December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: The future will be easy to use
by Rich Salz 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>There is more to this problem than how it is that I trust the key. There >is also what I trust it for. ... >It is hard to see how to record the information about how much I trust the >receipent's systems security. Bingo! This is one of the hard parts of certificate authorities; just what are you attesting to? The American Bar Association has a big document for public review that addresses what this might mean; there are a couple of RFC's that specify CA policies (one from COST in Sweden, I think), and RSA and/or Verisign will give you their policy in hardcopy. In x.509v3 certificates, there is an extensible field where the key-signer can put arbitrary data. The intent is apparently that you put the ISO object-ID (you know, those funny 1.3.2.11.... numbers) of the policy document. There is, of course, no way to interpret the semantics of this electronically. It will be interesting to see how various companies address this issue, for example as they start to support arbitrary CA's in browsers or servers while doing commerce over the web. /r$

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Re: key for Alice as promised (not)
by jimbell＠pacifier.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>On Tue, 28 Nov 1995, Adam Hupp wrote: > >> >Can you imagine?? I'm simply not willing to fool myself into thinking >> >that I ahve security by posting a key and using PGP. >> >> Unless you can post some proof that PGP is insecure, stop insisting it is. > >PGP is really not the issue. The issue is more my security and the >environment that I use PGP in. I don't have a trusted machine to run PGP >on. Anyone who wants to can come up to machine and copy my secret keyring >or they can even watch me typing my password in. > >So, I don't fool myself, and I don't use PGP, except for things like >exchanging a one-time pad with someone when I've already sent the message >out across another delivery mechanism, like on a floppy delivered my >courier. > >Alice de 'nonymous ... You're a bonehead. On the one hand, you FAIL to stop or dramatically reduce claimed spoofings of your notes by using PGP (which would almost certainly work perfectly for this limited purpose) yet you claim that you'll only trust PGP in a limited scenario of courier-delivered data! Talk about "penny-wise and pound foolish"! Wake up, idiot! The purpose of encryption and signing and such is to REDUCE problems, ideally to zero but if not to some adequately small value. To fail to use signing when there is no ongoing problem is risky; to not use signing when there is a serious continuing problem is downright lunatic. That sets up an irresolvable contradiction: On the one hand, you're willing to tolerate a continuing problem, yet on the other you claim that your standards are so high that you won't use a system unless the probability of security essentially precludes a loss of security. Now can you see why we're laughing?

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Re: The future will be easy to use
by James A. Donald 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 03:30 PM 11/28/95 EST, Carl Ellison wrote: > Of course. This isn't the base case. We would have some keys which I sign > based on my own personal knowledge; things handed to me by people I know; > some possibly published in the paper where the real key owner would see the > claim and be able to contest it. You are making the same erroneous assumption that Phil made when he designed the Web of trust: You assume that it is important and interesting to link key ID's to physical bodies. This is usually not the case: Linking key ID's to home web pages etc is not only easier -- it is also usually more interesting and important. --------------------------------------------------------------------- | We have the right to defend ourselves | http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ and our property, because of the kind | of animals that we are. True law | James A. Donald derives from this right, not from the | arbitrary power of the state. | jamesd(a)echeque.com

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Re: The future will be easy to use
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 03:30 PM 11/28/95 EST, Carl Ellison <cme(a)TIS.COM> wrote: >BTW -- PGP currently lacks a way for me to note, when I sign a key, how it >is that I trust that key (by personal meeting, by attribution, by message >association, ...). A signed attribute record would let me record that >information for myself as well as for others. That would be a useful feature, even if it's just an unstructured text file. There is a way to do it now, though it's inefficient and hokey - create multiple key-signing keys, with name fields indicating the attribute, sign them with your main key, and use the appropriate one of them to sign keys for people. For instance, I have a key named "Bill Stewart Unauthenticated Pseudonym Signing Key <stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com>" which I use to sign keys of significantly lower trust than my normal key; you could do similar things for higher-quality certification. This does increase the depth of the web-of-trust required, which is less of a problem for low-trust keys than for keys you actually care about :-) #-- # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, Freelance Information Architect, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # Phone +1-510-247-0663 Pager/Voicemail 1-408-787-1281

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Code to brute-force PGP passphrase?
by Rich Graves 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I have an old, forgotten PGP key for which I would like to issue a revocation certificate (or maybe I stole somebody else's with an identical name; who could tell?). I can put the key on a Mac, PC, or UNIX machine (various flavors). I think I have a pretty good idea what the middle of the passphrase contains, so I'd guess there are only about 2,000 possibilities to be explored. Anybody have code for any platform for cracking this? Alternatively, I could just give you the key and wait for the answer. - -rich -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMLzGmI3DXUbM57SdAQE8NAP9EKVkxVzsTPHQ0NcJJgU4aor8BQbjN2a5 OqNAkpeNoZOcn5NcqGBMjI6mVQbgVjnzDOdoDWngGmWbtruFcFjE1IM8iK/wScah Caqo7SuKQqUMXB8mAC5pVYmdavJrOX4WPcl6nT2MkJTvnJe7YgiCMWIdm+4XCPZ/ YybyYhWf7XA= =W5H8 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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break microsoft!!!
by Vladimir Z. Nuri 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

re: the recent message that windows 95 has weak password encryption due to a 32 bit random seed sent to RC4-- this seems like another EXCELLENT opportunity for some major cypherpunks press coverage and feather-in-the-cap accolades. remember, the last break of the Netscape RC4 algorithm (or was it MD5?) got front page NYT coverage and reverberated throughout the entire media. a "cypherpunk" accomplishing the same thing for Microsoft would potentially get *major* notice. I imagine a short .exe file that when run on the proper computer prints out passwords as it cracks them. this would get the attention of a LOT of people. I have the MS C++ compiler, and if someone could discuss the difficulty of writing this proposed "exe" file, the rough time required to break the keys, and other considerations (physical access to server computer required?) and maybe point to code pieces on the net (RC4 etc.) to pull it off, I might start the effort myself.

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Response to ping re: CJR
by Raph Levien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I just got a message on my answering machine from Sam Capino. He said they are working on answer to my CJR. They had hoped to get it out by now, but were set back by "the furlough." I had called him about a week ago to check up on the status, but at the time only got his answering machine. Of course, the original 15 days have passed, but I'm perfectly willing to let that slide since I'm not completely sure that the CJR was submitted using exactly the right process. Just thought you'd like to know. Raph

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Question on modular exponents
by Usuario Acceso2 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi CP's: I'd be pleased if someone explained me this ASAP: How could I demonstrate that _ (g^a)^b (mod p) = g^{(a*b) mod q} mod p _ when g's order in Zp is q? The same question remains for adition. I have the feeling the demonstration must be similar. Best. Jaime

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Re: The future will be easy to use
by Jonathan Zamick 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 9:26 AM 11/28/95, Perry E. Metzger wrote: >Jonathan Zamick writes: >> I can't agree. The model of a successful enterprise includes feedback from >> different levels of participants. > >This isn't an enterprise. The government is not a participant except >by their own desire to interfere. > >> Regardless, the government will be taking a role in encryption. > >What makes you say that? Besides, why would that be desirable on any >level? > >The Government will try to set standards and we will ignore them until >they try to force them on us by law, period. This discussion was based on a group of people getting together to create a new easy to use package for handling keys and such. The government is going to try to take a dominant stance, and mandate elements of it. That has to be assumed. Those elements we don't agree with will be ignored or worked around (depending if its government opinion or government law.) However, it is possible, even in an antagonistic relationship, to develop positive feedback. I may be cracked, but I'd like to think that it would be an advantage to find some area where the government and the Cypherpunk members do agree, to minimize the conflict over the areas where we don't. Still, this is getting past the original topic, and gets more into the religious level of whether there can be any cooperation when the two sides are Government and Good/Widespread Encryption. My stance is that currently, no, but that doesn't preclude it in the future. Others don't see it happening at all, or don't see it worth the investment to achieve. That is perfectly valid. --- Returning to the original topic though, do we want to get a smaller list together to spec out some ideas for the project that was discussed? A simple, transparent, tool which would allow people to use strong encryption without having to think about it? I don't have much time to contribute right now, but I can at least put together the list, and some ideas. Jonathan ------------------------------------------------------------------------ ..Jonathan Zamick Consensus Development Corporation.. ..<JonathanZ(a)consensus.com> 1563 Solano Ave, #355.. .. Berkeley, CA 94707-2116.. .. o510/559-1500 f510/559-1505.. ..Mosaic/WWW Home Page: .. .. Consensus Home Page ..

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Re: Elliptic curves, patent status?
by James A. Donald 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 05:16 PM 11/28/95 -0400, Michael Smith wrote: > > I'm unclear about the patent status of elliptic curve > systems. Are they covered by the Diffie-Hellman patent? > That is, is the lnguage of this patent broad enough to > cover _all_ public-key systems, regardless of their > mathematical basis? No, but RSA will litigate you with the objective of inflicting extravagant legal costs regardless. --------------------------------------------------------------------- | We have the right to defend ourselves | http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ and our property, because of the kind | of animals that we are. True law | James A. Donald derives from this right, not from the | arbitrary power of the state. | jamesd(a)echeque.com

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