December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: MEMS
by rah＠shipwright.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 9:15 PM 11/1/94 -0500, John Young wrote: >Benevolent advances on the ankle monitors cherished by >half-free culprits. Position indicators, DNA IDs, body >condition monitors (drugs, anyone), Nicoderm patches, first put >on soldiers for their protection and survival, to ease the way >to more general acceptance, kind of like the G.I. Bill for >tomorrow. One of the first places I read about this personal transponder stuff was in a book by G.K. O'Neill, of space colony fame. The book _2081_ (published in 1981, obviously), talks among other things (he thought magnetic levitated trains in evacuated tunnels were *way* cool) about transponders, and the uses of them in all kinds of computing, including electronic commerce of a sort: pick up the object you want to buy in a store and walk out with it. The store's systems know what the object is, who you are, and sends a message to your bank to deduct the amount from your account. He thought we were going to have to give up privacy to get this boon (and others which I can't remember), but with PKC and blind signatures, we know better now. Of course we also know now that he was copying Xerox PARC ubiquitous computing studies straight into his Apple II, but I had never heard of PARC, much less ubiquitous computing, and was amazed by the idea at the time. Cheers, Bob Hettinga ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) "There is no difference between someone Shipwright Development Corporation who eats too little and sees Heaven and 44 Farquhar Street someone who drinks too much and sees Boston, MA 02331 USA snakes." -- Bertrand Russell (617) 323-7923

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Snoop program for Linux
by Jim Pinson 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Thought ya'll might want to know that the latest Slackware Linux distribution has a "ttysnoop" program that watches a users login tty. I haven't tried it, and probably wont', but thought I'd pass it along. Jim Pinson Galapagos.

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CID
by merriman＠metronet.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>>I've got the specs for a program to use with your modem to generate >>what'll resemble a full CID. So with the computer set up to dial, even >>standard voice calls too and faxes, too, can be equipped with a fake >>field (or "header" if you will), displaying a homemade caller ID. >> >>Since it uses the exact same structure as the real caller ID, no telco >>along the entire system will ever doubt it. I can send the full >>specifications if you are seriously interested in doing the code in >>full or in part. Sorry, I can't implement it myself (lack of skills). I, for one, would be *very much* interested in receiving the specs and any additional information you could provide. Dave Merriman (not _caring_ who you are, where you're from, etc :-) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Finger merriman(a)metronet.com for PGP public key and fingerprint. PGP encrypted Email welcome and encouraged. War is Peace. Freedom is Slavery. Ignorance is Strength. No?

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California Code online
by Hal 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

For the "book disadvantaged" among us, I saw a reference today to the California civil code online. It is at: http://www.law.indiana.edu/codes/ca/codes.html. The form of this URL suggests that other states might be there, too, but I didn't look. This is a very nice presentation, structured with each section in a separate page, and a nice table of contents. I was browsing the commercial code which has lot sof interesting info on commercial paper and other subjects of interest with regard to digital cash. Hal

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Voice PGP, When?
by jamesh＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Punksters; Do we know when Voice PGP will be available? Can anyone point me to more info about it? I understand that "Call Security" does not include source, so I don't think I can consider using it. I'm wondering if I should continue writing my own. JJH -- Relationships are like modular furniture... Dardy Chang

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PGP
by jwhull＠cats.ucsc.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hey y'all, I saw Gengis Kahn's note on alt.usenet.kooks. Could you send me over your manifesto or what have you and anything accessible on PGP. Thanks Will Hull <jwhull(a)cats.ucsc.edu>

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cyphertext-only remailers / cryptanalysis code ?
by L. McCarthy 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Alex Strasheim writes: > One solution that I've thought about is only passing messages which are > composed of cyphertext. Does this make any sense? This sounds useful, but I'm curious how you would enforce it. I would think you'd need to do some nontrivial statistical analysis to be reasonably sure you weren't allowing various binaries, uuencoded files, etc. with faked PGP headers, without preventing people from using other encryption schemes. I'd say this is the flip side of the challenge faced by governments trying to outlaw transmissions using strong crypto. Incidentally, I'd love to get pointers to online pieces of code which perform various statistical tests on data to find patterns characteristic of particular encryption schemes, &c. for cryptanalysis. I want to cryptanalyze a couple of encryption algorithms and would like to do some experimental work. Please send me mail directly and I will summarize to the list later on. My starting points are Applied Crypto, the CEB, and Tim's Cyphernomicon. -L. Futplex McCarthy; use "Subject: remailer-help" for an autoreply PGP key by finger or server; "Better watch what you say, or they'll be calling you a radical...a liberal" --Supertramp "[CIA/KGB mole Aldrich Ames] took information in shopping bags out the front door" --miscellaneous Congressperson -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.1 iQCVAwUBLtJ3tWf7YYibNzjpAQGOVwQApexTVG/PfeHNQcE+xr5lsCWxtnC13/EL GE8A8T77YavVQDUt3P7zWH8nw05OUosUgwe3QQKu+rRQGV1Y5dLcpxMQIk/iFSE1 3hMzZYCv6L6OQ0wyt8VOuEGmg8ffvBIod9C9i9PndmHZY73j3WPoSbDXLsBXlQu4 my8Oz2NLAP4= =Zxlu -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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C.I.D.
by anonymous-remailer＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Multiple recipients of list <cypherpunks>: Some Happy Fool asked how we could defeat caller ID 'cause the *67 still sends along the calling number between switches (it just doesn't display it, but that is not the same as it not being available to the bad guys - *69 will still work, regardless). The discussion should probably be taken off the list, so please direct replies to me personally (or better: let us know of a more appropriate forum. I am disappointed in alt.hackers and 2600 really sucks, are there better places to go with this kind of stuff? Anybody?) To Happy Fool et al: I've got the specs for a program to use with your modem to generate what'll resemble a full CID. So with the computer set up to dial, even standard voice calls too and faxes, too, can be equipped with a fake field (or "header" if you will), displaying a homemade caller ID. Since it uses the exact same structure as the real caller ID, no telco along the entire system will ever doubt it. I can send the full specifications if you are seriously interested in doing the code in full or in part. Sorry, I can't implement it myself (lack of skills). If we get the thing running, it will dial any number and send the counterfeit header along with the call, making the telco switch believe it is dealing with a forwarded call. The beauty of it all is that this way, it will not insert its own header (it only does so when no previous CID header is detected). This is not just for use on the U-S Signaling System 7, because SS7 is now an international standard. Many countries are far more computerized than the U-S. In parts of Europe, some 95% of all areas now have digital switches. Caller ID is probably the most anticipated and feared part of these systems. This service, only available in digital areas, keeps track of the last 10 numbers that called and the time and date they did so. Example: Let's say you are in a digital area. You call a friend with a caller ID device (costing ~=$40). Between the first and second ring, they have your number. It's as easy as that. He doesn't even have to pick up the phone. Even busy calls or calls where no-one is home are registered! WARNING: When whole nations are digitalized, ANY system you call pegs you within 5 seconds of your call. What about diverters, call forwarders and stuff like that? They won't work. To cheat them, you need to produce fake headers. So if the software is not already written, let's write it. Volunteers? @@@@ This message has been brought to you by @ .. @ PETE "THE WIMP" WATKINS...BASICALLY SPINELESS(tm) | __ | \__/ <---Digitized representation of Pete Watkins My e-mail address is <mg5n+alias!wimp(a)andrew.cmu.edu>

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Re: Admiral Inman
by blancw＠pylon.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Our enemies are industriously corrupting the language in order to make the ideas of liberty inexpressible. In particular they are seeking to make the concepts behind the declaration of independence and the bill of rights unspeakably and therefore, they hope, unthinkable. .................................................... Do you think that 'our enemies' are doing this consciously, purposefully, deliberately? Do you think that they know these concepts well enough to apprehend what it is about their meanings that should be corrupted? Do you think that, having understood what these concepts represent, they are in such abhorrence of them that the only thing they can do, short of physical fighting against the promoters of the concepts, is disorient everyone into a confused state of cognitive indeterminancy & inefficacy? Maybe that's what happened to Inman during his rejection speech! Blanc

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Re: DC-Net implementation
by rishab＠dxm.ernet.in 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

acspring(a)knoware.nl (Andrew Spring): > >Using a central node to coordinate the DC-net traffic requires that the > >participants trust that central node. If the central node is evil, > A collation of N-1 nodes will always produce garbage; the whole set is > needed for the message to fall out. > Example > ... > A sends 14 - 5 = 9 to Central node > B sends 5 - 11 = -6 Central nodes are not nice for various reasons, including the usual networking and security (trust) advantages of wide distribution. IAC a central node is not necessary; for example, if each node were to output to the next: B sends Anum XOR Brnd (XOR msg) to C where Brnd is B's random number, msg is B's message (if any) and Anum is the similarly generated output of A. This is much closer to the original DCNet _bit_ flipping - the first XOR checks for equality while the second commits the 'lie' In this case whatever number A gets from D is the output of the net. There are lots of interesting cryptographic sub-protocols to make too much trust unnecessary. I also believe that error-correction is best left to lower levels of the network - there's no need for a DC Net not to assume a reliable data channel. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Rishab Aiyer Ghosh "Clean the air! clean the sky! wash the wind! rishab(a)dxm.ernet.in take stone from stone and wash them..." rishab(a)arbornet.org Voice/Fax/Data +91 11 6853410 Voicemail +91 11 3760335 H 34C Saket, New Delhi 110017, INDIA

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