December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

New version (1.2) of CFS now available
by Matt Blaze 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Source code for the latest version of CFS (release 1.2), the Cryptographic File System, is now available upon request for research and experimental use in the US and Canada. CFS pushes encryption services into the Unix(tm) file system. It supports secure storage at the system level through a standard Unix file system interface to encrypted files. Users associate a cryptographic key with the directories they wish to protect. Files in these directories (as well as their pathname components) are transparently encrypted and decrypted with the specified key without further user intervention; cleartext is never stored on a disk or sent to a remote file server. CFS employs a novel combination of DES stream and codebook cipher modes to provide high security with good performance on a modern workstation. CFS can use any available file system for its underlying storage without modification, including remote file servers such as NFS. System management functions, such as file backup, work in a normal manner and without knowledge of the key. CFS runs under SunOS and several other BSD-derived systems with NFS. It is implemented entirely at user level, as a local NFS server running on the client machine's "loopback" interface. It consists of about 5000 lines of code and supporting documentation. You must have "root" access to install CFS. CFS was first mentioned at the work-in-progress session at the Winter '93 USENIX Conference and was more fully detailed in: Matt Blaze, "A Cryptographic File System for Unix", Proc. 1st ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, Fairfax, VA, November 1993. (PostScript available by anonymous ftp from research.att.com in the file dist/mab/cfs.ps.) and in Matt Blaze, "Key Management in an Encrypting File System", Proc. Summer '94 USENIX Tech. Conference, Boston, MA, June 1994. (PostScript available by anonymous ftp from research.att.com in the file dist/mab/cfskey.ps.) The new version differs from the version described in the papers in a few ways: * The encryption scheme has been strengthened, and now provides greater security but with the online latency of only single-DES. * Support for the smartcard-based key management system is not included and a few of the tools are not included. * The performance has been improved. * The security of the system against certain non-cryptanalytic attacks has been improved somewhat. * User-contributed ports to a number of additional platforms. * Hooks for adding new ciphers. * 3-DES and MacGuffin encryption options. * Timeout options allow automatic detach of encrypted directories after a set time or period of inactivity. CFS is being distributed as a research prototype; it is COMPLETELY UNSUPPORTED software. No warranty of any kind is provided. We will not be responsible if the system deletes all your files and emails the cleartext directly to the NSA or your mother. Also, we do not have the resources to port the software to other platforms, although you are welcome to do this yourself. The software was developed under SunOS and BSDI, and there are also unsupported user-contributed ports available for AIX, HP/UX, Irix, Linux, Solaris and Ultrix. We really can't promise to provide any technical support at all, beyond the source code itself. We also maintain a mailing list for CFS users and developers; subscription information is included with the source code. Because of export restrictions on cryptographic software, we are only able to make the software available within the US and Canada to US and Canadian citizens and permanent residents. Unfortunately, we cannot make it available for general anonymous ftp or other uncontrolled access, nor can we allow others to do so. Sorry. Legal stuff from the README file: * Copyright (c) 1992, 1993, 1994 by AT&T. * Permission to use, copy, and modify this software without fee * is hereby granted, provided that this entire notice is included in * all copies of any software which is or includes a copy or * modification of this software and in all copies of the supporting * documentation for such software. * * This software is subject to United States export controls. You may * not export it, in whole or in part, or cause or allow such export, * through act or omission, without prior authorization from the United * States government and written permission from AT&T. In particular, * you may not make any part of this software available for general or * unrestricted distribution to others, nor may you disclose this software * to persons other than citizens and permanent residents of the United * States and Canada. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS BEING PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED * WARRANTY. IN PARTICULAR, NEITHER THE AUTHORS NOR AT&T MAKE ANY * REPRESENTATION OR WARRANTY OF ANY KIND CONCERNING THE MERCHANTABILITY * OF THIS SOFTWARE OR ITS FITNESS FOR ANY PARTICULAR PURPOSE. If you would like a copy of the CFS source code, please send email to: cfs(a)research.att.com DO NOT REPLY DIRECTLY TO THE SENDER OF MESSAGE. You must include a statement that you are in the US or Canada, are a citizen or legal permanent resident of the US or Canada, and have read and understand the license conditions stated above. Also include an email address in a US or Canada-registered domain. The code will be sent to you via email in a uuencoded compressed tarfile.

1 0

Eric, please can you clarify
by Jonathon Fletcher 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Eric, Can you clarify your intention for the list ? I'm a little puzzled by the alternatives that are flying about. You initially stated an intention to delay (eventually bounce) unsigned messages to cypherpunks list. A couple of posts back you talked about "This is an unsigned message" headers in messages. Are you intending to implement both of these, one of these, or one now and the other later ? What type of checking are you intending on signatures - just syntax or signature verification ? I apologize for asking for clarification, but I've lost the signal in amongst all this noise. -Jon -- Jonathon Fletcher, j.fletcher(a)stirling.ac.uk (X400: "/S=jf1/O=stirling/PRMD=uk.ac/C=gb/")

4 5

Re: The Market for Crypto--A Curmudgeon's View
by Amanda Walker 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> I disagree here -- I've gotten a couple of jobs where my net > reputation preceded me and was the primary motivator for my getting > an interview. I was also told at one of them to continue posting as I > did because they felt that their reputation was enhanced by mine. Indeed. Every job I've had since part-time consulting in college has been gotten through the net, and with me electronic presentation and reputation a large factor in getting hired. My official title at InterCon is "Software Engineer / Net Goddess", and among my official responsibilities are to competently and professionally represent myself and my employer on the Internet. The whole reason I'm on cypherpunks, in fact, is because we're ramping up on supporting encryption & authentication in our commercial software, and this is where the ideas are. > And "cannot make money on the net"? How do you see this? Much as I > hate the metaphor, I don't make money on the local highways either, > but they're a part of real life. It would also be hard to ship things without highways & airports :). This is why the net is an example of infastructure. InterCon probably makes more money from people who download our demos over the net, or see reviews and recommendations on comp.sys.mac.*, than we do from our traditional printed advertising (and given the quality of a couple of our MacWeek ads, this is a darned good thing :)). > Just because the reputations aren't digital yet, nor is the cash, > doesn't mean that the Net isn't real life. It's as real as nearby > I-94. And a lot more interesting and complex. I agree. And reputations *are* becoming at least partially digital. I've refused to hire people because I've seen them being twits on the net, and I've hired people (and been hired) because I make a generally good net.impression. It even got my picture in Fortune magazine this spring. If that's not at least a start at a digital reputation, I'm not sure what is. Amanda Walker InterCon Systems Corporation

1 0

Re: recent voice over data (fwd)
by Dave Emery 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message:

1 0

VOTE NO!
by anonymous-remailer＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On mandatory sigs: I personally don't fathom the idea (as some of you do), I've always perceived PGP(Tm) as something I would use when I really had something sensitive to send a friend, or when I was making a public announcement to a mailing list or newsgroup. But to use it to sign EVERY single piece of mail I send to cypherpunks is asking a lot from me as my setup is very similar to Tim Mays', and I don't want to be singled out because of it! I think the list should proceed as it has since its formation, and subscribers should just sign their messages as they see fit. I know I'm not posting anything new, but considering the torrential flood of trash that Detweiler posted, it's not that much of a waste. :-)= Good evening.

2 1

Re: Scalability of Ecash System / Article on Internet Cash available.
by rah＠shipwright.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 8:33 AM 12/2/94 -0500, Robert Hettinga wrote: >Filched from buyinfo, where they've been talking a lot about e$ lately... Oops. Sorry folks. That's what I get for letting my outbound mail stack up... Call it a prequel to the Brands excluded thread... Sorry again. Long story. Bob Hettinga ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) "There is no difference between someone Shipwright Development Corporation who eats too little and sees Heaven and 44 Farquhar Street someone who drinks too much and sees Boston, MA 02331 USA snakes." -- Bertrand Russell (617) 323-7923

1 0

Re: ERIK HUGHES: EGOTISTICAL PRICK
by ddt＠lsd.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- >Subject: ERIK HUGHES: EGOTISTICAL PRICK FWIW, I know Eric and can spell his name properly. From the numerous times I've been in his presence, it's my humble opinion that he's about the furthest thing from the bozo described in this flame that I can imagine. Whoever posted this rudeness is cruelly clue-challenged about Eric's character. From the content of his/her attack, this person should really apologize, but from the puerility of it, I doubt the author is mature enough to admit it. BTW, Eric was and is an early and consistent contributor of quality thinking to this list as far back as I can remember, which is early '92, has donate a lot of time and effort to helping maintain it, and I have no problem with him being photographed or known as a "founder." He's never in any way abused or even preened about it, afaik, and seems appropriately non-egotistical at all times, both in person and in posts. I'm pretty sick of ad hominem attacks like this on the net, but they usualy emanate from sleep-deprived teenagers with no manners who post anonymously, and not from responsible individuals trying to add a voice of humility to an important debate. Laugh it off, Eric, and ignore it (as I know you will). As for the idea of mandatory signatures: on the surface it's a pain and I don't much like it, but then, it does do an important thing in promoting "verifiable" posts. I don't post much material to the list (mostly I learn from you guys), and don't find it particularly onerous. Someone who contributes regularly might find it an inconvenience. Lots of things are way more inconvenient, if you ask me (like applying for an FOIA report). I think it might have the positive side-effect of providing an incentive for people to post meaningful information, and not lots of noise to the list (thereby somewhat diminishing the high volume). What effect does it have on anonymity, though? That could be a serious sticking point: as much as I dislike flames and idiocy from anonymous posters, I will defend their right to post anonymously regardless of how unpleasantly it smells. dave ____________________________________________ "Even the mad scientists called me crazy!" -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6 iQCVAgUBLt/zWaHBOF9KrwDlAQFzfAP+MusVHsSaPVq0jzLvqBCUVf8O+JAFbQXZ PKNHai6WXNJqECknifZ9GTYg0tccKY4G+xWjED6oLjeK3V1ds7hIaWNUrFg8Ok6r hH1oPnIMqxY6Iqc0XrgyY+5JnOBVWILA+Iwxy1I0UP+J10Tz8qUY1Q4CL5Ld7yqd FE7JafKUxOw= =Yoe9 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

1 0

Why nothing works <g> [Was: Mandatory sig workaround]
by shamrock＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Roy wrote in response to Tim: >Tim, just for fun, what tools would need to appear to make it possible >for you to sign your traffic? Maybe a description will inspire some of >the Macheads out there to get hacking. (the astute reader will note >that I'm not suggesting new tools to the erstwhile Mr. May, as has been >done so often in the past) There is no hacking in the world that could create the kind of tool that would be needed to satisfy Tim. What would be required to satisfy Tim can't be done and I think that most long time CP's are be well aware of that. We have had this discussion over and over for many issues (PGP, MIME,..) for the last two years. The problem isn't that there are no tools for Tim's Mac, the problem is that there is _no way_ to do all these things on Netcom's UNIX host. 1. Tim: "I can't do any of the new things you are proposing because I don't have the tools." 2. Some CP: "Just download your mail to your local machine and process it there. There are many great ways to automate this on a Mac." 3. Tim: "I don't want to have to download mail for processing. I want to be able to do it all on Netcom's machine." 4. Some CP: "Just run PGP on Netcom's machine and process the mail there.' 5. Tim: " Using PGP on a shared machine is a security risk." 6. Some CP: "Just use a low security key on Netcom to sign your messages." 7. Tim: "PGP on a timeshare is worse than nothing. It gives a wrong sense of security. " 8. Some CP: "Since you don't want to do it on the host and you don't want to do it on another machine, there is no way for you to do it." 9. GOTO 1. No, the above is not a quote of an acctual exchange, but rather an abreviated version of what I gathered from reading hundreds of messages and dozens of threads. YMMV, - --Lucky -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6ui iQCVAgUBLt41vASQkem38rwFAQFNRwP8DjwJ37unGf27LscvTOCU699wvXvH/pEI kBdvRCHJNQbcerBc7SDwjgVJC3XaaIDlO1rqBfcZXZETOa/3EKnjFHiX0+6Kb0zo b1k2lTmzFG7su2biwkmYkI5TlYEM4/nTpq/vYjZ3Md5rjXm5wA+cJcfivJd8RdX6 fRwWq2QXerM= =z9wu -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

4 3

AA BBS case
by moulton＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

A few months ago there were several posts about the AA BBS case. Here is the info about the sentencing. According to an AP story, Robert and Carleen Thomas were sentenced December 2, 1994 to 37 and 30 months in prison respectively for "transmitting pornography via computer and selling obscene videotapes". The defendents will be ordered to surrender their computer equipment according to U.S. District Judge Julia Gibbons. The defendants will begin their sentences in about two months and will not allowed to remain free during appeal. The Thomases' operated the members-only Amateur Action Bulletin Board System in California. They were tried and convicted in Tennesse.

1 0

Re: using us crypto sw outside usa
by wcs＠anchor.ho.att.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> I was wondering what is the legal status for using rsaref ooutside usa. > Is it legal or not? There are three problems - getting a copy, patent, and copyright. Getting a copy of RSAREF means that somebody has to export it, which the US government strongly disapproves of. On the other hand, if you're not a US citizen, and not in the US, and your government doesn't have laws against possessing things that other governments don't want you to have, no problem. Patent - the RSA algorithm patent doesn't apply outside the US, so no problem. Copyright - Most governments do honor U.S. copyrights. Some of the early RSAREF versions said that you may not export it, so there may be copyright problems if you use them outside the US. Newer versions have a warning that the US government doesn't permit export, and recommends talking to a lawyer if this affects you, but doesn't say that you may not do so - so there isn't a problem with permission, and therefore not with copyright. That's nice, because otherwise I would have had to pay somebody outside North America to write a clone. (I had offered anybody on the net outside the US/Canada $100 to do so, but nobody took it, and I now cancel that offer because RSA doesn't forbid overseas use and copies have apparently gotten distributed.) > Also, what is the legal status of RC4 code posted to the net? Uncertain. It was protected by trade secret (not giving anybody copies unless they sign a license contract), but somebody apparently violated their contract and disclosed it anyway. Some places have laws against using information released like that, some don't, some allow the originator of the information to sue. There's also the problem of verifying whether that *really* is RC4. Bill Stewart

1 0