December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Baby Bells Join In Fighting US Encryption Control
by Joe Acosta 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From <http://www.yahoo.com/headlines/970923/tech/stories/encrypt_2.html> [ Yahoo | Write Us | Search | Info ] [ Index | News | World | Biz | Tech | Politic | Sport | Scoreboard | Entertain | Health ] [ Reuters | Wired | ZDNet ] Tuesday September 23 10:04 AM EDT Baby Bells Join In Fighting US Encryption Control By Aaron Pressman WASHINGTON - Five of the influential "Baby Bell" regional telephone companies on Monday joined a coalition urging Congress to reject a proposal that would give U.S. law enforcement agencies access to otherwise secure computer files. The phone companies, along with dozens of high-tech companies and business groups, signed a letter opposing proposed limits on encryption technology used to protect computer files from outside access or interference. Louis Freeh, director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, has urged Congress to enact the limits. The Baby Bells and other opponents of encryption limits sent their letter to U.S. Rep. Thomas Bliley, Republican of Virginia, chairman of the House Commerce Committee. Later this week, the committee is expected to consider an encryption bill authored by Rep. Bob Goodlatte, a Virginia Republican. Prompted by Freeh, the committee is currently leaning toward amending Goodlatte's encryption bill to impose new limits. Five Baby Bells -- Ameritech, Bell Atlantic Corp., BellSouth Corp. , SBC Communications and US West -- signed the letter opposing the restrictions. Other groups signing the letter ranged across the political spectrum from civil libertarians at the Center for Democracy and Technology (CDT) to conservatives at Americans for Tax Reform. This would be a direct hit at the telecommunications infrastructure," said CDT executive director Jerry Berman who helped organize Monday's letter. It's an unmitigated disaster. " The letter was also signed by International Business Machines, which had previously been seen as one of the few companies not openly opposing the Clinton administration's policy restricting encryption exports. But the domestic limits being considered by the Commerce Committee would go well beyond current policy. Encryption products, which scramble information and render it unreadable without a password or software key," are increasingly being used to secure communications and electronic commerce over the Internet. But the FBI and other law enforcement agencies argue that encryption will also be used by criminals and terrorists to thwart wiretaps and police surveillance. The amendment being considered by the committee would require all encryption products sold in the United States to include a back door" allowing the government to crack any message covertly. [ SNIP for FAIR USE ]

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Random character stereograms and stego
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Here's an application which is well suited for steganography. This is a random-character stereogram. Look at it with a monospace font and unfocus your eyes so the two blocks of text merge, and you will see the message HI displayed: VGhpcyBpcyBhIHRlc3Qg VGhpcyBpcyBhIHRlc3Qg bWVzc2FnZSB3aGljaCBp bWVc2AFnZB3xaGljaCBp cyBiZWluZyBzZW50IHZp cyBZWmluZBzvZW50IHZp YSBzdGVnYW5vZ3JhcGh5 YSBdGVnYW5v9Z3JhcGh5 LgpIYWQgdGhpcyBiZWVu LgpYW1QgdhpBcyBiZWVu IGFuIGFjdHVhbCBtZXNz IGFIGoFjdVhXbCBtZXNz YWdlLCBpdCB3b3VsZCBo YWdlLCBpdCB3b3VsZCBo YXZlIGJlZW4gZW5jcnlw YXZIGJlZW4vgZW5jcnlw dGVkCnVzaW5nIGEgbWV0 dGVkCVzaUW5nIGEgbWV0 aG9kIHdoaWNoIHByb2R1 aG9kIdoa4WNoIHByb2R1 Y2VzIG91dHB1dCB3aGlj Y2VzI91dAHB1dCB3aGlj aCBpcyBpbmRpc3Rpbmd1 aCBcyBpbmRnpc3Rpbmd1 aXNoYWJsZQpmcm9tIHJh aXNoYWJsZQpmcm9tIHJh bmRvbSBieXRlcy4K bmRvbSBieXRlcy4K This was just done manually, so it's pretty crude. It would be easy to write a program to display any message desired. People could get in the habit of sending long vertical stereograms saying "GO GIANTS" or "MICROSOFT SUX" or whatever they felt like at the moment. The program could either generate its own random numbers or else suck in random data from a disk file. In this case, if you take the left block and reformat it so that it can be base64 decoded, you will see a short message. (Unix users can pass the left block through "mimencode -u".) In a real stego application the message would be encrypted in 'stealth' form so it was indistinguishable from random bits to anyone who did not hold the decryption key. This could even catch on as a legal "thumb your nose at the spooks" fad, people adding random sterograms at the end of their messages. You could even have an active .sig which had a constant message but used different random characters each time. They wouldn't actually be sending anything but there would be no way to be sure. Some people say they'll just forbid transmitting data that looks random, but realistically, that would be very unlikely to happen.

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Mail archive now available for Crowds mailing list
by Avi Rubin 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

There is now a hypertext archive of the crowds-talk mailing list at http://www.research.att.com/projects/crowds/archive/ It will be updated regularly.

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Coalition letter opposing Oxley amendment -- from Apple to USWest
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This is an encouraging letter, especially given the number and breadth of firms that signed on. But this section strikes me as telling: >We urge the Committee to reject the Oxley-Manton amendment and any other >form of domestic encryption control. Then the committee should reject even the "original" draft of SAFE, which has the first-ever domestic encryption control: penalties for the use of crypto in a crime. When crypto is widespread, //any// "crime" (like posting "indecent" materials?) will involve crypto. Domestic controls on encryption are not a reasonable tradeoff for lifting export controls. Don't sell out my rights to make a quick buck. (Then of course there's White's "compromise" language floating around that would double these criminal penalties. And Oxley -- in an effort to split the coalition -- is circulating draft language that might exempt some forms of mundane crypto-devices from his crypto-ban. Who knows? Maybe some Congressmen would vote for Oxley II in hopes of staving off Oxley I. But all these "compromises" are dangerous.) Advice to undersigned firms: Tell your lobbyists to block //all// encryption legislation that might come out of Congress. Then fire them. Spend the millions of dollars on R&D. Get crypto in the hands of the grandmothers of America. Or if you're not going to fire your lobbyists, at least order them not to try and push a bill through. I know it's difficult; that's all they know how to do. But, you see, not only is such a plan doomed to fail, it likely will backfire and threaten all of our freedoms in the process. -Declan ====================== September 22, 1997 The Hon. Thomas J. Bliley, Jr. Chairman House Commerce Committee 2125 Rayburn House Office Building Washington, D.C. 20515 Dear Chairman Bliley: We are writing to express our strong opposition to the Oxley-Manton amendment to HR 695, the Security and Freedom through Encryption Act (SAFE), which the Commerce Committee will consider this week, and to any form of government domestic controls on encryption. The Oxley-Manton amendment would impose unprecedented restrictions on the domestic manufacture and availability of encryption, thus potentially compromising the security of the nation's telephone system and the Internet alike. The amendment would: * prohibit the domestic manufacture, sale and importation of any encryption product or service unless the government is given immediate access to the plaintext of communications and stored files without the knowledge of the user; * prohibit network service providers, including telephone companies and Internet service providers, from offering encryption products or services unless communications can be immediately read without the knowledge of the user; and * give the Attorney General unprecedented, broad new powers to establish standards for encryption products and services. Encryption technologies are the vital tools consumers and businesses need to operate with security and privacy in the information age, and are a cornerstone of electronic commerce. Government domestic controls on encryption are incompatible with the consumer, corporate, and national security benefits of the national information infrastructure. Numerous communications products and services are now under development that incorporate encryption as an essential feature. Oxley-Manton will stifle these new products and services, end the deployment of market-driven key recovery systems, and undermine the potential of the new communications media for electronic commerce and the promotion of democratic values. * Strong encryption will not only ensure privacy but also help prevent crime on the network. However, by mandating trap doors in all domestic encryption products and communications networks, the Oxley-Manton amendment will make the personal records and communications of individuals and businesses more vulnerable to hackers, terrorists, industrial spies and other criminals. Put at risk will be medical records, tax returns, private email, business proprietary information and transactions, attorney-client communications, and cellular phone conversations. * Oxley-Manton's broad requirement for "immediate access" to decryption keys without knowledge of the user would force Americans to forfeit their constitutional right of privacy as a condition of participating in the information age. * Oxley-Manton invites disastrous industrial policy. It is industrial policy with criminal sanctions attached. The amendment authorizes the Attorney General to promulgate technical requirements for all encryption products and gives the Department of Justice prior approval authority over all encryption systems for computers and telecommunications. This will stifle innovation. It will drive encryption expertise out of this country. The market should be allowed to develop its own solutions, many of which in fact will meet law enforcement's needs within our existing system of legal authorities and safeguards. * Oxley-Manton will be ineffective in keeping strong encryption out of the hands of criminals. Criminals and terrorist groups will not use a system that gives the government access to their decryption keys. In fact, the FBI has admitted in Congressional testimony that criminals will always have access to strong unbreakable encryption. We urge the Committee to reject the Oxley-Manton amendment and any other form of domestic encryption control. Sincerely, ACL Datacom, Inc., California American Electronics Association American Automobile Manufacturers Association Americans for Tax Reform America Online, Inc. Ameritech ANS Communications, Inc., New York Apple Computer, Inc. Ashton Communications Corp., California and Texas Bell Atlantic Bell South Bowles Farming Co., Inc. Business Software Alliance Center for Democracy and Technology Commercial Internet eXchange Association CommerceNet Compaq Computer Corp. CompuServe, Inc. Computer & Communications Industry Association Computer Software Industry Association Consumer Electronic Manufacturers Association Counsel Connect Crest Industries, Inc. DataXchange Network, Inc. Direct Marketing Association Electronic Data Systems, Corp. Electronic Frontier Foundation Electronic Messaging Association Epoch Internet Fiber Network Solutions, Inc., Columbus, Ohio Genuity Inc., a Bechtel company IBM Corp. Information Technology Association of America Information Technology Industry Council (ITI) Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers - US Activities International Communications Association Intuit Inc. Internet Providers Association of Iowa Microsoft National Association of Manufacturers NETCOM On-Line Communication Services, Inc. NetINS, Inc., Iowa Novell Online Banking Association National Association of Manufacturers National Retail Federation Netscape Communications Corp. Phoenix Media/Communications Group Pro-Trade Group PGP, Inc. RSA Data Security, Inc. SBC Communications Inc. Securities Industry Association Silicon Valley Software Industry Coalition Software Forum Software Publishers Association Sun Microsystems, Inc. TheOnRamp Group, Inc., Ohio Trusted Information Systems United States Council for International Business United States Internet Council United States Telephone Association U.S. Chamber of Commerce US West Voters Telecommunications Watch

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SAFE Bill and CongressCritter Staffs
by Brian B. Riley 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 >1. Pick up the phone and call as many of the four > leading members of the Commerce committee as you can: > > Chairman Thomas Bliley (R-VA) (202) 225-2815 > Ranking member John Dingell (D-MI) (202) 225-4071 > Rep. Tauzin (R-LA) (202) 225-4031 > Rep. Markey (D-MA) (202) 225-2836 > >2. Ask for the staffer that handles the encryption issue. I called Bliley and Dingell, their offices are saying there is no dedicated 'staffer' on encryption, that its all being handled by Commerce Committee staff, both offices forwarded my call to the same Commerce staff person. The staff person says that right now there are no amendments formally being considered. That Oxley/Manton is just talk for the moment. Anyway I spoke my piece and said I encouraged the congressman to resist any amendments to HR695. He thanked me and said goodbye. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGP for Personal Privacy 5.0 Charset: noconv iQA/AwUBNCggQsdZgC62U/gIEQL7uACeKZeTN50JoiIO7WKhRbFPVWrjFV8AnAi1 XyP8wXVHO0MMAGakzq5Sg39l =d4wo -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Brian B. Riley --> http://www.macconnect.com/~brianbr For PGP Keys <mailto:brianbr@together.net?subject=Get%20PGP%20Key> "Darkness cannot drive out darkness, only light can do that. Hate cannot drive out hate; only love can do that. -- Martin Luther King Jr.

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Re: The great GAK crack (making GAK economically impossible) (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > Date: Tue, 23 Sep 1997 17:36:01 -0400 (EDT) > From: Ray Arachelian <sunder(a)brainlink.com> > Subject: Re: The great GAK crack (making GAK economically impossible) > That all depends on how they are set up to accept such key requests. Fer > instance, say they set up a nice litte web site that takes in credit > cards... can we say ping flood boys and girls? Can you say 'trace'? > Suppose they set up a mail in system where you have to mail letters to > them. We simply go through every magazine we find and send subscribtion > requests to that address. As most mags will happily send a free issue > this will do wonders... Send them to "Joe Smith, Care Of Key Escrow..." Can you say 'mail fraud'? > If they set up a phone line, we call the phone line and keep it busy... Can you say 'phone trace'? > If they set up a system whereby mistakes have to be refiled, then we > simply all march down there and demand that we get our keys registered and > we always make mistakes in something or other, or we forget our ID's. This works if it happens to be in the current location of an individual, seems pretty unworkable considering the geographic distribution of cpunks. > Denial of service attacks are always possible somehow or other... It's a > question of what we're willing to donate to the effort. Provided you can pay the bill to keep it going AND you use some form of anonymity (which I doubt you could hold up for long). ____________________________________________________________________ | | | The financial policy of the welfare state requires that there | | be no way for the owners of wealth to protect themselves. | | | | -Alan Greenspan- | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http:// www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

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Congress & Crypto Roundup: Vote in Commerce cmte tomorrow
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Both sides of the crypto-debate spent today jockeying for position before an important vote tomorrow in the House Commerce committee. At issue is whether the panel will follow the lead of the Intelligence committee and restrict your ability to protect your privacy with whatever technology you want. Law enforcement officials are pressing for a secret backdoor, and Rep. Oxley was planning to offer a proposal (Oxley I) giving them just that. * Today Oxley circulated a revised proposal that I think of as Oxley II. It's designed to respond to some of the criticisms: http://www.cdt.org/crypto/legis_105/SAFE/Oxley_Manton_rev.html * Law professors sent a letter criticizing Oxley I: http://www.law.miami.edu/~froomkin/lawprof-letter.htm * Yesterday dozens of groups -- from Apple to USWest -- sent out a letter criticizing Oxley I. (It's attached below.) The question is now: how many of these groups will oppose Oxley II? * Oxley is trying to carve off pieces of the alliance and get the Baby Bells not to oppose Oxley II, Reuters reports below. Also, grassroots law enforcement groups -- including some from California -- are sending their own letters to support Oxley. * Rep. Rick White is trying to cut a deal; he's proposing alternative, compromise language. A note from his staff is attached below. * Scientific and engineering professional societies, too, weighed in. I've attached their note at the end of this message. -Declan -------------- >From White's staff: >Congressman Rick White will offer an alternative to the Oxley/Manton >substitute in order to preserve the SAFE bill while addressing some of >the concerns of the law enforcement community. > >The White alternative would: > >1) Give law enforcement the tools they needs. The alternative would >create a National Electronic Technologies Center (NETCenter) to serve >local, state and federal law enforcement authorities by providing >information and assistance regarding decryption technologies and >techniques. In addition the NETCenter would give law enforcement access >to the tools they need to keep pace with changing technologies. > >2) Tough on those who commit crimes by using encryption. The >alternative doubles the allowable jail time for those who break the law >and commit crime and try to hide their tracks by use of encryption. > >3) Study. There has never been a study on a domestic key recovery >system and the recent proposal by the FBI. The White alternative calls >for a six month study of domestic key recovery system to determine its >effectiveness. > >4) Americans should not have to turn over the keys to their electronic >security. The 4th Amendment protects our individual right(s) to keep >protect our "effects." The White alternative states that the federal >government and the States cannot restrict the use of domestic encryption >technologies and cannot condition the issuance of certificates of >authentication -- which many believe will be necessary for electronic >commerce to succeed -- on the use of a government-blessed key recovery >system for encryption. -------- September 22, 1997 The Hon. Thomas J. Bliley, Jr. Chairman House Commerce Committee 2125 Rayburn House Office Building Washington, D.C. 20515 Dear Chairman Bliley: We are writing to express our strong opposition to the Oxley-Manton amendment to HR 695, the Security and Freedom through Encryption Act (SAFE), which the Commerce Committee will consider this week, and to any form of government domestic controls on encryption. The Oxley-Manton amendment would impose unprecedented restrictions on the domestic manufacture and availability of encryption, thus potentially compromising the security of the nation's telephone system and the Internet alike. The amendment would: * prohibit the domestic manufacture, sale and importation of any encryption product or service unless the government is given immediate access to the plaintext of communications and stored files without the knowledge of the user; * prohibit network service providers, including telephone companies and Internet service providers, from offering encryption products or services unless communications can be immediately read without the knowledge of the user; and * give the Attorney General unprecedented, broad new powers to establish standards for encryption products and services. Encryption technologies are the vital tools consumers and businesses need to operate with security and privacy in the information age, and are a cornerstone of electronic commerce. Government domestic controls on encryption are incompatible with the consumer, corporate, and national security benefits of the national information infrastructure. Numerous communications products and services are now under development that incorporate encryption as an essential feature. Oxley-Manton will stifle these new products and services, end the deployment of market-driven key recovery systems, and undermine the potential of the new communications media for electronic commerce and the promotion of democratic values. * Strong encryption will not only ensure privacy but also help prevent crime on the network. However, by mandating trap doors in all domestic encryption products and communications networks, the Oxley-Manton amendment will make the personal records and communications of individuals and businesses more vulnerable to hackers, terrorists, industrial spies and other criminals. Put at risk will be medical records, tax returns, private email, business proprietary information and transactions, attorney-client communications, and cellular phone conversations. * Oxley-Manton's broad requirement for "immediate access" to decryption keys without knowledge of the user would force Americans to forfeit their constitutional right of privacy as a condition of participating in the information age. * Oxley-Manton invites disastrous industrial policy. It is industrial policy with criminal sanctions attached. The amendment authorizes the Attorney General to promulgate technical requirements for all encryption products and gives the Department of Justice prior approval authority over all encryption systems for computers and telecommunications. This will stifle innovation. It will drive encryption expertise out of this country. The market should be allowed to develop its own solutions, many of which in fact will meet law enforcement's needs within our existing system of legal authorities and safeguards. * Oxley-Manton will be ineffective in keeping strong encryption out of the hands of criminals. Criminals and terrorist groups will not use a system that gives the government access to their decryption keys. In fact, the FBI has admitted in Congressional testimony that criminals will always have access to strong unbreakable encryption. We urge the Committee to reject the Oxley-Manton amendment and any other form of domestic encryption control. Sincerely, ACL Datacom, Inc., California American Electronics Association American Automobile Manufacturers Association Americans for Tax Reform America Online, Inc. Ameritech ANS Communications, Inc., New York Apple Computer, Inc. Ashton Communications Corp., California and Texas Bell Atlantic Bell South Bowles Farming Co., Inc. Business Software Alliance Center for Democracy and Technology Commercial Internet eXchange Association CommerceNet Compaq Computer Corp. CompuServe, Inc. Computer & Communications Industry Association Computer Software Industry Association Consumer Electronic Manufacturers Association Counsel Connect Crest Industries, Inc. DataXchange Network, Inc. Direct Marketing Association Electronic Data Systems, Corp. Electronic Frontier Foundation Electronic Messaging Association Epoch Internet Fiber Network Solutions, Inc., Columbus, Ohio Genuity Inc., a Bechtel company IBM Corp. Information Technology Association of America Information Technology Industry Council (ITI) Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers - US Activities International Communications Association Intuit Inc. Internet Providers Association of Iowa Microsoft National Association of Manufacturers NETCOM On-Line Communication Services, Inc. NetINS, Inc., Iowa Novell Online Banking Association National Association of Manufacturers National Retail Federation Netscape Communications Corp. Phoenix Media/Communications Group Pro-Trade Group PGP, Inc. RSA Data Security, Inc. SBC Communications Inc. Securities Industry Association Silicon Valley Software Industry Coalition Software Forum Software Publishers Association Sun Microsystems, Inc. TheOnRamp Group, Inc., Ohio Trusted Information Systems United States Council for International Business United States Internet Council United States Telephone Association U.S. Chamber of Commerce US West Voters Telecommunications Watch --- Lawmakers try to get Baby Bells out of code debate By Aaron Pressman WASHINGTON, Sept 23 (Reuter) - With a Congressional panel set to vote Wednesday on a proposal to impose domestic controls on encryption, lawmakers backing the limits worked furiously to convince telephone companies not to oppose them. Late Tuesday, officials at the five "Baby Bell" regional phone companies said they had not decided if last-minute changes to the proposal addressed their concerns. On Monday, the five companies joined dozens of high-tech firms and business and Internet groups in a letter opposing the proposal authored by Ohio Republican Rep. Mike Oxley. The restrictions, which would require all products sold in the United States to include features allowing the government to covertly decode any encrypted data, had been building strong momentum in Congress over the past month. And until the telephone company opposition surfaced two weeks ago, the proposal was expected to be adopted easily by the House Commerce Committee. But the opposition of the influential Baby Bells stopped the process and the committee decided to put off an earlier vote until Wednesday. In a recent revision, Oxley agreed to remove provisions which required network service providers such as the phone companies to provide immediate access to coded communications. Lawyers for the phone companies met Tuesday but did not reach a decision on the changes, according to Bell South spokesman Bill McCloskey. "The meeting ended inconclusively," McCloskey said. "We have no verdict." Oxley's office remained confident that changes could be made to mollify the phone companies. "We will get them onboard, there's no doubt," one staffer said. While lawmakers worked to assuage the concerns of the Baby Bells, and added a provision to appease the banking industry, leading science groups and law professors separately issued new statements on Tuesday completely opposing the Oxley restrictions. Professors from 23 law schools, including Yale, Harvard and Stanford, said the restrictions were a "profound mistake" that would "contravene fundamental principles of our constitutional tradition." Leading science, mathematics and engineering groups said the restrictions were impeding on the advance of cryptography research thus making all computer networks, including the Internet, less secure. The Oxley proposal will be considered as an amendment to a bill by Virginia Republican Rep. Bob Goodlatte that began as an effort to loosen strict U.S. export controls on encrypotion products and preclude domestic restrictions. Rep. Rick White, Republican of Washington, said Tuesday he would offer an alternative to Oxley's amendment that would meet many of the objections of industry, Internet groups and others. But White's proposal was not endorsed by leading law enforcement agencies that back Oxley's plan. White's plan would establish a center to help law enforcement agencies crack encryption used by criminals, start a study of technologies to allow government access and increase criminal penalties for use of encryption as part of a crime. While two House committees have approved the Goodlatte bill intact, two other panels added tighter export controls and domestic restrictions. After the Commerce Committee's vote, the bill goes to the House Rules Committee which must reconcile the competitng versions. No action is expected on the bill by the full House this year. ((--202-898-8312)) Tuesday, 23 September 1997 19:47:13 RTRS [nN2351141] --- PRESS RELEASE SEPTEMBER 24, 1997 LEADING US SCIENTIFIC, MATHEMATICS, AND ENGINEERING SOCIETIES PROTEST RESTRICTIONS ON CRYPTOGRAPHY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT The leading U.S. scientific, mathematics, and engineering societies sent a united message to Congress today protesting proposed U.S. cryptography policies that would maintain export restrictions limiting the open exchange of scientific information and the progress of scientific research and development. In addition, these organizations warned that new requirements for domestic key recovery raise serious scientific and technical problems that undermine its viability as a policy alternative. In a letter to the House Commerce Committee, the societies indicated that the policies will "diminish the scientific reputation of the United States and weaken us economically." This is the first time these highly influential societies have united to inform Congress how cryptography policies will effect the future of scientific research and development in the U. S. Until now, the debate has focused on commercial, civil liberties, and national security/ law enforcement interests. The House Commerce Committee will vote today on proposed legislation removing restrictions on the export of encryption products. However, amendments to this language were passed by two House Committees restricting the domestic use of encryption. The letter urges the Committee to reject such proposals or " U.S. leadership in many areas of science and technology is likely to be jeopardized with no discernible benefits to our National Interests." Export controls and domestic restrictions on cryptography development and use impact scientific freedoms in a number of ways. Cryptographers, a specialized subset of computer scientists, mathematicians, and engineers, are unable to communicateare unable to communicate with their colleagues overseas or to participate in international projects aimed at developing a secure GII. The full and open exchange of scientific information facilitated by these organizations has significantly increased the economic strength of the United States. However the proposed new laws would continue to force them to exclude members living outside the United States from this free exchange. According to Dr. Barbara Simons, " The scientific and engineering societies today speak with one voice in urging Congress not to enact cryptography policies which will prohibit scientists from performing important research. If scientists cannot research and develop new cryptographic tools, the future of electronic commerce may be in jeopardy." CONTACTS: Dr. Barbara Simons Chair U.S. Public Policy Committee for the Association for Computing phone: 408:256-3661 pager: 1-888-329-3091 pager id: 2533409 e-mail simons(a)VNET.IBM.COM Dr. Peter Neumann U.S. Public Policy Committee for the Association for Computing email: neumann(a)csl.sri.com Ed Lazowska Chair, Computer Science University of Washington e-mail: lazowska(a)cs.washington.edu phone: 206 543 4755 David L. Waltz President, American Association for Artificial Intelligence (AAAI) e-mail: waltz(a)research.nj.nec.com phone: 609-951-2700 fax: 609-951-2483 Irving Lerch Co-Chair, Committee on Scientific Freedom and Responsibility American Association for the Advancement of Science phone: 301 209 3236 Mary Gray Co-Chair, Scientific Freedom and Responsibility American Association for the Advancement of Science phone: 202 885 3171 Staff: Lauren Gelman 202/544-4859 gelman(a)acm.org Alex Fowler 202/ 326-7016 afowler(a)aaas.org September 24, 1997 Dear Chairman Bliley: As representatives of the leading scientific, mathematics, and engineering societies in the United States, we are writing to protest current and proposed U.S. cryptography policies that restrict the open exchange of scientific information and the progress of scientific research and development. We object to national policies that criminalize the use of cryptography that is not approved by the Administration or that mandate domestic key recovery schemes. The leadership that the United States currently enjoys in research and development of encryption algorithms, cryptographic products, and computer security technology will be seriously eroded, if not essentially eliminated, by misguided proposals to restrict the domestic use of encryption. o The development of strong cryptographic technology is crucial to the further growth of our electronic infrastructure. Encryption protects the security and privacy of communications and stored data. A lack of strong universally available encryption exacerbates security problems on personal computers, intranets, and the world-wide Internet. A recent National Academy of Sciences study warned against the government's premature reliance on key recovery as an encryption technique. It urged that the method be deployed in test situations first to work out problems. This has not been done. o Our organizations publish numerous scientific journals and conference proceedings, often relying on the Internet for publication. The free exchange of scientific information facilitated by our organizations has significantly increased the economic strength of the United States. But the proposed new laws would continue to force us to exclude members living outside the United States from this free exchange. The result would diminish the scientific reputation of the United States and weaken us economically. o It is unreasonable and probably unconstitutional to distinguish between printed and electronic distribution of encryption source code. U.S. policy should not create an artificial distinction between paper and electronic versions of a document. o U.S. scientists and engineers involved with research and development of cryptographic tools cannot publish their results using electronic media, are restricted in their efforts to educate the next generation of computer scientists, and cannot communicate with their international colleagues. For example, the U.S. cryptography community has not been able to participate in the Internet Protocol Security project, an effort to develop new international standards for Internet security. o Publication restrictions relating to cryptography have a negative impact on peer review and the development of robust algorithms. To demonstrate that encryption algorithms are secure, cryptographers publish their algorithms and other cryptographers try to break them. Not only does this process tend to identify faulty algorithms, but it is also a precondition for the public to have confidence that the algorithm is secure. o Computer systems currently are plagued by considerable security and privacy weaknesses. These problems will become more widespread as electronic commerce develops and computer systems become ubiquitous. Cryptographers in the U.S. face numerous barriers when addressing computer security issues, and some security researchers may be unwilling to continue their work because they will be restricted in publishing and discussing their research. In conclusion, we urge you to eliminate current policies that stifle the ability of researchers and implementers to study and build cryptographic algorithms, secure information systems, and secure network protocols. Otherwise, U.S. leadership in many areas of science and technology is likely to be jeopardized with no discernible benefits to our National Interests. For more information please contact Barbara Simons at 408/256-3661, Alex Fowler at 202/326-7016 or Lauren Gelman at 202/544-4859. Sincerely, ------------ ------------------------- Declan McCullagh Time Inc. The Netly News Network Washington Correspondent http://netlynews.com/

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Dental-Optical Plan
by doctors2＠kcopk.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hello, we work with a group of your local doctors and dentists and we are offering a Dental - Optical Plan that runs approximately $2 a week for an individual and $3 a week for an entire family with no limit to the number of children. Would you like our office to give you some additional information? Our doctors are grouped by area code and zip code, please list Name Address Area Code Phone Number It is not necessary to quote the entire message back with your reply. Thank you!

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test
by Igor Chudov 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

test

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17 Dec '03

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