December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: coding and nnet's
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 02:17 PM 11/10/95 -0500, Atp3000(a)aol.com wrote: >I just resently got interested in coding and cryptography, and I was >wondering if you could suggest 3 or 4 papers that adresses the aplication of >neural networks in cryptography. Schneier's 2nd edition says "Neural nets aren't terribly useful for cryptography, primarily because of the shape of the solution space. Neural nets work best for problems that have a continuity of solutions, some better than others. This allows a neural net to learn, proposing better and better solutions as it does. Breaking an algorithm provides for very little in the way of learning opportunities: You either recover the key or you don't. (At least this is true if the algorithm is any good.) Neural nets work well in structured environments when there is something to learn, but not in the high-entropy, seemingly random world of cryptography." And he doesn't give any references. That's been my opinion of the issue as well; I looked into it a bit when I was doing a project with the neural net folks back at Bell Labs, partly because neural net chips typically have lots and lots of parallel bit-sized horsepower. Unfortunately, the horsepower isn't arranged in ways that are very useful for crypto; adding together a large bunch of short chunks of data (maybe using floating point addition) and thresholding the sum isn't the right thing to do with highly discontinuous functions. You could take a similar chip design and connect the pieces together differently to make a brute-force searcher, i.e. take a gate array and wire it to do crypto-like calculations, but the neural net stuff doesn't do that very efficiently. #-- # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, Freelance Information Architect, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # Phone +1-510-247-0663 Pager/Voicemail 1-408-787-1281

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Re: Lotus Notes RSA Implementation Question
by eli＠GS160.SP.CS.CMU.EDU 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In article <+cmu.andrew.internet.cypherpunks+kkcsTXG00UfAE0ynIq(a)andrew.cmu.edu> Charlie Kaufman writes: >Notes V3 (the one currently deployed) uses 512 bit RSA keys in both >the USA and exportable versions. 512-bit RSA is exportable? I'm surprised. It would be interesting to CJR a known-secure binary for 512-bit RSA, attempting a little differential cryptanalysis on the NSA's practices. A fair test would require that you have the political clout of Lotus/IBM, though. -- Eli Brandt eli+(a)cs.cmu.edu

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Re: Photuris Primality verification needed
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 07:47 PM 11/8/95 -0800, you wrote: >>Including the provision for the 512 bit prime is *HARMFUL* and >>*DANGEROUS*. Export control is not really an issue here, because if >>companies in the United States cannot provide secure networking, >>there are other companies in the world that can. > >You've convinced me. I remove my proposal to include a recommended 512-bit >modulus. The smallest standard modulus will remain 1024-bits. If speed is really a concern, you could do a 640 or 768 bit modulus ("Hey, back when we wrote that, everybody assumed 640 would be enough for everybody!"), or alternatively, let people use 512-bit private modulus values - they're still short, but they're not a target if everybody's got their own (which also means that popular applications shouldn't ship with a built-in 512-bit prime; if Windows 97 did that, it'd be about the same as putting it in the spec, so really short primes should probably require user-generation, which may contradict the desire to use short numbers to save time.) One question is how to conveniently let the standard offer negotiation for the modulus length and value without adding a lot of handshake steps -> WILL MODLENGTH 512PRIV 768 1024 1024ALT 2048 <- DO MODLENGTH 512PRIV -> WILL MODULUS 8758432798573409875098347509834750983745098348584395984357908347509843750984 3750983 <- 404 HEY, THAT'S NOT A STRONG PRIME! #-- # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, Freelance Information Architect, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # Phone +1-510-247-0663 Pager/Voicemail 1-408-787-1281

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Re: "Industry Group Rebuffs U.S. on Encryption"
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 1:14 AM 11/9/95, Bill Stewart wrote: <deletia> | The fact that Netscape is including | secure email in their Navigator next release can be a big lever pushing the | Feds toward giving up, and perhaps deserves some publicity once the | release version is out the door. Giving up on what? On doing everything within its power to keep the world beyond itself strong-cypto-free? Not likely. In only a few decades, crypto's gone from being unheard of to the object of an increasingly high-profile PR war over "domestic and international terrorists and criminals." The govt's position, however, hasn't changed substantially: it doesn't like crypto, and it never will. There will never be a time when the cops who pull you over or drop by for a visit will say, "Ma'am, if you've encrypted that, we respect the fact that you don't want anyone to see that--so we'll just be going bow. You have a nice day, now, y'hear." And there will never be no cops. The gov't may well lose this fight eventually, but a few heads are gonna get broken before either side wins. This fight is playing itself out on the level of policy now, but it's much bigger than a policy issue. And the "revolution" of Newt and his legions of weenies (I say nothing of Clinton and his legions of weenies) is bullshit: he's an empty opportunist who's riding a fractious coalition that'll make Clinton look like a libertarian if it ever gets control of the country. And right now he's cluing in to the fact that he can score some points on encryption issues: he's got his eye on the snowballing WiReD coalition, which *no one* knew existed until a few years ago.

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Online ITAR and AECA; Bibliography of export control books
by John Gilmore 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> > Where can one get a copy of ITAR ? Secondly , has anyone written any > > books on the subject and if so who and what? The ITAR is a regulation, not a law. You can find it via my crypto export control page at http://www.cygnus.com/~gnu/export.html under "State Department export guidance". Or at ftp://ftp.cygnus.com/pub/export/itar.in.full. It's 380 kbytes (but ignorance of it is no excuse!). That regulation is authorized by the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), a law (22 USC Sec. 2778). The law is also available in the same places. It's only 40 Kbytes. I own and can recommend several books on export controls. Layman's books on general export controls and technology policy issues: 90-26801: Finding common ground : U.S. export controls in a changed global environment / Washington, D.C. : National Academy Press, 1991. xviii, 390 p. : ill. ; 24 cm. LC CALL NUMBER: HF1414.5 .F56 1991 87-34877: Technology transfer : a policy model / Philip A. Roberts. Washington, DC : National Defense University Press, 1988. xiii, 86 p. ; 21 cm. LC CALL NUMBER: HC110.T4 R62 1988 SERIES TITLE: A National security essay DEWEY DEC: 338.973/06 dc19 93-50697: Silencing science : national security controls and scientific communication / Harold C. Relyea. Norwood, NJ : Ablex Pub., c1994. xvii, 248 p. ; 23 cm. LC CALL NUMBER: Q223 .R45 1994. SERIES TITLE: Information management, policy, and services. DEWEY DEC: 338.97306 dc20. ISBN: 156750096X; 1567500978 (pbk.) Lawyer's Tome on export controls, with detailed case citations and such: 91-37498: Root, William A. United States export controls / 3rd ed. Englewood Cliffs, NJ : Prentice Hall Law & Business, c1991- 1 v. (loose-leaf) : ill. ; 26 cm. ISBN: 0139529381 LC CALL NUMBER: KF1987 .L54 1990. DEWEY DEC: 353.0082/76 dc20 [This one is loose-leaf and gets annual updates at $80/year. I forget how much it cost originally.] By the way, if you're trying to find general references on export controls or crypto, or anything else, I recommend `telnet://locis.loc.gov' and searching the Library of Congress card catalog or the copyright records. The user interface is IBM mainframe oriented, but the information is without peer. John Gilmore

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Re: coding and nnet's
by frantz＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 14:17 11/10/95 -0500, Atp3000(a)aol.com wrote: >I just resently got interested in coding and cryptography, and I was >wondering if you could suggest 3 or 4 papers that adresses the aplication of >neural networks in cryptography. Perhaps neural nets could be used in an unknown plain text, brute force attack to automatically select possible decryptions for human examination. I don't know of any papers on the subject. Bill ----------------------------------------------------------------- Bill Frantz Periwinkle -- Computer Consulting (408)356-8506 16345 Englewood Ave. frantz(a)netcom.com Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA

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Re: coding and nnet's
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Bruce Schneier comments: Neural Networks Neural nets aren't terribly useful for cryptanalysis, primarily because of the shape of the solution space. Neural nets work best with problems that have a continuity of solutions, some better than others. This allows a neural net to learn, proposing better and better solutions as it does. Breaking an algorithm provides for very little in the way of learning opportunities: You either recover the key or you don't. (At least this is true if the algorithm is any good.) Neural nets work well in structured environments where there is something to learn, but not in the high-entropy, seemingly random world of cryptography. "Applied Cryptography," second edition, 1996, p. 155.

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Re: Exporting software doesn't mean exporting (was: Re: lp ?)
by anonymous-remailer＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Fri, 10 Nov 1995, Peter D. Junger wrote: > In any case, I want to thank him for doing so, because it brought home > to me the important fact that it is possible that the ITAR provisions > relating to cryptographic software could be struck down, not because > they violate the first amendment, or would violate it if passed by > congress, and not because the court is trying to dodge the difficult > first amendment issue, but simply because the provisions are not > authorized by any legislation. Hmmm, Peter actually has me worried. I actually _understood_ what he was talking about. And that has me worried. I guess that reviewing all that LIBOR financing documentation over ten years ago, when I was extending a helping hand to the CIBC helped. No one should ever attempt to figure out what happens when you have an American highrise owned by a private Canadian citizen, go into receivership with a syndicated Euro-financing while attempting a head lease to AT&T. An experience like that leaves you scarred for life. You actually learn to grok "lawyer speak". I guess that an interesting follow up occurs, if I perhaps muddy the chrystal clear waters of Peter's analysis. It relates to another thread on this list, the thread on time-release crypto and the economics of information. A hypothetical which might clarify by making things murky. If I ... as a foreign citizen ... a Canadian ... were to release an algorithm for time-release crypto to another Canadian ... another foreigner, could I actually be hauled down by the scruff of my neck to face US style "justice". Could I be deprived of our Canadian traditions of Napoleonic Code and of British Common Law, to face Americanism's. Does anyone from State have any clarification of this policy-shift?? I find it ridiculous to hear that if I load a series of messages into a fax machine, and instruct that machine to send out a series of documents at some set point in time -- and that if I were to *communicate* this method of time delay cryptographically secure communication to another Canadian citizen, that I could actually be hauled out of my own country and dragged across an international border to face charges of treason against a state to which I have no allegiance. This would be laughable, if it weren't so sinister. I mean, it's only a FAX machine ... for goodness sake's. Here I am as a Canadian citizen, a citizen of a sovereign State, a state which has historically been a friend of the American people. A State which has actually sacrificed its own international stature and the security of its citizens, to benefit Americans. (Most notably, when Canada rescued the hostages in Iran) and America repays the citizens of Ambassador Ken Taylor's home town how?? With an implied threat of making them subject to US law because its administratively convenient? Indeed. Can't anyone find acts of treason, a little closer to home?? Domestically maybe ... possibly even right under your nose ... > It's too far off topic to pursue any further, but I must take > exception to the suggestion that we are well served by separation of > powers intruding into other legal domains. Bowsher tells us that > causation principles go out the window in SOP cases. That alone > makes it radioactive. You ain't whistling Dixie. > I must admit that I don't know what it is that he is refering to. Alice de 'nonymous ... ...just another one of those... P.S. This post is in the public domain. C. S. U. M. O. C. L. U. N. E.

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Re: [NOISE] DejaNews all over again--a URL for Usenet Searching
by Peter Trei 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> I usually avoid passing on URLs of interesting sites, in the name of > conserving bandwidth (*), but this one really has me jazzed: > http://dejanews.com/ > It allows searching of Usenet archives (a few months' worth, from what I > can see). Unfortunately, it does not archive alt, soc, talk, or *.binaries (the latter is probably a blessing). Specialized news grepping is still useful - see http://www.iii.net/users/trei/usenet.html for an example. Peter Trei Senior Software Engineer Purveyor Development Team Process Software Corporation http://www.process.com trei(a)process.com

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Re: Yvette
by carolann＠censored.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Just another Detweiler Tentacle...... Love Always, Carol Anne Tentaclefinder >> I'm wondering if Yvette from Smithfield, Va is as fine as most people say she >> is... -- Member Internet Society - Certified BETSI Programmer - Webmistress *********************************************************************** Carol Anne Braddock (cab8) carolann(a)censored.org 206.42.112.96 My Homepage The Cyberdoc *********************************************************************** ------------------ PGP.ZIP Part [017/713] ------------------- M8H,),S$8G>&.WP(8IRA`-M['+`Q%&_C"">5-F%LX@<_Q$;*P'',Q$Z/AA[8M MF=O0H+*%(-S%&>S%+FS&<LS%3(Q&#W1"<]2%`H^;,]^1C$'HBN8PX$4SYAU^ MPGD<Q0ZLA0D+,`MCT!LA**4M[-JPAK9F?40!AJ,CW"'%DR#:'9?Q)3[%<DQ` ------------------------------------------------------------- for next chunk to export --> http://dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/export/

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