December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: www.commentary.unabomber
by carolann＠censored.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Go FrogFarm Go! From: Damaged Justice <frogfarm(a)yakko.cs.wmich.edu> Subject: Re: www.commentary.unabomber To: carolann(a)censored.org Date: Wed, 20 Sep 1995 20:03:45 -0400 (EDT) X-Angst-Level: Fair to Middlin' X-Authentication-Vegetable: Aardvark X-NSA-Food: narcotics anarchy bosnia encryption assassinate X-Thrash-Confirmation: Ahh! Hippy on a stick! Organization: Somewhere just far enough outside of your jurisdiction Reply-To: frogfarm(a)yakko.cs.wmich.edu Yes, it's a complete version. I've also started a rudimentary rebuttal/ commentary page at http://yakko.cs.wmich.edu/~frogfarm/unabuttal.html - -- frogfarm(a)yakko.cs.wmich.edu (Damaged Justice) is officially declared Unmutual s..O).... The smurf wields a hypodermic! -- More -- I like women who @.../.".. You destroy the smurf! -- More -- are *strong*, in .$*...].. You feel self-righteous! <B>every</B> sense of the word. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMGCvXIrpjEWs1wBlAQFHWAP9Fnf7patTds/KSr6EssfDgZvZKSQiTSqT ddK52W1cbAI+oJT46v0rX2Z7gQeibjHu64jCpQLj7df62p11RD7ElseD9EOJLjUX wUOy5+ap9+dbdr1FViWgwG+B6qExmrduZTsJ3jHz8Fq6cxd8e5iRW+R61wT4Ph1W wZtDiMrUpIE= =UQy3 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -- Member Internet Society - Certified BETSI Programmer - Webmistress *********************************************************************** Carol Anne Braddock (cab8) carolann(a)censored.org 206.42.112.96 My Homepage The Cyberdoc *********************************************************************** ------------------ PGP.ZIP Part [017/713] ------------------- M8H,),S$8G>&.WP(8IRA`-M['+`Q%&_C"">5-F%LX@<_Q$;*P'',Q$Z/AA[8M MF=O0H+*%(-S%&>S%+FS&<LS%3(Q&#W1"<]2%`H^;,]^1C$'HBN8PX$4SYAU^ MPGD<Q0ZLA0D+,`MCT!LA**4M[-JPAK9F?40!AJ,CW"'%DR#:'9?Q)3[%<DQ` ------------------------------------------------------------- for next chunk to export --> http://dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/export/

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Re: Infoworld and Denning's study
by pgut001＠cs.auckland.ac.nz 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Infoworld NZ has just published an awful article (written by US reporter Sari >Kalin and titled "Criminals Eyeing Encryption"), which emphasises repeatedly >that encryption is a major problem just waiting to happen, using Dorothy >Dennings report as a basis. This represents a rather ugly way to interpret >the report (and, presumably, an attempt by the USG to recover something from >a report which was supposed to come down firmly in favour of crypto >restrictions but didn't). Due to the late hour I got that wrong, it's Computerworld NZ, not Infoworld (slight difference in naming). Even later last night I wrote a letter to the editor which, I gather, will appear in the next issue. I've included it below in case anyone finds it useful, it's written for a general audience who probably aren't aware of the deeper issues apart from the fact that the USG has a peculiar attitude towards crypto, due to length constraints I couldn't go into too much detail. If you feel the need to circulate this, please don't do so until after next Monday when it's officially published. Peter. -- Snip -- The article "Crims eyeing encryption" in the September 9 Computerworld presents an extremely peculiar view of the study "Encryption and Evolving Technologies in Organised Crime and Terrorism". The final conclusion of the study was that there is no real "encryption problem" which justifies placing limitations on the use of encryption, and yet the article, by more or less ignoring the conclusion and concentrating instead on a number of scaremongering quotes, manages to create exactly the opposite impression. To understand what's involved here, it might be useful to know a bit about the background of the study. For a number of years the US government has held that it needs to strongly restrict peoples access to encryption. They can't actually provide you with any supporting facts for this because they're all classified, but if they were allowed to tell you, they're certain you'd agree with them. Now over the years they came to the realisation that people weren't really buying this argument, and so they decided to create a study which would provide proof, once and for all, that they were right. The two people who worked on this study were Dorothy Denning, virtually the only supporter of the US governments policy apart from the US government itself, and a vice-president of SAIC, a large defence contractor. They toiled away for quite some time, and finally announced their results a month or two back. Unfortunately the findings put them in a rather awkward position: Although the study was supposed to provide proof that there was some sort of "encryption problem" which needed to be countered, it instead showed that there wasn't really a problem at all. Sure, it showed that criminals occasionally use encryption, just like criminals also drive cars, eat pizza, drink Coke, and (quite probably) read Computerworld. The important point - which was almost completely ignored in the article in favour of running scaremongering quotes from a variety of US government officials - was that the "encryption problem", the whole reason for the governments' claimed need to restrict encryption, by and large didn't exist. It got even worse for the government though. So convincing was the evidence in the study that Denning - for years a very outspoken supporter of their policies - did an about-face and declared that she was no longer prepared to back government plans for restricting encryption until someone proved to her that there was a very good reason for it (this was reported in a number of US papers and publications which cover computer issues, so it was reasonably well known, eg "Denning unable to confirm FBI Assertions; alters her position" in the Mercury News, the largest silicon valley paper). Although the governments star technical witness was unable to find any evidence that their position was valid, the Computerworld article, by resorting to selective quoting and innuendo, paints a very different, and quite inaccurate, picture. (As a side-note, I find it amusing to read that the government policy relies on people handing over their encryption keys to them. Quite apart from the question of why anyone would trust the US government with their keys, there's also the small problem that no criminal will ever do this - that's why they're criminals after all. The only ones who'll ever get caught by this cunning plan are you and I). -- Snip -- (I'm assuming most readers will get the Baldrick/Blackadder reference in the last sentence :-).

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RE: NETSCAPE TO PATCH SHAREWARE VERSION
by anon-remailer＠utopia.hacktic.nl 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Date: Tue, 12 Sep 1995 23:00:18 +0200 To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com Subject: Re: Netscape to patch shareware version From: anon-remailer(a)utopia.hacktic.nl (Anonymous) Organization: Hack-Tic International, Inc. >| Netscape said it received word last week that the State Department had >| cleared that version for release on the Net, but only within the U.S., >| owing to current export laws banning the export of encryption schemes >| stronger than 40 bits. THe company could provide no details by press >| time on how it would ensure that the 128-bit version wouldn't leak beyond >| U.S. borders. > >Ok, any bet on how long it will take? It's already been exported. Evidently, one of those who bought the commercial I note the site removed it, however, probably because Netscape Comm. Inc. reque

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(NOISE) X-FILES ANARCHIST
by dsc＠swcp.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Date: Sat, 16 Sep 1995 09:56:59 -0600 To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com From: dsc(a)swcp.com (Dar Scott) Subject: (Noise) X-Files anarchist I hardly watch TV ...blah, blah..., but I saw X-files last night. A very minor character was a cryptohacker who--to his surprise--brute-forced a military key for some files. He was described as an anarchist. To _my_ surprise, this anarchist was not associated with violence or lunatic ravings. He was shown as reading a book entitled something like Survey of Modern Conspiracy Theories. I see this as an improvement in the stereotype of computer-associated anarchists. And this I see as a good thing, since I think there is a lot that could be learned from anarchists. I think the character was killed, but I may have missed something. Dar =========================================================== Dar Scott Home phone: +1 505 299 9497 Dar Scott Consulting Voice: +1 505 299 5790 8637 Horacio Place NE Email: darscott(a)aol.com Albuquerque, NM 87111 dsc(a)swcp.com Fax: +1 505 898 6525 http://www.swcp.com/~correspo/DSC/DarScott.html ===========================================================

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Re: FUCK! how do i unregister from toad.com or the 2 other server ?%
by Allan Thompson 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

are you tired ? >I am tired, i am registered to 3 cypherpunks server and tired or receiving >40-50 new message each day! > >Please someone reply! > >Martin >mgmicro(a)usa.net > > > ************************************************** "The World is full of shipping clerks who read the Harvard Classics." --Bukowski ***************************************************

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RE: GAK
by terrell＠sam.neosoft.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Date: Thu, 07 Sep 1995 18:42:06 -0500 To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com From: terrell(a)sam.neosoft.com (Buford Terrell) Subject: Re: GAK >Date: Sun, 3 Sep 1995 21:25:26 -0400 (EDT) >From: Brian Davis <bdavis(a)thepoint.net> >Subject: Re: GAK >On Fri, 1 Sep 1995, Timothy C. May wrote: > >> At 10:56 PM 9/1/95, Buford Terrell wrote: >> >> >If you've ever watched Not_at_all_Funny Home Videos or any of the >> >American Urinal school of tabloid television, you soon start feeling >> >that the real threat to privacy is not the guvmint, but all of >> >the yoyos with their little cam corders running around pointing them >> >at people. >> > >> >Security cameras in ATMS and at airline ticket counters do more >> >to threaten you privacy than do FIBBIE wiretaps, and PGP won't >> >protect you from them. (and usually neither will the courts). >> >> I absolutely agree with this, though this doesn't mean I'll stop worrying >> about the government's plans for key escrow (GAK), about limits on key >> lengths, or about other efforts to thwart strong security. > >I, of course, know of the "dislike" of GAK here. I am curious to know, >however, if the "dislike" is because government would have access under >any circumstances or if the primary worry is that government will cheat >and get access when most would agree that they shouldn't (either by the >judge "cheating" or a TLA stealing it). > >In other words ... if it took agreement by a review board composed of >non-LEA members of this list, would the escrow be acceptable?? > >EBD > In my case, it's simply a matter of principle: the government has no right to know what I'm saying. Search warrants may allow them to get to "things" that I have, but the First and Fifth amendments make words sacred. If the government can eavesdrop on my conversation, then my speech is no longer free. A review board consisting of cypherpunks has no more right to listen to my private conversations than does the FBI, so I would not agree to that proposal either. --buford

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Selling our spin. was: Cypherpunks Press release
by Pat Farrell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Kevin L Prigge <klp(a)gold.tc.umn.edu> writes: > Does anyone know exactly how the press contact thing works? My impression > is that a reporter/journalist stumbles on to someone who knows something > about a particular area, and is willing to be interviewed. Then the next > time a story comes along that deals even slightly with that subject, the > reporter will tend to contact that person. I think the "exact" process varies with the journalist. But you have it generally correct. The press runs on reputations. When a writer gets a story, they look for "reliable sources" to contact. Reputations are based on a lot of things, including knowledge, speaking ability, looks and the ability to emit a sound-bite that is interesting. it is a strange process. I mean, I even got on CNN during the Morris worm. Tim is right, there is no "we" here. We can't have an official spokesperson, we don't agree on much. But we can work from the ground up. There are a number of serious cryptographers on the list, or at least friendly to the list when the S/N ratio makes sense. With a little work, we should be able to find a fairly long list of media contacts. We can even make it media friendly. >From people I've personally seen recently, we could have Doug Humphrey of Digex (nice to have a security-related company President) Bob Stratton of UU.Net (corporate security wiz) Carl Ellison of TIS (usually on c'punks light and at all DCcp meetings) probably others at TIS such as Ken Mendelsen or Steve Walker For the political side, the folks at EFF, CDT, EIPC, etc. And there are others that could be good contacts, such as William H Murray of Delloite and Touche, Matt Blaze of [Bellcore|BellLabs] It might take a while to get permission for referal, but I expect that most security consultants would consider being quoted in mainstream press to be good advertizing. If we make it easy, anyone would be willing to take advantage of the resource. We should also inclue a representative sample of folks who disagree with us. Any real list should include Dorothy Denning and other supporters. We can simply stack the deck. We can make sure that the mainline journalists know where to look, and make sure that CDT, EFF, ACLU, and EPIC have references that are ready when they are asked for referals. Assuming my web server recovers from the mention in comp.risks, I'm more than willing to accept suggestions and have a "security spokes-folks" page. Pat Pat Farrell Grad Student http://www.isse.gmu.edu/students/pfarrell Info. Systems & Software Engineering, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA PGP key available on homepage #include <standard.disclaimer>

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Re: Big Brother is watching you watch Farenheit 451
by Peter Trei 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Bill Stewart <stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com> wrote: > At 08:47 AM 9/4/97 -0400, Brian B. Riley wrote: > >in the process of rereading "Fahrenheit 451" - the recent printing of > >this in paperback features a Marquis that says somethig like "Now, more > >relevant than ever" - as much as I hate having someone else tell me what > >to think ... they certainly seem to be right. It has been over twenty > > BTW, the last copy of F451 I saw really irked me - the cover had > explanatory notes like "Fahrenheit 451, the temperature that books burn!" > and stuff about firemen whose job is setting fires. > Are today's kids dumbing down, or less literate, or is it just enough > longer since the book was written that publishers need to try harder to > get people to read it? Any day, I expect to hear that The State has mandated that all first editions of F451 be confiscated and landfilled. Why? Whatever the true motives, the one they will cite is "public safety": the first (hardback) edition is bound in asbestos. trei(a)process.com

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Re: netscape's response
by Jeff Weinstein 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Sep 20, 5:16pm, David_A Wagner wrote: > Subject: Re: netscape's response > In article <9509200139.ZM206@tofuhut> you write: > > On Sep 20, 12:29am, Christian Wettergren wrote: > > > One wild idea that I just got was to have servers and clients exchange > > > random numbers (not seeds of course), in a kind of chaining way. Since > > > most viewers connect to a number of servers, and all servers are > > > connected to by many clients, they would mix "randomness sources" with > > > each other, making it impossible to observe the local environment > > > only. And the random values would of course be encrypted under the > > > session key, making it impossible to "watch the wire". > > > > Wow, this is a great idea!! > > Are you quite sure this is a good idea? > > I'd be very scared of it. In particular, it opens up the chance for > adversaries to feed you specially chosen numbers to pollute your seeds. What I should have said is that its a very interesting idea. Given current perceptions of netscape, I should have made clear that I wouldn't do something like this without getting a lot more discussion and review of possible dangers and how to avoid them. I certainly can't fault anyone for wondering if we would just implement this without thinking it through, given recent events. --Jeff -- Jeff Weinstein - Electronic Munitions Specialist Netscape Communication Corporation jsw(a)netscape.com - http://home.netscape.com/people/jsw Any opinions expressed above are mine.

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RE: AN OPPORTUNITY NOT TO BE MISSED
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Date: Wed, 13 Sep 1995 19:25:24 -0700 To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com From: tcmay(a)got.net (Timothy C. May) Subject: Re: An opportunity not to be missed At 1:57 AM 9/14/95, Bill Stewart wrote: >Is Wavy Gravy running his "Nobody for President" campaign again this time? >After all, Nobody's going to balance the budget, and Nobody's going to >get the government out of your bedroom, and on the internet, Nobody can tell >if you're a dog or not :-) Or to update it for today: "Nobody(a)remailer.org for President." --Tim ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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