December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Remailer Abuse
by Rich Salz 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

What lists did you post to?

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More signal than YOU can handle.
by L. Todd Masco 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- For the moment, all of the archives that Eric just dropped me are on ftp://ftp.hks.net/cypherpunks/All I'll be making some primitive engines to access individual articles by various means but I thought I'd put 'em up in case anybody else with more disk space than brains would like to snarf 'em (following the Shulgin model). (By the way, Glimpse looks like it'll be ideal, since everything is already in its own file, the "since June" archive currently being our /usr/spool/news/... dir.) Look for more info in this space (that sucking sound is my copious free time). - - -- Todd. - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.7 iQCVAwUBLxD1GBNhgovrPB7dAQEOQAQAuTRIVTQOzIbjqrUAFsPu3xHTJAH+3YnX ickYtw627leo3vs7wD2rxGfHNx6As7JbzSI1JwD26zsb2CMqMGgvQHNQ5eD7rW/N 3ICSWACwESWlnL/rAFvVh69mZDM/IUv5C+eSTVHKdlh3KWYbetRvCgkRNQvGVl58 S06pthGBpJ8= =f4fe - -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBLxD1nyoZzwIn1bdtAQEv7wGAhSVywzGivjeo9fZwVrYDRaJx596TPVeJ pjutyvubg3yyKmqFD+Ele62LhiPvhxtX =pooh -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Data Haven problems
by dfloyd＠io.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- While programming my data haven code, I am wondering how to guard against spamming the data haven parser. It is trivial to mount a denial of service attack by repeatedly mailing large files. which will fill up the quota or filesystem of the data haven host, and if you have mail on a root partition, will cause hangs or crashes. Any ideas on how to guard against mailbombs, and to confirm to the sender that their files are stored successfully? Perhaps do a mailing with a test command that validates the existance of the file, and sends a reply back wether the file is okay or not, or would this result in a possible security hole? As to the code, this will have to be my second rewrite as I am going to do it in perl code, rather than C... last rewrite was from a daemon to a program activated by a .forward file. Lastly, instead of postage (like a remailer would get), how hard would it be to implement "rent" where if the "rent" is not paid, and a grace period has elapsed the file would be trashed. All this while preserving the anonymity of the sender and the data haven site. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAwUBLw7KpFLUeLjqSiixAQHs4wf+Mf4CVx77nXjUXug/3q1hINhCyWgWmal7 vY1WeCDXM+qrrdxUgqzIhYRYpCPKChMjeozFltn9T0CcH/YdaD5hx3dB5A0YUPWZ SpF5oCL3iZzf2veA8BBJEIrFdmts/nFUzWaqMx4+2IcufYb+0kVw/AKi2M5B0ZiT UoOFFIsySR9hIMMIfHlkGqrnoO8LhlViRBx4u1O0bb0GYAyc+Nv6HvDJOSWuVe9C g5B4GMLuW1t9e5Qw3W0Qy1VRIC4QbOrd0zbjDrQ38GUemOjALuZ2h4+tr3bR93KU ZthueqsIzGKlr90PU6AVVZd128mDHLofJO4I4IoOgSPV7XIK4tufyA== =KZk0 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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RC5 data, anyone?
by Andy Brown 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Has anyone got any plaintext/cyphertext/key data sets that I can use to test my RC5 implementation against? +-------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | Andrew Brown Internet <asb(a)nexor.co.uk> Telephone +44 115 952 0585 | | PGP (2048/9611055D): 69 AA EF 72 80 7A 63 3A C0 1F 9F 66 64 02 4C 88 | +-------------------------------------------------------------------------+

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Re: revoked transactions/guerrilla fee remailers
by jrochkin＠cs.oberlin.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 8:15 PM 01/09/95, L. McCarthy wrote: >- - From what I've seen so far, accepting payment would seem to make anonymous >_operation_ of a remailer well nigh impossible. Anonymous operation with >revenue would require a corresponding level of anonymity in the transfer of >money. Until such time as conversion of funds from a net-liquid form to a >conventional form becomes unnecessary (or just commonplace ?), financial >traffic analysis can't adequately be thwarted. >All this bodes ill, IMHO, for the prospect of guerrilla or quasi-guerrilla >remailers charging for service any time soon. There's just too much >infrastructure to which they'd need to be tied at the moment. Well, that's certainly true, for the reasons you gave. Right now, it's enough of a chore just to get non-anonymously run remailers charging for operation. And it's not easy to set up an effective guerilla remailer either. I think the set of tools and environments that make it possible to run a remailer anonymously and charge for it certainly aren't going to exist until the component problems of charging for a remailer at all and running a guerilla remailer at all are made easy. I think once both of those problems are dealt with, it won't be too dificult to deal with the combined problem of guerilla for-pay remailers. Or at least, exactly what things are neccesary to solve that combined problem will be obvious.

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positive publicity for anonymity
by nissim＠acs.bu.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I've just posted a proposal to alt.config for a new group alt.temping I'm hoping that temporary workers will use this as a forum to compare and contrast temp agencies, wage differences, 'permanent hire penalties' etc. There are about 4.4 million business service temps in the US. Wage differentials are noticeable - one egency will pay $2.00 more than another; this means $320/month to a temp worker. I expect temps to use anonymous posting capabilities to compare wage rates and company patterns *anonymously* because they may fear discrimination from their agencies. (I know I would) This seems like a very positive use of anonymity. Not only will millions of people on the bottom rung of office life be able to gain advantage by information, there are clear parallels to areas in the past of the left where unions and workers rights were seen as causes of first importance. In fact, the troubles involved in being temporary have been championed several times on television. This might make a good counterargument to 'teenagers and pipe bombs' If we say anonymity is a tool that helps up to 3-4% of the work force make intelligent choices and get paid more we may key into the left wing slant of the media. Treon Verdery (not posting from Adam's account this time!)

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Re: intelligent discovery agents
by Rich Salz 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Visit Sang at http://www.inlink.com/users/sangria/homepage.html >Sang has more information on Robots, Spiders, Ants, and Worms >than any other computer person I have yet to link up with. I suspect your original respondent doesn't get around very much. Rummaging around the above URL gets you little more then http://web.nexor.co.uk/mac/doc/robots/robots.html Tracing down the above URL points you to You really want to get the WWW conference proceedings; try email to wwwf94(a)osf.org and also http://www.ncsa.uiuc.edu/SDG/IT94/Proceedings/Agents.html Ob-crypto: there is a Security.html (instead of Agents) but it's more commerce-oriented, except for the DCE Web paper.

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AT&T produces video encryptor -- is it clipper based?
by perry＠imsi.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I just saw a story go by on the dow jones wire saying that AT&T had developed a "comprehensive security system for commercial information services". It is said to be an encryption system developed jointly by Bell Labs and VLSI, and its intedned for set-top boxes and "the internet". VLSI was one of the contractors on Clipper. Anyone know if this is an "escrowed" system? Anyone know any other details? Perry

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(fwd) Re: Racism on the Internet
by jamesd＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Xref: netcom.com alt.internet.services:40076 alt.internet.media-coverage:2932 Path: netcom.com!ix.netcom.com!howland.reston.ans.net!pipex!uunet!nwnexus!news.halcyon.com!usenet From: mpdillon(a)halcyon.com (Michael Dillon) Newsgroups: alt.internet.services,alt.internet.media-coverage Subject: Re: Racism on the Internet Date: Wed, 28 Dec 1994 18:11:51 +0000 Organization: Memra Software Inc., Armstrong, B.C., Canada Lines: 36 Message-ID: <dfQ0lapDlT1B073yn(a)halcyon.com> References: <18570UODGFHLRSDHOUP(a)curvet.com> NNTP-Posting-Host: halcyon.com This is forwarded from can.infohighway. Note the quote from Rutkowski at the bottom. This info should be more generally know on the net. In article <18570UODGFHLRSDHOUP(a)curvet.com>, dshaw(a)curvet.com wrote: > > IN>ae763(a)FreeNet.Carleton.CA (Harvey Goldberg) writes: > > >I work for the Canadian Human Rights Commission. > >I am currently doing research on the use of the > >Internet for the propagation of hate material. > >The purpose of the research is to determine what > >measures could be considered to control the use > >of the Net for this type of purpose. > > >I would appreciate hearing from anyone who has > >any views, information or comments on this > >subject or who know of anywhere on the Internet > >where this matter is discussed. > > According to Tony Rutkowski, Executive Director of the Internet > Society, "The Internet from a regulatory standpoint falls into the > category of private value-added networks, and in most countries under > the treaty provisions of the ITU, as well as the GATT, these are > networks that are outside the purview of government. To the extent > that there is any kind of obligation by governments, it is to allow > such networks to exist on a competitive basis". <Internet World, > January 1995>. --------------------------------------------------------------------- Cool cats, brick bats, bad boys wearin' big hats Surf's up, my cup, floating, flying, rising up. Michael Dillon mpdillon(a)halcyon.com C-4 Powerhouse, RR #2 michael(a)junction.net

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Re: Latency, bandwidth, and anonymity
by wcs＠anchor.ho.att.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

My initial reaction to "Anonymous video conferencing" was "That's when you wear black ski masks and use voice scramblers and call from video payphones", i.e. not very useful. ("Subcomandata Marcos here...") On the other hand, Wei Dai's followup message about > In the longer term, anonymous communication is in danger of being used > only by fringe groups if it falls too much behind the non-anonymous kind > in terms of latency and bandwidth (and cost, I guess). Maybe ONLY drug > dealers, nuclear terrorists, etc., will use anonymous remailers when full > sensory virtual interaction is the must popular way for most people to > communicate and remailers are still the only choice for the > anonymity-conscious. puts a different spin on it. It's a real problem, if not now, then maybe in 5-10 years. I realize that those of us in the Phone Company who have predicted universal Picturephone in the past have been over-optimistic :-), but the video compression people and the faster-chip people keep bringing us closer to having good-quality low-bandwidth video, and ISDN and fast modems are bringing available loop-end bandwidth up to the point that reasonably-priced circuits can carry it. (Long-haul raw bits have been cheap enough for a while; it's the distribution and switching technology that have a lot of the cost, and providing cheap high-bandwidth circuits makes it hard to make money on voice calls.) The approaches to anonymous video conferencing will depend a bit on whether the technology takes off on the nets or the phone system, if those two are still different by then. It's easier to obscure the origins of a call on the nets, where users own large parts, than it is on the phone system, where the Phone Companies own and operate most of it; the latter environment would require Phone Remailers, such as PBXs you call into on T1 lines and get shuffled out on other circuits - it's hard to get adequate mixing except in rather large environments.... Recircuiting on the nets will be left as an excercise to the reader. I suspect the harder parts of the job may be doing the faces and voices right - anonymous voice conference bridges are ok if the participants mostly don't know each other, but they're less useful if people know each other and cops with computerized voiceprint equipment may be eavesdropping (not common now, though computers and models of the human voice are improving; I suppose voice disguisers may improve from the kid's-toy quality to something better if there's a market, or if computers with full-duplex soundcards become more common.) Faces are harder, and they're not really a crypto problem - how do you fake them well? It's not too hard to do a "quayletool" quality solution that generates moving lips in front of a static picture, even timed with an audio feed, but that won't play too well in the business world, and having the camera pointing at your calendar or home page is only semi-useful. If video-calling evolves on the nets, there'll be a lot more need for speed-matching services, and it may be that computer-enhanced video receiving for high-bandwidth users will fund the technology development for face-simulation? If so, maybe you can use it to start with fake stills instead of real ones? Bill

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