December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Solution for US/Foreign Software?
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 6:21 PM 12/6/95, jim bell wrote: >NO! You didn't read my commentary carefully enough. These "hooks" (your >words) will, in effect, already be connected to encryption software weak >enough to make NSA happy. You know, 40 bit keys or something like that. >But instead of being in one large file, embedded into a program, it'll be >TWO files. Simple programming change. Everything that >implements/defines/limits the encryption to 40 bits will be in the smaller >file. >This really isn't a "hook," it's an internal connection between two >portions of the same program. (actually, it wouldn't need to be in two >separate files; a file which implements a patch for the first file would >work great.) > >It'll be exportable, because its key size is "acceptable." At the time >the export license is requested, the replacement module to increase key >size probably won't even exist, in order to avoid giving the USG an >excuse to deny the export license. After the license is obtained, the >replacement module is written and shipped to domestic users. > >I fully realize the USG won't "like" this kind of thing. But if they are >trying to take the position that certain kinds of encryption software CAN >be exported, and some can't, they're going to have to approve SOME >programs for export, using criteria which at least pretend to be >objective. Yes, I read your proposal. The "hooks" term is not my coinage, but refers to this general idea. I urge you to read what others, including companies, have had to say on this matter. Much of the debate on "interoperability" revolves around details of entry points to crypto modules and such hooks. No point in arguing with Jim on this anymore, so I won't. Good luck, Jim, in introducing such a product. --Tim May Views here are not the views of my Internet Service Provider or Government. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Civilizing Cyberspace (book note)
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forward: Steven E. Miller, a member of the national board of directors of Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility, has published a new book, *Civilizing Cyberspace: Policy, Power and the Information Superhighway* (Addison Wesley, 1995, 413 pages). This is the best book I have seen on the public policy debates surrounding the information superhighway. It covers all aspects of this debate, including democracy, citizenship, community networks, privacy, intellectual property, competing models of the NII, universal service, equity, freedom of expression, protecting the public interest, encryption, and so on. Highly recommended for anyone interested in this subject, or for use as a text in classes. Gary Chapman, Coordinator, The 21st Century Project LBJ School of Public Affairs, University of Texas, Austin

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Re: Solution for US/Foreign Software?
by jimbell＠pacifier.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> >> I'm not saying they are a "bypass" of the laws. Rather, I'm saying that >> if the goal is to: >> >> 1. Let companies like Netscape make foreign sales. >> >> 2. Still comply with the letter of the law. > >It takes more than one or two people to coordinate an international effort. >Once more than a few people know about it, it becomes "company policy" or >"corporate objective", in which case, the NSA/DoS will eventually figure it >out and start levying heavy fines and jailing the individuals. You miss the point! There will be no "international effort"! Here are the steps: 1. Write a program limited to keysize, carefully constructed to isolate those portions of the program which define key size, GAKedness, etc. 2. Get it export approved. Export it. THEN 3. Announce that a "US-only" version of the same program is being released, and include the minimal component which replaces the limited software. Release it, only in the US of course! >The main point is that there is no such thing as the "letter of the law". >What they enforce is much broader than that, and how they enforce it is much >more subtle than clear-cut criminal prosecution. Therefore, you cannot just >use literal loop holes just because it's not clear, because the law they are >enforcing is not clear either. The system I describe doesn't even violate the spirit of the rules. If anything, it bends over backward to implement a foreign version of the software which ALREADY is export-approved at the time it was, um, upgraded. True, it's possible to sneak the extra component out of the country, but hey, it's also possible to sneak an entirely new program out of the country. I'm not suggesting that the company who writes the component takes it out, it'll happen regardless. If the order of the versions was reversed, the USG might complain that the export version was "too similar" to the domestic version. That's why you wait for the export approval before you write the domestic version.

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Press Release on Response to Microsoft Internet Announcements
by Rich Graves 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I just posted the following from stanford.edu; it probably won't be approved and propagated in time, though. By the way, alt.internet.media-coverage, to which someone pointed me, is explicitly *not* for press releases. I do not plan to utter the string "cypherpunks(a)toad.com" because I think there's enough noise here already (some from me). Apologies to sameer for being presumptuous, but I did say "hope," and I also think tomorrow would be a really good time to document the .PWL file bugs... - -rich - ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Wed, 06 Dec 1995 14:39:23 -0800 From: Rich Graves <w95netbugs(a)aol.com> Newgroups: misc.news.internet.announce, misc.news.internet.discuss Subject: Info on Microsoft Internet Announcements Thursday, December 7, 1995 Please reply, if necessary, to the address in the current FAQ, because I very seldom actually log on to America "On Line." Before forwarding this along, please check whether this has already been done; and let me know after the fact. As has already been announced in the print press, Bill Gates, who works at a large software company, will hold a press conference tomorrow, December 7th (a date with some historical significance), to announce Microsoft's Internet strategy. For information on Microsoft-sponsored marketing events in your area, please see http://www.microsoft.com/events/ Approximately fifteen minutes after Mr. Gates begins speaking (anyone have the exact schedule? please phone me), we hope to release very significant updates to the following Internet sites: http://www.c2.org/hackmsoft/ [information on a few security problems with Microsoft products] http://www-leland.stanford.edu/~llurch/win95netbugs/faq.html [canon URL; multiple DNS-load-balancing SPARCServers] http://www-dccs.stanford.edu/NetConsult/Win95Net/faq.html [use this mirror of the above if you have an old DNS server that barfs on the www-leland lbnamed tricks] news.answers, comp.answers, comp.protocols.tcp-ip.ibmpc, and several higher-traffic groups will receive a text rendering of the above. This will be the first approved and rtfm-archived posting; the news-answers folks got back to me last week. gopher://quixote.stanford.edu/1m/win95netbugs will get a text rendering of the above, and contains relevant messages from an email discussion list. An email autoresponder to be named later (finger llurch(a)elaine.stanford.edu in the morning). The various archives on http://www.hks.net/ have additional information for the technically minded. A PGP-signed copy of this announcement is available on request, but I don't want to confuse the unwashed masses unnecessarily. - -rich "A day that will live in infamy" -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMMYaz43DXUbM57SdAQEeDQP/a8ZccX4fpMbKCNa6Cllii0qWI6A8oUKH 30fdoGl1HvlgWVhsB0paVLsQS8tQGsVt/MzKJLasTsnKuYVJCmdgmXcj9nEE9YIY SxBEDn6yGno2ey7G1lXJSkeVAjB8o/fX+kZXGNKfOGKgNqjIl12jHbW7NX1bsIKi wQl/s4uikQs= =6Z1M -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: News on Congressional Debate on Exon
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This is a VERY positive idea! At 3:54 PM 12/6/95, Peter Trei wrote: >Actually, I've been thinking about this quite a bit recently. I'm building >an SSL enabled server, and clent-side authentication may provide >some help. I could see a user getting his or her public key certificate >signed with different CA keys which assert any number of conditions, >such as: > >Key holder was born before (some particular date). >Key holder has access to sales data for XYZ corp. >Key holder is an adult who takes the first amendment seriously. > >... and the server would recognize different CA signatures as permitting >different levels of access. This is something that could get two things done: 1. Protect ISPs and Web sites from claims they aren't taking any steps to block children. (I won't get into the "children should be allowed to appreciate the beauty of the human body" issue, just noting that an ISP or Web site could deny access to account holders under 18, or over 30, or whatever he wants to do.) 2. Get wider currency for the concept of digitally signed credentials, especially if these are _blinded credentials_, where the credential is for an age, say, and not an identity. (Standard Chaumian stuff, though likely to be nontrivial to implement.) >If your browser permitted you to select the key certificate used in >setting up the encrypted link (and different certs or sets of certs >could be protected with different passphrases), then Mom or Dad >could use their I-am-an-adult credential to read www.xxx.com, >while Junior could not. There *is* a loss of anonymity in this scheme, >however. There may be ways around the loss of anonymity. Ideally, with blinded credentials, But in the short term, through Web proxies and/or servers. For example, Sameer's c2.org could issue accounts to people who can prove they are over 18 (notarized copies of birth certif., passport, etc.). Sameer's system would then have a credential saying "this account name is over 18." (There is of course little that can be done about people who lend their accounts to minors, absent any effective biometric security measures. No current system, certainly not Exon-Coates, can deal with this.) >I realize that digital credentials are old hat on this list. The point I am >making is that the pieces for doing this are here - we just need to >assemble them. > >(This is not to suggest that I am in favor of Exon/Coates in any way - >I am not. ) I think this could be quite a good project, provided it is not trying to be all things to all people. --Tim May Views here are not the views of my Internet Service Provider or Government. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Note on "Barring Netscape"
by Richard Charles Graves 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The Microsoft Internet Explorer sends the user-agent "Mozilla 1.22 (compatible" to hte server, which triggers an incorrect response from, e.g., www.c2.org. This little fraud has the potential to make you look silly if left unexplained. If you get the string "compatible;" (or Compatible;?), you should instead pop up Netscapisms that show that Microsoft is lying. Or maybe Billisms. <font face="Symbol">, which affects only MSIE, might be appropriate. -rich

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Re: The "Future" Fallacy
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 7:24 AM 12/6/95, blancw(a)accessone.com wrote: >From: Duncan Frissell > >Bill Gates (like Mister Newt before him) committed what I call the Future >Fallacy in "The Road Ahead." Page 106. > >"Soon any child old enough to use a computer will be able to transmit coded >messages that no government on earth will find easy to decipher." >................................................... > > >Billg is an optimist. > >What's wrong with this picture, Duncan? I found nothing wrong or incorrect with the quote Duncan attributed to Bill Gates (I haven't read Gates' book). I couldn't understand Duncan's koan, shrugged, and moved on. --Tim May Views here are not the views of my Internet Service Provider or Government. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: Geodesic Payment Systems? (was Re: Meeting notes from ANSI X.9 Meeting onElectronic Payment)
by rah＠shipwright.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Once again, Hettinga shoots from the hip, and hits an expert instead... ;-) At 9:07 AM 12/5/95, Nathaniel Borenstein wrote: >There are some interesting unspoken assumptions here. To calculate >anyone's "cost" on a transaction requires the complex amortization of >costs over many transactions, with assumptions/projections about the >transaction volume. I have no idea where you came by either of your >numbers, MTB's or FV's, but I can tell you that your guess about FV is >off the mark. And I'm sure that MTB is no more eager than we are to >publicly dissect all the underlying cost structures, so I have no idea >what the 50 cents that you cite really means. The 50 cents actually comes from this week's InfoWorld, Bob Metcalfe's column. I have know idea where he got the 50 cents, but he did say digital cash, so i expect that he means MTB. >To be perfectly clear: our minimum service charge is 30 cents, not 5 >dollars. If we didn't think it was worthwhile to take transactions that >small, we wouldn't do so. Fine. Are we including the cost of the credit card transaction to the consumer? Fees, interest, that stuff? There are lots of hidden costs in a book entry system. With a bearer-certificate system, the price is the spread between the certificate's bid and asked prices for (a traveller's check, for instance, is asked at a primium, and redeemed at face value, for instance. That's all the cost of using them.) >A true geodesic structure is self-supporting and self-structuring. A >cryptographic infrastructure can and should be similar, I agree >completely. However, a *monetary* infrastructure needs convertability, >and the points of conversion are always the best targets of attack for >criminals. (I've been casting about for an analogy to physical >geodesics, and it's hard to find one. The best I can come up with is to >imagine that in order to convert a carbon buckyball to a more >conventional set of carbon molecules, you had to do it through a service >bureau that was capable of error, fraud, or subversion by outside >criminals. This would ONLY matter if you ever wanted to do such >conversions, but it would matter a lot then, especially if you had to >suffer a serious financial loss if you got the wrong carbon molecules at >the end of the process.) Sometimes I feel like I'm beating this geodesic metaphor like a dead horse sometimes... ;-). > >IF you wanted to settle for a totally non-convertible economy (like >rubles in the old Soviet Union, or like the LETS system on the net >today, as I understand it) then you could build it geodesically. Really? > But if >you want to be able to convert back and forth between Internet payment >systems and non-Internet payment systems, it can never be truly >geodesic. It will always be attackable at the points of conversion. >(You may "trade digital certificates", but how do you know the ones >you're receiving were obtained for legitimate real-world value?) >Because of this, the underwriting financial institutions, who have a >very reasonable desire to limit their own risk, will inevitably seek the >protection-by-traceability offered by something less than perfect >anonymity. We may not like it, but it's a very natural position to be >taken by those who are actually bearing the financial risks at the point >of conversion. That may be true, Nathaniel, but just because the people who bring the money off the net need to be identified to the digital cash underwriter's (actually the underwriter's bank's) satisfaction, doesn't mean that the trades on the net can't be totally anonymous. We've gone over this before. Let's build a model to talk about this, and then you'll see what I mean. Suppose I open an anonymous bank account with ATM card. Then, on the net, I buy digital cash from a digital cash underwriter. The web-page reads my ATM swipe and PIN, and then pumps it (without the underwriter being able to read it) through to my bank, who says to the underwriter, "Yup, there's money here, send it to him, and I'll wire it you (now/overnight/whatever)." The digital cash underwriter then issues me my digital cash, and I put it on my hard drive. I buy stuff on the net. I sell stuff on the net. Sometimes I go online with the trade to check my buyers' cash, sometimes I don't. Element of risk there, but this risk can be made accountable. It's probably always going to be cheaper to do offline transactions, but there's the possibility that when I cash in that money, it has been spent already. Fair trade. It's probably quantifiable and thus can be dealt with. We won't know till we have data. Being an astute businessman (you can tell this is a model, right?), I end up with positive cashflow. So, that money I don't invest with a portfolio manager on the net by buying anonymous bearer certificates for his mutual fund, ;-), I decide to take off of the net and buy Netscape puts, March 1996, $10. So, I go to the underwriter's page (maybe I go to multiple underwriters' pages, or maybe there's an enterprising third-party money changer who honors all comers for a cut), and I cash out. I swipe my ATM and punch my PIN, and my bank says to the underwriter "OK, I know that account, how much are you sending me?", and the underwriter says how much, and how and when the money would arrive (wire? Rollerblade messenger? bunch of militia types in a purple Hummer?, anyway...). And there's money back off of the net. In this model, there's no reason why I can't send an anonymous software agent to buy stuff for me, why I can't buy anonymously or sell anonymously. So, given that model, what's the problem? Now, I've also been thinking about something else. Wei Dai has been talking about how anonymity will always cost more, and certainly, in the model above, there's a certain risk with doing off-line transactions. You don't know if the cash in the transaction is double-spent, like I said above, but that "special stuff" has to be done to accomodate anonymity, which will always cost more. I'll come back with a whole blather on this next week when I get back from the CyberDog Kitchen (I'm here, and Gromit says "hi"), but I think it comes from what the default mechanism for commerce is going to be, threaded, audit-trailed x.blabla or anarchic, geodesic, bearer-certificates. I bet you can guess where I'm going to come down on this... Cheers, Bob Hettinga ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA (617) 958-3971 "Reality is not optional." --Thomas Sowell The NEW(!) e$ Home Page: http://thumper.vmeng.com/pub/rah/ >>>>Phree Phil: Email: zldf(a)clark.net http://www.netresponse.com/zldf <<<<<

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Java musings
by Mark Hittinger 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I was starting to feel as if Java was going to be everything the hype was cracking it up to be. Then I saw Micro$oft jump on the Java bandwagon. Could Java already be dead? :-) Regards, Mark Hittinger Netcom/Dallas bugs(a)freebsd.netcom.com bugs(a)ritz.mordor.com

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Re: DigiCash releases protocol specs!
by Andrew Loewenstern 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> By popular request, DigiCash is releasing the protocol specs. Three cheers to DigiCash, Mark Twain, and Lucky! andrew

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