December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Air Force hacks Navy? Eeeek!
by Light Ray 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Read this. It's from the Electronic Telegraph, a neat web site in the UK. This article was later posted to comp.risks, and hence, Risks Forum digest, which is where I found it. The paragraphs have been numbered for easy reference. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- (paragraph 0) http://www.telegraph.co.uk/et/ (paragraph 1) A few clicks and then the e-mail message entered the ship's control system... War of the microchips: the day a hacker seized control of a US battleship (paragraph 2) BY SIMPLY dialing the Internet and entering some well-judged keystrokes, a young US air force captain opened a potentially devastating new era in warfare in a secret experiment conducted late last September. His target was no less than gaining unauthorised control of the US Navy's Atlantic Fleet. (paragraph 3) Watching Pentagon VIPs were sceptical as the young officer attempted to do something that the old Soviet Union had long tried to do and failed. He was going to enter the very heart of the United States Navy's warships - their command and control systems. (paragraph 4) He was armed with nothing other than a shop-bought computer and modem. He had no special insider knowledge but was known to be a computer whizzkid, just like the people the Pentagon most want to keep out. (paragraph 5) As he connected with the local node of the Internet provider, the silence was tangible. The next few seconds would be vital. Would the world's most powerful navy be in a position to stop him? (paragraph 6) A few clicks and whirrs were the only signs of activity. And then a seemingly simple e-mail message entered the target ship's computer system. (paragraph 7) First there was jubilation, then horror, back on dry land in the control room at the Electronic Systems Centre at Hanscom Air Force Base in Massachusetts. Within a few seconds the computer screen announced "Control is complete." (paragraph 8) Out at sea, the Captain had no idea that command of his multi-million-dollar warship had passed to another. One by one, more targeted ships surrendered control as the codes buried in the e-mail message multiplied inside the ships' computers. A whole naval battle group was, in effect, being run down a phone-line. Fortunately, this invader was benevolent. But if he could do it ... (paragraph 9) Only very senior naval commanders were in the know as the "Joint Warrior" exercise, a number of experiments to test defence systems, unfolded between September 18-25. Taking over the warships was the swiftest and most alarming of the electronic "raids" - and a true shock for US military leaders. "This shows we have a long way to go in protecting our information systems," said a senior executive at the airbase where the experiment was conducted. (paragraph 10) The exact method of entry remains a classified secret. But the Pentagon wanted to the first to test the extent of their vulnerability to the new "cyberwarriors" - and had the confidence to admit it. (paragraph 11) Now they believe they know what they are dealing with and the defences are going up. (paragraph 12) Reply to Electronic Telegraph - et(a)telegraph.co.uk Electronic Telegraph is a Registered Service Mark of The Telegraph plc -------------------------------------------------------------------------- This sounds very fantastic, like the plot of a movie. Indeed, _Hackers_ featured a "worm" that took over control of the ballast of oil tankers. Perhaps this is a case of a journalist being a good writer but not fully understanding the topic at hand. Does anyone know how true this article is? Or where we could find more info? If it is true, then this is almost scary. Let's pick the article apart: In paragraph (1), the author refers to "the day a hacker siezed control over a US battleship." I assume that "hacker" and "battleship" are being used loosely, as, as noted in an IW-list posting that I received a few minutes ago, there are no currently active US battleships. (?) In paragraphs (2) and (5), the author refers to the "hacker" "dialing the internet" and "[he] connected with the local node of the Internet provider." This implies that the whole operation was conducted over the internet. Do battleships even have internet connections? They may. But the military certainly wouldn't dialup through a civilian ISP where their data goes through unknown hands to perform a very secret operation. Everything is doubtlessly encrypted - was the attack performed with or without keys? Or was the crypto somehow bypassed? The intruder is referred to as "young US air force captain" in par 2, a "young officer" in par 3, a "computer whizzkid" in par 4, an "invader" in par 8, and a "cyberwarrior" in par 10. Who was he? I would assume that it was more likely a group of people who were "in the know." Even the average "Joe Hacker" (is there such a thing?) would have trouble controlling a "batteship" let alone through an ASCII connection. In par 2, the author states that the intruder was attempting to gain "unauthorised control of the US Navy's Atlantic Fleet" (sic). If these were indeed "Joint Warrior" experiments, then it would be authorized. Throughout the article, references are made to the attack beginning with "a simple email message." This could be possible, but it seems that a higher means of control would be necessary. Anyhow, the whole article seems factually incorrect. I'm very interested in finding out more on what ACTUALLY happened, tho.. Tobin Fricke fricke(a)roboben.engr.ucdavis.edu

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ex encrypted script
by andr0id＠midwest.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forgive me if this is a stupid question. I'm using AT&T unix Version 5 release 3.2.2 ( UNIX System V/386 Release 3.2) I have several simple scripts that are simple yet handle important realtime call proccessing tasks and remote control operations. These programs are my programs but are running on a system that is dialed into by the vendor once in a while. Is there a way to encrypt a script yet still allow it to be runnable? I know that the simple answer is to write it in C and compile it but I don't have the means of doing that at the moment. (i.e. there is not compiler on the system) I thought of a few simple protections but they all involve decrypting before running. Dr0id ( Computer Consulting & Management ) (P.O. Box 421 Cambria, IL 62915-0421) -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.6.2 mQENAzCsIi4AAAEH/1hb5+tO/n99Nbppf0ImLJ6AaVZ3NlZP0ZHwRQor00uA129i d4zWixNXxc8t2auaqN+asV99LpIip3/nQzBnjydiumeBdGLF2PR9+6X8X/RrqKa1 dVIukxM5Agg2eM6ih+0J38hgKJ3qzKXSz6sjYmpaxvbXZoHHOLUk/ZtHUKvvEyPw hnJEYnut8NUnIeK56lqeqRw86yoeRKymbfCdjdpgeY2aRwK2FJts8sbb7Fs10s4y jgxWIxIipBznbGUTh1hb2XrLGPENwk3E/qqXQJEsrySbtwdl6VgTVQjhDDEJMitL DYeiQ3W5EgxfcdbM1j2FwYu3P/dM6Y0I8xLMYT0ABRG0NmFuZHIwaWRAb2ljdTgx Mi5jb20gKG9pY3U4MTIuY29tIHN5c3RlbSBhZG1pbmlzdHJhdG9yKYkBFQMFEDCs LO90C7R/GkJcSQEB01cH/0KC3sd+u4OxMku5378SJktoN6QIQYLJ7uVbuV4S51yK NAotCGf4Wl6wwjynzZvXKU0H87oDuMiq7FybgMNL2n+4bQIZi0iz0lIuzwoMDu63 NrHUW9Kz42pOnhrEhrdkHhHL9O5GgD1yc40fJ3qw5h7LQEjDxgypyw0IFILFc34u LeRLliNibxKp8JwAxXNHWSgxu28TQvmnkHi0AHP6tJ/uZYe+4dqJtrMMsYFjzZaz DPmxD+dzbTwlQKtJaP1ZkDI0Sr072wrZDv+G86GyGBMX2lpSafpRitnxuUttjU9o wsQ9Qo5xiH1nZRCs/bDzJe/gng+GHzevixDIITurtNA= =SgPT -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

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PGP timeline FAQ... comments requested
by aba＠atlas.ex.ac.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

There seems to be much confusion amongst some of the newer users of PGP who frequent alt.security.pgp, and recently whilst delving in to give my version of how it happened my post got longer and longer, until it grew on the spur of the moment into a sort of FAQ. I got a few comments, and corrections from that post, but I thought there are likely to be people who know more annecdotes and were around at the time that RSA was being published in the face of NSA opposition, etc. Let me have your comments on the accuracy, plus any annecdotes which you think really should go in to give the correct feel for the historical timeline. Thanks, Adam ====================================================================== PGP timeline and brief history ====================================================================== contents: 0 Definitions of acronyms 1 History of crypto as it applies to PGP 2 Birth of PGP 3 USG decides they don't like PRZ 4 PRZ, MIT and RSA sort out earlier patent issues 5 Current legal status 6 ITARs viewed from inside the US 7 ITARs viewed from outside the US ====================================================================== 0 definitions of acronyms ====================================================================== PGP = Pretty Good Privacy PRZ = Phil R Zimmermann, internet folk hero, author of PGP RSA = The RSA public key algorithm as used in PGP RSADSI = rsa.com, RSA Data Security Inc, patent holders of some public key stuff, which they claim means that no one can use RSA without getting a license from them. PKP = public key partners RSADSI plus Cylink (plus others?) (now disbanded) ITAR = International Traffic in Arms Regulations controls export of controlled munitions from the US, things like military aircraft components, biological and chemical weapons, and also (very strangely) cryptographic software. PK = public key (crypto) NSA = US National Security Agency, US govt's largest spook agency. whimsically known as No Such Agency, because until recently the US govt tried to deny they even existed. OTDC = Office of Defense Trade Controls, USG group charged with enforcing ITAR. They consult with the NSA, the NSA has the last word on what gets export approval. ====================================================================== 1 History of crypto as it applies to PGP ====================================================================== 1.1 The year is 1976 a cryptographer, and privacy advocate named Whitfield Diffie, together with mathematician named Martin Hellman discovers public key cryptography. (DH key exchange is still a commonly used key exchange protocol -- DH = Diffie-Hellman). 1.2 1977 Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir, and Len Adleman discover another more general public key system called RSA (after surnames Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman). R, S & A were researchers at MIT (significant later, because MIT had part ownership of patents.) 1.3 NSA tells MIT and R, S & A that they'd better not publish this or else. 1.4 Amusingly Adi Shamir (A from RSA) isn't even a US citizen, he's an Israeli national, and is now back in Israel at the Technicon (is he, anyone know his current affiliation?) Who knows what the NSA would have done about him if they had succeeded in supressing RSA - not allowed him out of the US? 1.5 MIT and R, S & A ignore NSA and publish anyway in SciAm July 1977. Comms ACM (feb 1978, vol 21, no 2, pp 120-126 in case you want to see if it's in your library - it's in Exeter Univ (UK) library). 1.6 Because the publication was a rush job due to the NSA, R,S & A and the later formed PKP and RSADSI lose patent rights to RSA crypto outside the US. This is because most places outside the US, you have to obtain a patent *before* publication, where as in the US, you have one year from the publication date to file for patents. This also had implications for PGP later 1.7 IDEA was developed by Xuejia Lai and James Massey at ETH in Zurich. (Relevant to PGP because IDEA is the symmetric key cipher used together with RSA in PGP). Also crypto politics relevance in that it is another (of many) examples of the fact that crypto knowledge and expertise is worldwide, ie why export restrict something which is available both sides of the ITAR fence, or even originated *outside* it? (Strangely, ITAR applies to importing and then re-exporting a crypto system, even if no modifications are made). There are lots of other symmetric key ciphers, IDEA is one with a good reputation (no known practical attacks better than brute-force to date, and a good key size), and is just referenced here because of its use in PGP. (some years pass...) ====================================================================== 2 Birth of PGP ====================================================================== 2.1 PRZ wrote PGP 2.2 PRZ gave PGP to some friends 2.3 some friends up loaded onto a few bulletin boards (US only) One friend (allegedly Kelly Goen) went around pay-phones with a portable, an acoustic coupler, and a list of BBS phone numbers uploading and then driving on to another area. This cloak and dagger stuff was because at the time the USG had some draconian sounding proposed law on the books which sounded like it was going to outlaw crypto. The intention was to ensure that PGP was available before this law came into effect, and to avoid being stopped if the USG took interest. 2.4 somehow PGP leaked outside the US via the internet. Information wants to be free, as someone said: `trying to control the free flow of information on the internet is like trying to plug a sieve with a hole in it'. Also Tim May's quote 'National borders are just speedbumps on the information superhighway' expresses the point very nicely. 2.5 people all over the world (yeah outside the US too) start using PGP 2.6 RSA complains to PRZ that PGP violates their PK patents 2.7 PRZ tells RSA to get stuffed, says its the users problem to get a license 2.8 PGP is considered potentially patent infringing because of 2.6 2.9 Illegality taint increases the spread of PGP, generates news, more people get a copy to see what the fuss is about (some time passes, PGP gets real popular...) ====================================================================== 3 USG decides they don't like PRZ ====================================================================== 3.1 US govt decides that they don't like PRZ because the NSA can't tap all those internet mail messages anymore. (the NSA part is speculation, but in my opinion likely true). 3.2 US govt begins investigating PRZ for alleged aiding with ITAR violation. 3.3 Phil Zimmermann legal defense fund set up to cover his legal expenses 3.4 still on going... (concurrently...) ====================================================================== 4 PRZ, MIT and RSA sort out earlier patent issues ====================================================================== 4.1 MIT and PRZ work with RSA to sort out patent issue. 4.2 A solution is obtained in that RSA agree that PGP can use RSA provided that their RSAREF library is used. 4.3 PGP2.5 is written which uses RSAREF in place of MPILIB (also has backwards compatibility with older versions impaired to discourage use of older allegedly patent infringing versions - to keep RSA happy) 4.4 RSAREF may be slower, but at least with some negotiating by PRZ and MIT, PGP is now 100% legal in the US 4.5 MIT begins acting as official US distributor of PGP 4.6 As usual, a few milli-seconds (well okay, minutes) after the official release of a new version of PGP, it gets exported from the US. 4.7 The deal with RSA over RSAREF has fixed the patent related problems in the US, but it has created a copyright related problem outside the US, (recall 0.6). RSAREF is a software package copyrighted by RSA, and RSA is not allowed to export it because of ITAR, and their license agreement says as much (ie it says that you must not export it, and if you do export, you, and the subsequent users of it, are in breach of license). It is therefore supposed that RSA could if they wanted complain about this (who knows that they would want to, or what conceivable benefit it would give them if they did). This isn't enough to bother most people, but commercial users, and big organisations have lawyers, and are wary of such things. 4.8 Staale Schaumaker put together pgp26i to avoid this problem. Main difference between pgp26x and pgp26xi is that pgp26xi uses PRZs original big integer library MPILIB, which is any case faster than RSADSI's RSAREF, and the lack of the legal kludge noted in 3.3. ====================================================================== 5 Current legal status ====================================================================== 5.1 PGP is legal both inside and outside the US. You just need to use pgp26 versions inside the US, and pgp26xi versions outside the US. 5.2 In the US if you are using PGP in a commercial setting, and care about patents, you should purchase a copy of ViaCrypt pgp2.7 5.3 Commercial use outside the US: RSA is free, in the PGP docs (pgp262i & pgp262) Ascom-Tech are quoted as saying that currently no license is required for commercial use of PGP outside the US as far as they are concerned. Ascom-Tech are the patent holders of IDEA (see 1.7), the symmetric crypto system used by PGP. ====================================================================== 6 ITARs viewed from inside the US ====================================================================== 6.1 ITAR means that if you are in the US you should not export PGP. (Yeah it's already available on a few thousand ftp sites around the free world, so another export isn't going to make any difference, but the NSA and the ODTC might not see it in that light). 6.2 Even though controlling the export of freeware software available worldwide might seem incredibly stupid (not to mention pointless), you should bear in mind that the penalties for getting successfully prosecuted for violating ITAR are rather steep. Up to $1,000,000 (US$) fine, and and up to10 years imprisonment per count of export. 6.3 They'd probably never do anything to you, PRZ is just a scape goat (someone they can symbolically persecute to discourage others). I have personally seen several people from US sites post crypto source and binaries (nautilus, PGP itself even). Plus of course this: #!/bin/perl -s-- -export-a-crypto-system-sig -RSA-3-lines-PERL $m=unpack(H.$w,$m."\0"x$w),$_=`echo "16do$w 2+4Oi0$d*-^1[d2%Sa 2/d0<X+d*La1=z\U$n%0]SX$k"[$m*]\EszlXx++p|dc`,s/^.|\W//g,print pack('H*',$_)while read(STDIN,$m,($w=2*$d-1+length$n&~1)/2) has probably been exported a few hundred thousand times by now. (It's an implementation of RSA encrypt and decrypt in perl and dc - a real crypto system, which has every right to claim ITAR status if anyting does, and yet benefits from being more convienient to use as a .sig than a uuencoded PGP binary) ====================================================================== 7 ITARs viewed from outside the US ====================================================================== 7.3 If you are outside the US, ITAR probably doesn't apply to you. You could, if you could be bothered, down load PGP from a US site, and short of attempting an extradition for violating a regulation which only applies in the US, there would be nothing the NSA, or USG could do about it. Most extradition treaties tend to rely on the action being prosecuted being illegal in both countries. 7.4 Yeah, I know `tell that to Manuel Noriega' (a Panama citizen who was kidnapped by a USG undercover agents and brought to the US to face trial for importing/exporting drugs from Panama into the US. He broke no Panamanian laws, he is a citizen of Panama, and was in Panama when he committed his crime, and he is now languishing in a US jail). However, he was kidnapped for a number of reasons: 1. the USG thought they could get away with it (Panama owed them a few favours) 2. politically easy to pass of acts of aggression (kidnap by civilised countries in this day and age?) in the name of the `War on Drugs' 3. they thought it was worth it. Some of these criteria are likely to be missing if there was an attempt to extradite a non-US citizen outside the US for breaking ITAR. One big problem is that crypto is not controlled as much in most of the free world. Also the fact that the USG haven't bothered other people within the US who have similarly exported crypto software (examples cited in 6.3) would make the whole situation look rather silly. 7.5 A more important consideration is that although a non-US downloader of PGP from a US site would be effectively immune to the ITAR nonsense, the owner of the (US based) ftp/www site may not be. You might get the site owner in trouble for not taking adequate precautions. So politeness demands that you don't do it. 7.6 Indeed why bother anyway, because PGP is available from literally thousands of ftp sites, there is bound to be a closer (and hence likely faster download) copy, without any hoops to jump though. ====================================================================== Long live the Pretty Good revolution, Adam Back <aba(a)dcs.ex.ac.uk>

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last straw
by Dave Del Torto 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I've decided to cancel my CrampuNerve account and send the weasels a msg to telling them why. I encourage everyone here to do the same with your CI$ account (if you still have one). These [insert colorful expletive here]s only understand one thing: cold ca$h. Thus, the only effective way to send them an indication of one's displeasure at their poor precedent-setting is to vote with one's wallet. Any who are still unfortunate enough to rely on CI$ for Internet/Usenet access are getting reamed price-wise anyway, not to mention suffering poor reliability and now access, so maybe a few of them could also take this opportunity to migrate to an ISP with some real "backbone." CI$ is becoming redundant and now they're making themselves unappealing. Convenient, economical dialups are now available to Europeans and any of us Yanks who have to travel to Europe regularly through various non-anus-kissing ISPs (xs4all, iSYS, etc.). Back in '90-'92 CI$ used to be somewhat handy when travelling to Europe, but even then it was horribly expensive when you tallied up their "surcharges" for dialing in through Frankfurt, etc. Good riddance, say I. dave ____________________________________________________________ "I prefer a real whorehouse to The Theatre." -Dorothy Parker

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practical annoyances from multi-level security?
by Simon Spero 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Does anybody have any pet peeves and gripes about using systems with a compartmentalised security model- things that took ages to do even though they didn't really impact security, features that just got in the way or were too complicated to really use, etc? I'm currently working on a problem that seems to have some analogies to the compartmentalised problem, running code with various levels of trust were deliberate read-up and accidental write-down could be a breach. I've personally never used a system of this sort, but I've heard from friends in the RAF doing COM/SEC (more COM than SEC) that MLS can be a real pain at times. [for the truly paranoid, the RAF operates a network of communication satellites called Skynet :-)] Simon p.s. still no luck on the Hackers soundtrack - I did recognise a few prodigy tracks though (defun modexpt (x y n) "computes (x^y) mod n" (cond ((= y 0) 1) ((= y 1) (mod x n)) ((evenp y) (mod (expt (modexpt x (/ y 2) n) 2) n)) (t (mod (* x (modexpt x (1- y) n)) n))))

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Is Dr Fred Cohen a Loon???
by Anonymous User 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Trolling for Flames(just another anonymous poster destroying the 'net) :) The Subject says it all... I believe Fred suffers from a severely inflated ego and suffers from the "false expert" syndrome detailed by various self-help orgs... what say you fred?? Another anon poster destroying the integrity of the net

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CAV_ein
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

12-29-95. NYPaper: John Markoff page-ones Compuserve's cave-in to Reich sex law and the alt free-screeching for sex home censorship cave-in to rutting parents ashamed. CAV_ein

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Re: Australian "calculatorcard"
by amp 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-- [ From: amp * EMC.Ver #2.3 ] -- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- From: Cees de Groot \ Internet: (cg(a)bofh.toad.com) To: cypherpunks \ Internet: (cypherpunks(a)toad.com) Subject: Australian "calculatorcard" Hi everybody, CG> Yesterday, on UK Discovery, there was an item in the programme CG> Beyond 2000 about an Australian card which implements a CG> challenge-response protocol and can be used for banking, etcetera. CG> Basically, you give your card number (over the phone), get a CG> challenge number, enter your pin and the challenge, and then give the CG> response. All in CC format... sounds like the card i use for remote dialup to certain non-public systems i use at work. it has a six digit number on the front that changes every 60 seconds. the card is registered to me. when i enter my username/password i'm prompted for the number. it's Pretty Good (tm) security, but like anything not biometric, it is vulnerable to black-bag attacks. physical possession being all that is required. if you know the algorithm and the serial number of the card and the time, even that isn't necessary. CG> Can anybody provide me with pointers to more in-depth information CG> about this device and the algorithm(s) behind it ? i don't know if there are any net sources for them, but i'd be suprised if not. my card references "security dynamics" of cambridge massachusetts. amp <0003701548(a)mcimail.com> (since 10/31/88) <alan.pugh(a)internetmci.com> PGP Key = 57957C9D PGP FP = FA 02 84 7D 82 57 78 E4 E2 1C 7B 88 62 A6 F9 F7 December 30, 1995 23:29 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAwUBMOYRtIdTfgZXlXydAQGengf9EH07ubUAH43THj3l+6kWUjnXDYfe2DFj CvpEKlFoDkxwllDcIX0KfWK+ENr3YzyQp/yuWU+ZAw/ogci3y5r4IF+oJ4ItrVD6 pZ4AzF5NvXb2KWcnSaQoVsfo3yIt0bfRknuQjGyirntNhLpTkObVygbUmSSNeT8S hrpGB85IkEoy/km3pntCMfrfA0BrED3GCnNLxVYupY7jM7AxbD+mjHvS8to63bPv 68xjB93b+78ld/O0FPsOP7GQMbUZyTJMiLoNwiMhbgEi8Y4dFTlZ6mF6NMHsDxDy p/ocbp2dOj0Vy/BFbfbBqCgdjY3FoExRRHpgav8b0Xd4qNydkFDelg== =MSp2 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: ideath remailer permanently down / PGP key changes for Greg Broiles
by Greg Broiles 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Doh, the wordwrap on that message was ugly. Sorry. Gotta spend some more time making friends with Private Idaho. Short version: remailer(a)ideath.goldenbear.com is gone forever, sorry. All mail to anything @goldenbear.com is bouncing. Mail for me should be sent to "gbroiles(a)netbox.com", effective immediately. I have distributed a new PGP key to the keyservers and marked my old key obsolete. I will be signing list messages again once I get that wordwrap thing fixed. -- "The anchored mind screwed into me by the psycho- | Greg Broiles lubricious thrust of heaven is the one that thinks | gbroiles(a)netbox.com every temptation, every desire, every inhibition." | -- Antonin Artaud |

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Can We Cut the Crap?
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Really, the S/N ratio is approaching all-time lows, even for the Silly Season of Xmas. A week or so ago there was a massive flame war involving insults and counter-insults--I returned from my Xmas vacation to find the list melting down. Now, a week later, a new flamewar has erupted. There is no point in the back-and-forth of insults, "Dr. Fred is a loon," "Alice is Detweiler," and other such nonsense. If you don't want to read the comments of Fred Cohen, Dimitri Vulis, Alice whatever, Vlad/Lance/Larry/Pablo, then just don't read them! Filter them out, delete them immediately, read them briefly, whatever. At 5:04 PM 12/31/95, deadbeat wrote: >Regarding Fred Cohen, PhD: > [typical personal insults elided] >Let's also consider the granting institution, a second-rank school. Well, not quite. I seem to recall that Cohen's advisor at USC was Len Adleman, known perhaps to some of you as the "A" in RSA and more recently as the guy doing the "DNA computing" work. He was also working on viruses, perhaps in conjunction with Cohen, as of 1987-88, and gave an interesting paper at the 1988 Crypto Conference on "An Abstract Theory of Computer Viruses." Not surprisingly, Cohen's papers were the main citations. I recall Adleman describing in the oral talk just how it is that determining if a given program contains a virus is essentially equivalent to solving the halting problem, i.e., it may be undecidable whether a program has a virus, except presumably in some special cases (e.g., for very small programs). >Cohen's thesis broke new ground, but how many people have read it, or any of >his writings, or know anything about his ideas beyond a single word? How far >did he carry this work? Where are the conference and journal papers? Cohen's >reputation faded into obscurity long ago. Now he is building a new reputation >as a pig-headed loudmouth, threatening his "defamers." Shades of Sternlight. I have plenty to disagree with some of what Fred Cohen says, as I do with many people, but this is just plain ignorant. "How many people have read it, or any of his writings..." is a ridiculous argument, even for an ad hominem. Those who want to read it, can read it. The articles are readily available. I've even seen some of his books on the bookshelves of my local bookstores (haven't read them, though I flipped through "It's Alive!" and didn't see much of interest....but how many of us have written _any_ books?). I'm not convinced there's much more about the _theory_ of viruses to "push forward," for various reasons. The theory was laid out, some Bulgarians and others are busily writing viruses, but there's not likely to be some whole reservoir of new theory to be worked on. (This is true of a lot of fields, where the work done decades ago basically was complete....look at how we all cite Garey and Johnson and how little has changed in the field of NP-completeness.) Blasting Cohen because you don't think he carried his work far enough is clearly blasting wildly. Have you asked whether others on this list have carried the work they did in their early careers far enough? (Did I carry my work in the 1970s on alpha particle effects on chips far enough, or am I just a Cohen-like slacker because I moved on to other things?) Anyway, if you don't like Sternlight, or Cohen, or May, or Detweiler, or Metzger, or Vulis, *filter* them out! So why don't I just do this? Well, I do have a filter file in my Eudora Pro mailer, and I use it. But I still see the crossfire on the list, the pointless flames and personal attacks. This angers and saddens me. Hence this message. While I don't subscribe to the extreme view espoused by some, that the topics of the list should be exclusively crypto, math, programming, and Internet standards, I do think people should try to find some relevance to the larger themes of the list. The recent increase in "one-sentance repartee" is indicative of late-stage list meltdown. (Some of the posts here quote a couple of paragraphs, add one or two lines of insults, then have another screenful of PGP sigs, auto-signing sigs, anonymous IDs, and then a conventional sig. Jeesh!) I'm hoping that this is just a Xmas vacation silly season. --Tim May We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 - 1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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