December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: The Crypto Applications we would rather not talk about
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 2:00 AM 11/5/95, Nathan Loofbourrow wrote: > > The answers are there and have been published > > in most books on tradecraft, 3 person cells organized > > as pyramids. > >I've read only fictional accounts about the 3-person cell. Any >pointers to nonfiction material? "Tradecraft" didn't seem to be the >magic keyword in the local card catalog. It's easy to work out the relationships from first principles...I'm not sure what a book would add to your understanding. I suspect Kahn's "The Codebreakers" contains at least a brief mention of cell organizations, thought that was not Kahn's focus. Or, look at any of the various books on Soviet spy rings in the U.S., or various spy rings in WW II. For example, I think the true-life book "I Led Three Lives" might still be available--it was the basis of a t.v. show I used to watch in the early 60s. (The t.v. show presumably went to the same Politically Incorrect resting place as "Amos and Andy," mourned by Sapphire, The Kingfish, and me.) --Tim Views here are not the views of my Internet Service Provider or Government. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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To Repeat: Credentials Not Considered Necessary
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 1:03 AM 11/5/95, Simon Spero wrote: >On Sat, 4 Nov 1995, Timothy C. May wrote: > >> Therefore, there are few ways that citizenship can be "checked." Period. A >> foreigner who wishes to "prove" his non-U.S. status could, of course, show >> his green card. But this is different from proving citizenship. >> > >And here we have the rub. People with permanent residency (i.e. green >cards) are fully entitled to access to strong crypto. Most foreign >students are on J-1 visas, which do not grant permanent residency. Irrelevant. J-1 persons are still accorded the basic rights of citizens, save for a few things like voting, holding certain offices, and perhaps jury duty (not sure about this, as my recent jury summons was apparently based on my Calif. Driver's License and required no form of identification whatsoever). My basic point was that "J-1," "permanent resident," "citizen," "undocumented," and "completely and totally without proper papers" are, for the purposes being discussed here, all essentially identical. Any sysadmin who expects to have papers proving "citizenship" or any other status will have a tough time. Saying "People with permanent residency (i.e. green cards) are fully entitled to access to strong crypto." and--presumably--implying that J-1 visa holders are _not_ entitled to use strong crypto within the U.S. (or, for that matter, in their own countries, but this is another issue), is misleading. The laws about "showing a foreign national" certain items do not differentiate, so far as I have seen, between various kinds of visas. In any case, sysadmins generally do not ask for any kind of ID or proof of citizenship, morality, residency, etc. (On my many computer accounts over the years, as but one example, _never_ have I have been asked for credentials of any kind. Never. Not even a driver's license, let alone a passport or birth certificate or whatever. My current Internet Service Providers, netcom.com and got.net, are blithely uncaring about the fact that I am technically a citizen of Ruritania, and am not in the U.S. legally.) --Tim May Views here are not the views of my Internet Service Provider or Government. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: Telephone switch capacity -Reply
by shamrock＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 18:43 11/3/95, Rich Graves wrote: >[about the FBI supposedly wanting the ability to tap 1% of all phones in >the US simultaneously] [...] >Of course the FBI doesn't have the staff to listen to all these lines, and >they need an individual court order to authorize each individual >interception, so this numbers game is a bit of a joke. One more time. Despite what you read in the papers, despite what most people - even in the legal profession - believe, telephone wiretaps do _not_ require a court order. They haven't required a court order in over a year. The Digital Telephony Bill, which passed Congress by an overwhelming margin, _explicitly_ allows for wiretap authorizations other than a court order. The law does not impose any rules for these "other forms of authorization". "The captain signed it off" may suffice. -- Lucky Green <mailto:shamrock@netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred.

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[NOISE, if interesting NOISE] Assassins
by Black Unicorn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Interested parties might want to discuss the effectiveness of murder in politics with the world's most recent assassin. Or at least leave interesting mail to the security forces who will likely be running through his e-mail. Here's your chance to make your life REAL interesting, and test PGP, just send some encrypted mail to our friend and gunman Mr. Amir at: la59(a)popeye.cc.biu.ac.il --- "In fact, had Bancroft not existed, potestas scientiae in usu est Franklin might have had to invent him." in nihilum nil posse reverti 00B9289C28DC0E55 E16D5378B81E1C96 - Finger for Current Key Information

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Re: lp (134.222.35.2)?
by Richard Huddleston 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

134.222.0.0 is a Class B network, so if you do 'whois' on 134.222.0.0 (instead of the individual IP addresses) you find: European Unix Users Group (NET-EUNET-X25) Kruislaan 413 NL-1098 SJ Amsterdam NETHERLANDS Netname: EUNET-X25 Netnumber: 134.222.0.0 Coordinator: EUnet Ltd (EU-NIC) hostmaster(a)nic.eu.net +31 20 5925109 +31 20 5925165 (24hr Emergency) +31 20 5925163 (fax) Domain System inverse mapping provided by: NS.EU.NET 192.16.202.11 SUNIC.SUNET.SE 192.36.125.2 192.36.148.18 NS.UU.NET 137.39.1.3 NS2.NIC.FR 192.93.0.4 Record last updated on 07-Mar-94. ...what does this do to your traceroute dumps? Richard

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Re: lp (134.222.35.2)?
by Stephan Somogyi 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 7:20 5.11.95, Anonymous wrote: > it seemed worth reposting to CP--no, it's not entirely crypto-related, > but nor is it a completely vague allegation. [...] > From GovAccess.183.snoops: [...] >> Notice that both messages went through an unnamed site -- 134.222.9.1 and >> then a strangely-named site, "lp (134.222.35.2)" -- then through the same >> Vienna, Virginia (USA) site ... and thereafter, on to their destination. >> I.e., the second message went through Virginia to get from Switzerland to >> Israel. >> >> The whois servers at the InterNIC and at nic.ddn.mil for MILNET Information >> report, ``No match for "134.222.9.1". '' and `` No match for >> "134.222.35.2".'' >> >> Now let me see ... which spy agencies are located in or near Virginia? Oh please. The probable reason that the InterNIC doesn't know about the 132.222.0.0 networks is because they're in Europe. If you search for either of the network numbers of the IP addresses mentioned above in the RIPE database <http://www.ripe.net/>, you will find that they belong to the EUnet backbone. After pinging 134.222.9.1 successfully, I telnetted to it and it claimed, quite plausibly, that it's a device (presumably a router) in Amsterdam. I am currently unable to ping 134.222.35.2; this, however, fills me with no dread whatsoever. _______________________________________________________________________ Stephan Somogyi Senior Editor Digital Media

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My Sympathies to you at this time.
by Censored Girls Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

To those of you from Israel or who are Jewish, my deepest sympathies to all of you. Love Always, Carol Anne -- Member Internet Society - Certified BETSI Programmer - Webmistress *********************************************************************** Carol Anne Braddock (cab8) carolann(a)censored.org 206.42.112.96 My Homepage The Cyberdoc *********************************************************************** ------------------ PGP.ZIP Part [017/713] ------------------- M8H,),S$8G>&.WP(8IRA`-M['+`Q%&_C"">5-F%LX@<_Q$;*P'',Q$Z/AA[8M MF=O0H+*%(-S%&>S%+FS&<LS%3(Q&#W1"<]2%`H^;,]^1C$'HBN8PX$4SYAU^ MPGD<Q0ZLA0D+,`MCT!LA**4M[-JPAK9F?40!AJ,CW"'%DR#:'9?Q)3[%<DQ` ------------------------------------------------------------- for next chunk to export --> http://dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/export/

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Re: Sun speaks out - but not to the cypherpunks
by anonymous-remailer＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I know that it is rude to follow up one of your own posts, and I apologize in advance for this horrible faux-pas, but hopefully, it's excused this one time. I wrote: >One example of this that should serve as a useful case study is a recent >problem which was brought to the Canadian public's attention just this >week, on a program called the Fifth Estate. The CBC (Canadian >Broadcasting Corporation) detailed a software code problem in one of >AECL's (Atomic Energy of Canada Limited's) instruments which deliver >penetrating radiation. > >The software which controlled the radiation dose, would periodically >override the oncologist's calibration and deliver a radiation dose 100 >times what was prescribed. This software "bug" literally killed wherever >the machine was in use. Does anyone on this list know if the CBC has a web site on the Net? I'm hoping that someone (hint, hint) who has a convenient website, one with lots of spare bandwidth could volunteer to contact the CBC and persuade them to copyright clear the Fifth Estate program clip which documented some of the risks of software bugs in mission critical applications, and allow it to be placed on the Net. I'm hoping that this English language piece reaches a wide international audience. The Canadian Broadcasting Corporation is a Crown Corporation which has historically received its primary funding from the Government of Canada. Recently, it has suffered under the budgetary ax, and the push for privatization. I'm pretty confident that the Corporation would copyright clear the clip for MPEG distribution across the Net, if they were approached with the concept that the clip was a demonstration of the CBC's journalistic excellence and integrity, a piece which is demonstrative of the critical need to continue their funding. A concrete demonstration of the need for the CBC. And a piece which could well receive deserved international acclaim. The site would help them, and would simultaneously be a site of international public service. Nothing will drive home the need for quality software, quality code, and quality security more than the vivid graphic pictures of the consequences of sloppy code, or of the risks if certain critical systems, LANs, or private networks are compromised, or if security and privacy (which are flip sides of the same coin) are ignored. The sight of a body, that has had a hole burned straight through it from the front through to the spine is truly chilling and drives the message home. Nothing seems to speak as clearly as a picture ... as to what the stakes are ... of what "bugs" in code do ... and of what a network compromise can leave in its wake. A picture of consequences. Six people died in Canada and the United States due to the software flaw. Even after numerous reports of the flaws, the company refused to even acknowledge the existence of a problem, and in fact did everything within its power to make sure doctors, radiologists and physicists were unaware. The attitude of trivialization can only be characterized as fantastic, and would be unbelievable to anyone who has not viewed the piece. It's one hell of a backgrounder which not only details problems, but looks at solutions -- it examines attitudes, especially management attitudes. It truly deserves an expanded audience. From teachers, to students, to the international media, to the concerned private individual, all will be served well if this piece gets wide attention. Takers, anyone?? Alice de 'nonymous ... ...just another one of those... P.S. This post is in the public domain. C. S. U. M. O. C. L. U. N. E.

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Re: Re[2]: FBI seeks huge wiretapping system
by Jay Campbell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>It is a well-known fact that it was common practice for NSA operatives to > ^^^ >masquerade as Injuns in the 1800's and waylay Pony Express riders in order > ^^^^^^ >I think you'll find the NSA was not in existence in the 1800's. I'm disappointed at the sheer number of similar pieces of email I received on this. You'da thought the Capn Crunch reference was silly enough that people would give me a funny look and trash the original message. -- Jay Campbell edge(a)got.net - Operations Manager -=-=-=-=-=-=- Sense Networking, Santa Cruz Node Jay(a)Campbell.net got.net? PGP MIT KeyID 0xACAE1A89 "On the Information Superhighway, I'm the guy behind you in this morning's traffic jam leaning on his horn."

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Re: Credentials Without Identity
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I do not intend my comments below to be disrespectful to the people of Sweden. At 4:32 AM 11/5/95, Mats Bergstrom wrote: >Ah, the Swedish way is so much more convenient. Directly after birth you >get a tag around your arm, with a number that is later changed to an >entry into several databases, including 'Birth Registry' and you get >your Person Number for life, in the format YYMMDD-abcd, which is >unique (at least in Sweden). All forthcoming database entries are based >on this number, usually as a first key field. Surprise immigrants get a The Swedish way may be more convenient, but the Nazi way was even more convenient. The Person Numbers (or NonPerson Numbers, I suppose) were tattooed directly on the arms. For many of us, the essence of strong crypto, crypto anarchy, and the Cypherpunks list is to avoid this "Swedish future." Truly a blight on mankind, if you ask me. The U.S is moving swiftly in this direction. (Ironically, the foreign press clucks at our "fascism" with Proposition 187-type measures, while there own countries are far more restrictive in allowing immigration.) Fortunately, I have heard there is a "right wing" backlash growing in some of the Scandinavian countries, especially Norway and Denmark. ("Right wing" is what the press calls it...I hope it's really "anti-left wing," anti-cradle-to-grave-socialism.) >other person). Most Government databases are open to the public, so >the credit tracking agencies don't have to work very hard regarding The worst of both worlds: the government mandates that information be collected at every turn, then opens the records for all to see. >Now, there are laws against cross-referencing various databases >without the approval of the Data Inspection, which often says no. To my surprise, several people on this list have expressed support for the need for so-called "data privacy laws." I look at it this way: if I put things on my computer based on things I have learned, or even compile lists of people and places, etc., who can enter my home and demand that I expunge these records? The problem with well-intentioned laws about data privacy is that they impinge directly on the freedom to read and write, to make lists, to enter thoughts into computers, etc. (I'm sure the _intent_ is to go after MasterCard-type operations and inaccurate records, but businesses in Britain are already facing investigation for having computerized mailing lists. Ironically, the Cypherpunks mailing list might be illegal in the U.K. unless the legal forms were properly filled out, the fees paid, the parties notified on a regular basis of information about them, etc. And our archiving of posts is ipso facto illegal under several interpretations of the Data Privacy laws of some countries unless extensive notifications are made and permissions received. The Data Privacy laws make us all criminals for storing received messages in data bases.) More practically, giving a government the power to say which data bases are acceptable, and which data bases are illegal, is a terrible thing. Besides the opportunities for abuse (by a Stalin, a Nixon, a Pol Pot, a Clinton), it is also an impractical law to enforce, as Mats' next point makes: >But if you do it illegaly, there is very little risk of detection. >It looks like the Approved ID will be a smart-card with a signing >mechanism (probably escrowed), naturally linked to the Person Number, >real soon now, at least before the mythical y.2000 . Links to physical >characteristics (retina?) are not (openly) discussed yet but may >eventually come into play. ... And: >2) Prepare for Crypto Anarchy. Create untrackable net aliases for > future use. Keep informed of all the tricks to bypass coming > futile attempts to link net pseudonyms to Person Numbers (or > physical characteristics). Enjoy (and help create and protect) > the virtual sanctuary with digital mixes and anonymous http > proxies (and DC-nets or something better eventually). Sad, isn't it, that the world is rushing headlong into an Orwellian future. "Disneyland with a death penalty" ("Wired"--S. Sandfort, W. Gibson). --Tim May Views here are not the views of my Internet Service Provider or Government. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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