December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: FCPUNX:Macintosh [and perhaps other OS] Security Alert (fwd)
by Ray Arachelian 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

========================================================================== + ^ + | Ray Arachelian | Amerika: The land of the Freeh. | _ |> \|/ |sunder(a)dorsai.org| Where day by day, yet another | \ | <--+-->| | Constitutional right vanishes. | \| /|\ | Just Say | | <|\ + v + | "No" to the NSA!| Jail the censor, not the author!| <| n ========================================================================== ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Sat, 28 Oct 1995 11:12:00 -0400 From: Sal Denaro <Sal(a)panix.com> To: Ray Arachelian <sunder(a)amanda.dorsai.org> Subject: Re: FCPUNX:Macintosh [and perhaps other OS] Security Alert (fwd) > ---------- Forwarded message ---------- > Date: Sun, 15 Oct 1995 01:05:06 -0400 > From: Lucky Green <shamrock(a)netcom.com> > To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com > Subject: Macintosh [and perhaps other OS] Security Alert > > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > > A number of months ago, I discovered that various Macintosh "unused > diskspace" wipe utilities (Norton, Burn) fail to wipe the unused > slackspace at the end of the last block allocated to a file. This leaves > NumberOfFiles*512Bytes/2 = several kB of recoverable data on your average > drive. > I can verify that this is a cross-platform bug. The Dos/win3.1 and Win95 versions all have the same flaw. -- Salvatore Denaro sal(a)panix.com Spinning dreams with angel wings Yes, I use PGP torn blue jeans/a foolish grin

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Cryto article in SJ Mercenary
by Simon Spero 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

There's a full page equivalent article on encyption in today's San Jose Mercury News (12E-11E). The article concentrates on public key cryptography, and mixes some good stuff with some silly mistakes. The first page has about 4/5th of the article devoted to a big diagram showing how someone using public key encryption to cover a whole message, and sent it over the internet to someone in Argentina. All this without a mention of using symmetric cyphers, and without even mentioning ITAR. Another 1/8th of this page is given over to a bunch of cypher text that supposedly encodes the address of "Mr Cosmic Kumquat, SSl Trusters etc.." This address looks kind of familiar... but they seem to imply that the cyphertext is the output of an RSA encrpytion, not RC4. They then go on to discuss factoring, and explain the difference between the strength of algorithms in theory, and how Netscape became vulnerable due to "beginners mistakes" in the implementation, and how security is best assured by open disclosure, not security through obscurity. Simon ---- (defun modexpt (x y n) "computes (x^y) mod n" (cond ((= y 0) 1) ((= y 1) (mod x n)) ((evenp y) (mod (expt (modexpt x (/ y 2) n) 2) n)) (t (mod (* x (modexpt x (1- y) n)) n))))

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Re: /dev/random for FreeBSD [was: Re: /dev/random for Linux]
by Mark Murray 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> In a 386 or a 486 (under FreeBSD at least) there is a 1Mhz clock available. > How would _this_ be? On the Pentium there is the <whatsit?> register > which will give the board's oscillator (or 90 MHz) I believe. > > What's HZ set at for FreeBSD? Most of the x86 Unixes have generally > used HZ set at 100, because the interrupt overhead on a x86 isn't cheap, > and so you want to limit the number of clock interrupts. There are two interrupts 100Hz and the other 128Hz (The second gets pushed into the +-1K region during profiling. > You can sample the timing clock, but it turns out to be rather expensive > to do so; several I/O instructions, which will require several delays if > they have to go through your 8 MHz ISA bus. We've moved away from using > the hardware clock on the 386 because of the overhead concerns. On the > Penitum, we use the clock cycle counter. Drat. Methinks I need to follow suit, but I value that 1Mhz... > Well, verifiable randomness really is like gold. It's a valuable > resource. On a time-sharing system, where you really want to equitably > share *all* system resources perhaps there should be a quota system > limiting the rate from which a user is allowed to "consume" randomness. True. VMS could probably do this. <Ducks bricks> > On the other hand, most Unix systems *aren't* great at doing this sort > of resource allocation, and there are enough other ways of launching > denial of service attacks. "while (1) fork();" will generally bring > most systems to their knees, even in spite of limitations of the number > of processes per user. Most Unix systems don't protect against one user > grabbing all available virtual memory. And so on.... Getting there (I think). > There's nothing special about /dev/random in this sense; it's just > another system resource which can be abused by a malicious user, just > like virtual memory or process table slots. True. Good policing never hurt. > This is a strong argument for some form of specialised noise source. > I have read of methods of getting this from turbulent air flow in a hard > drive (an RFC, I believe). > > Yes, ultimately what you need is a good hardware number generator. > There are many good choices; from radioactive decay, noise diodes, etc. The idea that I like the most so far is to generate noise, but filter it through an LPF to get frequencies less than (say) 500Khz. Put that through schmitt trigger to get decent squarewaves and then into an N-bit hardware shift register with some XOR feedbacks to mix this. Voila! Nice numbers on demand. Shouldn't cost more than a few <shekels>... > Short of good hardware sources, the other really good choice is > unobservable inputs. Hence, the Linux driver is hooked into the > keyboard driver, and the various busmice drivers. Those are really > wonderful sources of randomness, since they're generally not observable > by an adversary, and humans tend to be inherently random. :-) Doesn't work on servers in locked rooms... :-( With those, as long as the machines are secure, (ie plebs cannot watch and time raw packets) the network card is OK. The server may not be on transit ethernet AT ALL. M -- Mark Murray 46 Harvey Rd, Claremont, Cape Town 7700, South Africa +27 21 61-3768 GMT+0200 Finger mark(a)grumble.grondar.za for PGP key

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A final Huber-Spam: ON MONEY
by rah＠shipwright.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Note the URL. There's more there for them as wants 'em. Cheers, Bob Hettinga --- begin forwarded text Date: Tue, 31 Oct 95 21:32:44 0500 From: Robert Hettinga <rah(a)shipwright.com> Organization: Shipwright MIME-Version: 1.0 To: rah(a)shipwright.com Subject: 031692.html X-URL: http://khht.com/huber/forbes/031692.html http://khht.com/huber/forbes/031692.html> ON MONEY > > by Peter Huber > > Forbes, March 16, 1992 at Pg. 144 > > Copyright 1992 by Peter Huber. Electronic copies of this document > may be distributed freely, provided that this notice accompanies all > copies. > > ------- > > While Europe strains to give birth to a new currency, Boris Yeltsin > toils to resurrect a dead one. With private markets triumphant > everywhere else, however, the mystery is why governments still have > to manufacture money at all. > > It is still often taken for granted that the one thing private > markets cannot make is money itself: Only government can do that. > But new governments of young nations, especially nations with > turbulent histories, can't make money, either. Nobody quite trusts > them, and without trust the paper lovingly engraved at the > government mint is valueless. > > Until recently, people put up with a lot of government paper because > even bad paper was more convenient than the alternative, which was > barter. Every self-respecting capitalist knew that government paper > was a perishable good, that it always decayed, slowly in > Switzerland, fast in Brazil, and most just put up with it. But if > capitalists can produce candies that melt in your mouth, not in your > hand, why not currencies, too? > > Money, as I wrote here two years ago (FORBES, May 14, 1990), is just > another network, our oldest medium of systematic communication. And > new communications technologies are fast surpassing the old. The > paperless bank, unlike the paperless office, is at hand. > > When it works, the old-fashioned paper we call money reliably > records past effort and promises future return. It's all a matter of > communication among stable communities of productive people. This is > why individuals can issue currencies, too -- personal checks, IOUs, > that sort of thing. Once it's established of an individual that her > word is her bond, she can in fact issue private currency at will, at > least among people who know her. > > But the trouble with private currencies has always been their > informational overhead. Personal checks bounce, the "I" behind the > IOU absconds to Monaco, Macy's defaults on its bonds. Private paper > is also volatile; pegging current value requires specialized > information from Wall Street, or a bank in Oshkosh, or a trading pit > in Chicago. In the past, it's often been cheaper to put up with the > steady but modest thievery of a central bank, which peels off 3% > (will it soon be 6%?) of your dollar every year through inflation, > than to sort out whose private paper is worth what at any given > moment. > > Computers and fiber-optic communications are changing all that. Our > new central bankers can be concerns like TRW and Dun & Bradstreet, > which track who's solvent and who's a deadbeat and convey the > information instantly, at the touch of a button, wherever it's > needed. Our new mints and engravers can be companies like Visa and > AT&T, which clear millions of transactions daily, both here and > abroad. > > What enterprises like these supply are the informational ingredients > of money. They already are far better than Alan Greenspan at > stabilizing value by assembling baskets of private paper as varied > and diversified as the global economy. Information about who earned > a credit yesterday or who can be trusted to pay back a debt tomorrow > can be passed around as easily as a dollar bill. More easily, in > fact. > > Like religious liturgies conducted in some otherwise dead language, > transactions may still be denoted in dollars or yen, but these > vestiges of an earlier age will ultimately give way to a new > financial vernacular. If everybody paid for everything (wages > included) by credit card, for example, the accounts could just as > well be denoted in pork bellies, IBM stock, quarterpounders with > cheese, or (more likely) some very large basket of hundreds of > different private goods and services, tangible and intangible. > > The Lynch, for example, might be a share in a standard pool of > commodity receipts maintained by Merril Lynch. Nobody would fully > trust the Lynch, of course, even if backed by 100% reserves, but > nobody would have to. Nobody trusts his food supply to any one > farmer, either. You diversify, you assemble baskets of baskets, and > you constantly search for quality goods and reliable supply. Same > with money. When the network and the computers behind it are > powerful enough, no central authority can or should supply the > currency, and no one will pay annual tribute by way of inflation to > the government mint. And with private money, private fortunes will > no longer be held hostage to public ineptitude in the Kremlin or on > Capitol Hill. > > So back to Yeltsin and how we can help him. Despite the corrupting > influences of the regulatory collectivist on our own shore, > America's phone companies and banks are still the best in the world. > Yeltsin needs them, far more than he needs the International > Monetary Fund, Pizza Hut or Western investment in Russia's oil > industry. Modern telefinancial enterprises can deliver the real oil > of the economy: truly stable media of exchange. > > The biggest contribution Yeltsin can make to Russia's fiscal policy > is to make way for currency capitalists. No exchange controls, no > bank insurance, no loan guarantees, no criminal prosecution for > ordinary bankruptcy, nothing but basic, narrowly interpreted laws > against outright fraud. > > Will the new private banks sometimes fail? Of course they will. Will > widows then be ruined? Certainly. So what else is new? In Russia > today the only bank in town has failed miserably, and the one cold > comfort for widows is that the ruin is universal. Give it a try, > Boris. You have nothing to lose but your rubles. --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) Shipwright Development Corporation, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA (617) 323-7923 "Reality is not optional." --Thomas Sowell >>>>Phree Phil: Email: zldf(a)clark.net http://www.netresponse.com/zldf <<<<<

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Re: /dev/random for FreeBSD [was: Re: /dev/random for Linux]
by Martin Diehl 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Theodore Ts'o writes... >Yes, ultimately what you need is a good hardware number generator. ... >I'm not entirely comfortable with the proposal of using air flow >turbulance [sic] from a hard drive ... Two important observations about the use of a disk drive to get randomness: 1. In the case of some workstations, the local network provides the disk drive and there isn't a local hard drive at all. Hence, any timing of disk accesses will give you data that is influenced by the file server more than the disk drive. 2. When doing time domain measurements (Hewlett Packard had some good application notes on this subject), you must consider base clock jitter. Ill try to illustrate with a diagram: actual event: V V clock granularity: /...../...../...../...../...../...../ the problem is that no matter how small the basic clock unit is (symbolized by "/", above), you can't be sure how much of that unit has passed when the event (symbolized by "V", above) occurs. For example, on the original IBM PC, clock interrupts occurred about 18.2 times per second (55ms interval). In that architecture, you can't time an event and have an uncertainty of less than 2 times 55ms If you propose using a special hardware random generator, you have a different set of problems: 1. You need to buy and install hardware on many different platforms -- you don't always have access to do that. 2. Many earlier posts on this subject pointed out that removing bias was important. In that case, you need to continuously test and recertify the hardware random generator for randomness. In order to do that, you need to have so much knowledge about generating and testing random numbers in software that you might as well use a software solution in the first place. Good luck

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Perfect Forward Secrecy - is it worth it?
by Simon Spero 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Quick survey; how important is perfect forward secrecy to you? I've asked three people locally so far and gotten four different answers, so in the spirit of spreading divisiveness where'er I go, I'll try and get a few more opinions here :-) In general, schemes offering PFS require a extra PK-op, and an extra round-trip when compared to non-PFS schemes. This cost is incurred once per "session", but can add on the order of seconds to startup times. Should key-management schemes where PK is available always provide PFS, allow PFS, or not provide PFS? The amount of code needed to implement each choice point is similar, if you're using something like BSAFE. Simon --- (defun modexpt (x y n) "computes (x^y) mod n" (cond ((= y 0) 1) ((= y 1) (mod x n)) ((evenp y) (mod (expt (modexpt x (/ y 2) n) 2) n)) (t (mod (* x (modexpt x (1- y) n)) n))))

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Electronic Warfare
by frezza＠interramp.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Cypherpunks, With your indulgence I would like to post this short essay here, which was stimulated by a recent report posted on this list that was passed on to me. The essay just ran as an op-ed piece in this week's issue of Communications Week. I would like to thank and acknowledge the author off the original report as well as encourage the cypherpunk community to keep me posted on related issues. (I cannot keep up with the volume on this list and, hence, am not a subscriber.) Thank you, Bill Frezza Columnist Communications Week Network Computing Magazine frezza(a)interramp.com --------------------------------------------------------------------------- ELECTRONIC WARFARE WAGES ON - AND YOU'RE THE TARGET Although the flap over the Clinton administration's attempt to promote escrowed-key encryption systems like Clipper has temporarily faded, the war on electronic privacy continues. As proceedings at the Fourth International Conference on Money Laundering, Forfeiture, Asset Recovery, Offshore Investments, the Pacific Rim, and International Financial Crimes reveal, there has been no let up in our government's efforts to blockade the cyber-frontier. No, you won't learn much from the Wall Street Journal or the New York Times, written by journalist-generalists who have no clue about where this technology is heading. The Feds have become so skilled at manipulating the Old Media that stories about electronic privacy invariably center on the latest drug kingpin, pedophile, or domestic terrorist. Attacking these universally abhorred enemies of the people not only makes for good headlines but keeps privacy advocates off balance as they are forced to defend abstract rights using loathsome examples. But if you tune in to the Cypherpunks mailing list (majordomo(a)toad.com) you can get some excellent first hand reports from the front. In the relatively short period since the passage of the Bank Secrecy Act, which, among other things, obliges banks to file Suspicious Activity Reports on its customers, banks have become virtual deputies in the treasury department's war on uncontrolled financial transactions. And this war is increasingly spilling into cyberspace. The conference underscored the fact that, paradoxically, we are heading not toward more specific and well defined transaction monitoring regulations, but less. How so? The problem with making regulations precise is that what software algorithms can define, other algorithms can evade. Instead, regulation by "raised eyebrow" is becoming the norm. Federal bank examiners have been given significant latitude to invoke draconian penalties against uncooperative banks. Because bank officers have few due-process protections under this regime, it is no surprise that most of them have become sniveling toadies. The objective is to insure that banks "voluntarily" introduce even more aggressive, unpredictable, and intrusive monitoring than the government would ever dare mandate. And to make sure nothing slips through the cracks, human surveillance will be supplemented with artificial-intelligence agents that can perform pattern analysis on the aggregate flow of electronic transactions, flagging anything remotely suspicious. George Orwell would be impressed. Lest you think that all of this is motivated solely by the drug war, a visit to the Treasury Department's Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) homepage (http://www.ustreas.gov/treasury/bureaus/fincen/facts.html) should open your eyes. This battle is not just about drug prohibition, a crime the Treasury Department would have to invent if it didn't already exist. The real struggle is about the future of tax compliance, and it has you in its sights. A famous Revolutionary War era pamphleteer, writing under the pseudonym "Brutus", perhaps said it best 200 years ago when he wrote - "The national government through its taxing power will introduce itself into every corner of the city and country. It will take cognizance of the professional man in his office or his study; it will watch the merchant in his store; it will follow the mechanic to his shop and his work, and will haunt him in his family and his bed; it will be the constant companion to the industrious farmer in his labour; it will penetrate into the most obscure cottage; and finally it will light upon the head of every person in the United States. To all these different classes of people and in all these circumstances on which it will attend them, the language in which it will address them will be GIVE! GIVE!" What Brutus didn't know and what the cypherpunks foresee is that one day strong encryption will make it impossible to spy on our activities in cyberspace. Heightened conflict is inevitable. Expect the rhetoric to get a lot hotter as the government spinmeisters labor to keep us focused on public enemies while frantically trying to keep its hand in every citizens pocket and its eyes on every bankbook. # # # COPYRIGHT CMP PUBLICATIONS 1995 Bill Frezza is president at Wireless Computing Associates and co-founder of the online forum DigitaLiberty. The opinions expresses are his own. Frezza can be reached at frezza(a)interramp.com. ------------------------------------ | Wireless Computing Associates, Inc. | 704 Stoney Hill Rd., Suite 155 | Yardley, PA 19067 | ph 215-321-0929, fax 215-321-0490 | urgent Email: frezza(a)radiomail.net | bulk Email: frezza(a)interramp.com ------------------------------------

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Re: Need Mail-to-News gates
by Rich Salz 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Until I can write a script to pull all the newsgroups from the active >file and place aliases for them in sendmail, the only way to use it is The "gag" program that comes with my news/mail gateway software known as newsgate can do this automatically. email to rsalz(a)nntp.com for a copy.

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From Bill Frezza: Electronic Warfare
by Ray Arachelian 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Sun, 29 Oct 1995 11:33:54 -0500 From: Bill Frezza <frezza(a)interramp.com> To: sunder(a)escape.com Subject: Can you post this? Ray, If you feel it is apporpriate, can you post the attached column to cypherpunks? Since I am not a regular subscriber (I can't keep up with the traffic) I thought it would be best to pass it by you first. Thanks, Bill Frezza ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ To: Cypherpunks(a)toad.com Subject: Electronic Warfare From: Bill Frezza (frezza(a)interramp.com) Dear cyhperpunks, Attached is a column that will appear on the op-ed page of tomorrow's (10/30) Communications Week that was stimulated largely by a report filed here by one of your members. I thought you would find it interesting and thought provoking. I would like to thank and acknowledge whoever it was that filed that report as well as encourage you all to keep me informed about related political developments. (I just don't have the bandwidth to follow the cyhperpunks list in its entirty.) It is my hope to bring the important issues you raise here to the attention of the industry and the general public. Regards, Bill Frezza Communications Week ELECTRONIC WARFARE WAGES ON - AND YOU'RE THE TARGET Although the flap over the Clinton administration's attempt to promote escrowed-key encryption systems like Clipper has temporarily faded, the war on electronic privacy continues. As proceedings at the Fourth International Conference on Money Laundering, Forfeiture, Asset Recovery, Offshore Investments, the Pacific Rim, and International Financial Crimes reveal, there has been no let up in our government's efforts to blockade the cyber-frontier. No, you won't learn much from the Wall Street Journal or the New York Times, written by journalist-generalists who have no clue about where this technology is heading. The Feds have become so skilled at manipulating the Old Media that stories about electronic privacy invariably center on the latest drug kingpin, pedophile, or domestic terrorist. Attacking these universally abhorred enemies of the people not only makes for good headlines but keeps privacy advocates off balance as they are forced to defend abstract rights using loathsome examples. But if you tune in to the Cypherpunks mailing list (majordomo(a)toad.com) you can get some excellent first hand reports from the front. In the relatively short period since the passage of the Bank Secrecy Act, which, among other things, obliges banks to file Suspicious Activity Reports on its customers, banks have become virtual deputies in the treasury department's war on uncontrolled financial transactions. And this war is increasingly spilling into cyberspace. The conference underscored the fact that, paradoxically, we are heading not toward more specific and well defined transaction monitoring regulations, but less. How so? The problem with making regulations precise is that what software algorithms can define, other algorithms can evade. Instead, regulation by "raised eyebrow" is becoming the norm. Federal bank examiners have been given significant latitude to invoke draconian penalties against uncooperative banks. Because bank officers have few due-process protections under this regime, it is no surprise that most of them have become sniveling toadies. The objective is to insure that banks "voluntarily" introduce even more aggressive, unpredictable, and intrusive monitoring than the government would ever dare mandate. And to make sure nothing slips through the cracks, human surveillance will be supplemented with artificial-intelligence agents that can perform pattern analysis on the aggregate flow of electronic transactions, flagging anything remotely suspicious. George Orwell would be impressed. Lest you think that all of this is motivated solely by the drug war, a visit to the Treasury Department's Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) homepage (http://www.ustreas.gov/treasury/bureaus/fincen/facts.html) should open your eyes. This battle is not just about drug prohibition, a crime the Treasury Department would have to invent if it didn't already exist. The real struggle is about the future of tax compliance, and it has you in its sights. A famous Revolutionary War era pamphleteer, writing under the pseudonym "Brutus", perhaps said it best 200 years ago when he wrote - "The national government through its taxing power will introduce itself into every corner of the city and country. It will take cognizance of the professional man in his office or his study; it will watch the merchant in his store; it will follow the mechanic to his shop and his work, and will haunt him in his family and his bed; it will be the constant companion to the industrious farmer in his labour; it will penetrate into the most obscure cottage; and finally it will light upon the head of every person in the United States. To all these different classes of people and in all these circumstances on which it will attend them, the language in which it will address them will be GIVE! GIVE!" What Brutus didn't know and what the cypherpunks foresee is that one day strong encryption will make it impossible to spy on our activities in cyberspace. Heightened conflict is inevitable. Expect the rhetoric to get a lot hotter as the government spinmeisters labor to keep us focused on public enemies while frantically trying to keep its hand in every citizens pocket and its eyes on every bankbook. # # # COPYRIGHT CMP PUBLICATIONS 1995 Bill Frezza is president at Wireless Computing Associates and co-founder of the online forum DigitaLiberty. The opinions expresses are his own. Frezza can be reached at frezza(a)interramp.com. ------------------------------------ | Wireless Computing Associates, Inc. | 704 Stoney Hill Rd., Suite 155 | Yardley, PA 19067 | ph 215-321-0929, fax 215-321-0490 | urgent Email: frezza(a)radiomail.net | bulk Email: frezza(a)interramp.com ------------------------------------

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Please send cash
by fc＠all.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I just picked this up from the Risks forum: > Date: Mon, 30 Oct 1995 16:14:59 -0500 > From: Drew Dean <ddean(a)CS.Princeton.EDU> > Subject: HotJava 1.0 alpha 3 security issues > > We have found several security problems in the 1.0 alpha 3 release of > HotJava from Sun Microsystems. The two most important problems are that > HotJava does not enforce the stated limits on where an applet can connect to > (an applet can talk to any place with which you have IP-level connectivity), > and HotJava is vulnerable to a man-in-the-middle attack, where someone can > watch your web-surfing, both seeing your requests, and the content that you > receive. Two of the Java attacks I outlined in this forum and got abuse for. > While HotJava prevents applets from actively opening connections that > violate the user-selected security policy, it allows an applet to accept > connections from anywhere. At this point, an applet only has to use any one > of a number of channels to communicate where it is, and have the remote end > do the active open. > > HotJava also allows an applet to set the proxy servers that the browser > uses. This opens up a huge hole for anyone concerned about the privacy of > their web surfing. Attacks 31-49 work here. > Please note that these bugs are specific to the 1.0 alpha 3 release, and are > _not_ bugs in the Java language itself, nor do they apply to Netscape 2.0 > beta 1J, which doesn't permit network connections. We have notified Sun of > these problems, and are presently writing a paper on these and other issues. > We will make more information available on our Web page after we hear back > from Sun. Drat - Sun doesn't offer awards. > > http://www.cs.princeton.edu/~ddean/java/ > > Drew Dean Dan Wallach > ddean(a)cs.princeton.edu dwallach(a)cs.princeton.edu Inquiring minds want to know. -- -> See: Info-Sec Heaven at URL http://all.net Management Analytics - 216-686-0090 - PO Box 1480, Hudson, OH 44236

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