December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Wash Post coverage of NIST Key escrow-export
by pfarrell＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Today's washington post has some coverage (finally) of the encryption/key-escrow/FIPS standards issues. Headline is Feuding again erupts over encryption exports I typed in the text. url: http://www.isse.gmu.edu/~pfarrell/nist/post.html Pat Pat Farrell grad student http://www.isse.gmu.edu/students/pfarrell Infor. Systems and Software Engineering, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA PGP key available via finger or request #include standard.disclaimer

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Re: Linking = Showing = Transferring?
by shamrock＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- In article <v02130501ac7e53505548(a)[18.157.1.107]>, joseph(a)genome.wi.mit.edu (Joseph Sokol-Margolis) wrote: >Here's my question, and a thought to ponder: If it is/becomes illegal to >have links on a homepage to pornography because it is ruled as the same as >having the pornography there; then can you have links to pages with links >(the same as having it) to pornography? This repeats, so would it be legal >to links at all? The answer is trivial. If it pisses of the fascists in power enough, you go to jail or get killed. - -- - -- Lucky Green <mailto:shamrock@netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred. - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBMFjNIyoZzwIn1bdtAQFtXQGAkgf19PR9xYU91knoFXfYCR5NaPyWCcPz BfpmmPksdMUFCk73R4rMJIc+LruHQGb9 =2aYL -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: CYPHERPUNK considered harmful
by David C. Lambert 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Peter Trei <trei(a)process.com> wrote: > Terms like 'cypherpunk' and 'cryptoanarchy' tend to pigeonhole us as > nutcases for many people, and are a barrier to getting our ideas > across. I'm not saying this pigeonholing is correct - in fact I despise > people who judge a book by it's cover, but so many people DO make such > snap judgements that we need to take this into account when talking to > the general public. Two of the responses to the "An opportunity..." post unapologetically admitted that they refused to read the text of the message due to the presence of the word "cypherpunk" in the first sentence. Shows you what we're up against. BTW, I'm not for changing the name of the list, but I do see the logic in a more establishment-friendly name to use when lobbying the public. David C. Lambert dcl(a)panix.com (finger for PGP public key) -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMFneAqpplsfgM88VAQE+5wP9GZrIoComyFDeQ6brTLJwZ2oamry3IfC7 XhlqMlAZnC2b1w521nm085nZKtO9/Ru9Fw3BllPinG8nGcBggr9zkH4Ba+Zbezh0 FKK29d7wFGQz1d5JfyYCZhl4dTBdbpnU4jd5Rb27XtvP9livAeR/HIwNAJMccSCX qO/kxlVRRZg= =1Lxr -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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More on remailer chaining
by nobody＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I have one small addition to the analysis I did yesterday of remailer chaining effects. Previously I was assuming that there was a uniform distribution of messages across remailers, so that all saw the same number of packets. How does this change if some remailers are used more than others? Again I will sneak up on the problem by taking a concrete example. Suppose there are two remailers and that we are using two-remailer chains which include the possibility of using the same remailer twice. Suppose one of the remailers is used much more than the other. Take an extreme case, where remailer 1 is used 90% of the time and remailer 2 is used 10% of the time. If we suppose that these probabilities affect both the choice of the first and second remailer in the chain, then the four possible chains have the following frequencies of use: 1,1 81% 1,2 9% 2,1 9% 2,2 1% Notice that this also implies that 90% of the messages enter the net at remailer 1 and 10% at 2, and also that 90% leave via 1 and 10% leave via 2. Now, ignoring for a moment the fact that there may be some reason people are shunning 2 (they suspect it is compromised, or it is unreliable, or something - but maybe it's just new and a lot of people haven't heard about it yet), what is the safest way to use this network? The key, I believe, is to imitate the observed statistics in your own choice of a chain, at least for the 2nd hop. 90% of the messages coming out of the first stage of either remailer will go to remailer 1. If you want your message to be lost most effectively among the others, you should choose remailer 1 as your own 2nd hop 90% of the time. This way your message will be 9 times more likely to go to 1 than 2, but since there is 9 times the traffic going to 1 than to 2 it will be perfectly masked. The result will be that your message is equally likely to be any of the N messages coming out of the remailer. Your statistics will match all of the others. Therefore, you get a full factor of N mixing with such an unbalanced network, just as much as you get with a perfectly symmetrical network - as long as you imitate the network statistics. The choice of the first remailer in your chain does not appear to be critical. We assume the opponent can see which remailer you have chosen (by tracking your message from your site to the remailer) so there is no advantage to choosing 1 over 2 as far as secrecy. You will get full N-fold mixing in either case. This is a bit counter-intuitive; it might seem that choosing 1 is superior to choosing 2 in terms of mixing. But look at a specific example: Suppose 100 messages enter the network, 90 at 1 and 10 at 2. After the first step, 9 messages go from 1 to 2 (10% of the 90) and 9 messages go from 2 to 1 (90% of the 10). Then 90 messages are sent from 1 and 10 from 2. Now, if your message entered at 2, but had a 90% probability of going to 1 at the second hop, then there is a 90% chance that it ended up as one of the 90 messages leaving 1, and a 10% chance that it ended up as one of the 10 messages leaving 2. This tells observers exactly nothing about where your message is. So choosing 2 as the first hop is just as good as choosing 1. Although I have not yet extended these results to longer hops and larger numbers of remailers, my guess is that the same general rule will apply there as well. This suggests that it will be useful and important to have accurate information about the usage levels of the various remailers so that you can accurately mimic those probabilities. How bad is it if you don't have accurate usage information? According to my calculations, in the case of two remailers, if the actual probabilities of the two remailers being used are p and 1-p, and the probabilities you use are q and 1-q, the mixing level you get decreases from N to N * (p/q)^q * ((1-p)/(1-q))^(1-q). If q=p and you have accurate information there is no reduction. In the example above, with p=.9, if you didn't know this and used q=.5, your mixing level reduces to N*.6. This is not a huge reduction even for this rather extreme case, but I can't guess how this will extend to larger networks and chains. Assuming these results do hold true, though, it suggests some interesting "market" dynamics. Patterns of usage of the remailers may tend to be stable since anyone who departs from the current usage pattern will stand out and hence lose security. It may be difficult for new remailers to become established since their initial usage level will be low, making it risky to use them to any significant degree. These considerations are somewhat similar to situations where there are competing but incompatible standards (e.g. Beta vs VHS VCR's) in terms of the barriers to entry. There may also be considerable misinformation about usage levels. It will be to the advantage of a site to exaggerate the number of messages they are handling. Especially if noise messages are used (a strategy I haven't tried to analyze yet) it would be easy to generate bogus statistics. Maybe some organization could collect statistics by polling remailer users about their practices rather than believing the operators, and make that information available. Another point is that, assuming that remailer operation is actually going to be profitable some day, there will be advantages to being one of the first to market. Getting your remailer widely known and used in the early days could establish market leadership which will have considerable staying power just from the inherent properties of how these networks work. Heavily-used remailers could charge premium prices while the "little guys" have to be cut rate in order to grow, compensating users for the loss of security they will experience. Maybe this will encourage people to make the investment to become what Tim May has called "Mom and Pop" remailers. This might be the golden opportunity to get in on the ground floor. For more information, send $10 in digital cash for our investment kit: "How you can make a fortune running anonymous remailers!" Please include an anonymous return address. :-) Hal -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 3.14159 iQCVAgUBLkghT6gTA69YIUw3AQFaJgP/e7RRWrEowQDQ9RdN+w9wC5zQ3Zod2w5n oeZLFlMJFzEjer2gxjh0yt+a0CPJA1p33W1BvxNODI2nmPHiFeVcD24L9oNzoyf9 QBrUMAJiuR09QQCPz8MjBwXdIXD1hU25hMiCN/drrJuRCgsFpp1wPlmWU2EnHK4g uoiDsWb4Wg4= =l7nS -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: CYPHERPUNK considered harmful
by aba＠atlas.ex.ac.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Dimitri Vulis <dlv(a)bwalk.dm.com> writes: > Anything posted to the main cypherpunks mailing list and the > spun-off mailing lists (steganogrpahy, remailers, nym servers, etc) > could be posted to the newsgroup by maiking one of the mail2news > gateways a subscriber. Not sure that would be a good idea, then the news group would *be* cypherpunks, and the cypherpunks list would have effectively become a USENET newsgroup (albiet with some mail2news stuff behind). For me part of the fun of cypherpunks is that things get discussed here which don't get discussed anywhere else, things happen here 1st, rc4 leak, that kind of thing, if it's happening crypto wise, it's on cypherpunks. You might lose some of the community feel to it if it was gated straight to a USENET group, I mean at that point the majordomo list server would have become a news2mail gateway. I was thinking more that you would have a separate newsgroup, but perhaps my feelings are more of the elitist stuff Peter was referring to, still I see no need to change a good thing, can't the two co-exist separately, Peter's stated aims didn't co-incide with my perception of the cypherpunks lists goals. ie the list (modulo cpunks write code wars) seems to me to be about people who share the common goal of free crypto for everyone, discussing how to go about this, writing code to help it happen, and analysis of what the government is up to where it infringes on cypherpunk goals. I think Peter's goals sounded more amenable to a forum which was a) easily accessible, and b) had a stated aim of a kind of cypherpunk technology transfer forum. Perhaps I am being eliteist, so shoot me, but I like cypherpunks the list the way it is! For your convenience reading cpunks there are a couple of solutions to the deluge of mail problem: there used to be a nntp server at nntp.hks.net which nntp served cypherpunks as a newsgroup (I haven't used this in a while as it appeared to be down or empty or somthing for a while), there are filters which you can set up to put all cpunks traffic in a separate mbox, and there are a couple of digest forms of cpunks around also. The filter won't help your down load time, the digest (I think Hal offers / was offering an encrypted digest which would also be compressed) and the nntp server might. > > Reckon cypherpunks as a group has enough readers to hmm, push through > > a vote for group creation, if the majority thought it was a useful > > exercise. A group soley for what? cypherpunks technology, social > > No vote is needed to create an alt.group: something like > 'alt.security.cypherpunks' or 'alt.privacy.cypherpunks'. Just post a proposal > to alt.config, post many articles seconding the proposal, let it be discussed > for a week, then issue a newgroup. Me, I quite like the cypherpunk name, I reckon it would be best from a distribution pov to get a big8 group, as you discuss. > To create a newsgroup in the 'big 8' (comp., sci., etc) one needs to > deal with unpleasant control freaks like group-advice, news.groups, > and David Lawrence. It takes up to 6 months. On the other hand, > many sites that have Usenet have comp.* but not alt.*. Their users > would still have to use the mailing lists or find another site. To > create something like comp.security.cypherpunks (I think this would > be the most appropriate place, since there's already c.s.announce, > c.s.misc, and c.s.firewalls), talk to the group-advice cabal. I'll let other people argue about newsgroups names. Adam

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Re: CYPHERPUNK considered harmful.
by Peter Trei 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Tim writes: >Indeed, some people here have been calling themselves by various names >("CypherGeek," "Crypto Rebel," etc.) for a long time. Personally, I despise >the terms "geek," "dweeb," and "nerd," and think anyone who calls themselves >by these insults is not "reclaiming and deconstructing the labels of the >oppressor class," as the slogan goes, but is merely insulting themselves. >Blacks who call themselves "niggers," homosexuals who call themselves >"queers," and computer programmers who call themselves "geeks" and "dorks" >are all playing the same game. I fail to see how you can write this, and then claim it's OK to call yourself a 'punk'. >A better approach is for the "conservatives" who want a "more conservative" >name to simply do what I suggested: form a new group and name it what they >like. They wouldn't have to quit this list, they would just be able to >cleanly recruit for their new list. >Seems simple to me. And honest. And less devisive than trying to change the >name of a group with a long history (by modern standards) and with several >well-known achievements. Who is trying to be dishonest, and what are they trying to be dishonest about? I'm really confused by this. Tim, I don't want to take your toy away, or minimize the acheivements of the cypherpunks (among whom I somewhat presumptively include myself). OK. Let's NOT drop the term 'cypherpunk'. However, I do think we need to have available another term for 'people with our interests' if we're going to have maximal effectiveness. What follows is my original followup, written last night. - --------------------------------------------------------------- I've gotten a number of responses to my post 'Cypherpunk considered harmful." It's pretty clear that a lot of people did not really understand what I was getting at. This is my fault. I'll try to clarify. What is the situation on the ground, here in mid September 1995? It's utterly clear that the US and other governments, are dead set against the widespread use of strong, unencumbered crypto. 'They' are using many different (and weak) pretexts to delay or prevent it's incorporation into commercial software. If there is a hidden state agenda, 'our' belief is it is that the state wishes to retain it's current ability to spy unseen on the citizenry, wiretapping with or without warrents, and examine stored information without the cooperation of the owner. The general 'cypherpunk viewpoint', if I may generalize, is diametrically opposite: It's not really a hidden agenda, since frequent rants make it pretty clear. Since we're not a unified command and control system like the state, different cypherpunks have different goals, but I hazard that most would agree with: 'Strong, uencumbered cryptography is an empowerment tool for the electronic age; it strengthens the individual in relation to the state, allowing him (or her) to communicate privately, and store his data as securely as if it resided in his own head. The widespread use of strong cryptography will lead to social changes that we regard as desirable.' If you accept this arguably paranoid vision of our situation, then it's clear that we are in a battle for the hearts and minds of the people: The State wants to convince people that their safety and prosperity lies in trusting Big Brother to watch over and take care of them, and nothing but danger lies outside of BB's line of sight. The cypherpunks take a much more libertarian viewpoint; that the state is already too strong and intrusive, and that cryptography will not only allow us to engage in commerce and protect ourselves against crime, it will also allow us to act outside of improper state control. But time is running out. All the state has to do is convince people that strong unescrowed encryption is needed only by criminals - if you trust the state, there is no reason to object to it being able to listen in - after all, all laws are reasonable, and the state won't listen in without a warrant. 'We' have a harder task. We need to convince people that they need encryption - it will protect us against criminals, snoops, and hackers, and the state's proposals will not do this. It's a much more subtle thesis, without the easy emotional hooks that can be exploited by the state to promote it's position. I don't think we can turn people into libertarians, and then get them to adopt cryptography to protect themselves from the statists. At least, not enough people to count in the short term, and the short term is where we need to focus at the moment. I *do* think we can persuade people that they need cryptography to protect themselves against criminals, and that the governments proposed standards for key length limits and key escrow will make the crypto so weak and insecure that it will cause more crime than it will prevent. That's a critical point - that the individual can, without difficulty, use cryptography to protect him or herself against criminals more effectively than he could by relying on the state. The memes we want to propagate are 1. "I need strong unescrowed cryptography to protect myself against criminals." If we can convince a large portion of the population of this (and we have truth on our side), we'll be well on our way. 2. "The government's initiatives on encryption, while they may be well-intentioned, are worse than useless, and will endanger me and my loved ones." If we can get this through the public's collective head as well, we'll have won the battle. This goal is where the 'cypherpunk considered harmful' title comes from. I want to propagate these ideas. If I go up to an average person and tell them "The State is working to ensure that it can spy on your every communication, and can't be trusted to follow it's own rules for doing so. Use cryptography to help promote cryptoanarchy!", he will usually dismiss me as a nutcase. If I say "Criminals and hackers can tap your internet communications, defraud your cell phone account, eavesdrop on your calls, impersonate you, steal your credit card numbers, and spy on your business secrets. I can tell you how you can easily prevent this", then he is interested, and wants to know more. Terms like 'cypherpunk' and 'cryptoanarchy' tend to pigeonhole us as nutcases for many people, and are a barrier to getting our ideas across. I'm not saying this pigeonholing is correct - in fact I despise people who judge a book by it's cover, but so many people DO make such snap judgements that we need to take this into account when talking to the general public. For those who have responded, *I* do not have a problem with the term cypherpunk. However, I know that there are many people who do, people we want on our side. I propose that in communicating with the cryptographic laity, we should be emphasizing the anti-crime aspects of crypto, as well as it's enabling impact on commerce and the American software industry. We'll get a lot more converts with this approach than we would by emphasizing the political aspects of cypherpunk, no matter how important we think they are. Think about it. Which future would you rather see: 1. Lots of people demanding strong unescrowed crypto for what you consider rather peripheral and politically unaware reasons, which you have educated them in. 2. Unescrowed crypto banned, with those who promote considered aiders and abeters of the four horsemen, (but boy are they ideologically pure!). Peter Trei I probably won't see any responses till Monday. I'm going for a weekend at a resort on Lake Winnipesaukee. If you need me, I'll be in the hot tub. :-) -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMFmmK1QxhKXe9s8VAQE+tgP+NcKdGvBeJpa8AHGr/RhKCHudZP2qmRNP J699UCCvN006ywIjurjuis48VPj26uxBkcRbeuzNxGlKmZqXIkS0vEcFjrrZhBsK V9dLFFGTZ6JG3nK++mleW1wQB/F0azXXvXKJWa6R+Tnj1oo2ADUxGNQMs9IVmgR3 zsyK3fej+IQ= =YqDH -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Peter Trei Senior Software Engineer Purveyor Development Team Process Software Corporation http://www.process.com trei(a)process.com

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More on ECheques
by John Hemming CEO MarketNet 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

1. I was not suggesting that you put your real bank account number in the program. A test number is perfectly adequate. 2. In the UK people advertise their Bank Account numbers so that people can pay them. 3. If you do use your real bank account number, I will not pay you anything nonetheless.

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(Noise) X-Files anarchist
by dsc＠swcp.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I hardly watch TV ...blah, blah..., but I saw X-files last night. A very minor character was a cryptohacker who--to his surprise--brute-forced a military key for some files. He was described as an anarchist. To _my_ surprise, this anarchist was not associated with violence or lunatic ravings. He was shown as reading a book entitled something like Survey of Modern Conspiracy Theories. I see this as an improvement in the stereotype of computer-associated anarchists. And this I see as a good thing, since I think there is a lot that could be learned from anarchists. I think the character was killed, but I may have missed something. Dar =========================================================== Dar Scott Home phone: +1 505 299 9497 Dar Scott Consulting Voice: +1 505 299 5790 8637 Horacio Place NE Email: darscott(a)aol.com Albuquerque, NM 87111 dsc(a)swcp.com Fax: +1 505 898 6525 http://www.swcp.com/~correspo/DSC/DarScott.html ===========================================================

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[Howard Winter: PGP 2.6 available on magazine cover]
by nobody＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-------- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- An interesting comentary on the effectiveness of ITAR... Zeke - ------- Forwarded Message Newsgroups: alt.security.pgp,connect.audit From: hdrw(a)ibmpcug.co.uk (Howard Winter) Subject: PGP 2.6 available on magazine cover X-Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone and may not represent the views of the IBM PC User Group. Date: Sun, 21 Aug 1994 23:22:23 GMT Message-ID: <CuwrLD.M6v(a)ibmpcug.co.uk> In case anyone's interested, the magazine PC Answers (issue 7, Sept 94) here in England has a copy of PGP 2.6 on a cover disk, along with the Windows front end: PGP WinFront from Ross Barclay. This appears to be the 'plain' version, no suffix. If it wasn't supposed to be exported from the USA, it's leaked in a big way! According to the RSA and MIT licences included, it's available for any non-commercial use. Looks like I'll start using PGP in earnest. Has anyone any advice on how to get my public key 'trusted', since I don't know anyone else who already has a trusted key? Similarly, how do I know when to trust keys I receive, given that I have no keys yet that I 'trust'? Cheers, - -- Howard Winter hdrw(a)ibmpcug.Co.UK CIS: 100111,1420 0W21' 51N43' - ------- End of Forwarded Message -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLlrM2xVg/9j67wWxAQGA9AP/fEruPVpNMdjP0SV54o7uD5YqJXplXsjE JZpCBQ/2EJn3ZQfvf0Ow3aSfSX1QyoDKCIeKj6Tj55pz96wFOUXa4REByNLimN/V Ob7MIql9fGcM8vC2iG0PZhtbii8iNr+Wk9QBSIMx26EDUrqR36gz/e5nqrf3tlxw 9FRwNj7PgSw= =EKt9 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Explaining Zero Knowledge to your children
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 3:10 AM 9/15/95, hallam(a)w3.org wrote: >The cave analogy sucks. > >The way I tried to explain Zero Knowledge is this: > > >Imagine that you have a duplicator device which you want to sell, you don't >want to explain why it works to the buyer however since then they would >just make their own (patents have been abolished by this time). You also don't >want the buyer to be able to prove to anyone else that you have a duplicator. > >So what you do is you play the "what hand is it in game" and you do this >with a >10$ bill provided by the buyer and who records its serial number. You hold the >original article in one hand and the duplicate in the other. The buyer choses >one hand, you show the article in that hand. The buyer knows you had a 50:50 >chance of a lucky guess so you do it again, each time the probability of >getting >it right by a lucky guess halves. After 10 tries or so it is virtually certain >that you were not faking. > > >Any better ideas... Clever, but I think it's missing an important element of zero knowledge interactive proof systems. For example, why not simply open _both_ hands? By opening both hands one shows immediately that one has a duplicator, but does not show how the duplicator works. The same results are obtained with perfect certainty in _one_ round that the ZKIPS approach takes N rounds (as N gets large). Granted, this fails the " don't want the buyer to be able to prove to anyone else that you have a duplicator" test, but I don't think that is central to ZKIPS. I think a more important test is "don't show others how to make matter duplicators." Matter duplicators are "self-demonstrating" without revealing how they work, so they don't fit the model of (or create a need for) software-based ZKIPS. For example, in the Hamiltonian cycle example, the Prover demonstrates to the Skeptic either the set of nodes, with the nodes labelled, or a Hamiltonian cycle, with the nodes unlabelled. If he shows _both_ the set of nodes _and_ a Hamiltonian cycle, then he's given the Skeptic the whole shebang. In Phill's example, he's just taught the Skeptic "how to make a matter duplicator." But I applaud the creation of new and simpler examples, and maybe I'm wrong and Phill's example captures the essence of zero knowledge interactive proofs. I'll think about it some more. Comments? --Tim May ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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