December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: HIP hip hooray
by Mark Grant 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Zooko Journeyman (zooko(a)xs4all.nl) wrote: >HIP rocked. I'm still trying to adjust to the mundanity >of everyday life. I loved meeting some cpunks in Real >Life. Hey, Zooko! You were the only Cypherpunk who made the article in the 'Independent' (by that blonde reporter who was wandering around), though Lucky Green was mentioned by name. '"[hacking] can be a wonderful thing", explained Zooco, a member of the CypherPunks. "Pretty much every useful aspect of modern computing was devised by hackers -- like the Internet and email."' So did she spell your name wrong, or were you using a pseudonym ;-) ? Mark

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The Card!!!!!
by mornings＠concentric.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

CASH ADVANCE APPROVED: YES APPROVAL NUMBER: 000-458249 CREDIT LIMIT: $3,000.00 APPROVAL EXPIRES: 09/01/97 CREDIT PROVIDER: MORNINGSTAR BANK AFFILIATION: NONE CARD ISSUED: MORNINGSTARCARD MEMBER STATUS: PENDING ANNUAL FEE: NONE APR: 17.99% DEAR FUTURE CARDHOLDER, CONGRATULATIONS! YOU HAVE BEEN PRE-APPROVED FOR A $3,000.OOO UNSECURED CREDIT LINE FROM THE FINANCIAL DIVISION OF MORNINGSTAR ENTERPRISES REGARDLESS OF YOUR PAST CREDIT. YOUR APPROVAL NUMBER IS 000-458249 AND YOUR PRE-APPROVED CREDIT AMOUNT OF $3,000.00 FOR CREDIT PURCHASES AND CASH ADVANCES WILL BE AVAILABLE ONCE YOU RECIEVE YOUR MORNINGSTARCARD JUST BY CALLING NOW! AS A MEMBERSHIP BENEFIT, YOU WILL BE PROCESSED* AT NO COST FOR AN UNSECURED MAJOR CREDIT CARD WITH A CREDIT LINE OF UP TO $5,000.00 REGARDLESS OF PAST CREDIT. SEND NO MONEY NOW - THERE IS NO SECURITY OR MONEY DEPOSITS REQUIRED! CALL IMMEDIATELY WITH YOUR APPROVAL NUMBER TO ACTIVATE YOUR MEMBERSHIP AND ITS BENEFITS. BY ACTING NOW - WE'LL ASSIGN YOUR MORNINGSTARCARD WITHIN THE NEXT 48 HOURS AND THEN APPLY YOUR ONE TIME MEMBERSHIP FEE BY THE PAYMENT METHOD YOU PREFER. IN ADDITION, YOU'LL RECEIVE $100.00 OFF YOUR FIRST CREDIT PURCHASE OVER $200.OO WITH THE MORNINGSTARCARD JUST BY CALLING NOW! GETTING MORE CREDIT IS AS SIMPLE AS CALLING US TODAY T0 ACTIVATE YOUR MEMBERSHIP AND TO OBTAIN YOUR PIN CODE FOR CASH ADVANCES BEFORE YOUR APPROVAL EXPIRES. SO CALL NOW AND GET THE CREDIT YOU DESERVE. 100% QUALITY ASSURANCE AND NO LESS! CALL RIGHT NOW(IF BUSY KEEP TRYING) ********** 1-702-435-1930************** FOR IMMEDIATE ACTIVATION AND ESTABLISH FOR CREDIT TODAY! * YOU MUST CALL TO OBTAIN YOUR PIN CODE FOR CASH ADVANCES AND FOR MEMBERSHIP ACCEPTANCE ALONG WITH OBTAINING COMPLETE DETAILS OUTLINING OUR PROGRAM!

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Re: Fiat Shamir Zero Knowledge Test
by kooltek＠iol.ie 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Can someon point me to a net description of >the "Fiat Shamir Zero Knowledge Test" used >in the RCA DirecTV smart cards. > The standard text on this is the paper "How To Prove Yourself" by Fiat and Shamir. I'll try and dig up the name of the ftp site I found it on but in the meantime here is a rough description. The access control system for RCA DirecTv was developed by News Datacom. They, News Datacom, also developed the security for the VideoCrypt system here in Europe. The smart card used in VideoCrypt here in Europe has been continually reverse-engineered for the last three card issues. (currently on issue 09). Therefore much of the description below is based on the European system. Of course the fact that the DSS cards are now turning up in Europe repainted as Sky cards indicates that the ROM is identical. This is where the routined for card i/o protocols and data packets are. As a result, the DirecTv system probably uses the same packet types. Any of the pirate smart card emulator programs available on BBSes on FTP sites can be used to monitor the data flowing to and from the card. Cutting to the chase: Packet - Direction- Bytes - Function 70 C > D 6 Card presents 6 byte ID number to decoder 7C C > D 16 Card sends tiering/authorisation levels to decoder 7E C > D 64 Card sends X value for ZKT to decoder 80 D > C 1 Decoder sends Q flag to card (either 00h or 01h) 82 C > D 64 Card's Y ZKT response to decoder 70 C > D 6 Card presents 6 byte ID number to decoder The Fiat Shamir ZKT as used in here is dependent on a number of elements: S, the serial number of the card. N, the common modulus. R, the look-up table in the card (a block of data). X, the value sent by the card to be authenticated. Q, the calculation mode flag (either 00h or 01h) Y, the calculated response from the card. The X value is calculated as X=R^2 mod N. The Y responses are calculated as follows. Y = R if Q=00h Y = (R * S) mod N if Q=01h The Q flag tells the card how to generate response Y. The card would be authenticated in the following cases: If Q=00h then Y^2 = X mod N If Q=01h then Y^2 = (X * V) mod N where V is the card identity number received prior to the authentication process. S, the card serial number is derived from V by the equation: S = sqrt (V) mod N The implementation of the ZKT in VideoCrypt is faulty and open to a simple hack. It is designed to make the card authenticate itself. Many of the earlier decoders had a flaw in the ZKT calculation routines in the decoder. Of course the data in the decoder was easily popped by hackers since the microcontroller in charge of the authentication was not secured. In the VideoCrypt system, one of the latest bypasses for the ZKT is to record the response from a valid card and have the pirate card replay it. This saves a lot of time and it does work perfectly. Since the complete contents, (ROM and EEPROM), of the VideoCrypt card are now available, the whole idea of authentication is invalid. In the DSS system, however, there the ZKT is still viable though there are some ways in which it theoretically could be bypassed if it uses the same implementation as VideoCrypt. Regards...jmcc (John McCormac) -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.6.2 mQCNAzAYiFIAAAEEANTTBXIijEE82VN6nL7U+Or0Br4/eJ6POKxfxy64GOJsEO7g kPrAI3zzuYZ4XhOH01Lt4dtr+0hmanMpKOssYR02sZGaR6OARWSRe9KIWpSUGHG3 8pBBCqYO6adzFEVEOclqDQ1L6QZaOsf+qX8h9eo/bXpeYg43PZvSRmmL6lExAAUR tA5rb29sdGVrQGlvbC5pZQ== =vzc/ -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

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A problem with anonymity
by Scott Brickner 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I was thinking about some issues related to electronic commerce, and it occurred to me that there is a significant problem in conducting business with untraceable pseudonyms (anonyms?). The problem occurred to me while considering inheritance. If one operates a business under an anonym (as opposed to the sort of conditionally traceable pseudonym proposed by AT&T in "Anonymous Credit Cards" <URL:ftp://ftp.research.att.com/dist/anoncc/anoncc.ps.Z>), there's a strategy for transferring unlimited funds to one's posterity. Consider a business which typically has a lot of assets, but which are offset by a lot of liabilities --- almost any sort of VAR will do, for instance. In your will, you leave the key to unlock a private message to your heir, in which you hand over the information necessary to assume your anonym. Since the heir presumably has his own identity (whether anonymous or not is immaterial, except to *his* heirs), and the anonym can't be linked to you, he has no reason to care about maintaining the reputation of the anonym. In dismantling the anonym, he sells its assets to his own identity at a fraction of their worth, and defaults on the liabilities. Since the anonym behaved reputably during its life, it developed what would have been a credit-worthy reputation, had it been a (traceable) pseudonym. But, since there's nothing to link the anonym to its heirs (or ancestors), the creditors of the anonym must eat the loss. Since the process of taking an anonym from scratch to a positive reputation would be reasonably short (presumably not too much longer than taking a real name or pseudonym the same distance), especially when helped along by being fed the profits from the legitimate business of an ancestor anonym, it's likely that a single individual could pull off such an asset transfer at least two or three times a decade, as well as at inheritance time. A market which permits anonyms to have credit based on reputation will probably have a constant stream of defaults caused by such behavior, representing a significant risk factor in extending credit to anonyms which can't be predicted by reputation. Comments?

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Re: A problem with anonymity
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:32 PM 8/31/95, Scott Brickner wrote: >I was thinking about some issues related to electronic commerce, and it >occurred to me that there is a significant problem in conducting >business with untraceable pseudonyms (anonyms?). The problem occurred >to me while considering inheritance. > >If one operates a business under an anonym (as opposed to the sort of >conditionally traceable pseudonym proposed by AT&T in "Anonymous Credit >Cards" <URL:ftp://ftp.research.att.com/dist/anoncc/anoncc.ps.Z>), >there's a strategy for transferring unlimited funds to one's >posterity. > >Consider a business which typically has a lot of assets, but which are >offset by a lot of liabilities --- almost any sort of VAR will do, for >instance. In your will, you leave the key to unlock a private message >to your heir, in which you hand over the information necessary to >assume your anonym. Since the heir presumably has his own identity >(whether anonymous or not is immaterial, except to *his* heirs), and >the anonym can't be linked to you, he has no reason to care about >maintaining the reputation of the anonym. In dismantling the anonym, >he sells its assets to his own identity at a fraction of their worth, >and defaults on the liabilities. ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ You don't have to look to death and inheritance for this problem to crop up. Similar situations arise when: - a pseudonym simply decides to dissolve the current pseudonym and shift focus to another pseudonym (perhaps transferring a bunch of assets, then simply vanishing and leaving "no forwarding address') (This is of course the basis of any number of scams and "boiler room operations." Crypto does not completey eliminate scams like this, and, in fact, generates some new kinds of scams.) - this is also a well-known problem with any services that handle money, valuables, etc. For example, the money courier who vanishes to Rio de Janeiro. This is one thing that _bonding_ is designed to partially ameliorate. One posts a bond which is greater than the amount being carried, or at least is some large amount. (Calculations are complex, and various agencies may have various policies, depending on other reputation factors.) >Since the anonym behaved reputably during its life, it developed what >would have been a credit-worthy reputation, had it been a (traceable) >pseudonym. But, since there's nothing to link the anonym to its heirs >(or ancestors), the creditors of the anonym must eat the loss. The concept of "reputation capital" is a critical one. ideally, one never "trusts" an agent with a transaction greater than the value of the reputation capital he will lose if he defaults. There are still scams and manouvers to thwart this reputation capital scheme. The agent planning to "defect" (default, split, abscond, renege, etc.) can try to pile up as many pending transactions as possible, anticipating that the various transactees will be unaware of each other. (This of course happens in real life.) Whether cryptographic protocols (cf. the "encrypted open books" proposal by eric Hughes for one approach which may be useful) solve this problem is not known at this time. But the non-crypto world has of course not solved this problem, either. ... >A market which permits anonyms to have credit based on reputation will >probably have a constant stream of defaults caused by such behavior, >representing a significant risk factor in extending credit to anonyms >which can't be predicted by reputation. > >Comments? Lots of issues need to be thought about. My hunch is that economists, game theorists, and scam artists will all discover digital money and pseudonyms and will explore various aspects of this situation. I devoted a pretty big chunk of my Cyphernomicon to these "darker sides" of anonymity, of reputation capital, and suchlike. By no means did I cover all the issues of "crypto anarchy," but I suggest interested folks take a look at the chapter on crypto anarchy for more discussion. --Tim May ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: ASSETS FORFEITURE BILL ON THE MOVE
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

To: remailer(a)REPLAY.CO From: CypherPisser <cp(a)dev.null> X-Mailer: WinSock Remailer Version ALPHA1.3B X-Comments: - X-Comments: "I am not an asshole, but I play one in real life." X-Comments: - X-Comments: "If you can't say something nice about someone... X-Comments: ...piss on 'em." X-Comments: - X-Comments: This message is NOT from CypherPisser. X-Comments: It was sent by an automated anonymous asshole under the X-Comments: auspices of the Electronic Forgery Foundation. X-Comments: - X-Comments: Note: Send any complaints about abuse of this remailer X-Comments: to the person most concerned about your rights and X-Comments: freedoms. (Hint: It's a "mirror" site.) X-Comments: - X-Remailer-Setup: Maximum Message Size -- None X-Remailer-Setup: Reordering is OFF X-Remailer-Setup: News Posting DISABLED X-Remailer-Setup: Subject Header KEPT X-Remailer-Setup: Logging COMPLETE Messages X-Remailer-Setup: PGP and plaintext messages accepted Subject: Re: ASSETS FORFEITURE BILL ON THE MOVE ;: Anon-To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com Robert Hettinga wrote: > From: Vinnie Moscaritolo <vinnie(a)vmeng.com> > ASSETS FORFEITURE BILL ON THE MOVE > > At press time, the U.S. House Judiciary Committee had passed > H.R. 1965 -- an assets forfeiture bill. This legislation contains > provisions that would allow the Clinton-Gore Administration to > seize the assets of virtually any business on any pretext -- > including firearms-related businesses! Even if the warrant for > the original seizure is struck down, the government would then be > given additional time and "discovery" to examine the business > records to try and build a case to continue holding the assets > (read: firearms). Virtually any business that has any substantive > inventory and that is extensively regulated by the government is > in danger of having its goods seized -- even for non-criminal > regulatory infractions. H.R. 1965 is a Clinton-Reno scheme -- and > a civil rights nightmare -- and we strongly believe it will be > used as a tool against gun stores, collectors, or anyone else who > has a firearms collection or inventory worth stealing. Is it time to kill these fuckers, yet? Does anybody know what the secret signal is for us to descend on D.C. en masse and slaughter every living soul in the defense of freedom? (or merely on a whim?) Is the 'secret signal' when the sun comes up in the morning? That works for me! Uuhhh...Anonymous

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Re: A problem with anonymity
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 2:06 AM 9/1/95, Mac Norton wrote: >On Thu, 31 Aug 1995, Timothy C. May wrote: > >> You don't have to look to death and inheritance for this problem to crop >> up. Similar situations arise when: > >But these are problems of fraud that the criminal and civil >justice systems already comprehend. I think what is posited >is something a bit more unique. The guy who takes in money and vanishes, or skips to Rio, out of the reach of extradition treaties, is not all that different from the posited situation of a nym dematerializing. The "law" can't really touch either situation, efficiently, and so other mechanisms are generally used (or recommended, though many con victims have fail to do so). I've not claimed the scenarios are identical, only that the issue of agents taking in money or promising services and then vanishing is as old as history. That such things will happen with digital pseudonyms is assured. Fortunately, countermeasures appear practical. ... >> - this is also a well-known problem with any services that handle money, >> valuables, etc. For example, the money courier who vanishes to Rio de >> Janeiro. > >I don't think bonding is applicable in this posit, given the >assumed established creditworthiness of the original anonym. >Perhaps he originally posted a bond, but the market would >probably have dispensed with that condition as an unnecessary >formality at some point in his glowing credit history. > >MacN If the "market" (actually, some players in the market) chose to dispense with bonding and then got burned, so be it. Later iterations of the market, and the players, will thus likely _not_ dispense with bonding and other such measures. Think of it as evolution in action. --Tim May (P.S. Could people try not to include all of the post they are responding to in their replies?) ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Vote 'Till It Hurts!
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

WEIRDNUZ.491 (News of the Weird, July 4, 1997) by Chuck Shepherd * Lewis Ecker II, a diagnosed sexual sadist, was turned down in his release bid from St. Elizabeth's Hospital in Washington, D. C., in December even though he has made considerable improvement during his stay, even winning elective office in D. C. in 1990 (and being re-elected twice since) as an Advisory Neighborhood Commissioner. However, according to hospital officials, Ecker hurt his chances of release by secretly composing 21 sexual-sadist narratives (discovered in a search of the office he had been given the privilege of using) that featured himself as the protagonist who humiliated and injured female victims.

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Re: No charges for Ruby Ridge murderers
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 06:30 PM 8/15/97 +0200, nobody(a)replay.com (Anonymous) wrote: <snip> > The Justice Department decided not to bring charges against former >FBI Deputy Director Larry Potts or Danny Coulson, Potts' deputy during the >1992 seige at the remote cabin of white supremacist Randy Weaver, said >government officials who spoke on condition of anonymity. Randy Weaver was a white SEPARATIST, not a white supremacist. The media is somehow capable of getting the separatist vs. supremacist when it comes to Louis Farrakhan, but not for Randy Weaver. Randy may well be, privately, a white supremacist. I think it's very likely, and even more likely that Farrakhan is a black supremacist, but no media person has ever pointed to a statement suppporting white SUPREMACY, as opposed to separation, by Weaver. They continue in their leftwing racist lies because they are biased, as a whole, against "evil" white males. Sad that they can't use truth as a standard instead of lies, since the truth is bad enough. ... > The department said in a statement obtained by The Associated >Press, "The available evidence does not support further criminal >prosecution of FBI officials ... from the August 1992 incident at Ruby >Ridge." The available evidence did, however, support a multimillion dollar verdict for Weaver. Sometimes, it's so wonderful being a taxpayer I have to break down and cry... Themediaislefty-racistmonger

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LuRaSHA vaporware...
by Deranged Mutant 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The encrypted filesystem I promised never came through, partly because I've been busy but also because I'm toying with writing it for OS/2 instead... alas I know little about OS/2. Either way, the encryption/decryption routines are nicely written, and I am willing to make them available for perusal either way (their written in 386 Assembler code). Drop me a note if you're interested.

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