December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Admiral Inman
by jamiel＠sybase.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>replied that the governmental concern about wiretaps was and is primarily >and unambiguously about narcotics. and >Back to Narcotics. He gave the statistic that 90% of the narcotics leads >related to money laundering come from domestic wiretaps. Wow, this is easy then: legalize drugs and wiretaps are practically unessessary. Buy a copy of High Times today! ;) It does amaze me that what can be a victimless activity is such a hotbutton. A direct quote from him saying the above would be a nice tool the next time kiddie porn and terrorists are thrown out for the press to chew on. >Inman was surprised by the looming introduction of VoicePGP, and said that >that would be a big problem I like the sound of this. > So Inman >seems sensitive to issues of privacy, but in this case, they seem to be >primarily associated with invasions of privacy by the media rather than by >the government. Typical. Sounds like a very interesting talk. -j

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Re: Admiral Inman
by pcw＠access.digex.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>>Inman was surprised by the looming introduction of VoicePGP, and said that >>that would be a big problem > >I like the sound of this. > I've always assumed that the excitement behind the Digital Telephony bill was to go after VoicePGP. My prediction is that the Internet alone is legal but the Internet plus VoicePGP can't be deployed without someone building in the wiretaps for the government. Since no one owns the Internet and no one can add the wiretap ability, then the Internet + VoicePGP will be verboten. Since they can't very well ban the Internet, they'll just ban using VoicePGP on public networks. But, you'll be free to use it in the privacy of your own home. That's my latest paranoid thought. -Peter

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C.I.D.
by anonymous-remailer＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

How can we defeat caller I.D.? It used to be that if you wanted to have anonymous e-mail, you could sign on to a BBS. But I am scared by the new modems that are equipped to log caller I.D. The general public believes that if they want to remain anonymous, they can defeat caller ID by dialling *67 before making a call, that way making sure that their number is not revealed. Ha! This is true, but not the full truth ... because Big Brother still has the number: The calling number is sent between switches always, regardless of whether or not *67 (Caller ID Block) is dialed. It just sends along a privacy indicator if you dial *67, and then the final switch in the path will send a "P" instead of the calling number to the Caller ID box. (But it will still store the actual number - *69 will work whether or not the caller dialed *67). What the final switch along the path does with the calling number depends on how the switch is configured. If you are not paying for Caller ID service, the switch is configured so that it will not transmit the Caller ID data. Before this, if you wanted to make sure a system didn't trace you back, you could call through a few diverters, PABXs, etc. However, today with Caller ID, your call information will be routed from diverter to PABX to system instead of stopping at the first diverter. The effect call forwarding has on the various services is interesting... Say I have my home telephone forwarded to Lunatic Labs, and it has Caller ID. If you call me, the call will forward to Lunatic Labs, and its Caller ID box will show YOUR number, not mine (since your line is the actual one making the call). Does this get you thinking? Anybody knows of a way to *really* defeat caller I.D.? Or, absent that, a more appropriate mailing list than this for such questions? |[]|[]|[]|[]|[]| "The Happy Fool"© []|[]|[]|[]|[]|[ PS: I did not want to participate in the great logo debate a while back, but if you want my 2C's, I think a simple padlock would be a great symbol, especially for an icon to do unbreakable encryption: Click it and seal. Elaborate? Then just put it on a red wax-seal.

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Pentium bug and CRYPTO
by Claborne, Chris 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Will the following error (Re Pentium Floating Point Bug Date: 15 Nov 1994) cause problems with PGP key generation or any other normal operations with PGP or other crypto. I'm not a math mathmatics nerd but I know we generally deal with big numbers. For all of you paranoids out there, YES this is a plot by NSA to weeken our crypto capabilities, this is the only bug that we KNOW about :) NOTE: I'm currently not receiving cypherpunks mailing for some reason. I'm not sure why, so please copy me on your posts. (Hughes, have you had a chance to look at this?) Thanks! ... __o .. -\<, chris.claborne(a)sandiegoca.ncr.com ...(*)/(*). CI$: 76340.2422 PGP Pub Key fingerprint = A8 FA 55 92 23 20 72 69 52 AB 64 CC C7 D9 4F CA Avail on Pub Key server. PGP-encrypted e-mail welcome! - ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- -- > >>> > > >>> > Subject: Pentium Floating Point Bug Date: 15 Nov 1994 > >>> > Summary: Divisions might give incorrect results on Pentium > >>> > > >>> > Pentium Floating Point Division Bug > >>> > > >>> > There has been a flurry of activity the last fews days on the > >>> > Internet news group, comp.sys.intel, that should interest MATLAB > >>> > users. A serious design flaw has been discovered in the floating > >>> > point unit on Intel's Pentium chip. Double precision divisions > >>> > involving operands with certain bit patterns can produce incorrect > >>> > results. > >>> > > >>> > The most dramatic example seen so far can be extracted from a > >>> > posting last night by Tim Coe of Vitesse Semiconductor. In MATLAB, > >>> > his example becomes > >>> > > >>> > x = 4195835 > >>> > y = 3145727 > >>> > z = x - (x/y)*y > >>> > > >>> > With exact computation, z would be zero. In fact, we get zero on > >>> > most machines, including those using Intel 286, 386 and 486 chips. > >>> > Even with roundoff error, z should not be much larger than eps*x, > >>> > which is about 9.3e-10. But, on the Pentium, > >>> > > >>> > z = 256 > >>> > > >>> > The relative error, z/x, is about 2^(-14) or 6.1e-5. The computed > >>> > quotient, x/y, is accurate to only 14 bits. > >>> > > >>> > An article in last week's edition of Electronic Engineering Times > >>> > credits Prof. Thomas Nicely, a mathematics professor at Lynchburg > >>> > College in Virginia, with the first public announcement of the > >>> > Pentium division bug. One of Nicely's examples involves > >>> > > >>> > p = 824633702441 > >>> > > >>> > With exact computation > >>> > > >>> > q = 1 - (1/p)*p > >>> > > >>> > would be zero. With floating point computation, q should be on > >>> > the order of eps. On most machines, we find that > >>> > > >>> > q = eps/2 = 2^(-53) ~= 1.11e-16 > >>> > > >>> > But on the Pentium > >>> > > >>> > q = 2^(-28) ~= 3.72e-09 > >>> > > >>> > This is roughly single precision accuracy and is typical of the > >>> > most of the examples that had been posted before Coe's analysis. > >>> > > >>> > The bit patterns of the operands involved in these examples > >>> > are very special. The denominator in Coe's example is > >>> > > >>> > y = 3*2^20 - 1 > >>> > > >>> > Nicely's research involves a theorem about sums of reciprocals > >>> > of prime numbers. His example involves a prime of the form > >>> > > >>> > p = 3*2^38 - 18391 > >>> > > >>> > We're not sure yet how many operands cause the Pentium's floating > >>> > point division to fail, or even what operands produce the largest > >>> > relative error. It is certainly true that failures are very rare. > >>> > But, as far as we are concerned, the real difficulty is having to > >>> > worry about this at all. There are so many other things than can > >>> > go wrong with computer hardware, and software, that, at least, we > >>> > ought to be able to rely on the basic arithmetic. > >>> > > >>> > The bug is definitely in the Pentium chip. It occurs at all clock > >>> > rates. The bug does not affect other arithmetic operations, or the > >>> > built-in transcendental functions. Intel has recently made changes > >>> > to the on-chip Program Logic Array that fix the bug and is now > >>> > believed to be producing error free CPUs. It remains to be seen > >>> > how long it will take for these to reach users. > >>> > > >>> > An unnamed Intel spokesman is quoted in the EE Times article as > >>> > saying "If customers are concerned, they can call and we'll replace > >>> > any of the parts that contain the bug." But, at the MathWorks, > >>> > we have our own friends and contacts at Intel and we're unable > >>> > to confirm this policy. We'll let you know when we hear anything > >>> > more definite. In the meantime, the phone number for Customer > >>> > Service at Intel is 800-628-8686. > >>> > > >>> > -- Cleve Moler moler(a)mathworks.com > >>> > Chairman and Chief Scientist, The MathWorks, Inc. > >>> > > >>> > >> > >> > >>-- > >>Steve > >> > >> > >>-------------------------------------------------------------------------- > >>----- > >>- > >> I am in the field on the Outer Banks of North Carolina until 27 November. > >> From 28 Nov - 4 Dec I will be on the Dream Cruise in the Atlantic. > >> After the cruise I will go to AGU, and finally to Pullman about 8 Dec. > >> > >> > >> Steve Elgar FAX : (919) 261-4432 > >> Army Research Pier ATT : (919) 261-1706 > >> 1261 Duck Road OMNET: s.elgar > >> Kitty Hawk, NC 27949 internet: elgar(a)eecs.wsu.edu > >> > >> > >> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.7 iQCVAwUBLtCzSlzvpSsKhLftAQEvLgQApXWCmyqkp2gh66Kpfk7EQk0XQL9aqb3b i18QnfYFYYtzvK+wZHEtB+AR3ksZGDJ7RgNkRlB3JF1sFF1HnRhUOnjppJGCMqhY f0ZzrwEN+k0jHg6K3sfXdKCmbZ/CKdypc+eZW69Nh2WVtO/RPwIrKo/GlAVSzeK1 1pVXULR+qxE= =SUYe -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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New remailer concept.
by Jim Pinson 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

It occurs to me that most people have more to fear from their neighbors, than they do from the powerful TLA's. Knowing that you are hunting for a new job is not important to the world at large, but could be embarrassing if your current employer found out. Likewise, the people most interested in knowing about that sex list you subscribe to are your coworkers. The answer of course is encryption, but that is a problem when you are writing to your, well... , "crypto challenged" friends. Also, two way encrypted messages to most discussion lists is not possible (to my knowledge). To address these problems I suggest the creation of "crypto remailers". They would work like this: You subscribe to the remailer by sending a request including the account name you wish. This could be either a real name (jpinson) or a pseudonym (lizard). You would also include in the subscription request a copy of your public key. Assuming there are no name collisions with existing users, you would get back a message of acceptance, and a copy of the remailers public key. To use the remailer, you would create a message containing as the first line a "request remail to: USERNAME" , followed by your message. You then encrypt the message with the remailers public key and send it to the "remail" account at the remailer. The remailer then decodes the message you sent, and sends it to its destination as plain text. It sets the "from" field to your account name on the remailer. The recipient of your message can then reply to your remail account in plain text, with no need for any "remail to " commands or special processing. A .forward pipe on your remailer account would run a Perl script to encode the message to you with your public key, and send it to your real address. (for security it could set the "from" field to something other than your remail account name) The advantage is that you have total protection at your end. All mail to and from the remail account is encrypted. You could now subscribe to lists, and receive mail from lists, without your local administrator knowing anything about them. This last feature could be useful for students at universities that limit access. Is there anything like this out there already? Jim Pinson Charles Darwin Research Station, Galapagos

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C.I.D.
by anonymous-remailer＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Multiple recipients of list <cypherpunks>: Some Happy Fool asked how we could defeat caller ID 'cause the *67 still sends along the calling number between switches (it just doesn't display it, but that is not the same as it not being available to the bad guys - *69 will still work, regardless). The discussion should probably be taken off the list, so please direct replies to me personally (or better: let us know of a more appropriate forum. I am disappointed in alt.hackers and 2600 really sucks, are there better places to go with this kind of stuff? Anybody?) To Happy Fool et al: I've got the specs for a program to use with your modem to generate what'll resemble a full CID. So with the computer set up to dial, even standard voice calls too and faxes, too, can be equipped with a fake field (or "header" if you will), displaying a homemade caller ID. Since it uses the exact same structure as the real caller ID, no telco along the entire system will ever doubt it. I can send the full specifications if you are seriously interested in doing the code in full or in part. Sorry, I can't implement it myself (lack of skills). If we get the thing running, it will dial any number and send the counterfeit header along with the call, making the telco switch believe it is dealing with a forwarded call. The beauty of it all is that this way, it will not insert its own header (it only does so when no previous CID header is detected). This is not just for use on the U-S Signaling System 7, because SS7 is now an international standard. Many countries are far more computerized than the U-S. In parts of Europe, some 95% of all areas now have digital switches. Caller ID is probably the most anticipated and feared part of these systems. This service, only available in digital areas, keeps track of the last 10 numbers that called and the time and date they did so. Example: Let's say you are in a digital area. You call a friend with a caller ID device (costing ~=$40). Between the first and second ring, they have your number. It's as easy as that. He doesn't even have to pick up the phone. Even busy calls or calls where no-one is home are registered! WARNING: When whole nations are digitalized, ANY system you call pegs you within 5 seconds of your call. What about diverters, call forwarders and stuff like that? They won't work. To cheat them, you need to produce fake headers. So if the software is not already written, let's write it. Volunteers? @@@@ This message has been brought to you by @ .. @ PETE "THE WIMP" WATKINS...BASICALLY SPINELESS(tm) | __ | \__/ <---Digitized representation of Pete Watkins My e-mail address is <mg5n+alias!wimp(a)andrew.cmu.edu>

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Re: Admiral Inman
by wcs＠anchor.ho.att.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Peter Wayner writes: > I've always assumed that the excitement behind the Digital Telephony > bill was to go after VoicePGP. Not really - Digital Telephony goes after the phone companies, not the end users, which makes it easier for the government to impose. Among other people it *is* going after are cellphone companies which are getting a lot of pressure to include encryption on their radio links (some people are pressuring them to use *real* encryption, the NSA has been pressuring them to use at most wimpy encryption, and some people have been pressuring them to put in _anything_, even rot-13, just so there's _some_ vague privacy protection out there.) It's also, of course, going after carriers who have the _gall_ to use more powerful telephone systems than the FBI can afford to crack :-) Now, VoicePGP may be the next step in banning things - after all, they could declare use of cryptography to be Probable Cause that you're conspiring about something, which would let them confiscate your computer equipment and make you sue to get it back. Bill

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Re: New Opportunity for Anonymous Reamilers
by jgrubs＠voxbox.norden1.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- alex <cp(a)omaha.com> writes: > > I guess this should mean some more business to my friends at > > Pagesat, which broadcasts a completely uncensored real time feed of the > > USENET over a small dish Ku band satellite link to all of North America. > > And they are a real licensed common carrier (their principle business is > > wide area paging services) so they can't be held responsible for the > > contents of the traffic either. > > Do you need to be licensed to be a common carrier? If so, who grants the > licenses, and what qualifications does a business need to meet in order > to qualify? The FCC regulates interstate common carriers (plus radio licensing of the microwave/satellite uplinks). State public utility commissions also control certain aspects of intrastate service. I don't know if they have any say in satellite service to intrastate customers. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBLtFJgd74r4kaz3mVAQGmbQQAhitU7vGX9OAsEm/grTDWciBf1MlEhV2L +sBf3OcB/GjYuiIuWftH+Qn7E46nzIRC4gTNz+Ibo5ouwkjyggcuVtNyXhFgvXZm hJH+EHz0X1MqqwTkF7fQPv7QPxGwqHI4vbQANeCBnM0eKDAe+r9/wnGPIn2ODdu8 gzLHBQuQlVo= =zac0 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ... "The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in the insidious encroachment of men of zeal, well meaning but without understanding." - Justice Louis Brandeis -- jgrubs(a)voxbox.norden1.com (James C. Grubs, W8GRT) Voxbox Enterprises, 6817 Maplewood Ave., Sylvania, Ohio 43560-1956 Tel.: 419/882-2697

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Re: Admiral Inman
by jgrubs＠voxbox.norden1.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- jamiel(a)sybase.com (Jamie Lawrence) writes: > >replied that the governmental concern about wiretaps was and is primarily > >and unambiguously about narcotics. > > and > > >Back to Narcotics. He gave the statistic that 90% of the narcotics leads > >related to money laundering come from domestic wiretaps. > > Wow, this is easy then: legalize drugs and wiretaps are practically > unessessary. Buy a copy of High Times today! ;) > > It does amaze me that what can be a victimless activity is such > a hotbutton. Drugs are victimless? What about crack babies, which cost a million dollars EACH in medical care, btw. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBLtFKT974r4kaz3mVAQGRFQP7BTRsuovvI8ZEb7mty/5as+ranbCph3ix 7XxFyuL7p8O209RKWfH7X1thvO8fmURaWHdEawBLtCorgLWYSe6T8uumVZHFfLXt clyScxRYacEVuI59P0/9Xi1x8ggecQt3s0ckv8IKSA1DfR5C0e/O8bap7wysCxd8 Q5cDTSC1lKs= =IEwo -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ... "The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in the insidious encroachment of men of zeal, well meaning but without understanding." - Justice Louis Brandeis -- jgrubs(a)voxbox.norden1.com (James C. Grubs, W8GRT) Voxbox Enterprises, 6817 Maplewood Ave., Sylvania, Ohio 43560-1956 Tel.: 419/882-2697

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usenet -> mail gateway
by skaplin＠skypoint.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- In view of the situation at CMU and McGill a stray idea crossed my mind. If someone were to set up some mailing lists which routed the content of the particular usenet group to the subscribers, this would stymie big brother to a certain extent. The problem would be that they could possibly block certain domains from incoming e-mail to thwart this. A solution would be to dummy up the from address. Daily the address would or could change, thus frustrating the powers that be. An additional solution would be to throw encryption into the list software so that each message would be encrypted to it's recipient, further frustrating the powers. Another concept would be to daily blast an encrypted packet (SOUP or whatever) to the subscribers of the list. They could then post replies or follow ups through a mail -> usenet gateway. ============================================================================== Doing easily what others find difficult is talent; doing what is impossible for talent is genius. - Henri-Frdric Amiel, "Journal", 1883 ============================================================================== skaplin(a)skypoint.com | "...vidi vici veni" - Overheard | outside a Roman brothel. PGP encrypted mail is accepted and | preferred. | Change is the only constant in the | Universe..."Four quarters, please." E-mail key(a)four11.com for PGP Key or | Finger skaplin(a)mirage.skypoint.com | Smile!! Big brother is watching. ============================================================================== -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBLtFh7gpnimeWAf3FAQFXdAP7ByfEkiuGGzcBYiu7zyT63l4sHYKjiQkl 2Xv4yD0cEh/84QqPZzFayhCBCaSi7prrUWP19QjmJfZPqwIIE2t9mU0QGOvelID2 Qxeg9rYEJtTFRroFDfS6at0GbkfBeNwqyI61St1sZucFXfJx/LJxsC1Z2oylzJMO 7/OAdSG5Xqo= =AXTD -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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