December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Mixmaster On A $20 Floppy?
by tallpaul＠pipeline.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Jan 10, 1996 03:00:00, 'Bill Stewart <stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com>' wrote: >At 08:55 PM 1/5/96 -0500, tallpaul(a)pipeline.com (tallpaul) wrote: >>I've reports that the latest version of SyQuest's external parallel port >>EZ135 "floppy" drive is due on the shelves this month. > >Iomega's ZIP drives are similarly priced, hold 100 MB, and >come in parallel and SCSI flavors. > Quite right. In many ways the SyQuest and Iomega products are identical. However, I'm shooting for the SyQuest because of the advertised 12.5 msec access time. In any case, the tech is there and it is portable so we can expect to see a variety of similar products in the future. >>Question 1: Can you fit linux, pgp, mixmaster, etc. on the 135 Mb disk and >>have enough useful space left over for a useful amount of data? > >As various people have said, you can do it on a couple of floppies. >Is Mixmaster designed in a way that could easily accommodate having >Mixmasters pop in and out of existence, either well-known ones that travel, >or (with some enhancement) temporaries that pop up and squawk their >existence to some sort of web site or mailing list? What would it >take to add this capability? > I can't answer these questions which is why I started this thread to get answers from those who have the knowledge required to make meaningful answers. The major problem today stopping the proliferation of "temporary" sites seems to be the user interface. Ultimately, we would want something that was very easy to use and had incredibly simple user manuals (like the Army's Training Manuals for really dumb soldiers). You know, the ones that start: "This is a bullet. It has a pointy end and a flat end. The pointy end is the end you want to face the enemy. The flat end is the end you want to face you." >>Question 3: Anyone want to speculate on what data recovery is like when >>encrypted data and the horse it rode in (and out) on has all been >>physically destroyed at a replacement cost of only $US20? > >Old 5 1/4" floppies make a very secure satisfying sound when you >take the magnetic material out and drop it into a shredder :-) >The 20 MB Bernoulli Box floppies were also shreddable. > Yeah, and imagine the noise an anti-privacy technician makes when he/she/it is told to try to extract plaintext from the shredded results. >#-- ># Thanks; Bill ># Bill Stewart, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com, Pager/Voicemail 1-408-787-1281 ># ># "The price of liberty is eternal vigilance" used to mean us watching ># the government, not the other way around.... > > -- -- tallpaul -- Any political analysis that fits on a bumper sticker is wrong.

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Reports available via CTRS
by David J. Bianco 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

[Abstracts for, and (in most cases) links to these report titles can be found at the CTRS site, http://www.itribe.net/CTRS/ ] 1.Tuomas Aura, Modelling the Needham-Schroeder authentication protocol with high level Petri nets, Technical Report B14, Espoo, Finland, September 1995. 2.Arnold G. Reinhold, Diceware for Passphrase Generation and Other Cryptographic Applications, Cambridge, MA, July 28, 1995. 3.Arnold G. Reinhold, A Diceware Word List, Cambridge, MA, July 28, 1995. 4.Arnold G. Reinhold, Results of a Survey on PGP Pass Phrase Usage, Cambridge, MA, July 28, 1995. 5.Arnold G. Reinhold, "Common Sense and Cryptography" , Internet Secrets, John Levine and Carol Baroudi (Ed.), Foster City, CA, 1995, pp. 115-150. 6.Arnold G. Reinhold, On the Function of MHC-Antigen Specificity, Cambridge, MA, March 3, 1989. 7.VeriSign, Inc., FAQ: Answers About Today's Digital IDs, July 15, 1995. 8.Roos, Andrew, A Class of Weak Keys in the RC4 Stream Cipher (Preliminary Draft), Westville, South Africa, September 1995. 9.Terry Ritter, Substitution Cipher with Pseudo-Random Shuffling: The Dynamic Substitution Combiner., Cryptologia, vol. 14, no. 4, 1990, pp. 289-303. 10.Terry Ritter, Transposition Cipher with Pseudo-Random Shuffling: The Dynamic Transposition Combiner., Cryptologia, vol. 15, no. 1, 1991, pp. 1-17. 11.Terry Ritter, The Efficient Generation of Cryptographic Confusion Sequences., Cryptologia, vol. 15, no. 2, 1991, pp. 81-139. 12.Terry Ritter, Voice and Video Cryptography in a DSP Environment., Proceedings of the Second Annual Texas Instruments TMS320 Educators Conference, Houston, Texas, August 5-7, 1992. 13.Terry Ritter, Estimating Population from Repetitions in Accumulated Random Samples., Cryptologia, vol. 18, no. 2, 1994, pp. 155-190. 14.Camenisch, Jan; Piveteau, Jean-Marc; Stadler, Markus, An Efficient Fair Payment System, India, Mai 1996. 15.Camenisch, Jan; Piveteau, Jean-Marc; Stadler, Markus, An Efficient Electronic Payment System Protecting Privacy, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 875, pp. 207-215, Berlin, November 1994. 16.Camenisch, Jan; Piveteau, Jean-Marc; Stadler, Markus, Blind Signatures Based on the Discrete Logarithm Problem, Proceedings of EUROCRYPT 94,Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 9505, pp. 428-432, Berlin, May 1994. 17.Stadler, Markus; Piveteau, Jean-Marc; Camenisch, Jan, Fair Blind Signatures , Proceedings of EUROCRYPT 95,Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 921, pp. 209-219, Berlin, May 1995. 18.Kocher, Paul C., Cryptanalysis of Diffie-Hellman, RSA, DSS, and Other Systems Using Timing Attacks, Stanford, California, December 1995. 19.Schoenmakers, Berry, An Efficient Electronic Payment System Withstanding Parallel Attacks, CS-R9522, Amsterdam, Netherlands, March, 1995. =========================================================================== David J. Bianco | Web Wonders, Online Oddities, Cool Stuff iTribe, Inc. | Phone: (804) 446-9060 Fax: (804) 446-9061 Suite 1700, World Trade Center | email: <bianco(a)itribe.net> Norfolk, VA 23510 | URL : http://www.itribe.net/~bianco/

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SSN collection prank
by Vladimir Z. Nuri 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I haven't seen this here. somewhat amusing. ------- Forwarded Message Date: Sun, 7 Jan 1996 19:49:14 -0500 (EST) From: Brad Dolan <bdolan(a)use.usit.net> To: snet-l(a)world.std.com Subject: (fwd) Private SSN Collection Project <cool!> (fwd) - - ---------- Forwarded message ---------- - - ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Sun, 31 Dec 1995 00:01:48 -0800 From: Clint Danbury <danbury(a)shell.wco.com> Thank you for your response. Please send Full names and Social Security Numbers of anyone you know, including government officers and/or employees, to: Clint Danbury, Box 750037, Petaluma, CA 94975-0037 email: danbury(a)ssnShirt.com Questions And Answers On The Nationwide SSN Collection Project. - - -1- Why are you collecting SSNs ? Answer: For fun and amusement. - - -2- What do you plan to do with them ? Answer: Put them on sweatshirts and sell them through specialty clothing retailers. It has been suggested also that I post them on large billboards along the Mexican border, but I don't have enough capital to pull of such a stunt at this time. - - -3- How long do you intend to continue this ? Answer: Until it becomes illegal. The moment any legitimate government authority informs me of the specific laws which (A) Forbid the collection, recording, and distribution of SSNs by private parties, and (B) Provide legal recourse for the individual citizen against private parties which do so, I will stop. - - -4- What if the government finds out what you're doing ? Answer: First off, the government knows very well what I'm doing. I've been "reported" multiple times to the SSA and the Secret Service. Secondly, the government can find me quite easily (I'm in the phone book). Third, I will cooperate completely with any legitimate government authority. - - -5- Here's my ex-spouse's SSN; will you make him/her miserable for me ? Answer: Hell No ! If you want me to engage in illegal activity for you, then go somewhere else ! - - -6- Isn't what you are doing illegal ? Answer: Not according to the SSA. They have declared the private use of the SSN unrestricted. (More on this in a few questions) - - -7- If My name/SSN were in your database, would you tell me ? Answer: In order for me to confirm this, you must first tell me what your full name and SSN is, then I will tell you if you were already in there. If this sounds like two-faced hypocrisy, great! I got the idea from CBI-Equifax; that's their very own policy. If you don't tell them what your SSN is, they won't tell you what they've got on you. Therefore, I have decided to do the exact same thing. (If you don't believe it, then why don't you call them and ask for yourself?) - - -8- What if someone did the same thing to you ? How would YOU feel ? Answer: This already has happened to me. I told the SSA office about it, repeatedly, and they would take no action. (The story appears in the next answer.) - - -9- How did this all start ? Answer: In 1985, a co-worker learned that I object to the "Uni-Number" concept of identifying a single person across multiple databases. I was (and still am) specifically concerned about the use of the SSN for Non-Tax identification. The company placed our SSNs on our name tags, which, thankfully, we did not have to wear constantly, although we would occasionally have to display it for a guard during certain times. This co-worker went poking through my briefcase while I was out of my office, copied down my SSN, and then, for his own fun and amusement (I'm guessing at his motives, I don't know his true reasons) displayed it for me, and would not tell me where he got it. Seeing that this angered me, he then went to other co-workers, who joined him in making my SSN even more public. They then went to the personnel files, (which the company made no attempt to keep locked) and double-checked the number with my job application. After that, they memorized it, and, (again, I'm guessing here) for their own amusement, they would recite it in unison around the lunch table. (I know this sounds impossible, but it really did happen.) After that job ended (not very happily, surprise) I let myself cool off for a few months, and then moved to another city. During my time in that other city, I contacted the SSA office there, seeking another SSN. I made dozens of phone calls and wrote letter after letter, all to no avail. My letters got shorter and to-the-point, not long drawn out things. It took only 30 seconds to read them. This continued for several months. The result was always the same: words without action, and no replacement SSN. The company in that city went down the tube, and I had to move again. I wrote and called off-and-on over the next few years, and got the same treatment; empty words, stall-him-off, and they would make no statement one way or the other. In September of 1993 (perhaps an earlier date, I'm not sure) the SSA finally came out and gave their official written approval for unrestricted use of the SSN by private individuals and private organizations for any purpose, including fun and amusement. The pamphlet is entitled "Your Social Security Number", is SSA Publication 05-10002, and dated September/1993. You can get a copy by calling them at 1-800-772-1213. On page 9 of that pamphlet, they have finally removed all restrictions on the private use of the SSN and they've put it in writing... "Because there is no law concerning the use of a person's Social Security number by a private individual or organization, Social Security has no control over such use." So, if those are the rules they've made, fine. Those are the rules by which I'll act. The collection and distribution of other people's SSNs is (as you've just read) a legally unrestricted activity and that's exactly what I'm doing. - - -10- Where do you get the SSNs ? Answer: "...there is no law..." so, just like CBI, TRW, TU, et.al., I don't have to tell you where I got yours. Ask CBI where they got your SSN; they won't tell you, and neither will I. - - -11- How do you check for accuracy ? This question bothered me a lot at first, however, it has become astoundingly simple to check whether a number is accurate or not. So, just exactly how do I do this ? CBI doesn't have to tell, and neither do I. "...there is no law..." - - -12- How can I get a copy of your list ? Answer: Unfortunately, I have found the drones to outnumber the worker-bees by a factor of about 10-to-1. This is not the soup-kitchen, it's a group project. If you want SSNs from me, then I want SSNs from you. In the past, I offered a 1-for-1 exchange. I will no longer make that public offer. What is offered is this: If you will send me full names and SSNs of prominently elected officials, media-babes, et.al., then I will (to the extent my database allows) send you back full names and SSNs of other prominent politicians and media babes, 1-for-1 if I can. Of course, full names and SSNs of any individual or group are still welcome, they just don't qualify for the 1-for-1 offer. Copyright, 1995 by Clint Danbury (Better Living Thru Better Living) ************************************************************************** X SNAIL ME + GABRIELLI'S (Mendocino,CA, USA) 0 X YER ROSEHIPS + 0 X IF YOU LIKED THIS POST! + *Pinot Noir* & *ASCENZA* (WHITE-BLEND)-YUMMY!0 ************************************************************************** [Ask Fer "Mendocino,Ca. -- *Gabrielli Wine*" at yer local wine shop if'n ya want to tend yer rugosa] Let your voice be heard in the campaign to save the life of Mumia Abu Jamal ++++ more info: http://www.calyx.com/ ++++ - ------- End of Forwarded Message ------- End of Forwarded Message

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More on Belgian 'key escrow law'
by lvhove＠vnet3.vub.ac.be 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I looked up the law mentioned in the newspaper article and it goes like this (non french speaking cypherpunks, please see comments below <grin>): ---- "Loi du 21 décembre 1994 portant des dispositions sociales et diverses" - published in the 'Moniteur Belge' (= the official journal in which all laws are published), Vol. 164, Nr. 250, Friday 23 December 1994, p. 31878-31963. (p. 31960-31961): " Art. 202 Il est inséré dans la loi du 21 mars 1991 portant réforme de certaines entreprises publiques économiques, un article 70bis, rédigé comme suit: <<Art. 70bis - Le Roi fixe, par arrêté délibéré en Conseil des Ministres, les moyens techniques par lesquels Belgacom et les exploitants des services non réservés qu'Il désigne doivent permettre, le cas échéant éventuellement conjointement, le repérage, les écoutes, la prise de connaissance et l'enregistrement des télécommunications privées dans les conditions prévues par la loi du 30 juin 1994 relative à la protection de la vie privée contre les écoutes, la prise de connaissance et l'enregistrement de communications et de télécommunications privées.>>" (p. 31961): " Art. 203 L'article 95, alinéa 1er, de la même loi est complété comme suit: <<5° l'appareil terminal rends inefficaces les moyens permettant, dans les conditions prévues aux articles 88bis et 90ter à 90decies du Code d'instruction criminelle, le repérage, les écoutes, la prise de connaissance et l'enregistrement des télécommunications.>>" ---- Simplifying it all seems to boil down to this: The 1994 Law ammends a 1991 Law; that is, it adds a couple of articles/paragraphs. Art. 202 stipulates that Belgacom (= Belgium's leading telephone company) and other telecom companies have to cooperate with law enforcement when it wants to tap telephone lines - no, sorry, make that telecom lines (!). Note that tapping is only allowed under certain circumstances stipulated in the so-called Privacy Law (see also my previous posting to this list). Art. 203 is the most important as far as key escrow is concerned. It completes Art. 95 of the 1991 Law which stipulated 4 conditions in which telecom equipment may be seized. These initial conditions are rather harmless (equipment does no longer conform to the initial specifications, it hinders public broadcasts, presents health risks for the users,...). Art. 203 adds a 5th and stingy one: equipment that makes tapping impossible may be disconnected from the network and seized ... On the face of it - I'm not a lawyer, so don't pin me down on this - this means no crypto (or only with key escrow) ... Ciao, leo _________________________________________________________________________ Leo Van Hove Centre for Financial Economics Vrije Universiteit Brussel (Free University of Brussels) Pleinlaan 2 B-1050 Brussels Vox: +32 2 629.21.25 Fax: +32 2 629.22.82 e-mail: lvhove(a)vnet3.vub.ac.be VUB's Web site: http://www.vub.ac.be _________________________________________________________________________

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Re: When they came for the Jews...
by E. ALLEN SMITH 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In regards to all this, I thought that people might be interested in knowing about an interview on Fresh Aire, a radio program I heard via WNYC. The individual being interviewed was the American Jewish Committee's person on Hate Groups, Kenneth Stern. He was being interviewed due to a book he'd written before the Oklahoma City bombing, in which he (mis-)called all militia groups hate groups. In the interview, he was asked about the Simon Weisenthal Center's letter in regards to the Internet. He spoke in opposition to it, and mentioned later that he tends to advise people that the best solution for hate speech is speech against it- a definitely good message. He mentioned the Internet as being a popular place for militia and similar groups to form. The two reasons he gave were that it was an easy means to spread information, and that the information was hard to verify (the urban/computer legend phenomenon, helping give rise to the various conspiracy theories circulating on the Net). He also mentioned that "hate" groups, including militias are using encryption, but didn't say anything further. Unfortunately, he also had some problems, which I'll go into here because of the analogies between guns and cryptography. While having respect for the First Amendment's protections of speech and press, and (to some degree) even the Second Amendment's protections of the right to keep & bear arms, he forgot completely about freedom of association- he called for a federal law making it a felony to have "private armies." There are some such laws on the books on various states, but they are (fortunately) not enforced, and thus have not yet been constitutionally challenged. The second group of his problems were in defining all militia groups as "hate" groups. His basic analysis for this was threefold: A. They have members in common with some definite hate groups, such as the Aryan Nations. B. Some militias have made racist, etcetera statements that qualify them as hate groups. C. They hate somebody, namely the federal government. The first argument falls apart once one points out that this is a classic conspiracy theorist untrue argument- one can use it to argue that the Trilateral Commission runs the US government, for instance. The second argument is obviously false. It's a variety of stereotyping, something that I would have thought he'd be more sensitive to. The third argument would classify the Simon Weisenthal Center as a hate group... he might actually have the guts to do this, since he also named the Nation of Islam as a hate group (due to their antisemitism, though, not due to their anti-white racism). All in all, though, he gave a much better impression for his group than I've gathered for the Simon Weisenthal Center. IIRC, the latter was essentially put together to pursue Nazis, as opposed to Neo-Nazis. My guess is that they're feeling useless and wanting to pursue somebody- sort of like the Secret Service and Steve Jackson Games. -Allen

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Re: PRIVACY: Private traces in public places
by tbyfield＠panix.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:26 PM 1/9/96, Alexander 'Sasha' Chislenko wrote: >- Landfills: They are probably the richest source of detailed historical >information > that is not obtainable from any other source and can be used to reconstruct > the detailed history of society, economy, technology and any single >person with > incredible detail. I ain't holding my breath until someone develops a search engine for Fresh Kills. Ted

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Scenario: Digital Telephony Leads to GAK
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Thanks, Leo, for providing this, and the translation into English. At 7:45 PM 1/9/96, Leo Van Hove wrote: >I looked up the law mentioned in the newspaper article and it goes like >this (non french speaking cypherpunks, please see comments below <grin>): ... >Art. 202 stipulates that Belgacom (= Belgium's leading telephone company) >and other telecom companies have to cooperate with law enforcement when it >wants to tap telephone lines - no, sorry, make that telecom lines (!). >Note that tapping is only allowed under certain circumstances stipulated in >the so-called Privacy Law (see also my previous posting to this list). This is almost exactly the same provision that Digital Telephony established in the U.S., namely, that switch providers (phone companies, loosely speaking, but possibly more, including packet switches....). More on this in a moment. >Art. 203 is the most important as far as key escrow is concerned. It >completes Art. 95 of the 1991 Law which stipulated 4 conditions in which >telecom equipment may be seized. These initial conditions are rather >harmless (equipment does no longer conform to the initial specifications, >it hinders public broadcasts, presents health risks for the users,...). >Art. 203 adds a 5th and stingy one: equipment that makes tapping impossible >may be disconnected from the network and seized ... On the face of it - >I'm not a lawyer, so don't pin me down on this - this means no crypto (or ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ >only with key escrow) ... ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ I think this ties in closely with the European meetings on key escrow (recall that our earliest indications of a move to get "software key escrow" came from the Karlsruhe meeting in the spring of 1994, and various international forums on key escrow began soon thereafter). This fits with several trends I and others here have discussed: * getting corporations to do as much of the enforcment work as possible. * using the civil forfeiture and penalty provisions to terrify the corporations, ISPs, switch providers, etc., to cooperate (I referred to this as "deputizing" the corporations as soldiers in the government's wars). * having Europe launch the crackdowns, then pleading that the U.S. must "conform" to international treaties and law enforcement agreements. (Some have argued that the Bavarian version of Exon was a step in this direction....) So, we need to be alert for the following scenario: 1. Telephone companies, telecom providers, ISPs, etc., must conform to the Digital Telephony wiretapping provisions, or variants thereof (not just the language of Digital Telephony, but also language in pending and future bills). 1a. If Exon passes, ISPs may also have to verify ages of users. This would necessitate a form of "Internet ID card," with all that this implies for the use of cryptography, anonymity, etc. 2. European companies (private, and PTTs) set the precedent. 3. An exception is made for key escrow. That is, one of the companies in #1 can be held harmless if it has taken major steps to ensure that users are not using encryption that is not properly escrowed. That is, they can escape the Title 18 fines and seizure of their equipment if they "cooperate" with "valid investigations." 4. A few prosecutions will likely have to made, just to make sure the message is properly received. (Like the two-by-four over the head I mentioned in my last message.) 5. A panic sets in. Just as CompuServe dumped 200 newsgroups on the whiff that a prosecution and seizure might happen, many ISPs will ignorantly send out warnings to users that all encrypted messages must use GAK. (To be sure, not all will. Some will ignore the warnings, some will contemptuously flout the law, etc.) 6. The government gets a large fraction of messages into a GAK format. Once again, corporations and ISPs become the deputies. (Note: Sure, superencryption still works, and no GAK system will be universally successful. Maybe not even successful in a majority of cases. But probably enough to cripple large-scale usage and, especially, commercial payment usage. This may be enough for the IRS, FinCen, etc.) We really need to be looking to what the nations of Europe are doing (as we have been of course, as the crypto laws of Europe have always been interesting to us, even if the machinations of the U.S. get most of the attention, for obvious reasons). --Tim May We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 - 1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: A couple of ideas for PGP-based programs
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 02:32 AM 1/6/96 -0800, Alan Olsen <alano(a)teleport.com> wrote: >1) Something I would like to see on the keyservers for PGP is a way of >retreving all of the key revokations since x date without having to get all of >the keys since that date. The web interface to the MIT keyserver lets you search for keys, and probably some of the other interfaces do too. So do a retrieve on REVOKE, snarf the output, and feed it to perl or grep or something. PGP keyserver >2) I would like to see a program like private Idaho have the ability to send >mail to the key server and grab all of the "unknown signator" keys. This would >have the interesting effect of building a more complete keyring, while using >the "web of trust" to weed out alot of the bogus keys that tend to crop up on >the key servers. I found that a very convenient way to add things to my keyring was to use the keyserver web page and Private Idaho simultaneously. Grab the keys you want on the keyserver, cut+paste into Private Idaho, decrypt (PGP won't find a message, but will find keys), and click on anything you don't recognize. Parsing email isn't too tough, but it takes some work, and it's easier for PC tools to interact through Netscape or finger when they can instead. > After n number of iterations you would have more of the >"important keys" n=4 is an interesting depth, given PGP's default settings..... #-- # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com, Pager/Voicemail 1-408-787-1281 # # "The price of liberty is eternal vigilance" used to mean us watching # the government, not the other way around....

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Re: Revocation, Trust, Policy Models, etc.
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>>The question is: is there a "majority vote" mode on the keyservers that >>causes them to remove a key if enough people claim it is no longer valid? No - it's too easy to attack. (It's also outside the scope of what the keyservers do - they're convenient ways to collect the data for the Web of Trust, but they're not trusted themselves.) Even if you wanted "A majority vote of people who've signed a given key" to revoke the key, that's easy to attack - you and your tentacles can all sign the victim's key, send the signatures to the keyservers, and now that you're the majority, you can all send in notes saying "please revoke victim(a)antinuke.org's key - he's an FBI plant". I'm not really satisfied with Matt's description of revocation that requires it to be done by a key's signers, not owner, though there are workarounds for most of the problems, though I agree that PGP's framework is deficient (not inadequate - it's still Pretty Good - but way underpowered.) One problem is that usually _you_ are the one who knows your key needs revoking (either you forgot the passphrase, or you know the computer it was on has been compromised, or whatever.) Under PolicyMaker, I guess the best way to implement this is to always sign your own key (since signers are the ones who revoke keys), and establish policies requiring unrevoked self-signatures. It may be difficult to implement Certificate Revocation Lists in a way that works well for your own keys, though, depending on why you want to revoke them. #-- # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com, Pager/Voicemail 1-408-787-1281 # # "The price of liberty is eternal vigilance" used to mean us watching # the government, not the other way around....

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Re: <fwd> Spiegel on CIS Censorship
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:11 PM 1/8/96 -0500, Vin McLellan wrote: >CIS's utter >ignorance of free-speech principles set the stage for the symbolic >Bravarian Censorship of the Net. You'll hear of a dozen other nations >jumping in, with different standards, within the month. Don't overdo the CIS newsgroup "ban". The first sysop to "ban" newsgroups did so many years ago. There are well-developed techniques to read "banned" newsgroups. A FAQ and everything. http://www.ECNet.Net/users/mumbv/pages/banned-groups-faq.shtml Compuserve is just a large proprietary service and sometime ISP (and one of the most expensive ones). They are not a big player on the Net. > I find the tragic association of a "free" Internet and porn to be >painfully common among cyberless adults even in my own community. Odds >are, my state, Massachusetts -- arguably the most liberal of the US states >-- would vote for Censorship Filter tomorrow if it were on a ballot. Luckily it's not and can't be. > It's amazing how incompetent the liberal/libertarian side has been >in this public debate. (So incompetent, in fact, that there has been _no_ >public debate!) Everyone who wants to place control over any filter (any >part of The Filter?) in the hands of the citizen is just another >snuff/torture/kiddy porn addict. Almost all of the articles on the CIS "ban" have mentioned that "therapeutic" groups were also included. Certainly the Net has let CIS know what we think of them. They expressed surprise at our reaction. Their "ban" isn't even a ban as my piece on using CIS to read banned groups shows. (http://www.cs.umass.edu/~lmccarth/cypherpunks/banned.html) It is making it into Wired and the Baltimore Sun (maybe) and was good enough that Michael Miller, author of "Using Compuserve" linked to it from his book page: http://www.mcp.com/people/miller/cistop.htm. DCF

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