December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Disk Encryption Software
by Robert A. Hayden 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hi all, I figured this was a good crew to ask this question of. Does anybody know of some kind of disc encryption software that would work with W95 and a ZIP drive? What I'd like to be able to have is an encrypted disc that when I put it in, it would demand a passphrase, and then it would be unlocked for working. Incorrect passphrase and it's still gibberish. Does this kind of implement exist yet? :-) -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: PGP Signed with PineSign 2.2 iQCVAwUBMHkoMjokqlyVGmCFAQHHeAP9HfALv1lJxFOhVn18/yjhbS90ekGGo60H qMF+KcCupdpY/wYYdvImZr2gjbfIGSutI0najla5XJbH5Jp95Gk9Fy5n3SnvJanc bIIipD+fMBitzjjz54DvEj0TxCYoVJaSeXhKcforfYeuetIA4YwGuksP1yOpivc0 hDOQwxgELDI= =XXhK -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ____ Robert A. Hayden <=> hayden(a)krypton.mankato.msus.edu \ /__ Finger for Geek Code Info <=> Finger for PGP Public Key \/ / -=-=-=-=-=- -=-=-=-=-=- \/ http://krypton.mankato.msus.edu/~hayden/Welcome.html -----BEGIN GEEK CODE BLOCK----- Version: 3.1 GED/J d-- s:++>: a-- C++(++++)$ ULUO++ P+>+++ L++ !E---- W+(---) N+++ o+ K+++ w+(---) O- M+$>++ V-- PS++(+++)>$ PE++(+)>$ Y++ PGP++ t- 5+++ X++ R+++>$ tv+ b+ DI+++ D+++ G+++++>$ e++$>++++ h r-- y++** ------END GEEK CODE BLOCK------

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Re: Certificate proposal
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:04 AM 10/9/95 EDT, Carl Ellison <cme(a)TIS.COM> wrote: >>I don't understand this whole discussion. A certificate is a signed >>binding of a key and a unique name, right? >It depends on how you define certificate. If you define it this way, then >I'm proposing the elimination of certificates (because I'm eliminating the >unique name as something different from a key). > >If you define certificate as I do -- as a bound statement of some attribute >of a key, then it should become clearer. It's just that the attribute I'm >binding is not some unique person-name -- rather something like permission >to spend money from a bank account. This doesn't necessarily eliminate certificates - while you have a signed statement from Alice's key that she uses Bank Account X, and a signed statement from Alice's key authorizing transfer of $D from Bank Account X to Bank Account Y, the Bank, or a customer, may refuse to accept the request unless there's a signed statement from the Bank's key that Alice's key uses Account X. None of these need Alice's name, or for that matter the Bank's, as long as there's also a signed attribute statement from the Bank's key that it's a bank, etc. The meaning of the certificates changes a bit, but there's still a certificate from the bank binding Alice's Key to Alice's Bank Account. #--- # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, Freelance Information Architect, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # Phone +1-510-247-0664 Pager/Voicemail 1-408-787-1281 #---

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Re: PC disk wipe software
by rah＠shipwright.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>PC Tools has a wipe program that will either wipe individual files, or >wipe all unallocated diskspace. It also allows you to choose the level >of wipe (single overwrite, multiple, etc). There has been considerable discussion on the MCIP list about how most *Mac* programs that purport to do this, like Burn, for example, leave stuff over in disk blocks. My understanding is that this is not a trivial problem, and it occurs in MUSH-DOS as well.... Cheers, Bob Hettinga ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) Shipwright Development Corporation, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA (617) 323-7923 "Reality is not optional." --Thomas Sowell >>>>Phree Phil: Email: zldf(a)clark.net http://www.netresponse.com/zldf <<<<<

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Re: Certificate proposal
by Carl Ellison 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- >Date: Thu, 5 Oct 1995 21:40:04 -0700 >From: Hal <hfinney(a)shell.portal.com> >I don't really care whether the name is called an attribute, a >distinguished name, or an ooblek. I just don't see how you're going to >get along without it. The fact is, we live in a world populated by >people and companies and we use names to identify them. I will grant >that there are problems with uniqueness but I don't think the solution >can be to just give up on the whole idea of names since they are so >messy. We're not talking about giving up on names. You have lots of names for things -- some of them are even nicknames, known only to you. For any certification scheme, you also need a unique name. If you happen to use the public key as that unique name, you have the proposal we're talking about. It has an advantage -- that you don't have to certifiy the binding between the unique name and the key. That's built in. -Carl +--------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Carl M. Ellison cme(a)tis.com http://www.clark.net/pub/cme | |Trusted Information Systems, Inc. http://www.tis.com/ | |3060 Washington Road PGP 2.6.2: 61E2DE7FCB9D7984E9C8048BA63221A2| |Glenwood MD 21738 Tel:(301)854-6889 FAX:(301)854-5363 | +--------------------------------------------------------------------------+ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMHlSzVQXJENzYr45AQFYvgP+O12CvK058nWvhvq48QIqIBo8N5jU6uqN 8kFagz2iKPLcv+cLJ7AiFiOAU3mY5CiWkU0pK6z9YlNgB7d5SNqyzpAL8jIe6zgI xD5hAesL6Pz85f8OLAn9teoydW9k3QzBekOeT0xCKkIj8+8KUDM7nrUMl2t08bTr OG53eFdFD6o= =d7lq -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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HTTP anon proxy pointers
by Kevin L Prigge 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I seem to recall that someone was working on an anonymous http proxy a couple months ago. Pointers would be appreciated. Thanks. -- Kevin Prigge | Holes in whats left of my reason, CIS Consultant | holes in the knees of my blues, Computer & Information Services | odds against me been increasin' email: klp(a)cis.umn.edu | but I'll pull through...

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Re: Crypto's Role in Evil?
by shamrock＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- In article <9510090412.AA02181(a)pulm1.accessone.com>, blancw(a)accessone.com wrote: > Another thought is that as people become more separated into individual > self-reliance, they must develop other ideas, organizations, or means by which > they may defend themselves from abuse. That is, if they cannot rely on > governments (as they come to realize that governments don't make much > difference in terms of salvation), then individuals must become more > imaginative over how they can defend themselves against those who are not so > conscientious in upholding a sense of personal honor & moral rectitude. Correct, Blanc. That's why I am saving my pennies to buy an AR-15. I know the government of the near future will not be in a position to stand in the way of my involuntary participation in organ transplant experiments. It will be up to the individual and voluntary neighborhood associations, etc. to provide our personal security. - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBMHlVXCoZzwIn1bdtAQFkawF8DBRY8Nxeqkld5Ltw1J6VTqm+5JtN2sNZ PPCOCt7Gl1NKQmkJPlWBC5TY4cgtMrc0 =0pt6 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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java security concerns
by cmcmanis＠scndprsn.Eng.Sun.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Perry pointed out the standard set of concerns that anyone should have with Java. About the only thing I'd care to dispute at the moment is that Java is a "large complicated" application. It is in fact less than 20K lines of C code. And while it is true that applications of even this size are difficult to prove safe, there has been an effort to break that problem up into components such that each "layer" can be proven safe and where that layer is used that safety carries over. Let me give you an example: There are three "parts" of the Java system: o Java Bytecode o Java Runtime o Java Virtual Machine. At a "meta" level there is the Java Language and the compiler that converts it into byte codes however for the purposes of a security discussion those are irrelevant since the browser in this case receives byte codes and the compiler at the other end is presumed suspect. So one way to approach this analysis is to look first at the bytecodes. One of the things you will discover is that Java is *not* a general purpose language. It lacks crucial features such as introspection and anonymous memory access. So you might ask "How can anyone write anything useful in it then?" and that is a fair question. The answer is that it does have one loophole and that loophole is the 'native' keyword on a method description. Basically, if you need a general purpose feature (like object inspection) you can get it with a native method. "So I write a native method to delete your files, what does that buy me?" you might ask. Well Java is also a _late binding_ language. Thus the binding of external method references (which native methods are by definition one) can be identified at bind/link time (which always occurs on the client) and optionally rejected. The next level of inspection is all of the classes that, through one of their methods, actually call a native method. Those can be analyzed closely and there are relatively few of them (about 28). The final level of inspection is the virtual machine interpreter. Its operation as a giant switch statement can be inspected for valid code design. It isn't all that large and a team of three can inspect it in under a week. If the layers work, the system works. We encourage any questions on security or identifying any "holes" to be sent to java(a)java.sun.com for our immediate attention. --Chuck However, Java is also late

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Re: Certificate proposal
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 4:46 PM 10/9/95, Hal wrote: >Bill Stewart <stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com> writes: .... >>also a signed attribute statement from the Bank's key that it's a bank, etc. >>The meaning of the certificates changes a bit, but there's still a certificate >>from the bank binding Alice's Key to Alice's Bank Account. > >I can see using keys with attributes in this way, for credentials or as >other forms of authorization. But what about for communications privacy? >What is the attribute that tells you that using this key will prevent >eavesdropping? For communication, the only credential Alice needs to ensure that only Bob can read her message is that she uses Bob's public key. If "Bob the Key" reads it, presumably it was "Bob the Person" who read it. (Again, Bob the Key = Bob the Person to many of us. If Bob the Person has let his private key out, so that Chuck the Person is also able to read the Bob the Key stuff, etc., then of course cryptography cannot really handle this situtation.) --Tim May Views here are not the views of my Internet Service Provider or Government. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: Software Patents are Freezing Evolution of Products
by Peter Williams 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>>Thesis: Software patents are a bad idea because they freeze the evolution >>too early and payment metering schemes are too difficult to arrange, which >>also helps to freeze evolution. Software patents are bad because customers >>cannot freely and without entanglements incorporate the ideas into their >>own products. The situation has become much worse with software, because >>there is no physical object which can be used to meter usage of a patent. Its nice to see a carefully reasoned argument. Consider, also reading http://www.verisign.com/faqs/id_faq.html http://www.verisign.com/apple/cis.html Comment: The thesis is fundamentally flawed in the case of publickey applications which provide or exploit digital signatures, as its assumptions are false, patently. However, a gem of truth is revealed; however, possible outcomes may be unpalatable as "pay-per-view". Crypto metering for commercial-grade systems is easy. A number of companies, including those who are bantering about the latest batch of payment protocols, are beginning to really understand that to combat intruder-in-the middle attacks of the commercial end-systems' keying material, its necessary to authenticate the source of keying material used for all subsequent security services. Contrary to the thesis, there are an ever evolving number of practical ideas upon the nature of security services and secure applications. (In fact, its ever harder to track the explosion of innovation which is actually happening.) To combat the threat which intruder-in-the-middle represents to the key exchange/agreement crypto underlying most applications, a notion of public-key certificates was formulated. The certificate is a certified end-system key. The evaluation of the certificate requires users to consider trust models, as someone "trusted" digitally signs the key to assert that the key is certified for purpose X. The number of trust models being propounded is astounding; the innovation wonderful to behold; contrary to the thesis. Two models are prevalent - the Kent RFC 1422 model which uses third-parties to base non-repudiation services, and the Zimmermann PGP model which does not use third-parties, and accomplishes something other than non-repudiation. Other models are in heated discussion! There is a little truth in the thesis that asserting upfront to the licensor the nature of your idea does hamper innovation. However, a solution maybe at hand. Note, anyway, that (a) RSA is an excellent public-key scheme which is free of patent restrictions anywhere in the world except US territories (b) personal use of RSA in the US is effectively unlicensed (see PGP/PGPfone) (c) RSAREF is a free reference implementation available for developers to innovate with, before deciding how to make their ideas commercially available (d) there are lots of competitive providers of RSA stuff supporting many form-factors and packaging styles. So either all innovation occurs in the US, else free public availability is not the key to idea generation. Both these conclusions are patently wrong, in my view. Whats a solution? Well there is a solution which gets rid of the up-front, tell-all requirement. Its called controlled certificate issuance. Given the importance of the certificate role, if one meters certificate issuance such that a postage-stamp fee goes to the licensor for each key used in any idea, for any purpose, however often or valuable-a-transaction, then the developer is effectively freed up - in terms of innovation. The keying material can be Diffie-Helman, knapsack, anything the developer like. Whats the downside - well its like having a pay-per-view box on your company TV. Still, this is highly regarded by many industries and is the basis of much competition in the broadcasting & programming distribution industry. Some people, really object to pay-per-view. But then, some people object to inventors getting benefit from their discovery. One metering product is the BBN safekeyper. Metering certificates causes about as much hate mail, as MIT patent enforcement though. So beware about even thinking about reading the following pages for more information about the options and issues: http://www.verisign.com/faqs/id_faq.html - for digital ID material (lots of references) http://www.verisign.com/apple/cis.html - for metering and "simple" licensing How do we do away with the say-it-all-up-front restriction, which is currently the only means whereby the licensor can collect a negotiated fee? RSA DSI invested heavily in a hardware product for metering the issuance of those critical certificates. That is, any developer w

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Re: PC disk wipe software
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>There has been considerable discussion on the MCIP list about how most >*Mac* programs that purport to do this, like Burn, for example, leave stuff >over in disk blocks. My understanding is that this is not a trivial >problem, and it occurs in MUSH-DOS as well.... Doing it _right_ is not a trivial job. Consider disk controllers that map out bad blocks so the OS never needs to see them - if you're trying to remove highly classified data, the fact that Diskwipe won't ever see them might be a serious problem, even if it is close enough for government work. For a more realistic scenario, consider Stacker and other disk-compression software; you don't know what physical blocks the file was written on, or whether overwriting the logical blocks of the file will actually write to the same physical blocks. In some cases you can assume that it probably won't. You also can't expect to write large blocks of 1s or 0s over the disk, because disk compression will turn them into small blocks with run-lengths or equivalent. (Writing PRNG random noise will do, or you can generate counter-based patterns that may work, or do something cryptographically strong if you want to take the time.) #--- # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, Freelance Information Architect, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # Phone +1-510-247-0664 Pager/Voicemail 1-408-787-1281 #---

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