December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

ALERT:INTERNET DAY OF PROTEST TUESDAY DECEMBER 12, 1995 (fwd)
by Sarah Thompson 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Date: Sun, 10 Dec 1995 01:44:01 -0700 >From: molly(a)aros.net >Subject: ALERT:INTERNET DAY OF PROTEST TUESDAY DECEMBER 12, 1995 (fwd) >To: andelain(a)aros.net, matti(a)community.net, CAPSTACK_T(a)MSdisk.WUstl.EDU, > will(a)btsslc.com > > >======================================================================== > CAMPAIGN TO STOP THE NET CENSORSHIP LEGISLATION IN CONGRESS > > On Tuesday December 12, 1995, Join With Hundreds of Thousands > Of Your Fellow Internet Users In > > A NATIONAL INTERNET DAY OF PROTEST > > PLEASE WIDELY REDISTRIBUTE THIS DOCUMENT WITH THIS BANNER INTACT > REDISTRIBUTE ONLY UNTIL December 20, 1995 >________________________________________________________________________ >CONTENTS > Internet Day of Protest: Tuesday December 12, 1995 > What You Must Do On Tuesday December 12, 1995 > List of Participating Organizations > Where Can I Learn More? > >________________________________________________________________________ >INTERNET DAY OF PROTEST: TUESDAY DECEMBER 12, 1995 > >Outrageous proposals to censor the Internet demand that the Internet >Community take swift and immediate action. We must stand up and let >Congress know that we will not tolerate their attempts to destroy this >medium! Please join hundreds of thousands of your fellow citizens in a >National Day of Protest on Tuesday December 12, 1995. > >As you know, on Wednesday December 6, 1995, the House Conference >Committee on Telecommunications Reform voted to impose far reaching and >unconstitutional "indecency" restrictions on the Internet and other >interactive media, including large commercial online services (such as >America Online, Compuserve, and Prodigy) and smaller Internet Service >Providers such as Panix, the Well, Echo, and Mindvox. > >These restrictions threaten the very existence of the Internet and >interactive media as a viable medium for free expression, education, >commerce. If enacted, the Internet as we know it will never be the >same. > >Libraries will not be able to put any books online that might >offend a child somewhere. No "Catcher in the Rye" or "Ulysses" on the net. >Internet Service Providers could face criminal penalties for allowing >children to subscribe to their Internet Services, forcing many small >companies to simply refuse to sell their services to anyone under 18. Worst >of all, everything you say and publish on the net will have to be "dumbed >down" to that which is acceptable to a child. > >As Internet users, we simply must not allow this assault against the >Internet and our most basic freedoms to go unchallenged. > >On Tuesday December 12, the organizations below are urging you to >join us in a NATIONAL DAY OF PROTEST. The goal is to flood key members of >the House and Senate with phone calls, faxes and email with the message >that the Internet community WILL NOT TOLERATE Congressional attempts to >destroy the Internet, limit our freedoms and trample on our rights. > >Below are the phone, fax, and email address of several key members of >Congress on this issue and instructions on what you can do to join the >National Day of Protest to save the Net. > >______________________________________________________________________ >WHAT YOU MUST DO ON TUESDAY DECEMBER 12, 1995 > >1. Throughout the day Tuesday December 12, please contact as many > members of Congress on the list below as you can. If you are only > able to make one call, contact House Speaker Newt Gingrich. Finally, > if the Senator or Representative from your state is on the list > below, be sure to contact him or her also. > >2. Urge each Member of Congress to "stop the madness". Tell them that > they are about to pass legislation that will destroy the Internet as > an educational and commercial medium. If you are at a loss for > words, try the following sample communique: > > Sample phone call: > > Both the House and Senate bills designed to protect children > from objectionable material on the Internet will actually > destroy the Internet as an medium for education, commerce, and > political discourse. There are other, less restrictive ways to > address this issue. > > I urge you to oppose both measures being proposed in the > conference committee. This is an important election issue to > me. > > Sample letter (fax or email): > > The Senate conferees are considering ways to protect children > from inappropriate material on the Internet. A vote for either > the House or Senate proposals will result in the destruction of > the Internet as a viable medium for free expression, education, > commerce. Libraries will not be able to put their entire book > collections online. Everyday people like me will risk massive > fines and prison sentences for public discussions someone s > somewhere might consider "indecent". > > There are other, less restrictive ways to protect children from > objectionable material online. This is an important election > issue to me. > >3. If you're in San Francisco, or near enough to get there, go to > the Rally Against Censorship from Ground Zero of the Digital Revolution: > > WHEN: Monday, December 11, 1995 12:00 - 1:00 PM > WHERE: South Park (between 2nd and 3rd, Bryant and Brannon) San Francisco. > SPEAKERS: To be announced > BRING: Attention-grabbing posters, signs, and banners that demonstrate > your committment to free speech and expression, and your feelings > about Congress. > FOR UPDATED INFORMATION (including rain info): > http://www.hotwired.com/staff/digaman/ > > >### THIS IS VERY IMPORTANT ### > >4. Mail a note to protest(a)vtw.org to let us know you did your part. > Although you will not receive a reply due to the number of > anticipated responses, we'll be counting up the number of people that > participated in the day of protest. > > > P ST Name and Address Phone Fax > = == ======================== ============== ============== > R AK Stevens, Ted 1-202-224-3004 1-202-224-1044 > R AZ McCain, John 1-202-224-2235 1-602-952-8702 > senator_mccain(a)mccain.senate.gov > D HI Inouye, Daniel K. 1-202-224-3934 1-202-224-6747 > R KS Dole, Robert 1-202-224-6521 1-202-228-1245 > D KY Ford, Wendell H. 1-202-224-4343 1-202-224-0046 > wendell_ford(a)ford.senate.gov > R MS Lott, Trent 1-202-224-6253 1-202-224-2262 > R MT Burns, Conrad R. 1-202-224-2644 1-202-224-8594 > conrad_burns(a)burns.senate.gov > D NE Exon, J. J. 1-202-224-4224 1-202-224-5213 > D SC Hollings, Ernest F. 1-202-224-6121 1-202-224-4293 > senator(a)hollings.senate.gov > R SD Pressler, Larry 1-202-224-5842 1-202-224-1259 > larry_pressler(a)pressler.senate.gov > R WA Gorton, Slade 1-202-224-3441 1-202-224-9393 > senator_gorton(a)gorton.senate.gov > D WV Rockefeller, John D. 1-202-224-6472 n.a. > senator(a)rockefeller.senate.gov > > Dist ST Name, Address, and Party Phone Fax > ==== == ======================== ============== ============== > 6 GA Gingrich, Newt (R) 1-202-225-4501 1-202-225-4656 > 2428 RHOB georgia6(a)hr.house.gov > 14 MI Conyers Jr., John (D) 1-202-225-5126 1-202-225-0072 > 2426 RHOB jconyers(a)hr.house.gov > 1 CO Schroeder, Patricia (D) 1-202-225-4431 1-202-225-5842 > 2307 RHOB > 18 TX Jackson-Lee, Sheila (D) 1-202-225-3816 1-202-225-3317 > 1520 LHOB > 6 TN Gordon, Bart (D) 1-202-225-4231 1-202-225-6887 > 2201 RHOB > > >4. Forward this alert to all of your wired friends. > >________________________________________________________________________ >WHERE CAN I LEARN MORE? > >At this moment, there are several organizations with WWW sites that now >have, or will have, information about the net censorship legislation and >the National Day Of Protest: > >American Civil Liberties Union (ftp://ftp.aclu.org/aclu/) >Center for Democracy and Technology (http://www.cdt.org/) >Electronic Frontier Foundation (http://www.eff.org/) >Electronic Privacy Information Center (http://www.epic.org/) >Wired Magazine (http://www.hotwired.com/special/indecent/) >Voters Telecommunications Watch (http://www.vtw.org/) > >________________________________________________________________________ >LIST OF PARTICIPATING ORGANIZATIONS > >In order to use the net more effectively, several organizations have >joined forces on a single Congressional net campaign to stop the >Communications Decency Act. > > >American Civil Liberties Union * American Communication Association * >American Council for the Arts * Arts & Technology Society * Association >of Alternative Newsweeklies * biancaTroll productions * Boston >Coalition for Freedom of Expression * Californians Against Censorship >Together * Center For Democracy And Technology * Centre for Democratic >Communications * Center for Public Representation * Citizen's Voice - >New Zealand * Cloud 9 Internet *Computer Communicators Association * >Computel Network Services * Computer Professionals for Social >Responsibility * Cross Connection * Cyber-Rights Campaign * CyberQueer >Lounge * Dorsai Embassy * Dutch Digital Citizens' Movement * ECHO >Communications Group, Inc. * Electronic Frontier Canada * Electronic >Frontier Foundation * Electronic Frontier Foundation - Austin * >Electronic Frontiers Australia * Electronic Frontiers Houston * >Electronic Frontiers New Hampshire * Electronic Privacy Information >Center * Feminists For Free Expression * First Amendment Teach-In * >Florida Coalition Against Censorship * FranceCom, Inc. Web Advertising >Services * Friendly Anti-Censorship Taskforce for Students * Hands >Off! The Net * Inland Book Company * Inner Circle Technologies, Inc. * >Inst. for Global Communications * Internet On-Ramp, Inc. * Internet >Users Consortium * Joint Artists' and Music Promotions Political Action >Committee * The Libertarian Party * Marijuana Policy Project * >Metropolitan Data Networks Ltd. * MindVox * MN Grassroots Party * >National Bicycle Greenway * National Campaign for Freedom of Expression >* National Coalition Against Censorship * National Gay and Lesbian Task >Force * National Public Telecomputing Network * National Writers Union >* Oregon Coast RISC * Panix Public Access Internet * People for the >American Way * Republican Liberty Caucus * Rock Out Censorship * >Society for Electronic Access * The Thing International BBS Network * >The WELL * Voters Telecommunications Watch > >(Note: All 'Electronic Frontier' organizations are independent entities, > not EFF chapters or divisions.) > >________________________________________________________________________ > End Alert >======================================================================== > > > >~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ > Paula Davidson > mesoelectronic hunter/gatherer > davidson(a)cs.unca.edu http://www.cs.unca.edu/~davidson/ > Specializing in Exploration and Tool Use on the Matrix of the Net >~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ > > > > > ><---- End Forwarded Message ----> > > > Sarah Thompson, M.D. righter(a)aros.net Executive Director, Women Against Gun Control PO Box 271307 Salt Lake City, UT 84127-1307 (801)328-9660 - voice (801)966-7278 - fax

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Re: .PWL spin
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 05:12 PM 12/9/95 -0500, Joseph M. Reagle Jr. wrote: > So now, I don't even bother with that, I'm just hoping securdrv, >sfs, or something makes it to W95 one of these days... (I doubt either of >those will make it...) SecureDrive works under Windows 95 if you disable all 32-bit disk drivers. Control Panel System Performance File System Troubleshooting Disable all 32 bit protected mode disk drivers You have to run SECTSR before starting Win95. A pain but it does work. I will be working on figuring out how to force Windows 95 to disable 32 bit access for just my SecureDrive disk alone. Should be possible. DCF "Windows 95 beats having a personal life."

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List of reliable remailers
by Raph Levien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I operate a remailer pinging service which collects detailed information about remailer features and reliability. To use it, just finger remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu There is also a Web version of the same information, plus lots of interesting links to remailer-related resources, at: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP encrypting client for outgoing mail, which is available at: ftp://ftp.csua.berkeley.edu/pub/cypherpunks/premail/premail-0.33a.tar.gz For the PGP public keys of the remailers, finger pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu This is the current info: REMAILER LIST This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration options and special features for each of the remailers. The second part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each remailer. You can also get this list by fingering remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu. $remailer{"extropia"} = "<remail(a)extropia.wimsey.com> cpunk pgp special"; $remailer{"portal"} = "<hfinney(a)shell.portal.com> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"alumni"} = "<hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"bsu-cs"} = "<nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu> cpunk hash ksub"; $remailer{"c2"} = "<remail(a)c2.org> eric pgp hash reord"; $remailer{"penet"} = "<anon(a)anon.penet.fi> penet post"; $remailer{"ideath"} = "<remailer(a)ideath.goldenbear.com> cpunk hash ksub reord"; $remailer{"hacktic"} = "<remailer(a)utopia.hacktic.nl> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"flame"} = "<remailer(a)flame.alias.net> cpunk mix pgp. hash latent cut post ek reord"; $remailer{"rahul"} = "<homer(a)rahul.net> cpunk pgp hash filter"; $remailer{"mix"} = "<mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord ?"; $remailer{"syrinx"} = "<syrinx(a)c2.org> cpunk pgp hash cut reord mix post"; $remailer{"ford"} = "<remailer(a)bi-node.zerberus.de> cpunk pgp hash ksub"; $remailer{"hroller"} = "<hroller(a)c2.org> cpunk pgp hash latent ek"; $remailer{"vishnu"} = "<mixmaster(a)vishnu.alias.net> cpunk mix pgp. hash latent cut ek ksub reord"; $remailer{"robo"} = "<robo(a)c2.org> cpunk hash mix"; $remailer{"replay"} = "<remailer(a)replay.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"spook"} = "<remailer(a)valhalla.phoenix.net> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek reord"; $remailer{"rmadillo"} = "<remailer(a)armadillo.com> mix cpunk pgp hash latent cut"; $remailer{"ecafe"} = "<cpunk(a)remail.ecafe.org> cpunk mix"; $remailer{"wmono"} = "<wmono(a)valhalla.phoenix.net> cpunk mix pgp. hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"shinobi"} = "<remailer(a)shinobi.alias.net> cpunk mix hash latent cut ek reorder"; $remailer{"amnesia"} = "<amnesia(a)chardos.connix.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub"; $remailer{"gondolin"} = "<mix(a)remail.gondolin.org> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek reord"; catalyst(a)netcom.com is _not_ a remailer. lmccarth(a)ducie.cs.umass.edu is _not_ a remailer. usura(a)replay.com is _not_ a remailer. Groups of remailers sharing a machine or operator: (robo hroller c2) (flame hacktic replay) (wmono spook) (alumni portal) Use "premail -getkeys pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu" to get PGP keys for the remailers. Fingering this address works too. Last update: Mon 11 Dec 95 6:49:36 PST remailer email address history latency uptime ----------------------------------------------------------------------- portal hfinney(a)shell.portal.com #+*########* :44 99.85% hacktic remailer(a)utopia.hacktic.nl ******* **** 7:17 99.72% c2 remail(a)c2.org *++-.-++ +++ 47:37 99.65% rmadillo remailer(a)armadillo.com ++++++++ +++ 38:51 99.38% amnesia amnesia(a)chardos.connix.com -+- -+ +--+ 1:55:48 99.36% flame remailer(a)flame.alias.net * *** * **** 19:31 99.30% spook remailer(a)valhalla.phoenix.net ..-* ****** 53:58 99.08% extropia remail(a)extropia.wimsey.com ---.- -.--- 6:49:13 98.44% shinobi remailer(a)shinobi.alias.net + --- -- - + 53:31 98.38% ecafe cpunk(a)remail.ecafe.org ### ##-## 2:18 98.11% wmono wmono(a)valhalla.phoenix.net * ** ** 12:36 98.07% mix mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com .-__ _-__. 27:56:43 97.91% replay remailer(a)replay.com * + +** ** 5:41 97.69% gondolin mix(a)remail.gondolin.org - --_.- 10:47:46 97.00% vishnu mixmaster(a)vishnu.alias.net *#** # 5:26 96.37% alumni hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu *# # # 1:20 96.28% bsu-cs nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu ## # # # :15 95.56% ford remailer(a)bi-node.zerberus.de ---._...-- 15:06:29 94.28% hroller hroller(a)c2.org ####*+### -# 5:21 94.25% rahul homer(a)rahul.net ** +* *+**+* 4:32 99.67% penet anon(a)anon.penet.fi - . -- 13:10:01 83.74% robo robo(a)c2.org #-## 5:59 52.62% History key * # response in less than 5 minutes. * * response in less than 1 hour. * + response in less than 4 hours. * - response in less than 24 hours. * . response in more than 1 day. * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days). cpunk A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To: field. eric A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead. penet The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses X-Anon-To: in the header. pgp Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email address, should be used as the encryption key ID. hash Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of outgoing messages. ksub Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode. nsub Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode. latent Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option. cut Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option. post Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header. ek Encrypt responses in reply blocks using Encrypt-Key: header. special Accepts only pgp encrypted messages. mix Can accept messages in Mixmaster format. reord Attempts to foil traffic analysis by reordering messages. Note: I'm relying on the word of the remailer operator here, and haven't verified the reord info myself. mon Remailer has been known to monitor contents of private email. filter Remailer has been known to filter messages based on content. If not listed in conjunction with mon, then only messages destined for public forums are subject to filtering. Raph Levien

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Re: Pornographic stories
by Daniel Miskell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

A&SUser writes: >Hey, I'm Molly, and I know I sent you a bit of mail a couple of days ago. > I'm not sure how you do your Pornographic server, so I'll just ask >again. I know I would be VERY gratful if you could send me any XXX >stories, I love to read them. I could reward you over the net somehow >I'm sure. >my adress is mphillips(a)cctr.umkc.edu > >Thanks....I'll be waiting. > What the hell are you talking about?? This is the cypherpunks mailing list!! Jeses, try alt.sex.stories. :P Munster --- _________________________________ *!Cheese Doctrine:!* Though cultured over time, and aged to perfection, one must not yield to produce mold. One must also not belittle themselves by conforming to the "whiz", but melt over the unprocessed ideas of Ghuda. _________________________________

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Today's Baltimore Sun on the NSA...
by pcw＠access.digex.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

As I mentioned on Sunday, the Baltimore Sun is running a long series on the NSA. Today, the published an article that described how the NSA routinely listens into the phone calls of Americans. This happens in two ways. First, if the conversation leaves the country then the NSA can intercept it. Second, the NSA is also allowed to grab local phone calls for "training" purposes. The funniest part of the article mentioned that Henry Kissenger got both ends of the stick. He relied on NSA to pass him sensitive information about his rivals. But the head of the Department of Defense, who got to appoint the head of the NSA, made sure that the NSA told him what Kissenger was up to. The strangest anecdote involved a Baltimore Sun reporter who called Cuban diplomats from overseas. This was picked up by NSA and the evesdropper openly chatted about it a civilian cocktail party. The details got back to the reporter. The parties in the Baltimore suburbs are from the pages of Fleming not from the pages of Cheever. There is some debate about the whole issue of snooping on American citizens. Everyone quoted on the record says it's all pretty upstanding and good. The paper also gives a fair amount of ink to the argument that American citizens could be involved in terrorism too. This seems to be logical to me. The deepest point made was that NSA could never really assume greater law enforcement practices because this would involve disseminating their information to a much larger audience. Since using secret information often reveals that you can get it, there is little doubt that people would stop using the phone system and the other information sponges. So much for absolute power. -Peter Wayner -=-=-= On Friday, the last article in the series is promised to report, "The next war will be fought with computers. NSA is getting ready." You will be able to buy a reprint of the NSA stories from SunSource. $3.95. Call 410-332-6962.

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[NOISE] Re: Pornographic stories
by pjm＠ionia.engr.sgi.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Scott Binkley writes: > Stop posting this type of crap on the Internet. I'd be pleased if people would refrain from posting to inappropriate groups. There a number of acceptable venues for pornography on the Net. > People like you are the ones to get everyone censored. If we censor ourselves, the bluenoses win. > Hopefully everyone else will flame you a thousand times over A polite note suggesting that one remember to log out when leaving one's terminal unattended should suffice. Regards, Patrick May -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMMy/qu5Yg08fDKehAQG8nAQAlJZjWwGPfkCgM3+umOFlfNd0wYZBCKiw M3JktEPpBpviMmiiH6WgKI0BHpvWhLmEcwVQ7Bs56pRtLma/gp66ljOC+eP2m78f KxN8Ao9o/MDDdX7LHUHC7IeliMikBcdkCBttrHdKXpY6xTFAygwVH2qC+rmam0Xp Gz0USqvzDc0= =2V4I -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: More elveator problem
by wlkngowl＠unix.asb.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Sat, 9 Dec 1995 00:23:41 -0800, Jerry Whiting wrote: >More on The Elevator Problem: >I'll confess that we're working on a new private key encryption product. Free >and clear of existing claims on intellectual property, I'd like a protocol >that answers the elevator problem: how can Alice and Bob agree on a private >key via a compromised channel? I don't want them to meet under a street lamp >and whisper in each other's ears _before_ trying to establish a secret on a >crowded elevator. [..] >Something that I neglected to mention before is that Alice and Bob do have a >unique ID within this system, not that they necessarily know each others. If >one assumes that they do, they then share a secret: the knowledge of each >other's unique ID. [..] Wait... are unique IDs secret from others? Can they share theirs with ea. other without compromising something? Maybe using a hash of their combined secret ideas (adding them, or mixing the bits... how long is the unique ID?) can be used to generate a "key" to exchange other information.... >Jerry Whiting >jwhiting(a)azalea.com

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MD4 weaknesses (Was: Windows .PWL cracker implemented as a Word Basic virus)
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 06:20 PM 12/10/95 -0500, daw(a)quito.CS.Berkeley.EDU (David A Wagner) wrote: >-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > >In article <95Dec10.175318edt.1732(a)cannon.ecf.toronto.edu>, >SINCLAIR DOUGLAS N <sinclai(a)ecf.toronto.edu> wrote: >> My understanding was that MD4 had been broken once, at the cost of >> much computer time. >Not *that* much computer time... >In my copy of Hans Dobbertin's paper, the abstract says > >``An implementation of our >attack allows to find collisions for MD4 in less than a minute on a PC.'' > >As far as I know, the difficulty of inverting MD4 is still an open >problem -- but why would you want to use a broken algorithm like MD4 >when you can use MD2, MD5, or SHA? Do you have a reference to Dobbertin's paper? Schneier's discussion of MD4 says that DeBoor and Bosselaers cryptanalyzed the last two of the three rounds of MD4 in 1991, Merkle did the first two, and Biham discussed a differential attack on the first two, but nobody had done the whole thing. Does Dobbertin's attack take one of these and use it to feed an otherwise-brute-force search? #-- # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, Freelance Information Architect, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # Phone +1-510-247-0663 Pager/Voicemail 1-408-787-1281

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Re: Timing Cryptanalysis Attack
by Peter Trei 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> > People employing systems like PGP are already advised to use them > > on private machines, with only one user, and untampered-with > > binaries. > > Timings like the ones listed are trivial to take in establishing > things like SSL sessions, or Photuris sessions. The danger is to > online protocols, not to PGP. > Perry Loathe as I am to disagree with Perry :-), is it really 'trivial' to take these timings in an online protocol? Paul writes on the DH example: ------------------------- A preliminary implementation of the attack using the RSAREF toolkit[8] has been written. RSAREF scans across the exponent from MSB to LSB and does two exponent bits at a time, so corresponding adjustments to the attack were made. Using a 120-MHz PentiumTM computer running MSDOSTM, a 512-bit modulus, and a 256-bit secret exponent, processing times ranged from 392411 microseconds to 393612 microseconds and closely approximated a normal distribution with a mean of 393017 microseconds and a standard deviation of 188 microseconds. -------------------------- Note that the range is 1201 microseconds and for RSA: -------------------------- RSAREF's modular reduction function with a 512-bit modulus on the same 120-MHz PentiumTM computer takes an average of approximately 17 microseconds less time if c is slightly smaller than p, as opposed to slightly larger than p. Timing measurements of many ciphertexts can be combined to detect whether the chosen ciphertexts are larger or smaller than p. ------------------------- The range here is 17 microseconds. Paul notes: --------------------------- Random delays added to the processing time may increase the number of ciphertexts required, but do not completely solve the problem since attackers can compensate for the delay by collecting more measurements. (If enough random noise is added, the attack can become infeasible.) -------------------------- In a 'real' system, there is a lot of unpredictable variation in the timing of the signal. Sources of such noise include routers, and other sessions on the server (any decent server these days is multi-tasking, and can handle multiple connections simultaneously). On top of that, real protocols have a lot of processing overhead, looking up certificates and keys, generating MAC hash values, etc, many of which are difficult to predict. I tried pinging some machines to look at the slop in the roundtrip times. I have not checked traceroute, but for what it's worth, I'm in central Massachusetts. elnath (local to my lan) <10 ms rtfm.mit.edu (20 miles) 10-21 ms iii1.iii.net (FreeBSD on a 120MHz P5, 35 miles) 100-200 ms utopia.hacktic.nl (Netherlands) 190-781 ms Maybe Paul can give us some figures as to how *much* random noise is enough to make his (very elegant!) attack unfeasible. Note that the range of the random slop I'm getting is hundreds to thousands of times the range of the signal he needs to detect. Statistical techniques, averaging the return times for the same text over many trials may be useful, but the number required to detect a less than 1% variation is going to be high. The attack might be feasible of it can be mounted on a quiet server from a point 'close' (in network terms) to the timing system, and the intervening network segments are also fairly quiet. I don't think random users are going to crack the Dilbert Store, however. Speaking for myself.... Peter Trei Senior Software Engineer Purveyor Development Team Process Software Corporation http://www.process.com trei(a)process.com

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Voluntary Key Escrow is Freedom, Surveillance is Privacy
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Citizen-unit jim bell wrote: >Pardon me, but since this "key escrow" system was always claimed to be >"voluntary," then how can there be any kind of legal penalties associated >with "failure to release" those keys? > > >Which raises another question: Let's suppose I owned a product based on >CKE, and I went to the escrow agent and said, "This escrow is voluntary, >right? If so, erase my key in your possession." > >Not that I'd trust them to do so, but how "voluntary" can a system be if >people can't volunteer out of it? In much the same sense the income tax system is "voluntary." For further details, consult the definition of "newspeak" in Orwell's novel. Remember, saying that Voluntary Key Escrow is neither "voluntary" nor "escrow" is thoughtcrime. Freedom is Slavery, Surveillance is Privacy, Censorship is Decency --Citizen-Unit May227-80-5992 Views here are not the views of my Internet Service Provider or Government. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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