-202-225-4656 > R KS Dole, Robert 1-202-224-6521 1-202-224-8952 > > If you're at a loss for words, try one of the following: > > Please oppose the recent proposal from the Religious Right to > censor the Internet. The only effective way to address children's > access to the Internet is through parental control tools outlined > by the Cox/White/Wyden approach. > or > As a religious person and a parent, I oppose the Religious Right's > attempts to censor the Internet. I am the best person to monitor > my child's access to the Internet using parental control tools > as outlined in the Cox/White/Wyden approach. > >2. Join the online fight by becoming a volunteer for your district! > > Check to see if you're legislator is in the list below. If they are > not, consult the free ZIPPER service that matches Zip Codes to > Congressional districts with about 85% accuracy at: > > URL:http://www.stardot.com/~lukeseem/zip.html > > The conference committee legislators are: > House: Barr (R-GA), Barton (R-TX), Berman (R-CA), Bliley (R-VA), > Boucher (D-VA), Brown (D-OH), Bryant (D-TX), Buyer (R-IN), > Conyers (D-MI), Dingell (D-MI), Eshoo (D-CA), Fields (R-TX), > Flanagan (R-IL), Frisa (R-NY), Gallegly (R-CA), Goodlatte (R-VA), > Gordon (D-TN), Hastert (R-IL), Hoke (R-OH), Hyde (R-IL), > Jackson-Lee (D-TX), Klug (R-WI), Lincoln (D-AR), Markey (D-MA), > Moorhead (R-CA), Oxley (R-OH), Paxon (R-NY), Rush (D-IL), > Schaefer (R-CO), Schroeder (D-CO), Scott (D-VA), Stearns (R-FL), > White (R-WA) > Senate: Burns (R-MT), Exon (D-NE), Ford (D-KY), Gorton (R-WA), > Hollings (D-SC), Inouye (D-HI), Lott (R-MS), McCain (R-AZ), > Pressler (R-SD), Rockefeller (D-WV), Stevens (R-AK) > > If your legislator is on the conference committee, you have a chance > to influence their vote on this issue with your power as a constituent. > Volunteer to help educate your legislator by sending mail to > volunteer(a)vtw.org. A coalition volunteer will be in touch with you. > > You can starting working to help spread the word in your district by > sending this letter to five friends. Ask them to call Dole and Gingrich > as well. > >3. The People for the American Way (PFAW) and the American Civil Liberties > Union are organizing a letter from ORGANIZATIONS to the Conference > Committee to oppose the censorship provisions. > > If you are a representative of an organization that would like to > signon to this letter, you should contact jlesser(a)pfaw.org IMMEDIATELY. > >4. We can't suggest relaxing at this point. The stakes are too high, and > the risk is too great. Everything now hangs in the balance. > >________________________________________________________________________ >THE LETTER FROM ED MEESE AND THE CHRISTIAN RIGHT > >October 16, 1995 > >The Honorable Thomas J. Bliley, Jr. Chairman >Committee on Commerce >United States House of Representatives >Washington, DC 20515 > >The Honorable Larry Pressler, Chairman >Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation >United States Senate >Washington, DC 20510 > >Re: Computer Pornography Provisions in Telecommunications Bill > >Dear Mr. Chairmen: > >We are writing to urge the conference committee seeking to reconcile the >telecommunications bills passed by the House and Senate include in the >final bill the strongest possible criminal law provisions to address the >growing and immediate problem of computer pornography without any >exemptions, defenses, or political favors of any kind accorded to those >who knowingly participate in the distribution of obscenity to anyone or >indecency to children. While there is no perfect solution to the problem >of computer pornography, Congress could not hope to solve this problem by >holding liable only some who are responsible for the problem. > >The recent Justice Department prosecution project targeting those who >violated federal child pornography law using America On-Line is >instructive in this regard. More than ninety individuals were targeted for >prosecution although many others, perhaps as many as 3,000 according to >one press report, were originally targeted by the Department of Justice as >potential violators of child pornography laws. Apparently due to a >shortage of investigative and prosecutorial resources, the project was >limited. Since there are insufficient resources to investigate and >prosecute but a fraction of those that are trafficking in child >pornography by computer, then there will likely be even fewer resources >available to investigate and prosecute those involved in obscenity and >indecency. > >Thousands of individuals both in this country and abroad are regularly >placing obscenity and indecency on the Internet. It is not possible to >make anything more than a dent in the serious problem of computer >pornography if Congress is willing to hold liable only those who place >such material on the Internet while at the same time giving legal >exemptions or defenses to service or access providers who profit from and >are instrumental to the distribution of such material. The Justice >Department normally targest the major offenders of laws. In obscenity >cases prosecuted to date, it has targeted large companies which have been >responsible for the nationwide distribution of obscenity and who have made >large profits by violating federal laws. Prosecution of such companies has >made a substantial impact in curbing the distribution of obscenity, with >many such offenders going out of business altogether. So too will >prosecution of access providers which _knowingly_ traffic in obscenity >have a substantial impact, a far greater impact than just the prosecution >of a person who places one or a few prohibited images on the Internet. >Such a person could not traffic in pornography without the aid or >facilitation of the service or access providers. Indeed, if Congress >includes provisions protecting access or service providers in whatever >bill is finally passed, it is likely that most in this country who are >trafficking in indecency to children or obscenity would continue to do so >since the threat of prosecution would be minuscule, given the numbers of >those currently involved in this activity. It is also likely that those >outside our country who are engaged in these activities would continue to >do so since it would be nearly impossible to extradite them to the United >States for prosecution. Thus, unless all who knowingly participate in such >matters are subject to the law, the Internet will remain the same and >Congress will have failed in its responsibilities to the children and >families of America. > >Federal law has traditionally assigned equal liability both for those who >commit a crime and those who aid and abet a crime. See Title 18 U.S.C. >Code Section 2: "(a) whoever [sic] commits an offense against the United >States or aids, abets, councils [sic], commands, induces, or procures its >commission, is punishable as a principle [sic]." Service or access >providers who knowingly participate in the distribution of indecency to >children or in obscenity to anyone are aiders and abettors in the >commission of those crimes and thus should have liability under any law >Congress passes. Current federal law on child pornography provides no no >exemption or defense for access providers. Thus, the child pornography law >provides a strong deterrent against trafficking in child pornography for >those who would otherwise knowingly participate in its distribution by >computer whether pedophile or access provider. > >The changes in law which we support would not hold an access provider >criminally liable for all illegal pornography on the Internet which their >services may be used to obtain. Nor would it require that access providers >check all communications to ensure that no violations of the law are >occurring. They would simply be required to avoid knowing violations of >the law. This is an obligation imposed on all citizens. Technology exists >today for access providers, through a simple process, to target or flag >and remove files containing objectionable material. > >We support the House-passed language insofar as it addresses obscenity by >amendment Title 18, Sections 1462, 1465, and 1467 of the United States >Code. The provision restricting transmission of indecency in the House-passed >bill, an amendment to Section 1465, is inadequate, and we urge that it be >substantially revised. > >Attached is the specific language we support which includes the House >passed language on obscenity and includes revisions on both the House >passed language on indecency, which would amend Title 18 and the >Senate-passed language on indecency, which would amend Title 47. The >combination of these provisions, we believe, would provide effective laws >to curb obscenity and indecency on the Internet by establishing that all >who knowingly participate in the distribution or facilitation of obscenity >to anyone or indecency to children would be subject to the law. > >Thank you for your concern and attention to this matter. > > >[signed] > >Edwin Meese III > >Ralph Reed >Christian Coalition > >Donald E. Wildmon >American Family Association > >Alan Sears, Former Executive Director >Atty General's Commission on Pornography > >Phyllis Shafly >Eagle Forum > >Beverly LaHaye >Concerned Women for America > >Reverend Louis P. Sheldon >Traditional Values Coalition > >Jay Sekulow >American Center for Law and Justice > >Paul Weyrich >Free Congress Foundation > >Paul McGeady >Morality in Media > >Len Munsil >National Family Legal Foundation > >Robert Peters >Morality in Media > >Kenneth Sukhia >Former United States Attorney, N.D., FL >Former Chairman, Atty General's Advisory Committee >Subcommittee on Child Exploitation and Obscenity > > >-------------------------- > > >Section 1465 of Title 18, United States Code, is amended to punish >distribution by computer of indecent material to minors by adding at the >end the following: > >Whoever knowingly communicates, transmits, or makes available for >communication or transmission, in or effecting interstate or foreign >commerce an indecent communication by computer to any person the >communicator or transmitter believes has not attained the age of 18 years >of age, knowing that such communication will be obtained by a person >believed to be under 18 years of age, shall be fined under this title or >imprisoned not more than five years, or both. > >TITLE IV -- OBSCENE, HARASSING, AND WRONGFUL UTILIZATION OF >TELECOMMUNICATIONS FACILITY > >SEC. 401. SHORT TITLE > This title may be cited as the "Communications Decency Act of >1995". > >Sec. 402. OBSCENE OR HARASSING USE OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES UNDER >THE COMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1934 > >Section 223 (47 U.S.C. 223) is amended -- > (1) by striking subsection (a) and inserting in lieu of [sic]: > ``(a) Whoever-- > ``(1) in the District of Columbia or in interstate or foreign >communications -- > ``(A) by means of telecommunications device knowingly-- > ``(i) makes, creates, or solicits, and > ``(ii) initiates the transmission of, > any comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image, or other > communication which is obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, or > indecent, with intent to annoy, abuse, threaten, or harass > another person; > ``(B) makes a telephone call or utilizes a > telecommunications device, whether or not conversation or > communication ensues, without disclosing his identity and > with intent to annoy, abuse, threaten, or harass any person > at the called number or who receives the communication; > ``(C) makes or causes the telephone of another repeatedly > or continuously to ring, with intent to harass any person at > the called number; or > ``(D) makes repeated telephone calls or repeatedly > initiates communication with a telecommunications device, > during which conversation or communication ensues, solely to > harass any person at the called number or who receives the > communication; > ``(2) knowingly permits any telecommunications facility > under his control to be used for any activity prohibited by > paragraph (1) with the intent that it be used for > such activity, > > shall be fined not more than $100,000 or imprisoned not more > than two years, or both.''; and > > (2) by adding at the end the following new subsections: > > ``(d) Whoever-- > ``(1) knowingly within the United States or in foreign > communications with the United States by means of > telecommunications device makes or makes available any > indecent communication in any form including any comment, > request, suggestion, proposal, or image, to any person under > 18 years of age regardless of whether the > maker of such communication placed the call or initiated the > communication; or > ``(2) knowingly permits any telecommunications facility > under such person's control to be used for an activity > prohibited by paragraph (1) with the intent that it be > used for such activity, > shall be fined not more than $100,000 or imprisoned not more > than two years or both. > ``(e) Defenses to subsections (a) and (d), restrictions on > access, judicial remedies respecting restrictions for > persons providing information services and > access to information services-- > "(1) It is a defense to prosecution that a person has complied > with regulations designed to restrict access to indecent > communications to those 18 years old or older as enacted by the > Federal Communications Commission which shall prepare final > regulations within 120 days of the passage of this bill. Until > such regulations become effective, it is a defense to > prosecution that the person has blocked or restricted access > to indecent communications to any person under 18 years > of age through the use of verified credit card, adult access > code, or adult personal identification number (PIN). > Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to treat > enhanced information services as common carriage." > "(2) No cause of action may be brought in any > court or any administrative agency against any person on account > of any activity which is not in violation of any law punishable > by criminal or civil penalty, which activity the person has taken in > good faith to implement a defense authorized under this section or > otherwise to restrict or prevent the transmission of, or access to, > a communication specified in this section. > (f) Nothing in this subsection shall preclude any State or > local government from enacting and enforcing laws and regulations > which do not result in the imposition of inconsistent obligations on > the provision of interstate services. Nothing in this subsection > shall preclude any State or local government from governing conduct > not covered by subsection (d)(2)." > (g) Nothing in subsection (a), (d), or (e) or in the > defenses to prosecution under (e) shall be construed > to affect or limit the application or enforcement of any other > Federal law. > (h) The use of the term 'telecommunications device' in this > section shall not impose new obligations on (one-way) broadcast > radio or (one-way) broadcast television operators licensed by the > Commission or (one-way) cable services registered with the > Federal Communications Commission and covered by obscenity and > indecency provisions elsewhere in this Act. > >Sec. 403. OBSCENE PROGRAMMING ON CABLE TELEVISION. > > Section 639 (47 U.S.C. 559) is amended by striking "10,000" and >inserting "$100,000" > >Sec. 404. BROADCASTING OBSCENE LANGUAGE ON THE RADIO. > > Section 1466 of Title 18, United States Code, is amended by >striking out "$10,000" and inserting "$100,000". > >Sec. 405 SEPARABILITY > > "(a) If any provision of this Title, including amendments to this >Title of [sic] the application thereof to any person or circumstance is >held invalid, the remainder of this Title and the application of such >provision to other persons or circumstances shall not be affected >thereby." > >________________________________________________________________________ >CHRONOLOGY OF THE COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT > >Sep 26, '95 Sen. Russ Feingold urges committee members to drop > Managers Amendment and the CDA from the Telecommunications > Deregulation bill >Aug 4, '95 House passes HR1555 which goes into conference with S652. >Aug 4, '95 House votes to attach Managers Amendment (which contains > new criminal penalties for speech online) to > Telecommunications Reform bill (HR1555). >Aug 4, '95 House votes 421-4 to attach HR1978 to Telecommunications > Reform bill (HR1555). >Jun 30, '95 Cox and Wyden introduce the "Internet Freedom and Family > Empowerment Act" (HR 1978) as an alternative to the CDA. >Jun 21, '95 Several prominent House members publicly announce their > opposition to the CDA, including Rep. Newt Gingrich (R-GA), > Rep. Chris Cox (R-CA), and Rep. Ron Wyden (D-OR). >Jun 14, '95 The Senate passes the CDA as attached to the Telecomm > reform bill (S 652) by a vote of 84-16. The Leahy bill > (S 714) is not passed. >May 24, '95 The House Telecomm Reform bill (HR 1555) leaves committee > in the House with the Leahy alternative attached to it, > thanks to Rep. Ron Klink of (D-PA). The Communications > Decency Act is not attached to it. >Apr 7, '95 Sen. Leahy (D-VT) introduces S.714, an alternative to > the Exon/Gorton bill, which commissions the Dept. of > Justice to study the problem to see if additional legislation > (such as the CDA) is necessary. >Mar 23, '95 S314 amended and attached to the telecommunications reform > bill by Sen. Gorton (R-WA). Language provides some provider > protection, but continues to infringe upon email privacy > and free speech. >Feb 21, '95 HR1004 referred to the House Commerce and Judiciary >committees >Feb 21, '95 HR1004 introduced by Rep. Johnson (D-SD) >Feb 1, '95 S314 referred to the Senate Commerce committee >Feb 1, '95 S314 introduced by Sen. Exon (D-NE) and Gorton (R-WA). > >________________________________________________________________________ >FOR MORE INFORMATION > >Web Sites > URL:http://www.vtw.org/exon/ > URL:http://epic.org/ > URL:http://www.eff.org/pub/Alerts/ > URL:http://www.cdt.org/cda.html > URL:http://outpost.callnet.com/outpost.html > >FTP Archives > URL:ftp://ftp.cdt.org/pub/cdt/policy/freespeech/00-INDEX.FREESPEECH > URL:ftp://ftp.eff.org/pub/Alerts/ > >Gopher Archives: > URL:gopher://gopher.panix.com/11/vtw/exon > URL:gopher://gopher.eff.org/11/Alerts > >Email: > vtw(a)vtw.org (put "send alert" in the subject line for the latest > alert, or "send cdafaq" for the CDA FAQ) > cda-info(a)cdt.org (General CDA information) > cda-stat(a)cdt.org (Current status of the CDA) > >________________________________________________________________________ >LIST OF PARTICIPATING ORGANIZATIONS > >In order to use the net more effectively, several organizations have >joined forces on a single Congressional net campaign to stop the >Communications Decency Act. > >American Civil Liberties Union * American Communication Association * >American Council for the Arts * Arts & Technology Society * Association >of Alternative Newsweeklies * biancaTroll productions * Boston >Coalition for Freedom of Expression * Californians Against Censorship >Together * Center For Democracy And Technology * Centre for Democratic >Communications * Center for Public Representation * Citizen's Voice - >New Zealand * Cloud 9 Internet *Computer Communicators Association * >Computel Network Services * Computer Professionals for Social >Responsibility * Cross Connection * Cyber-Rights Campaign * CyberQueer >Lounge * Dutch Digital Citizens' Movement * ECHO Communications Group, >Inc. * Electronic Frontier Canada * Electronic Frontier Foundation * >Electronic Frontier Foundation - Austin * Electronic Frontiers >Australia * Electronic Frontiers Houston * Electronic Frontiers New >Hampshire * Electronic Privacy Information Center * Feminists For Free >Expression * First Amendment Teach-In * Florida Coalition Against >Censorship * FranceCom, Inc. Web Advertising Services * Friendly >Anti-Censorship Taskforce for Students * Hands Off! The Net * Inland >Book Company * Inner Circle Technologies, Inc. * Inst. for Global >Communications * Internet On-Ramp, Inc. * Internet Users Consortium * >Joint Artists' and Music Promotions Political Action Committee * The >Libertarian Party * Marijuana Policy Project * Metropolitan Data >Networks Ltd. * MindVox * MN Grassroots Party * National Bicycle >Greenway * National Campaign for Freedom of Expression * National >Coalition Against Censorship * National Gay and Lesbian Task Force * >National Public Telecomputing Network * National Writers Union * Oregon >Coast RISC * Panix Public Access Internet * People for the American Way >* Republican Liberty Caucus * Rock Out Censorship * Society for >Electronic Access * The Thing International BBS Network * The WELL * >Voters Telecommunications Watch > >(Note: All 'Electronic Frontier' organizations are independent entities, > not EFF chapters or divisions.) > >________________________________________________________________________ > End Alert >======================================================================== > > ******************************************************************** Lynne L. Harrison, Esq. Poughkeepsie, New York lharrison(a)mhv.net "Say not, 'I have found the truth', but rather, 'I have found a truth.'" - Kahlil Gibran from "The Prophet" ********************************************************************

1 0

Re: toolkits?
by droelke＠spirit.aud.alcatel.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Timothy C. May wrote: > > At 12:41 AM 11/7/95, Stephen Whitaker wrote: > > >just might have a prayer of doing it right, whatever that is. What would it > >look like if secure communications and anonomynity were designed in from the > >start? Is this what Sameer is doing in Bezerkeley? > > > >What machines are considered minimum requirements to use these tools? What > >are the essential reference works? > > "Security and anonymity" are not matters for government to ensure. > [...] > I urge you, Stephen, to read up on encryption and the benefits contained > therein. Looking to your state capital to secure your communications is a > lose. > Tim - I think your libertarian side is showing here.... Not that this is a bad thing, but I think there are some things that state governments can and/or should do. First off - avoid trying to legislate minute details of any encryption or signature scheme. Bureaucrats trying to understand, much less control technical things is doomed to fail. (take GOSIP as a prime example) Second - push for legal acceptance of digital signatures and acceptance of privacy through encryption. I believe Utah has taken a strong step in this direction. Most people, businesses, and courts won't accept digital contracts and the like until there is more of a sound set of laws behind them. Strong laws against government snooping or against anti-encryption or anti-anonymous laws are a good thing IMO. Besides - laws like that will let the bureaucrats drown themselves in their own paperwork making sure then follow their own rules - and keep them out of our hair. ;-) Third - provide services to the citizenry. For example - provide a public key server. Or how about a digital time-stamping service. If the crap was kept out of these services, and they were free for anyone to use, then it would advance the idea of encouraging people to use crypto in their daily lives. Warning - Although I think there are some good things that governments can do, it is also very important to watch out for "sabotage" by the government. Governments tend to like control too much and by trying to maintain control, reverse a useful service to one that is a dis-service to the people. In general, if governments get out of the way, people will take care of problems themselves. Dan ------------------------------------------------------------------ Dan Oelke Alcatel Network Systems droelke(a)aud.alcatel.com Richardson, TX

1 0

Re: idle CPU markets
by srao＠ISI.EDU 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Date: Fri, 27 Oct 1995 06:25:34 -0700 > To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com > From: Jay Campbell <edge(a)got.net> > Subject: Re: idle CPU markets > Sender: owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com > A graphic-arts chum of mine is really hyper about cycle sales - it will > allow him to produce broadcast-quality commercials on a project-by-project > basis without a huge initial hardware upgrade investment. Is anyone working > on a Java libarary/demo/whatnot that allows plug-in algorithms, work > completion 'fetch next batch' code, and some rudimentary authentication > scheme? If not, I may tinker with this - if so, I'd like to chat :) At USC/Information Sciences Institute, we are developing a system that will enable computer owners to sell or barter processor-cycles on the Internet. This is in some ways similar to what you talk about, in that it allows the execution of plug-in applications, and the policies for allocation and deallocation of remote resources are decided by the owners and are transparent to the end user. However, unlike Java, our applications are compiled C programs that execute on *compute servers* rather than on client machines. The application could in turn be an interpreter for some other language (e.g. Java). We also support parallel applications that use the Parallel Virtual Machine (PVM) libraries for interprocess communication. We have implemented a prototype known as the Prospero Resource Manager (PRM); a parallel version of POVRAY raytracing program is one of the applications we've run using PRM. We are currently working on integrating PRM with authentication and payment products (including kerberos, netcheque and netcash) developed as part of our other projects on security and electronic commerce. If you are interested in further information about any of these products, or are interested in participating in any aspect PRM's development we'd be happy to talk to you. More information is also available on our web pages: http://nii-server.isi.edu/info/prm and http://nii-server.isi.edu/gost-group. We also believe that one of the parallel applications for which PRM is useful is showing the weakness of certain encryption methods with limited key size. If anyone has suggestions for algorithms or software that might be included as a demo application in the next release of PRM, please contact me. Santosh Rao.

1 0

Re: censored? corrected [Steve Pizzo cited in The Spotlight]
by Rich Salz 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Originally DNS was just a handy user-friendly thing, but then >it because the primary way to name a host. This allowed the IP address >to become irrelevant, which allows entire sites to be renumbered when the >network topology changes. This is important to keep the routing tables >small (by minimizing the backwards-compatibility exceptions), which is >a critical problem today. Thus all recent architectural decisions have >been away from direct use of IP addresses anywhere. Hunh? The Arpanet always used hostnames. Just about the only time you needed to specify a raw network address was when you were dialed into a TAC and you did things like "@o 137" to connect to mit-mc. DNS was created because the hosts.txt file, a single network-wide file that listed the name, address, aliases, system type, etc., of every host in the Arpanet got to be unmaintainable. Routing is totally unrelated to DNS, based as it is in IP addresses. Routers know nothing about DNS. /r$

2 1

Re: Exporting software doesn't mean exporting (was: Re: lp ?)
by Rich Salz 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Strangely >enough this would seem to hurt, not help, the NSA in the most important >part of their current mission, which is to help protect US industry >against industrial espionage and virtual terrorism, which is a far more >pressing threat. Matt's NATO adventures, for example, are an interesting example of what happens when the two missions -- "protect our secrets" and "read theirs" -- come into conflict. (Not unlike the US Dept of Agriculture.) Their open involvement in places like W3C, where Agency staff talk about getting Fortezza cards in COTS products provide another datapoint. Budgets cuts may turn out to be strong crypto's best friend. /r$

1 0

Re: Java insecurity - long - argumentative - you are warned.
by anonymous-remailer＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Mon, 6 Nov 1995, Dr. Frederick B. Cohen wrote: > WARNING - THIS MESSAGE CONTAINS INFORMATION THAT MIGHT BE CONSIDERED AS > A FLAME BY SOME READERS - IT IS LONG AND TEDIOUS - YOU ARE WARNED! > > 4.2 Security in the Java Environment > > > > Security commands a high premium in the growing use of the Internet > > for products and services ranging from electronic distribution of > > software and multimedia content, to "digital cash". The area of > > security with which we're concerned here is how the Java compiler and > > run-time system restrict application programmers from creating > > subversive code. [long list of important questions deleted ...] Essentially, I think that all of this will distill to a single issue, vis-a-vis Java or any other paradigm which wishes to represent itself as *secure*. Where is the security review role placed within the project development life cycle?? Is it at Design Concept? Or during Application Development? Or is it done last, after design completion, after all of the programming is complete and the production people are involved in operational turnover. Or is it done at all? This concept is not new, and should not present any problems to anyone in the industry. Even John Q. Public will understand it, if we use a simple construction analogy. If you want to build a secure house, your security doesn't start AFTER the house is built. It has to start at a very early stage. It starts before the blueprints are made, when you specify that you want a concrete windowless box located on a quiet street at the end of a cul-de-sac. That is simple and obvious. You certainly don't have *security* if after building a glass house on Main Street, if after the design is finished, the footings have been poured, and the key is about to be turned over to the occupant; if then, as an afterthought you put a single strong deadbolt on the front door to "secure" it. Anyone who can't or won't quite grasp this idea is either willfully attempting to steer gullible individuals astray, or is congenitally stupid. It's time to call a spade a spade. > What exactly does this mean? > > > While all this checking appears excruciatingly detailed, by the time > > the byte code verifier has done its work, the Java interpreter can > > proceed knowing that the code will run securely. Knowing these > > properties makes the Java interpreter much faster, because it doesn't > > have to check anything. Yikes!! I'll leave this for someone else to address. This sounds to me like a variation on virus scanning. I think that there are far more reputable virus experts than I who can comment and expand on *flaws* with that approach. > No runtime checking whatsoever. Get past the supposed verifier, and you > have free run of the machine. A single verifier bug or inadequacy, and > the world is unsafe for electronic commerce. As someone who *vividly* remembers October, 1987 and the near economic meltdown which was BARELY averted by the Fed, a near meltdown which occurred because of the interactions of systems far less intelligent or complex than those we routinely utilize today, systems which directly interface not only to each other, but have undocumented, non-predictable interactions with "soft and wet" systems, I might have some serious concerns. Then again, it is _only_ the economy, isn't it? > ASBESTOS SUITS MAY NOW BE REMOVED - FLAME OFF. > > P.S. > > When: Tuesday, November 7, 8AM > Where: The Hilton, Washington D.C. (the CSI conference) > The talk: 50 Ways to Attack Your World Wide Web Systems > > If you want a chance to heckle - be there. Drat ... I don't think that I'll be able to attend. I've already got a local presentation that I've pencilled in for tomorrow morning at some god awfully early hour. Then again, D.C. isn't quite my circuit. I was hoping though for some clarification. Are you THE Dr. Frederick B. Cohen?? The one who originally coined the phrase "computer virus" and who maintains the computer virus FAQ? Are you THAT Dr. Frederick B. Cohen, and are you speaking publically in Washington, tommorow as one of the keynote speakers? If you are, I'd be interested as to whether you'll talk about the recent gaping security hole in the existing installed Navigator code base which I detailed to this list's subscribers. The one posted this last Friday the Thirteenth, that questioned Netscape's wisdom in creating an experimental MIME object which does not follow the usual HTTP request/response paradigm, but instead allows a server to open and maintain a bi-directional communications channel from server to client. Effectively a non-password protected telnet into the heart of any system, a open exploitable connection which penetrates proxy servers and firewalls, and acts as an enhanced bi-directional delivery/recovery mechanism? I'd be very interested in the comments around that, especially since both Netscape and AT&T (who distributes the softwre under its own brand name) have made an explicit "no comment". I'd especially be interested in any post-session transcript. I also think that Elaine Garzarelli might be interested. Especially since she'll be addressing the nation and the public via the public television airwaves this Friday evening. Or at least ... uhmmm ... I _think_ that's when her electronic daytimer has her pencilled in ... Alice de 'nonymous ... ...just another one of those... P.S. This post is in the public domain. C. S. U. M. O. C. L. U. N. E.

1 0

Re: forging headers (with more header information)
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Without having any access to anything but the headers, it looks like >you are an employee for SGI and sent the message from there. > >Look at the last Received: header. It went from sgi.com to mit.edu to >well.com and then to you. Obviously was forwarded from a remailer inside SGI .... #--- # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, Freelance Information Architect, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # Phone +1-510-247-0664 Pager/Voicemail 1-408-787-1281 #---

1 0

Re: Java insecurity - long - argumentative - you are warned.
by goedel＠tezcat.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- >> > While all this checking appears excruciatingly detailed, by the time >> > the byte code verifier has done its work, the Java interpreter can >> > proceed knowing that the code will run securely. Knowing these >> > properties makes the Java interpreter much faster, because it doesn't >> > have to check anything. > >Yikes!! I'll leave this for someone else to address. This sounds to me >like a variation on virus scanning. I think that there are far more >reputable virus experts than I who can comment and expand on *flaws* with >that approach. This "checking," as any comp-sci undergrad will tell you, amounts to solving the halting problem for the java interpreter. While this is possible for a finite state automata like the java interpreter (made more difficult by the fact that it can use the "net" for additional state), it is not even remotely feasable. If you can write a checker that works in a reasonable amount of time, I'll write a turing machine simulator that'll do something nasty if the input machine halts. Then we'll split the fame and fortune for solving the 5 state Busy Beaver problem. Deal? -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQBgAwUBMJ8gtXIf3YegbdiBAQGqMQJXWzwuPYM2bNb96Fgfb1wGeDC83fNFOW5H 8PQHbnt8bDFsHxKv2L8kcBhtO/TWA0cugVYR9YFf2BOaGoA2UIoCBdwfABM1HAKU hd0H =TA2E -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Dietrich Kappe | Red Planet http://www.redweb.com Red Planet, LLC| "Chess Space" | "MS Access Products" | PGP Public Key 1-800-RED 0 WEB| /chess | /cobre | /goedel/key.txt Web Publishing | Key fingerprint: 8C2983E66AB723F9 A014A0417D268B84

2 1